EDITED BY

KARIN GWINN WILKINS, THOMAS TUFTE, AND RAFAEL OBREGON

The Handbook of Development Communication and Social Change

WILEY Blackwell

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The Handbook of Development Communication and Social Change

Global Handbooks in Media and Communication Research

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The Global Handbooks in Media and Communication Research series is co-published by Wiley Blackwell and the International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR). The series offers definitive, state-of-the-art handbooks that bring a global perspective to their subjects. These volumes are designed to define an intellectual terrain: its historic emergence; its key theoretical paradigms; its transnational evolution; key empirical research and case study exemplars; and possible future directions.

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About the IAMCR

The International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR) (http://iamcr.org) was established in Paris in 1957. It is an accredited NGO attached to UNESCO. It is a truly international association, with a membership representing over 80 countries around the world and conferences held in different regions that address the most pressing issues in media and communication research. Its members promote global inclusiveness and excellence within the best traditions of critical research in the field. The current president of the IAMCR is Janet Wasko.

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Series Editor's Preface

Welcome to the Global Handbooks in Media and Communication Research series. This grew out of the idea that the field needed a series of state-of the-art reference works that was truly international. The International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR), with a membership from over 80 countries, is uniquely positioned to offer a series that covers the central concerns of media and communications theory in a global arena.

Each of these substantial books contains newly written essays commissioned from a range of international authors, showcasing the best critical scholarship in the field. Each is pedagogical in the best sense, accessible to students and clear in its approach and presentation. Theoretical chapters map the terrain of an area both historically and conceptually, providing incisive overviews of arguments in the field. The examples of empirical work are drawn from many different countries and regions, so that each volume offers rich material for comparative analysis.

These handbooks are international in the best sense: in scope, authorship and mindset. They explore a range of approaches and issues across different political and cultural regions, reflecting the global reach of the IAMCR. The aim is to offer scholarship that moves away from simply reproducing Westcentric models and assumptions. The series formulates new models and asks questions that bring communication scholarship into a more comprehensive global conversation.

The IAMCR (http://iamcr.org) was established in Paris in 1957. It is an accredited NGO attached to UNESCO. It is a truly international association, with a membership around the world and conferences held in different regions that address the most pressing issues in media and communication research. Its members promote global inclusiveness and excellence within the best traditions of critical research in the field.

This series supports those goals.

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Annabelle Sreberny
Past President of IAMCR and Series Editor
London, December 2010

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While many people have inspired our work in the field as well as our dedication to this Handbook, we particularly want to thank our students, colleagues, and families for their encouragement, and the many activists and citizens who devote themselves to social change.

A very particular thanks goes to all the contributors – we are so thankful to each of you for sharing your experiences and insights. Without your contributions, there would have been no book.

Introduction

Karin Gwinn Wilkins, Thomas Tufte, and Rafael Obregon

This *Handbook of Development Communication and Social Change* offers a valuable resource for advocates, scholars, and communities engaged in long-term and comprehensive struggles for social justice. The strategic use of communication and media as tools and processes to articulate and propel social, cultural, and political change has increased over the years. Globally we are witnessing a consolidation and expansion of the communication used strategically in development organizations (McKee, Bertrand, and Becker-Benton 2004); a very strong activist driven use of communication for the purposes of social mobilization and political transformation (Rodríguez 2001); and more specific media-focused uses of communication advocating social and political change (Downing 2010). While these streams generally typify the field of communication for development and social change today, they seem to have separate niches in the academic literature and in their application. By bringing together these themes, we aim to transcend misleading binaries separating artificial political boundaries of developed from developing, social categories of modern from traditional, communicative approaches of mediated from interpersonal, toward a more comprehensive approach, rarely offered in academic publications. Beyond the inherent value of producing a text that brings together various contributions that reflect these areas, we argue that that there is a need for a book that attempts to bridge the apparent divide among these perspectives. Instead of compartmentalizing strategic development interventions without a sense of context, composing critique of development without grounded observation, or considering activist communication solely within the confines of those with access to resources, we propose this text as an integrated framework toward understanding the nature of communication for development and social change, as well as new directions for

the field. Given recent synergies and processes, media development, social mobilization, and political change have come together in ways that illustrate a growing role for activist communication across the globe. These processes of agency and participation are posing growing challenges to the established paradigms within development communication, inviting us not only to outline established paradigms, but also to chart emerging trends within development communication.

Although there are several valuable published volumes offering overviews of social movements (such as those edited by Downing 2010; Rodríguez, Kidd, and Stein 2009), and of development and social change (Hemer and Tufte 2005; Gumucio-Dagron and Tufte 2006; Wilkins and Enghel 2012), as well as these issues within the broader rubric of global communication (Wilkins, Straubhaar, and Kumar 2013), this book fills a critical niche by offering a comprehensive framework in a growing area of research and action, as social movements and organizations make strategic use of communication technologies and processes in a complex world of dominant global industries and oppressive political regimes. Recognizing a changing global context, this work integrates the interests of many of the International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR) sections, including that of participatory communication, health communication, community communication, communication policy and technology, gender and communication, political communication, and political economy.

Through this handbook we wish to represent and examine this proliferation of approaches to communication, media, development, and social change, providing a general overview of the existing conceptual and practical strands within this field, as well as offering critical analysis and identifying promising directions for future research and intervention. Communication approaches to development and social change engage critical reflections of discourse and praxis, as well as strategic interventions through the work of the development industry, as well as social movement and activist efforts. The organization of this handbook reflects and integrates the diversity of our field, beginning with a critical articulation of the field's history, moving toward a reconceptualization that builds on key development themes; assessing strategic intervention approaches; and recognizing activist engagement toward social and political change.

Conceptually, the breadth of communication for and about development as it is known today ranges from a variety of prescriptive forms of strategic communication, be they persuasive or participatory, to much more open communicative processes, where the strategic aspect focuses on facilitating and catalyzing dialogue, debate and participation, building capacity around, and leading processes that the target audiences drive themselves, be it in social movements, in civil society, in public and/or private organizations, and seeking greater individual and collective agency and engagement. Digital media have created new dynamics of interactivity between people and organizations (and governments); they have created new speeds and forms of circulating information and they have thus stimulated many new ways of social organization, mobilization, participation, and activism.

Contributing authors focus on the comprehensive nature of social problems, rather than limiting work to singular evaluations of projects studied without context. By focusing on particular isolated strategies, these evaluations neglect attention to the critical issue being addressed, such as adequate health care, human rights, or gender equity. In order to resolve social justice problems within their historical and situational contexts, research needs to assess a variety of strategies and contextual conditions over time, in order to consider long-term, sustainable solutions.

This handbook offers thoughtful, critical assessments of key issues in the field. Each section includes an overview chapter by one of the editors, reviewing emerging directions. In Part I, we begin with an introduction to the field in its historical context, including attention to globalization, given the critical parameters of economic structures, political alliances, and transnational social trends, as well as post-development contexts. Critical reflections of the field are pronounced through attention to political economy and advocacy. Carrying this attention to what development itself communicates about the nature of problems and their resolution, we address key themes, including social equity with attention to human rights; public health; multiculturalism and indigenous communities; and natural resources and the environment.

The next two sections of the book examine the strategic work of development institutions (Part II) and of social movements (Part III). In our attempts to understand strategic interventions for development as comprehensive approaches, we include chapters devoted to broad issues such as campaigns, media development, and participatory communication, followed by more specific strategies including commonly practiced development approaches using story telling, entertainment education, theater for development, music, and social entrepreneurship, along with their theoretical frameworks.

Given that a key intention of this volume is to integrate recognition of social movement strategies with development, the third section offers critical attention to social movement strategies using communication and media to promote social and political change. These efforts are similar to those depicted in Part II in that they attempt to use communication for strategic social change, yet they differ in critical ways. In contrast to the institutionally driven programs implemented through the development industry described in the previous group, this section recognizes social movement strategies that are initiated through the work of communities, at times resisting development, while at other times working in parallel or even with little connection to mainstream development practice. These chapters address the organizing and communicative practice of social movements; transnational civil society; social media activism; social accountability; citizens' media and journalism; citizen observatories; community media; youth-generated media; and video activism.

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Part I

Communicating Development and Social Change

1

Development Communication and Social Change in Historical Context

Pradip Ninan Thomas

At any given time, there is a great variety of theoretical and practical approaches in development communications/communications and social change (CSC). Broadly speaking, development communication/communications and social change is about understanding the role played by information, communication, and the media in directed and nondirected social change. It also includes a variety of practical applications based on the mainstreaming of communication as "process" and the leveraging of media technologies in social change. This chapter will specifically deal with development communication/communications for social change from the perspective of communication rights and will include a section on "Voice" making a difference in the context of the "Right to Information" movement in India. In the pedagogy of CSC, we are accustomed to contrasting the "dominant paradigm" and, in particular, its assumptions related to the role of communication in social change along with its preferred methods with that of the participatory school that emerged in the late 1960s, since then becoming global in scope. In its practice, however, it is clear that mixed approaches characterize field applications of CSC and that participation in itself means different things to different people. This has resulted in a variety of participations that can be plotted on the typology that Arnstein created in the late 1960s, ranging from the maximalist to the minimalist.

One of the perennial issues in CSC is whether or not it has an identity that it can call its own and a tradition of theorization that makes it distinctive from other areas in communications. The theorization of CSC has always been dependent on borrowings from other disciples – from rural sociology that provided the basis for the diffusion model to the radical pedagogy best illustrated by the contributions made by the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire. CSC theorization has also been

shaped by a great variety of "isms" and schools of thought, including Marxism, feminist theory, post-colonial and subaltern theories, identity theory, globalization, social movement theory, and information and communications technology (ICT) for development theories. In recent times, social networking and urban interventions have also contributed to shaping the practice of CSC, although this is yet to be reflected in its theory. While one can argue that these many borrowings and traditions of interdisciplinarity have contributed to the shaping of CSC as a field and to its dynamism, it is also clear that a consequence of these many influences is the existence of a variety of fault lines – between theory and practice, between technology and the social, policy and the implementation of policy, the global and the local, technocratic and managerial approaches versus endogenous, people-centered approaches. In other words, at any given time, the field is characterized by a variety of disjunctures. In spite of the evidence of quantum, what seems to be the case is that the "practical horse" has bolted leaving the "theoretical cart" behind. In other words these literally thousands of initiatives, learnings, and experiences are yet to become foundational material for an explication of theory reflective of, and conversant with, local realities. It would seem that the advent of the "participatory" model stymied further theoretical innovation given that this was interpreted as the "Holy Grail" that would usher in the promised land characterized by communications for all. Key words such as development, participation, social capital, poverty reduction, civil society and empowerment, among others, have an auratic power that disallows any form of questioning. Issue 4–5 of volume 17 of the journal *Development in Practice* is devoted to a deconstruction of such key words and Andrea Cornwall, in an article entitled "Buzzwords and fuzzwords: Deconstructing development discourse," makes the following observation:

> Development's buzzwords are not only passwords to funding and influence … The word *development* itself … has become a 'modern shibboleth, an unavoidable password', which comes to be used 'to convey the idea that tomorrow things will be better, or that more is necessarily better' … the very taken-for-granted quality of 'development' leaves much of what is actually *done* in its name unquestioned. (Cornwall 2007: 471)

Enclosures are rather unfortunately a characteristic of this rush to invest words with value and this is best illustrated by the fact that the very phrase "communication for social change" was slated for trademarking by a non-profit organization in the USA. What seems to be missing in this situation is any serious theorizing that is grounded in context and that is conversant with local categories.

This chapter will explore critical issues related to the theorizing of communication and social change. In brief, the history of theory in this area is largely made up of two distinct traditions: (1) the dominant paradigm associated with Everett Rogers, Daniel Lerner, and Wilbur Schramm and (2) the participatory/multiplicity model associated with a number of scholars. A recent account of that history is Emile

McAnany's (2012) *Saving the World: A Brief History of Communication for Development and Social Change*. The dominant paradigm and in particular the tradition associated with Rogers – the diffusion of innovations – has been critiqued for its top-down nature although arguably this model remains global. The dominant paradigm is also associated with a strongly "behaviorist" emphasis at the expense of "structures" and this focus on change at the level of the individual remains persistent and paramount. While the participatory model and its emphasis on communication as process does have its merits; in reality there are different traditions of participation, some that are more inclusive than others. Terms such as the role of communications in empowerment, access to communication, and participation as process were articulated by proponents of this model. Rather than deal with the history of theorizing in this area, it will deal with contemporary deficits in the theorizing of CSC and explore three possible avenues for the reinvigoration of CSC theory: (1) the possibilities for understanding conceptual categories such as participation in and through digital interventions such as the Free and Open Source movement and digital labor, (2) attempts to understand CSC theory through the lens provided by communication rights movements (the example of the Right to Information movement in India is given in order to explore validation of local processes of participation and Voice through the mechanism of Public Hearings), and (3) the need for CSC theory to converse with Actor Network Theory linked to a critical political economy of communications toward an understanding of the role played by power/knowledge in the creation and maintenance of networks of power involved in CSC policymaking.

The Commodifications of Participation

An obvious starting place to explore these dislocations is to begin with the multi-accentual nature of concepts such as participation, access, and Voice that is contextually defined and that offers many meanings to many people and many opportunities for practice. Even within civil society interventions related to CSC, these concepts are routinely invoked by different organizations – from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and UNICEF to the World Bank, and organizations such as AMARC, APC, and WACC. Participation is influenced by political economy and by different visions of utopia, of orderings of the world. A critical, political economy inspired approach offers the means to explore communications and social change in terms of its shapings by structures, ideologies, and power flows. The Slovenian social philosopher Slavoj Žižek in his book *First as Tragedy, Then as Farce*, in a critique of capitalism and a call to the "left" to reinvent itself, includes an interesting critique of the embrace of "cultural capitalism" that also offers the possibility for a redemption through consumption. He uses the example of a Starbucks coffee advertisement that sells a "coffee ethic" through linking consumption of

coffee to Fair Trade, ethical investment, and the enjoyment of good "coffee karma", thereby enhancing our enjoyment of feel-good consumptive practices. As he points out:

> The "cultural" surplus is … spelled out: the price is higher than elsewhere since what you are really buying is the "coffee ethic" which includes care for the environment, social responsibility towards the producers, plus a place where you yourself can participate in communal life … (Žižek 2009: 53–54)

The upshot of our involvement in such circuits of cultural consumption is that we end up contributing to initiatives that are destined to forever deal with the symptoms of poverty but never with its causes, which include unjust trade practices, poverty and exploitation, the issue of land, and so on. Participation in this utopia is limited precisely because it does not give either the producer or consumer the opportunity to take part in an exercise of freedom. It is very similar to the "slacktivist" cultures that are rife in the era of social networking. This is a culture that encourages people to click and contribute to online polls and issues but that does not enable an engagement with real issues in the world of the here and now. NGOs, for the most part, tend to replicate the logic of neoliberalism and participation therefore tends to become the means for extending the project of neoliberalism through enabling people to participate in a variety of forms of "compassionate capitalism."

This evisceration of meaning has undoubtedly enabled the worldwide diffusion of the concept of participation. Its status as a weasel word has enabled its mainstreaming, given that it can be invested with meaning in context. More often than not this process of divesting and investing in meanings has led to participation becoming an "empty signifier," the basis for donor–recipient relationships in the funding of aid and in the writing of reports but not as an essential ethic, skill, and process related to building up capacities in local populations. So, one can argue that participation really has become critical to the reinvention of the dominant paradigm in the context of the twenty-first-century development industry. The argument here is that the field has moved away from the Freirean understanding of participation as praxis, as the means for empowerment and the basis for engagements with reality in order to change it. Instead, participation today is invoked by all sections although rarely as the basis for transformative change. Students from the Centre for Communication and Social Change, UQ, Brisbane, have consistently reported after carrying out fieldwork in countries including Nigeria, Vietnam, and Indonesia that participation remains elusive, a mystery to most people although it exists as a buzzword in the background, invoked by everyone involved in development although practiced by none. While extensive projects find it difficult to mainstream "participation," it is more likely that participation does work in the context of small-scale projects. This is borne out in a 2012 global survey of participation of community radio stations carried out by

the Aachen-based organization CAMECO. On the nature and levels of participation, the evidence suggests regional differences: there are bound to be community radio stations in every region of the world that exhibit a maximalist approach to participation.

> Whereas the ranking of the different areas of participation is similar in all regions, big differences exist in their importance: Latin America tops participation in programming (90%), but is far below average in management and ownership. In Africa, the level of participation in financing (54%) and ownership (49%) is relatively high; participation in ownership is more common in anglophone countries. In Asia, participation in management plays a crucial role (69%). … The number of radio stations where community members play a greater role in production, presentation or journalism is still rather high: Community members function as local reporters (69%), work as presenters (63%), are responsible for special programmes / time slots (61%), and are musicians (61%), citizen reporters (56%) or editors / producers (39%). The number of radio stations where community members bear a higher responsibility for programme contents, i.e., as editors, producers or presenters, is generally higher in Asia … than in Africa or Latin America. (Frolich *et al*. 2012: 8–9)

The Cooption and Redemption of Participation in a Digital Era

While these types of assessments of participation do have their limitations, given that they do not generate information on the granular nature of participation or its micropolitics, they have value as a snapshot of participation in the global community radio movement. For CSC theorists, however, one can argue that it is equally profitable to explore participation online, given that it reflects a range of participations – from the corporate control and commodification of participation via myriad versions of "interactivity" to real possibilities for an exploration of alternatives. Henry Jenkins's "Convergence Culture" that celebrates prosumerism and online freedoms has attracted criticism from media scholars on the left of the academic spectrum including Christian Fuchs, Mark Andrejevic, Graham Murdock, and others. Mark Andrejevic makes the point that interactivity is located within "digital enclosures" and is the perfect means for both the state and private companies for the surveillance of users for security reasons and from a market perspective:

> There is a price to be paid for convenience and customization – and we will likely end up paying it not just by sacrificing privacy, but by engaging in the work of being watched: participating in the creation of demographic information to be traded by commercial entities for commercial gain and subcontracted forms of policing and surveillance. (Andrejevic 2007: 98)

In a related piece on the "affective economics" of interactivity, Andrejevic (2011: 616–617) makes the point that at the end of the day audience identification with brands, in spite of the hype of interactivity, are attempts at control and not empowerment. "A context in which control relies increasingly upon expanded opportunities for participation requires a rethinking of the oppositions that place participation per se on the side of democratic empowerment" for there is a need to recognize the "role played by participation in the modulation of affect as a modality of control." Nicholas Carah (2010) in his book *Pop Brands* shows how mobile phone-based interactivity with bands in the context of music festivals in Australia facilitates branding through "immaterial labour."

However this very same terrain of the digital has also become the space for innumerable, collaborative projects involving participation. One of the intriguing aspects of information as a commodity is that it cannot, by its very nature, be completely commodified, unlike the vast majority of physical goods. As an immaterial good and service, its status as property remains elusive and is difficult to map onto the existing system of intellectual property. While not denying the fact that information as a commodity and as flows generates massive amounts of global capital, the disruptive potential of the digital continues to unsettle both governments and corporates. The worldwide free and open-source software (FOSS) movement offers compelling evidence of shifts in the production of value. As Daniel Ross (2011: 145) succinctly puts it, "What we find when we are considering FOSS is that it is in fact a highly conflicted entity within the capitalist apparatus of accumulation: simultaneously capable of being commodified, yet acting as reactant of decommodification: consuming commodified wage labor, yet existing as the product of volunteerism." This ambivalent nature of information, in particular, its differential valuations at the moment of exchange, reflects as Murdock has suggested, the beginnings of an emerging "gift economy," and, as such, is indicative of the deep fault lines that run within the core of the contemporary informational mode of production. Projects such as Wikipedia and the worldwide success of FOSS as a movement suggest that the meaning of participation can be redeemed online via cooperative endeavors that involve collaboration, sharing, and volunteerism, which has also been described as a case of "digital gifting." Murdock, in an essay that argues the case for moral economies supportive of "public cultural commons," describes digital gifting as follows:

> Digital gifting outside the price system operates at three basic levels. Firstly, there is sharing where individuals circulate self-produced or found material using their own website or web space. … At the next stage up there is co-operation, where individuals contribute to making a shared domain more useful. … Finally, there is collaborative activity designed to create a new cultural product or resource that can be freely shared. (2011: 25)

I would argue that the study of labor in the context of FOSS and other online projects offers textured possibilities to understand participation in the context of

contemporary social change. We need to, however, locate our understanding within the possibilities of capital given that none of these processes is outside of the system, although they certainly hint at subversions of that system. I would also argue that traditional approaches to understanding participation, such as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) are dead-ends precisely because innumerable studies have shown the limits of participation. We know what the obstacles are, what the issues are – but we tend to replicate such studies and they confirm what we already know of the limits of participation. To a large extent the mainstreaming of extensive behavioral change communication initiatives has led to the globalization of formulas and to the inevitable contraction of innovation and creativity. The compartmentalization of behavioral change and social change by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), as per the following description, exemplifies this approach to communication and social change in which a focus on discrete variables enables individuals to be abstracted from the system and collective attributes to be abstracted from individuals. The result is a schizophrenic approach in which behavioral change and social change are unrelated and managed separately.

> Behaviour change is commonly defined as a research-based consultative process for addressing knowledge, attitudes and practices that are intrinsically linked to programme goals. Its vision includes providing participants with relevant information and motivation through well-defined strategies, using an audience-appropriate mix of interpersonal, group and mass-media channels and participatory methods. Behaviour change strategies tend to focus on the individual as a locus of change. (UNICEF, 2012)

> Social change, on the other hand, is understood as a process of transformation in the way society is organised, within institutions, and in the distribution of power within various social and political institutions. For behaviours to change on a large scale, certain harmful cultural practices, societal norms and structural inequalities have to be taken into consideration. Social change approaches, thus, tend to focus on the community as the unit of change. (UNICEF, 2012)

The Contributions of Communication Rights Movements to CSC Theory: The Right to Information Movement in India and Voice

I also believe that CSC theory, and in particular its conceptual core consisting of concepts such as participation, access, empowerment and voice, can become reinvigorated through new meanings from the study and analysis of communication rights movements, particularly those that have evolved in response to specific deficits at local levels. Let me share one example of indigenous categories and

processes that were a central aspect of an approach to communication and social change. The movement is the Right to Information (RTI) movement in India, which is widely recognized as the most significant movement since the nationalist movement that led to India's independence. This was a movement I had studied in 2010 and which was then published as one of five case studies in the book *Negotiating Communication Rights: Case Studies from India* (Thomas, 2011). The background to this movement is the reality of corruption and graft on a gargantuan scale and its impact on the lives of ordinary Indians. India's welfare economy reaches out into the lives of millions of people. Billions of dollars are spent annually on a range of entitlements – from employment, education, health care, and subsidized food – although only a small proportion of actual funds are actually spent on development. The RTI movement began in a small village in the state of Rajasthan, western India, in the 1990s and ultimately became the basis for a nationwide movement that resulted in numerous legislations at federal and state levels. While this movement is by no means "complete," is "in process," and faces multiple obstacles, it has contributed to the revitalization of democracy and the validation of the contributions of ordinary people to the shaping of democratic futures.

The strength of this movement is that it has transformed tried and tested local forms of participation into a nationwide ethic and in that process validated the low-cost and the everyday, cooperative styles and local communicative practices. As opposed to formulaic, top-down participation, movements like the RTI have made participation as a skill, ethic, and process the very basis for people's empowerment. It can be argued that local cultural forms and activities are typically relational and it is this accent on process that facilitates individual buy-in into a movement. Klandermans and Oegema (1987: 519) refer to the processes involved in individual participation in movements:

> At the individual level, becoming a participant in a social movement can be conceived as a process with four different steps: becoming part of the mobilization potential, becoming target of mobilization attempts, becoming motivated to participate, and overcoming barriers to participate. The first two steps are necessary conditions for the arousal of motivation. Motivation and barriers interact to bring about participation: the more motivated people are the higher the barriers they can overcome.

Public Hearings, Participation, Voice

The strength of the Right to Information movement in India includes the following. It is an indigenous social movement that was a response to felt needs. It started as a grass-roots movement supported entirely by voluntary, local contributions and it employed familiar pedagogical tools like the Jan Sunwai (public hearing) that was used to strengthen and valorize Voice and offer frameworks for participation. This

movement validated public hearings as a means of participation in the creation of transparency and accountability. The Jan Sunwai is often used by traditional organizations in India, such as guilds and associations of small traders and manufacturers, to make themselves accountable to their publics. "The Jan Sunwai" is, as pointed out in the *Lokniti Newsletter* (November 8, 2005): "an empowering process in that it not only does away with civil society structures that are stacked against the marginalized but also inverts power equations in favor of the marginalized, by making them the center of the discussion. There are no experts and "hence no chance of objectification of the victim" and the "victim represents his case without any technical assistance." In the words of the Dalit intellectual Gopal Guru (2007): "The *sunwai* is a public hearing but it is different from legal and procedural hearings instituted by the state which by its official, legal, and almost pompous nature, place the victim at an inherent disadvantage. The *sunwai* restores to a person his place in the system by allowing him to represent himself and make himself heard." Most importantly the Jan Sunwai is a mechanism that affirms Voice and strengthens self-confidence often in contexts where caste and class collude to silence people. In the context of the RTI movement, these public hearings allowed local people to examine both the information and dis-information on local development, the collusions, the silences, the corruption, and the political economy of underdevelopment. In Mohanty's words (2006: 20): "The term *jan sunwai* is taken literally, and it implies that the power, legitimacy, and sanctity of the forum will emanate from the people, not any judge or panel; and that it is a hearing and not a court or agitational body. The decision of the assembled collective to pose certain sets of questions would determine the priorities of the hearing. It did not pass a verdict or punish the guilty. It is out to shame those government officials, in connivance with suppliers and contractors, who made money illegally from the public works." Fifteen Jan Sunwais, organized in advance, became critical to the empowerment process. These public hearings were complemented by "*dharnas*" (sit-ins) at the office of the Chief Minister and local government in the face of official inaction on the evidence of corruption. The dharna as non-violent civil resistance also became the space for celebrating solidarity. There were instances when the *dharnas* stretched over days in the context of stalemates. As one report states:

> The dharna … witnessed an unprecedented upsurge of homespun idealism in the small town of Beawar and the surrounding countryside. Donations in cash and kind poured in daily from ordinary local people, including vegetables and milk from small vendors, sacks of wheat from farmers in surrounding villages, tents, voluntary services of cooking, serving cold water … and cash donations, even from the poorest. … Even more significant was the daily assembly of over 500 people in the heat of the tent, listening to speeches … Active support cut across all class and political barriers. Rich shopkeepers and professionals to daily wage labourers, and the entire political spectrum from the right wing fringe to communist trade unions extended vocal and enthusiastic support. (Shah and Agrawal 2005)

Given the long, drawn-out nature of the *dharnas*, there were numerous focused cultural events – plays, music, devotional singing, question-and-answer sessions – that were used to strengthen solidarity, awareness, and involvement. The intentional use of local culture and popular involvement in the creation of these skits, dramas, and music were critical to the making of this movement.

The use of the Jan Sunwai is an important indigenous means and pedagogical device deployed by this movement to mobilize, radicalize, and give voice to marginalized people who have traditionally been expected to remain silent, even in the face of the most horrendous atrocities committed by the forward castes and by the wealthy. As Jenkins (2007: 60) describes it:

> The MKSS's key innovation … was to develop a novel means by which information found in government records could be shared and collectively verified: the *jan sunwai* (public hearing). A jan sunwai is a publically accessible forum, often held in a large open-sided tent pitched on a highly visible spot, at which government records are presented alongside testimony by local people with firsthand knowledge of the development projects that these records purpose to document. Key pieces of information from project documents are read aloud. Those with direct knowledge of the specific government projects under investigation are invited to testify on any apparent discrepancies between the official record and their own experiences as labourers on public-works projects or applicants for means-tested antipoverty schemes.

Public hearings played an important role in creating popular understandings of the Right to Know. Shah and Agrawal (2005) have highlighted the participatory nature of the step-by-step process related to a typical Jan Sunwai, summarized as follows:

- Information on suspected corruption in local development projects is generated from extensive research by volunteers organizing the *Jan Sunwai*.
- Official records on amounts sanctioned and actually spent on local development projects are procured from local government offices and analyzed.
- A public hearing is organized independently, not through the official village assembly, in a public place, in the village concerned.
- Extensive publicity is given to the public hearing. All villagers, government officials, elected representatives, and the press are invited.
- The hearings are presided over by a panel of respected individuals from the local community.
- At the start of the *Jan Sunwai* the rules of the meeting are laid out. All, except persons under the influence of alcohol, are entitled to speak. Everybody must speak on the theme and be restrained in their language.
- Identified cases are taken up one by one. Detailed accounts of development expenditures from official records are demystified, paraphrased and read out aloud for the assembly.

- Villagers, particularly laborers, suppliers, and contractors speak out and verify whether they received the money due to them or whether construction took place as claimed. Officials are encouraged to clarify or defend themselves.
- In this way discrepancies are highlighted and officials are asked to explain gaps and shortfalls in accounting.

In the case of the RTI, participation and Voice were both a process and means used to validate life worlds against a system that hitherto flourished with little transparency and no accountability. Voice and participation enabled local people to recognize the value of information as a right that could be used to explore access to other rights linked to employment and food security. In other words, Voice and participation became the means for the affirmation of life. It resulted in ordinary people gaining access to entitlements and thus led to their enjoying a quality of life that the system had hitherto denied them.

CSC Theory and the Need to Account for Networks and Structures

It is clear that CSC theorization has reached an impasse. It is rarely that one comes across a robust theorization that provide a pathway to understand the processes of social change or how to understand the role played by communications in the contestations between dominance, resistance, and the making of sustainable futures. Mohan J. Dutta's (2011) volume *Communication Social Change: Structure, Culture and Agency* offers a refreshingly different basis for the exploration of CSC – one that is rooted in an understanding of the real roles played by international agencies and the politics of CSC in the context of the political economy of aid, food security, health and gender, and the variegated terrains of resistance. The commoditization of behavior change communications has reached epidemic proportions. The accent on symptoms rather than causes has led to the normalization of short-term, project-based CSC initiatives and to a perpetuation of individual-based projects abstracted from context. The obsession with results-oriented projects, outcomes, and numbers has led to a skewed understanding of what communication in social change in all about. We do not seem to have moved on from the bad old days when technology and technique were seen as sufficient inputs to the challenges faced by development. This way of thinking continues to haunt CSC with a renewed energy – with social networking being the latest panacea. Evgeny Morozov in his book *The Net Delusion* deals with this technological determinism, particularly the cyberutopianism and Net-centeredness that are rife today.

> If anything, the Iranian Twitter revolution revealed the intense Western longing for a world where informational technology is the liberator rather than the oppressor, a world where technology could be harvested to spread democracy around the globe rather than entrench existing autocracies …The fervent conviction that given enough good gadgets, connectivity, and foreign funding, dictatorships are doomed, which so powerfully manifested itself during the Iranian protests, reveals the pervasive influence of the Google Doctrine. (Morozov 2011: 5–6)

My own personal point of view is that CSC theory needs to be constantly renewed and that it must intentionally borrow and adapt new theories that allow for new understandings and ways of grasping both old and new realities. While Actor Network Theory has been critiqued for not dealing with structures, I think both ANT and a critical political economy of communications can be used to understand the role played by networks within the new structures of domination. Vincent Mosco, in his classic text *The Political Economy of Communication*, makes the point that, in order to study the media, one needs to study it in context, within the structures and processes that give it meaning and enable its production and reproduction.

> Decentering the media means viewing systems of communication as integral to fundamental economic, political, social and cultural processes in society … the point is that the political economy approach to communication places the subject within a wider social totality. … Both political economy and communication are mutually constituted out of social and cultural practices. Both refer to processes of exchange which differ but which are also multiply determined by shared social and cultural practices. (Mosco 1996: 71–72)

Mosco's suggestion that the wider social totality simply has to be made sense of equally applies to CSC. It is simply bad theory that highlights behavioral change without dealing with structures; participation without dealing with power; and technology without dealing with the social. One can argue that the dominant paradigm is yet to "pass" and that, rather unfortunately, the participatory model has been coopted within this framework. However, and rather than concluding on a pessimistic note, I strongly believe that there any number of learnings that one can glean from the "majority" world, and that there are innumerable traditions of practice in these contexts that can throw light on communication and social change theory and practice. The example that I have highlighted of "Voice" in the context of the Right to Information Movement in India reflects a social experience from the periphery that has become the basis for a national movement. Such examples of needs-based rather than imposed solutions, can contribute to knowledge development and can certainly strengthen the theorizing of communication and social change.

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2

Globalization and Development[1]

Toby Miller

The two nouns in this chapter's title are among the most freighted in academia and public policy of the post-World War II period, even though both concepts are quite venerable: they existed in Islamic social theory a millennium ago (Mowlana and Wilson 1988).

Development has been a *desideratum* since decolonization began in earnest in the 1940s. Globalization has had even greater currency since neoliberalism began in earnest in the 1990s. The two terms refer to policy fashions within the Global North, applied domestically and to the Global South. The first describes the plan to adopt Western Europe, Japan, and the US as implicit deflators of other nations, as measures of economic and political systems, at the same time as responding to cries for freedom from imperial enslavement and popular penury. The second is a rejection of mercantilist, dirigiste policy in favor of a more market-oriented rhetoric with massive, if often disguised, state intervention. Both are instances of governmentality.

Roland Barthes (1973) coined this term to describe the tendency for regions, states, and cities to claim responsibility for, and legitimacy from, the economy. Michel Foucault (1991) modified governmentality to describe investing in skills as a means to economic growth and social control, a concept animated in policy terms by Amartya Sen via the notion of building capacity (2009; for application to communications, see Garnham 1997). It neatly encapsulates the discourse of development and globalization in its clandestine and sinister, as well as overt and benign, modes. For development is the rubric under which the Global North identifies decolonizing and postcolonial elites that it backs in nationalist movements, while globalization is its means of redistributing gains made by working-class political action back up the social scale. Each intervention may be fundamentally

anti-democratic, but its rhetoric applauds and invokes everyday people's efforts to transcend economic abjection.

How did such bizarre paradoxes come to pass; what impact have they had on communications; and how do they operate today? These questions elude settled answers, because their complex and conflicted articulations arise across an ever-changing history and geography.

The Formation of the Paradoxes

When modern capitalism met modern imperialism, the resulting encounter bound together forces that were always already both contradictory and compatible. So the idea of free labor in the metropole, ready to work in new farming and factories for entrepreneurs, had as its coefficient enslaved labor on the periphery, ready to work in farming and mining for imperialists. And as a further contradiction/compatibility, empires adopted cultural doctrines of improvement via monotheism and liberalism; they were keen to instruct as well as control the peoples whom they ruled, whether for religious or liberal reasons. This simultaneously delusional, idealistic, and utilitarian mission of ethical uplift, underpinned by invasion, enslavement, and occupation, continued unabated for centuries. Only with latter-day liberation movements, diasporic immigration patterns, the rise of multiculturalism, and the emergence of newly dynamic economies, has it retreated, and perhaps only provisionally.

With Indian independence in 1947 – the epochal moment of postcolonialism – the advent of the United Nations as the permanent consolidation then expansion of the Allies who had won World War II, and the desire of the US government to open up new markets through decolonization, development discourse grew in size and fervor. Starting in 1945, two historic promises were made by established and emergent governments: to secure the political sovereignty of citizens and their economic welfare. At the end of World War II, universal sovereignty required concerted international action to convince the extant colonial powers (principally Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Portugal) that the peoples whom they had enslaved should be given the right of self-determination, with nationalism a powerful ideology of political mobilization as a supposed precursor to liberation. When this promise was made good, the resulting postcolonial governments undertook to deliver on the economy. Economic welfare seemed locally deliverable, via state-based management of supply and demand and the creation of industries that would substitute imports with domestic production. Most followed capitalism in one country, known as import-substitution industrialization (ISI), frequently via state enterprises or on the coattails of multinational corporations (MNCs) that established local presences. But postcolonial states suffered underdevelopment because of their dependent relations with the core, and were unable to grow

economically. Public–private partnerships intervened around the world to destabilize threats to US economic dominance that might emerge.

Among the overt premises of this modernity were nationalist fellow feeling and individual/state sovereignty as habits of thought. The daily prayer called for a "modern individual" who would not fall for the temptations of Marxism–Leninism or Maoism. Development necessitated displacement of "the particularistic norms" of tradition by "more universalistic" blends of the modern to help create "achievement-oriented" societies (Pye 1965: 19).

This narcissism derived from the assumption that the US embodied individual freedom, economic growth, and political expression: the ideal form of nation building. It drew on a model of the person to construct a model of the country. This was based on the psy-function's contribution to communication: cognition (supposedly governed by nature) and behavior (presumptively governed by environment). These concepts in turn derived from Kant's distinction between bodily and behavioral experiences: morality and cognition separated brains from bodies even as they linked them, via claims to ethical conduct and national allegiance and the need to generate adherence through custom and critical thought as well as state power (Kant 1987, 1991; Miller 2008).

The most compelling reactions to the psy-function model have derived from the Global South. In the words of the great liberation psychologist of Central America, Ignacio Martín-Baró (later murdered by Yanqui-backed assassins): "there does not first exist a person, who then goes on to become socialized." Rather, the "individual becomes an individual, a human person, by virtue of becoming socialized" (1996: 69). Such forms of resistance recognize that the raw stuff of human beings is not individuals: people *become* individuals through discourses and institutions of culture, in an oscillation between the law, economy, and politics, with the psy-function operating as a switching-point between proclivities and aptitudes (Foucault 2006: 58, 190). But this insight has not ruled the development day. Instead, rites of passage from traditional societies have been displaced, supplemented, or rendered symbolic in industrial and post-industrial economies (Healy 2002).

In keeping with this complex heritage, contemporary imperialism – that is, US imperialism – poses many complexities, for opponents, analysts, and fellow travelers alike. It has involved invasion and seizure, in the case of the Philippines and Cuba; temporary occupation and permanent militarization (Japan); naked ideological imperialism (the Monroe doctrine[2] and Theodore Roosevelt); and a cloak of anti-imperialism (Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Barack Hussein Obama II).

Yanqui imperialism differs from the classic nineteenth-century model, and it has proven much harder to gain independence from US than European colonists. This is because Yanqui imperialism began at a well-developed stage of industrial capitalism and led into the post-industrial age, breaking down colonialism in order to control labor and consumption on a global scale. The free markets that had been undermined by classic imperialism in 1914 were firmly re-established in the 1990s as rhetorical tropes in ways that confirmed the drive toward a loose model

of domination, with economic power underwritten by militarism rather than settlement, via the exploitation of a global division of labor: governmentality without government, as it were. Today's imperialism is therefore as much a discursive formation as a military struggle.

None of this means that the US variety lacks the drive or the horror of old-world imperialism – just the latter's overt policies and colonial *rites de passage*. The country that advertises itself as the world's greatest promise of modernity has sought to translate its own national legacy, of clearance, genocide, and enslavement as much as democracy – a modernity built, as each successful one has been, on brutality – into a foreign and economic policy with similar effects and, at times, methods.

Given their experience of the Monroe Doctrine over two centuries, it is no surprise that Latin Americans developed a counter-theory, dependent development, in the 1940s. It gained adherents across the Global South over the next three decades in reaction to the unreconstructed institutional narcissism of the US, which ignored the fact that developed societies at the world core had become so through their colonial and international experience, both by differentiating the metropole from the periphery and importing ideas, fashions, and people (Prebisch 1982; Cardoso 2009). These radical critiques of capitalist modernization shared the view that the transfer of technology, politics, and economics had become unattainable, because MNCs united business and government to regulate cheap labor markets, produce new consumers, and guarantee pliant regimes (Reeves 1993: 24–25, 30).

Despite the power of this critique, it never attained hegemony in policy debates. Formal *political* postcoloniality rarely became *economic*, apart from some Asian states that pursued permanent capitalism, known as export-oriented industrialization (EOI), and service-based expansion. And after the capitalist economic crises of the 1970s, even those Western states that had *bourgeoisies* with sufficient capital formation to permit a welfare system found that stagflation undermined their capacity to hedge employment against inflation. So they selectively turned away from ISI, and required less-developed countries to do the same (Higgott and Robison 1985). Development policies of the 1950s and 1960s were problematized and dismantled from the 1970s, a tendency that grew in velocity and scope with the erosion of state socialism a decade and a half later.

Citizenship was turned on its head through historic policy renegotiations conducted by capital, the state, and their rent-seeking intellectual servants in political science and economics. Anxieties over unemployment were trumped by anxieties over profits, with labor pieties displaced by capital pieties, and workers called upon to identify as stakeholders in business or customers, not combatants with capital (Martin 2002: 21; Miller and O'Leary 2002: 97–99). These reforms redistributed income back to bourgeoisies and metropoles: reactionaries favor individual rights in the economic sphere of investment, but not other fora. Today's privileged citizens are corporations, and people are increasingly conceived of as self-governing consumers (*Economist* 2004).

For instance, George Bush Minor's *mantra* was "making every citizen an agent of his or her own destiny" (2005). In Mexico, this neoliberal trend reached its apogee when then-President Vicente Fox repeatedly and notoriously challenged reporters querying the record of neoliberalism with: *"¿Yo por qué? … ¿Qué no somos 100 millones de mexicanos?"* [Why ask me? … Aren't there a hundred million other Mexicans?] (quoted in Venegas 2003). The burden of his words – offered in the company of Carlos Slim, then Mexico's wealthiest individual and by 2012 the world's richest man and principal benefactor of the *New York Times* – was that people must assume individual responsibility for their material fortunes. The fact that not every Mexican had control over the money supply, tariff policy, trade negotiations, labor law, and exchange rates might have given him pause. Or not.

Thanks to this neoliberal project, financial and managerial decisions made in one part of the world increasingly take rapid effect elsewhere. New international currency markets have proliferated since the decline of a fixed exchange rate, matching regulated systems with piratical financial institutions that cross borders. Speculation brings greater reward than production, as sales of securities and debt outstrip profits from making cars and building houses. The international circulation of money creates the conditions for imposing global creditworthiness tests on all countries. At a policy level, this has ended ISI and the very legitimacy of national economies, supplanted by EOI and the idea of an international economy. Today's governments are supposed to deliver formal sovereignty and controlled financial markets, but globalization orthodoxy and business priorities insist on privately managed international capital. In the words of the radical Egyptian economist Samir Amin, "the space of economic management of capital accumulation" no longer coincides with "its political and social dimensions" (1997: xi). Even *The Economist* (1999: 4) acknowledges that it is "[i]mpossible" to combine political democracy with corporate liberty in this manner. Globalization does not offer an end to center–periphery inequalities, competition between states, or macroeconomic decisions taken by corporations; it cuts the capacity of the state system to control such transactions, and relegates responsibility for the protection and welfare of the workforce to MNCs and financial institutions.

With productive investment less profitable than financial investment, and companies rationalizing production, functions of marketing, labor, and administration have been reconceived on an international scale. The loan-granting power of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund has forced a shift away from the local provision of basic needs, redirecting public investment toward sectors supposedly endowed with comparative advantage.

Changes in development logic have generated an extraordinary redistribution of global income: development norms have shifted into reverse. In the two decades from 1960 to 1980, most of the Global South was state-socialist, or had a significant welfare system, and followed ISI. Per capita income during that period increased by 34% in Africa and 73% in Latin America, while the standard deviation of growth rates amongst developing economies from 1950 to 1973 was 1.8. In the decades

since these political economies shifted to EOI, the corollary numbers disclose a drop in income across Africa of 23% and an increase in Latin America of just 6%, while the standard deviation of growth has climbed to 3.0 – because of China's and India's successes. In 1997–1998, the richest 20% of the world's people earned 74 times the amount of the world's poorest, up from 60 times in 1990 and 30 times in 1960; 56% of the global population made less than US$2 a day. In 2001, every child born in Latin America immediately "owed" US$1,500 to foreign banks, as if this were part of original sin. For a tiny number, that would amount to a few hours of work once they attained their majority. For most, it would represent a decade's salary (Ocampo 2005: 12–14; United Nations Development Programme 2004; Sutcliffe 2003: 3; García Canclini 2002: 26–27).

Consider a prominent example of neoliberal "development." After the CIA-engineered Chilean *golpe* of September 11, 1973, thousands of leftists were murdered and tortured, followed by a so-called economic miracle that was nothing of the kind. Under the democratically elected socialist Salvador Allende, who was ousted that terrible day, unemployment had run at 4.3%. Under his successor, the neoliberal military dictator Augusto Pinochet, it reached 22%. Real wages decreased by 40% and poverty doubled, thanks to intellectual allies and corporate chiefs affiliated with US foreign and economic policy. The dictator's key advisers included freshly minted economics PhDs from the University of Chicago tutored by Milton Friedman, who himself attended the court of the mass murderer (Miller 2007).[3]

But the neoliberal dream endured. US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick announced to the World Trade Organization in 2001 that compliance with trade liberalization was an acid test of attitudes to terrorism, and the US Government's 2002 *National Security Strategy* referred to a "single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise." Identical *nostra* animated the next Administration (Holland 2005; The White House 2002, 2010; Mukhia 2002; Nandy 1998: 48).

This model, elegantly simple and seductively meritocratic in its pure form, has never been applied, and never could be, outside the inequalities and struggles of time and place. Rather than sitting comfortably alongside democracy and equality, the neoclassical economics that drives such princely laissez-faire distortions has been a tool of domination. For countries used to occupation by colonial powers, such "development" amounts to one more sign that political participation is pointless.

Communications

While there is a deep and rich history within the Global South of theorizing development and communication (Manyozo 2006), the dominant paradigm in policy terms and influence has originated in the North. We have already seen how the psy-function influenced Yanqui development discourse. Here, my use of

"communications" is focused on the media infrastructure of telecommunications, the press, television, cinema, the Internet, and so on. I begin with the lived experience of unequal media exchange – in an unexpected location.

In 1820, the noted British essayist Sydney Smith asked: "In the four quarters of the globe, who reads an American book? or goes to an American play? or looks at an American picture or statue?" (1844: 141). Three decades later, Herman Melville opposed the US literary establishment's devotion to all things English. He contrasted a Eurocentrically cringing import culture with a mission to "carry Republicanism into literature" (Newcomb 1996: 94).

Unsurprisingly, the US became an early-modern exponent of anti-cultural imperialist, pro-nation-building sentiment, using ISI to develop its communication capacities by rejecting intellectual-property regimes. That dedication to ISI changed when its market position did, as decades of protectionism and an increasingly large and affluent domestic population created robust cultural industries by the turn of the twentieth century. Overseas expansion soon became necessary because of a saturated domestic market.

Initially, development communication borrowed these practices. Old-school development advocates spoke of countries creating their own infrastructure, from telecommunications to television channels. But this soon turned to a notion of transfer, whereby wealthy nations sold gadgets and genres to less wealthy ones. By the 1950s, the successful export of media technologies and texts from the US to the Global South was touted as critical for the development of populations said to be mired in backward, folkloric forms of thought and lacking the trust in national organizations required for modernization (Pye and Verba 1965). Public investment was discouraged as a means of autonomy, displaced by a cosmic faith in market-driven power.

To US Cold War Warriors like professional anti-Marxist Ithiel de Sola Pool (1983), cultural conservative Daniel Bell (1977), and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (1969), communications technologies guaranteed US cultural and technical power across the globe, provided that the blandishments of socialism and critiques of global business did not stimulate class struggle. And today, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's consultancy firm advises that the US must "win the battle of the world's information flows, dominating the airwaves as Great Britain once ruled the seas" (Rothkopf 1997: 38, 47) while former National Intelligence Council chair Joseph Nye has promulgated the embarrassingly penile metaphor "soft power" to describe the use of culture as propaganda (2002), and the State Department uses "regional media hubs" to forward its project of *Leading Through Civilian Power* (2010: 60–61).

Nevertheless, nineteenth-century US critiques of cultural imperialism as per Melville still resonate (elsewhere) in everyday talk, broadcast and telecommunications policy, unions, international organizations, nationalistic media and heritage, cultural diplomacy, anti-Americanism, and post-industrial service-sector planning (see Dorfman and Mattelart 2000; Beltrán and Fox de Cardona 1980; Schiller 1976, 1989).

They are exemplified by Armand Mattelart's stinging denunciation of external cultural influence on the Global South:

> In order to camouflage the counter-revolutionary function which it has assigned to communications technology and, in the final analysis, to all the messages of mass culture, imperialism has elevated the mass media to the status of revolutionary agents, and the modern phenomenon of communications to that of revolution itself. (1980: 17)

The cultural-imperialism thesis turned Melville's original argument *volte face*. It said that the US, which had become the globe's leading media exporter, was transferring its dominant value system to others, with a corresponding diminution in the vitality and standing of local languages, traditions, and national identities. Lesser, but still considerable, influence was attributed to older imperial powers, via their cultural, military, and corporate ties to newly independent countries. The theory attributed US cultural hegemony to its control of news agencies, advertising, market research, public opinion, screen trade, technology transfer, propaganda, telecommunications, and security (Primo 1999: 183). In addition, US involvement in South-East Asian wars and its adherence to the Monroe Doctrine in the Americas led to critiques of military interventions against struggles of national liberation and targeted links between the military–industrial complex and the media, pointing to the ways that communications and cultural MNCs bolstered US foreign policy and military strategy, which in turn facilitated corporate expansion.

During the 1960s and 1970s, cultural-imperialism discourse found a voice in public-policy debates through the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), where the Global South lobbied for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). UNESCO set up an International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems to investigate North–South flows and power. It reported in 1980 on the need for equal distribution of the electronic spectrum, reduced postal rates for international texts, protection against satellites crossing borders, and media systems that would serve social justice rather than capitalist commerce (Mattelart and Mattelart 1998: 94–97).

But UNESCO soon ceased to be the critical site for NWICO debate. The US and the UK withdrew from the Organization in 1985 because it denounced Zionism as racism and supported state intervention against private-press hegemony. The past three decades have seen UNESCrats distance themselves from NWICO in the hope of attracting these countries back to the fold. The US rejoined in 2003 in time to make noises about the Organization contemplating a convention on cultural diversity that might sequester culture from neoliberal trade arrangements – the wrong kind of globalization, it might be democratically rather than economically driven. The US argued that texts were not culture, which it defined as the less

commodifiable and governable spheres of religion and language. Then the Organization recognized Palestine in 2011 and the US again refused to pay its dues (Gerbner 1994: 112–113; Gerbner *et al*. 1994: xi–xii; State Department 2011).

NWICO was in any event vulnerable from all sides for its inadequate theorization of capitalism, postcolonialism, class relations, the state, and indigenous culture, in addition to its complex *frottage* – a pluralism that insisted on the relativistic equivalence of all cultures and defied chauvinism, but rubbed up against a powerful equation of national identities with cultural forms (Schlesinger 1991: 145). NWICO's concentration on national culture denied the potentially liberatory and pleasurable nature of different takes on the popular, forgot the internal differentiation of publics, valorized frequently oppressive and / or unrepresentative local bourgeoisies in the name of maintaining and developing national cultures, and ignored the demographic realities of its "own" terrain. For example, alternatives to Hollywood funded movies under the banner of opposition to cultural imperialism frequently favored exclusionary, art-house-centered hegemons who privileged "talent" over labor, and centralized authority over open decision making. All too often, this led to public subvention of indolent national bourgeoisies or oleaginous Gringos using proxy locals to fund offshore production (Miller *et al*. 2005).

The Cold War may be over, but the thesis remains. In the contemporary moment, the US forms a power triad of the technical and ideological world alongside Japan and Western Europe. China and India are finally becoming the economic powers that their population numbers should ensure. While the latter have many leading software engineers in addition to a huge army of labor, they lack the domestic venture capitalists, the military underpinnings to computing innovation, and the historic cross-cultural textual power that characterize Sony, the BBC, Hollywood, and the Bay Area. It comes as no surprise, for example, that the triad still accounts for 80% of the globe's TV programing market (Best *et al*. 2011; Boyd-Barrett 2006; *IDATE NEWS* 2009). For instance, the US children's channel Nickelodeon is available in well over 150 countries, young people across Africa are familiar with *SpongeBob*, and 80% of shows for children outside the white-settler colonies and China comes from the US (Osei-Hwere and Pecora 2008: 16, 19; Götz *et al*. 2008).

In the Global North, the post-Cold War era remains dominated by cultural issues, but of a quite different kind, thanks to the contributions of Middle Eastern historian and professional anti-Palestinian Bernard Lewis and Cold War political scientist and Vietnam War architect Samuel Huntington. In the wake of Sovietism, these two men turned from politics and economics to culture in search of geopolitical comprehension.

Lewis (1990) coined the expression "clash of civilizations" to capture the difference, as he saw it, between the separation of church and state that had generated US successes versus their intercalculation in Islamic nations, which had supposedly made those countries subordinate. Huntington appropriated the "clash

of civilizations" to argue that future world historical conflicts would not be "primarily ideological or primarily economic" but "cultural" (1993: 22).

This "cartoon-like world" (Said 2001) has gained immense media and policy attention since September 11, 2001. Journalists across the Global North promote the notion of an apocalyptic struggle between good and evil as the bifurcation of the West and Islam. Across the daily press and weekly and monthly magazines of ruling opinion, extra-state violence is attributed to Islam in opposition to freedom and technology, never as the act of subordinated groups against dominant ones.

The *New York Times* and *Newsweek* gave Huntington room to account for what had happened in terms of his "thesis," while others adopted it as a call for empire, from the supposed New Left through to leading communitarians and the neoliberal *Economist*. Arab leaders met to discuss the conceit, and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi invoked it. When the US occupation of Iraq entered its third year, military commanders and senior non-commissioned officers were required to read the book (along with V.S. Naipaul and *Islam for Dummies*) (Rusciano 2003; Said 2001; Schmitt 2005).

Not everyone was so taken with these ideas. UNESCO's Director General prefaced the Organization's worthy Declaration on Cultural Diversity with a rebuttal (Matsuura 2001) and *El País*'s cartoonist Máximo traumatically constructed a dialogue alongside the tumbling Towers: "Choque de ideas, de culturas, de civilizaciones" [Clash of ideas, of cultures, of civilizations] drew the reply "choques de desesperados contra instalados" [the clash of the desperate against the establishment] (quoted in García Canclini 2002: 16). Israel's *Ha-aretz* regarded Lewis and Huntington's "hegemonic hold" as "a major triumph" for al-Qaeda, and the *Arab News* aptly typified it as "Armageddon dressed up as social science" (quoted in Rusciano 2003: 175).

Study after study has disproven Lewis and Huntington's wild assertions about growing ethnic struggle since the Cold War and a unitary Islamic culture opposed to a unitary Western culture. Such claims neglect conflicts over money, property, and politics and cultural differences within the two blocs (Fox 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2003: 203; United Nations Development Programme 2004). The clash-of-civilizations thesis does not work if you apply it to Iran supporting Russia against Chechen rebels and India against Pakistan, for example (Abrahamian 2003: 535). Yet we must engage this discourse, because it represents a powerful anxiety underpinning ideas of development and communication that is as fundamental as the concerns about Marxism of an earlier period. Culture is central, but not in terms of opposition to cultural imperialism or resistance to international capital – rather, as an explanation for underdevelopment.

We must also attend to reconceptualizations of economic dependency theory. By the 1970s, developing markets for labor and products, and the shift from the spatial *sen*sitivities of electrics to the spatial *in*sensitivities of electronics, pushed the Global North beyond treating the Global South as a supplier of raw materials to viewing them as shadow-setters of the price of work, competing

amongst themselves and with the Global North for employment. Production became split across continents via a New International Division of Labor (Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1980).

Labor-market expansion and developments in global transportation and communications technology have diminished the need for collocation of management, work, and consumption. Just as manufacturing fled the Global North, cultural production has also relocated: popular and high-cultural texts, computer-aided design and manufacture, sales, marketing, and information may now be created and exchanged globally, to create a New International Division of Cultural Labor (Miller *et al*. 2005; Miller *et al*. 2001). But this almost mundane aspect does not draw the attention of policymakers and the bourgeois press. They are animated by grander stuff.

Communications as Development and Globalization

Communications technologies themselves are frequently regarded *as* development and globalization – signs of a transcendent progress. George Orwell described these fantasies 70 years ago in ways that resonate today:

> Reading recently a batch of rather shallowly optimistic "progressive" books, I was struck by the automatic way in which people go on repeating certain phrases which were fashionable before 1914. Two great favourites are "the abolition of distance" and "the disappearance of frontiers". I do not know how often I have met with the statements that "the aeroplane and the radio have abolished distance" and "all parts of the world are now interdependent." (1944)

Pragmatic desires for a trained workforce and modern infrastructure have dominated the material reality of development, but at a discursive level, technological determinism has characterized development and global communications, claiming magical qualities that can override socioeconomic inequality. Today's mantra is very similar to the fantasy that Orwell noticed long ago: utopian yearnings for a world free of institutional constraints.

Bourgeois economists claim that cell phones have streamlined markets in the Global South, enriching people in zones where banking, economic information, and market data are scarce. Fantastic claims made for this technology include "the complete elimination of waste" and massive reductions in poverty and corruption through the empowerment of individuals (Jensen 2007). This utopianism has seen a comprehensive turn in research away from unequal infrastructural and cultural exchange toward an extended dalliance with new technology and its supposedly innate capacity to endow users with transcendence (Ogan *et al*. 2009). The latest

media technologies are said to obliterate geography, sovereignty, and hierarchy in an alchemy of truth and beauty. This deregulated, individuated, technologized world makes consumers into producers, frees the disabled from confinement, encourages new subjectivities, rewards intellect and competitiveness, links people across cultures, and allows billions of flowers to bloom in a post-political cornucopia. It's a bizarre utopia. People fish, film, fornicate, and finance from morning to midnight. Consumption is privileged, production is discounted, and labor is forgotten. The *Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age*, for instance, proposes that political-economic gains made for democracy since the thirteenth century have been eclipsed by technological ones:

> The central event of the 20th century is the overthrow of matter. In technology, economics, and the politics of nations, wealth – in the form of physical resources – has been losing value and significance. The powers of mind are everywhere ascendant over the brute force of things. (Dyson *et al.* 1994)

Time magazine exemplified this love of a seemingly immaterial world when it chose "You" as 2006's "Person of the Year," because "You control the Information Age. Welcome to your world" (Grossman 2006).

This discourse buys into individualistic fantasies of reader, audience, consumer, and player autonomy – the neoliberal intellectual's wet dream of music, movies, television, and everything else converging under the sign of empowered and creative fans. The New Right of communication studies invests with unparalleled gusto in Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, evolutionary economics, and creative industries. It's never seen an "app" it didn't like or a socialist idea it did. Faith in devolved mediamaking amounts to a secular religion, offering transcendence in the here and now via a "literature of the eighth day, the day after Genesis" (Carey 2005).

Consider the publicity generated when Kelvin Doe, a 15-year-old Sierra Leonean, was invited to MIT in 2012 because he had constructed a radio station from detritus in trash cans. More than two million online viewings of the university's video about him in just one week testify to the appeal of this apparently unlikely story of a Third World prodigy who was constructed as embodying the need to replace aid programs with individual initiative (Lieberman 2012; Hudson 2012). That account erased an alternative that could have analyzed his achievement as an impressive moment in centuries of skillful media ragpicking, a heritage that illustrates the power of creativity, collectivity – and pollution. Such stories can be retold to draw us into the materiality and inequality at the heart of development and globalization and question their utility – if they are analyzed in a critical way (Medina 2007).

The contemporary rhetoric of development, globalization, and communications *does* speak of community activism rather than government policy or commercial will (Wilkins 2008). But this is all too quickly appropriated by technological

fantasies: for example, Facebook features "Peace on Facebook" and claims the capacity to "decrease world conflict" through intercultural communication, while Twitter modestly announces itself as "a triumph of humanity" (*Economist* 2010: 61). Machinery, rather than political-economic activity, is the guiding light. Even the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, long a key site for alternative theories and representations of development, has joined the chorus (2012).

But as Orwell realized, the story is more complex. Max Weber insisted that technology was principally a "mode of processing material goods" (2005: 27) and Harvey Sacks emphasized "the failures of technocratic dreams[:] that if only we introduced some fantastic new communication machine the world will be transformed" (1995: 548). So, rather than seeing new communications technologies as magical agents that can produce market equilibrium and hence individual and collective happiness, we should note their other impacts. In 2011, the cost of broadband in the Global South was 40.3% of average individual gross national income (GNI). Across the Global North, by comparison, the price was less than 5% of GNI per capita (International Telecommunication Union 2012: 4). The putative freedoms associated with cell phone usage have created nightmares for public health professionals, as prostitutes at risk of sexually transmitted disease increasingly communicate with clients by phone and are less easy to educate and assist than when they work at conventional sites (Mahapatra *et al.* 2012). Or consider the mad opposition to infant immunization that dominates YouTube videos and responses on the topic. This is just one of countless examples of perilous medical misinformation that circulates irresponsibly on the service (Keelan *et al.* 2007). Similarly, as fewer and fewer media outlets become available to them, tobacco companies turn to the Internet and product placement via "smoking fetish videos." Aimed at under-age drug users under the soubriquet of "community engagement," they draw massively positive reactions. Many old TV commercials for cigarettes are also slyly archived there, breathing new life into their emphysemic messages (Freeman and Chapman 2007).

Furthermore, when old and obsolete cell phones or other communication technologies are junked, they become electronic waste (e-waste), the fastest-growing part of municipal cleanups around the Global North. E-waste has generated serious threats to worker health and safety wherever plastics and wires are burnt, monitors smashed and dismantled, and circuit boards grilled or leached with acid, while the toxic chemicals and heavy metals that flow from such practices have perilous implications for local and downstream residents, soil, and water. Most electronic salvage and recycling is done in the Global South by pre-teen girls, who work with discarded television sets and computers to find precious metals, and dump the remains in landfills – less romantic ragpickers than MIT's Kelvin Doe. The e-waste ends up there after export and import by "recyclers" who eschew landfills and labor in the Global North in order to avoid the higher costs and regulatory oversight of recycling in countries that prohibit such destruction to the

environment and labor. Businesses that forbid dumping in local landfills as part of their corporate policies merrily ship it elsewhere (Maxwell and Miller 2012).

This material reality remains invisible to the new-media clerisy and bourgeois economics alike, but it *has* been recognized in the technocratic cloisters of communications diplomacy. For example, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) acknowledges that the proliferation of communications technology causes grave environmental problems (2008: 67–84; 2009: 2, 5). The ITU predicts that communications technologies will connect the 6.5 billion residents of the earth by 2015. In the near future, then, "everyone can access information, create information, use information and share information," which "will take the world out of financial crisis, because it's the only industry that's still growing", thanks to developing markets (Hibberd 2009: 1). But at the same time, the Union presses for "climate neutrality" and greater efficiency in energy use, and such venues as the 2008 World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly in South Africa encouraged members to reduce the carbon footprint of communications, in accord with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Touré 2008).

In a similar vein, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development says communications can play a pivotal role in developing service-based, low-polluting economies in the Global South (offering energy efficiency, adaptation to climate change, mitigation of diminished biodiversity, and diminished pollution) but cautions that such technological advances can produce negative outcomes. For example, remote sensing of marine life may encourage unsustainable fishing (Maxwell and Miller 2011).

Conclusion

We are in the midst of the greatest global economic crisis in seven decades, one that exceeds the 1930s and 1970s versions in both its reach and impact, and a global environmental crisis that is entirely without precedent. Orthodox policies and programs have failed to comprehend or ameliorate these situations. Radical critics continue to problematize dominant discourses of development, globalization, and communication. Although today's neomodernization models are more sensitive than their forebears to unequal wealth, influence, and status, they do not measure up to critical theories of dependent development, underdevelopment, unequal exchange, world-systems history, center–periphery relations, cultural imperialism, post-colonialism, and environmental impact (Kavoori and Chadha 2009; McPhail 2009; Miller 2012). Such counter-discourses will always struggle against the institutional force, hegemonic media status, and academic endorsement of dominant discourses. But they provide a sharp reminder that there *is* another way. Across the Global South, vigorous and inventive tactics and strategies counter

labor exploitation and occupational health and safety risks, offering power-generation alternatives and mounting vibrant critiques of structured domination in communications (Bycroft 2011; Kapur and Wagner 2011; Bolaño 2012).

Of course, utopia should be part of our deliberations – but couched as citizenship rights rather than entrepreneurial fictions. The UN's definition of communication for development calls for:

> two-way communication systems that enable dialogue and that allow communities to speak out, express their aspirations and concerns and participate in the decisions that relate to their development. (United Nations Development Program 2009)

And the World Congress on Communication for Development seeks:

> A social process based on dialogue using a broad range of tools and methods. It is also about seeking change at different levels including listening, building trust, sharing knowledge and skills, building policies, debating and learning for sustained and meaningful change. (United Nations Development Program 2009)

How can these aims be achieved? A clear-headed analysis of unequal exchange of cultural textuality, technology, and labor should be our starting-point – not fantasies about individual psyches or technological transformations.

Notes

1   Thanks to Karin Wilkins and other editors for their helpful comments and to Richard Maxwell for work that contributed to the section on electronic waste.
2   The Monroe Doctrine was adopted as US foreign policy in the 1820s under its eponymous president of the time (James Monroe) in opposition to European intervention in the Western Hemisphere. It holds that all activities in the Americas are the business of the USA.
3   His sickening recommendations are proudly displayed by the Cato Institute (Piñera 2006).

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3

Political Economy
of Development

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Political economy is a key approach to studying international development and social change. Research originating from a political economy approach will be familiar to those of us who are aware of global concerns that emphasize big numbers: how many millions of dollars of aid are distributed, how many people earn less than a dollar a day, child mortality rates, whether economies in developing countries are growing or stagnating, and so on. Political economy is often expressed in these kinds of figures, but it is the way these figures are used that characterizes the research field. Data showing a decline in child mortality rates over the past 50 years, for example, enable us to analyze the relationship between the *policies*, which were designed to impact upon this area (such as health care education, immunization programs, and distribution of contraceptives), and the *effects* of those policies. When bottom-line figures like these are published, they are used to assess how well development policies are working. At its core then, political economy is not just about economics or big numbers, but about *whether appropriate decisions are being made*.

This chapter explores the political economy of international development. It begins with a discussion of the history of the term, and raises some important issues relating to its origins that are still relevant to the field today. It then discusses one of the most important controversies in development communication research: the cultural imperialism debates. This touches upon issues essential to contemporary scholarship within the field. Following this, the chapter provides an outline of the political economy of international development, examining the main kinds of actors involved in providing development assistance of different kinds. Finally, the chapter summarizes the main issues in the field in order to provide students with suggestions for further research.

The History of Political Economy

Political economic reasoning has been around for thousands of years. Until relatively recently, it tended to be developed by philosophers with much wider-ranging interests than the economy. In *The Republic*, Plato (circa 400 BC) elaborated upon the kind of society that would be created if his philosophical ideas were put into practice. One of his lasting innovations was that people should only do the jobs for which they are best suited. This is known as *division of labor*, the idea that specialization of tasks leads to greater growth for a city or state. It is a classic example of a policy designed to impact upon the economy, rooted in a particular view of good governance and good living. It is still used today. There are a multitude of policies that enforce division of labor in most Western countries, such as those that govern education systems, employment laws, wage and tax structures. These have been designed to encourage specialization of working roles on the understanding that this is the most effective way to organize a successful society.

The term in its modern usage originates from the seventeenth century, when the study of economic policies and the production of wealth became a pre-occupation for the competitive European empires. Formative figures such as John Locke (1632–1704) and Adam Smith (1723–1790) were philosophers rather than economists, and their economic reasoning derived from systematic writings on ethics, political theory, and scientific method. Writing at a time when the sense of a national interest was becoming increasingly important, these so-called moral philosophers looked for practical applications for their ideas. Locke is best known for his work on property rights, while Smith is often considered the father of free trade. Discussions of the best policies for governing successful economies took a central part in their writings, and schools of thought developed around their ideas about social organization and economics.

An important point to reflect upon is how central the practical needs of imperialist nations were to the field during this period. Political economics from the seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century was focused on promoting the national wealth. There were no effective supranational bodies like the United Nations, and it was common for diplomatic agreements to be agreed and then reneged upon. European imperialist countries saw parts of the world such as Africa, Asia, and the Americas as resources which could be owned and fought over. Political economic theories focused on how best to exploit the resources available to a nation; they designed the policies which would help their country become richer and form larger armies, without much thought for the indigenous people living in the territories they controlled or the needs of a functioning international system. The closest thing to modern-day humanitarian aid was probably provided by Christian missionaries, who provided basic health care and education in support of religious conversion.

Discussions of development and social change were therefore limited to domestic issues, and particularly to coping with the effects of industrialization, urbanization, and development within peasant communities in the home nation. An example of how domestic welfare outweighed foreign humanitarian concerns can be seen as recently as the late nineteenth century. Between 1870 and 1900, up to 29 million people are believed to have died from famine in British-controlled India (Davis 2001: 7). As a consequence the political economic theories championed by the likes of Adam Smith in support of the self-interest of trading empires, India's surplus grain was transported to England so that the poor in the Victorian slums had a cheap food source. However, this meant that there were no reserves when drought came to India. These and other economic policies steered by the British to enhance domestic development directly contributed to the deaths of millions in the foreign territories they controlled (Davis 2001: 26ff). Since the major trading empires of the sixteenth to twentieth centuries ruled through force, these and countless other humanitarian disasters provide part of the motivation for the belief that Western/Northern nations have a moral obligation to support development in regions they previously exploited. Political economy – through statistical data and an analysis of the associated political structures – provides a way of examining these kinds of issues.

Of course, there were alternative approaches based upon political economy that were critical toward the goals of classical economics. Marxism – directly or indirectly – probably provides the single most important influence upon contemporary theories of development and social change. In *Capital*, Karl Marx (1818–1883) demonstrated the historical contingency between politics and economics, and in particular how the relationship between the two adapts across different eras and different forms of social organization to maintain power structures favorable to certain groups. As imperialist competition intensified around the turn of the twentieth century, theories of political economy inspired by Marxist approaches explored the policies governing the international circulation of capital. Notions such as *uneven* or *unequal development* attempted to explain how and why development occurred differently in different countries, and such theories provide the basis for research that is critical toward the modernization policies developed countries have traditionally favored toward underdeveloped regions (Trotsky 2008).

Contemporary approaches to political economy in the field of development and social change have their origins in the period immediately following World War II. An important outcome of the war was the inability of the European imperialist powers to maintain their overseas territories. Dozens of former colonies in Africa and Asia became independent nations between the late-1940s and mid-1960s. The question of the best policies to create wealth and modernization in underdeveloped regions came to the fore. During the Cold War, the two major superpowers competed for influence in these newly independent countries, using different political economic ideologies as methods for promoting development.

The United States had an agenda of modernization through free trade, with a laissez-faire, democratic leadership. The Soviet Union favored modernization through a planned and centralized economy, with an authoritarian leadership. While the Cold War is often considered a battle of ideologies – communism versus democracy – these ideologies were expressed through political economic structures based upon those ideals. Much like with the moral philosophers, political economy was part of a broader system of thought about how good governance can lead to the development of a successful society.

Political economic approaches to development and social change have therefore tended to share certain characteristics. The first is that they are not always the work of economists. Rather, considerations of good governance have developed from systematic reasoning about basic social and ethical issues: what constitutes a fair society, how we should treat one another, how limited resources can best be allocated, and how we can promote growth. This is because political economy is not just about big numbers that demonstrate change, but also about the soundness of the policy decisions shaping those numbers. This often has an ethical dimension, and is almost always rooted in a broader set of worldviews. A good starting point for any researcher of political economy is to ask what beliefs motivate a particular set of policies.

Secondly, political economic thinking has traditionally been about self-interest within national boundaries. How do we best promote wealth and a successful society? Its application in international development is a relatively recent occurrence, which requires a far broader application of the notion of self-interest, and which often relies upon more complex motivations. For example, one justification of development funding used by the United States after 9/11 was that failed states create terrorists, and therefore it is in the self-interest of Western nations to help people in failing states. Other issues such as post-imperial guilt, religious or political ideology, moral or ethical conviction, diplomatic, military and trade concerns, and even celebrity endorsements can provide motivations for certain kinds of political economic reasoning. Normative concepts such as the *international society* (Bull 1995) and the *global village* (McLuhan 2011) have also come to the fore in recent decades. All of these challenge the notion of self-interest, and replace it with a sense of *global citizenship*. However, it is important to remember that aid and development are often motivated by a number of reasons at the same time, and that humanitarian or ethical goals are only one part of the equation.

Thirdly, the relation between the *political* and the *economic* should be considered dynamic and changing. In the eighteenth century, the newly acquired wealth of the merchant classes enabled certain privileged groups to seize political power from the aristocracy, most notably in the French and American revolutions. In the American Revolution in particular, the economic concerns of the merchant classes, such as barriers to trade with other empires enforced by the British, were entwined with the goal of political autonomy. Philosophers like John Locke provided political, ethical, and economic theories to support the liberation movement, and

following independence the US was able to embark on a major program of national development based around aggressive expansionism funded by trade. However, the political economic structures of different countries across time and space – that is, during different eras and in different parts of the world – do not follow these same patterns. When conducting or assessing political economic research, it is essential to understand the complex relationships that shape policies for development. As shall be discussed in the following section, development theories drawing upon political economy approaches have tended to fall into the trap of treating the United States as the "universal nation" providing the template for developmental thinking, although more recent theories have attempted to redress this issue.

Political Economy and Communication: The *Cultural Imperialism* Controversy

One of the most significant controversies in the field of development communication in recent decades refers to a body of research termed *cultural imperialism*. The purpose of this research was to demonstrate that approaches to development favored by the United States and other Western nations were flawed. Many of the authors used political economic research to demonstrate this. A striking aspect of these debates was that they spilled over from academia into negotiations over international communication policies within the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Developing countries and scholars used this research to argue the need for a *New World Information and Communication Order* in which international communication policies could support development in poorer countries. The outcome of these heated discussions was that the United States, United Kingdom, and Singapore temporarily left UNESCO in the mid-1980s, and withdrew their funding for it (Nordenstreng 1984). All three have since rejoined, but this controversy demonstrates some of the ways in which political economic research into communication has played an important role in real-world debates surrounding development and social change.

Cultural imperialism refers to the ways in which free trade increases the dominance of developed countries over developing countries. Herbert Schiller defines it as:

> the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even to promote, the values and structures of the dominant center of the system. (Schiller 1976: 9)

By this, Schiller meant that *modernization theory* actually favored the West rather than developing countries. Modernization theory refers to the idea that if

developing countries mimic Western political and economic structures, they will "advance" along similar lines. However, Schiller's political economic studies showed that such approaches simply enabled developing nations to neatly fit into organizational structures favorable to the West. For example, pressure upon developing nations to sign up to laissez-faire trade policies such as the *free flow of information* meant that Western nations with established media production and distribution networks – such as Hollywood – held a significant trading advantage (Thussu 2000: 55–56). Studies found that Western media were often brought in by developing nations, and this had negative effects on the development of their own media systems. This is termed *dependency theory*, which is the argument that these kinds of development policies leave developing nations dependent on regularly importing essential products from the West. This provides profound advantages to Western nations and corporations, while undermining efforts to protect and promote the economies and cultures of developing nations.

This latter point, referring to the role of communication in promoting culture, is especially important. While the circulation of Western media creates economic and structural disadvantages in developing nations, it also has an effect on culture. This is sometimes also referred to as *media imperialism*, which refers to the ways in which exported media carry a "semiotic construction" of important political and social issues "through the images of the world, nations, institutions, people and activities, that media design, package and disseminate" (Boyd-Barrett 2007: 61; Boyd-Barrett 1977). Western media therefore hinder development ideologically, as well as structurally. Between various political, economic, and cultural demands made upon developing nations under the justification of modernization policies, it was argued that "the typical structures of colonial exploitation" had been recreated by modernization theories (Arrighi 1978: 140). When scholars and representatives of developing nations presented these findings at successive UNESCO meetings during the 1970s and 1980s, they met with vehement disapproval. This raises questions of the overarching political ideologies and the relationship between development policies and self-interest referred to above.

From the perspective of political economic scholarship, there are a number of important lessons to be learned from cultural imperialism research. Although the critique fell out of favor during the late 1980s, useful reflection has taken place over the flaws in methodologies by many of the authors previously working in the field (compare, for example, Boyd-Barrett 1977, 2007, Tomlinson 1991, 1997, or Mattelart 1979, 2002). When reassessing Schiller (1992) for the mid-1990s context, John Thompson argues that a contemporary study of how nations and other trans-national actors exert power through media should acknowledge that there are many forces behind capitalist and state practices, not just one "national policy." Therefore it is incorrect to simply blame Hollywood or the United States for these policies; rather, we must better understand the dynamics behind policy formation.

Furthermore, media distribution patterns engage with long-term patterns of cultural interaction, which means that any effects within developing countries are

likely to be unpredictable and formed out of a variety of influences. It is simply not true to say that one culture is "polluted" by another; on the contrary, cultures are always interacting. Cultural imperialism approaches undervalue the creative ways in which audiences engage with culture, often relying on reductionist methodologies that determine simple effects based on what big data patterns appear to show (Thompson 1995: 164–178; van Elteren 2003: 171). Thompson concludes, "This thesis is unsatisfactory not only because it is outdated and empirically doubtful, but also because it is based on a conception of cultural phenomena which is fundamentally flawed." Herbert Schiller and his contemporaries would need to demonstrate the "multiple, shifting ways in which symbolic power overlap[s] with economic, political and coercive power in the process of globalization" (Thompson 1995: 172–173).

I mentioned in the introduction that political economic research uses data as a way of assessing the *effects* of policies. What Thompson and his contemporaries suggested was that political economic research needs to consider effects in far more nuanced ways. The structures that govern international development are multifaceted and complex, and the impact of any given policy varies greatly. To counteract this, recent research on development and social change has emphasized the *experiences* of groups and individuals in different parts of the developing world. This is generally seen as a remedy to the aggregative, impersonal data preferred by political economic approaches. A good way to use political economy is to combine it with cultural or ethnographic fieldwork, so as to grasp the "big picture" and its impact upon specific communities. We still need to understand the political and economic frameworks designed to produce development in order to ascertain whether sound decisions are being made; however, we also need to integrate a more personal dimension to the analysis in order to see what political economic decisions mean for real people. Furthermore, the complexity of the development industry demands a far more nuanced analysis of how policies are actually formed and executed if we are to truly understand and critique them.

On the one hand, cultural imperialism research produced convincing evidence of imbalances in communication policies for development. This was a major success for political economic approaches to research. On the other hand, it is clear that political economy can only explain part of the issue. It relies on aggregations, simplifications, and explicatory categories which do not hold up to scrutiny. This is because, if we are to understand social change, we must engage with cultures and peoples. Political economic approaches are useful for grasping large trends, but bad for analyzing social phenomena. It's therefore important to be aware of the value of political economy as a research tool, and to also be aware of its weaknesses. In the following section of this chapter, we appeal to the strengths of political economic research in order to analyze the institutional structures of the development industry. This does not tell us everything about the industry, but it provides overarching data about the main actors involved in international development as a starting point for further investigation.

The Institutional Matrix of the Development Industry

The international system underwent substantial restructuring after World War II with the formation of the United Nations and the establishment of the modern nation-state (rather than empires) as the practical units governing international relations. Toward the end of the twentieth century, a series of trends intensified, which are intimately linked to questions of development and social change. This may be referred to as the rise in *boundary-spanning actors*; individuals and organizations originating in one country but having areas of operation that cross state lines (Hocking, 2002). International migrants, multinational corporations, transnational news agencies, and supranational regulatory bodies like the United Nations are the more traditional boundary-spanning actors, but since the 1980s these have been joined by sub-state actors (such as local governments), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society organizations (CSOs). The intensification of boundary-spanning activity has radically altered the international development field, which means that it is important to map the institutions through which international development is organized.

A political economic approach begins by assessing the largest financial flows and the actors who provide them. Development funding is tracked by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). OECD-DAC membership used to be exclusively for the wealthier donor countries, but it now cooperates with dozens of non-members and claims to capture about 95% of development funding. OECD-DAC is the only institution that independently assesses and verifies donor activities, and its statistical data are usually considered to be the most accurate available since they is compiled the year after spending took place, based on actual rather than projected funding. However, OECD-DAC only reports *official development assistance* (ODA). ODA is defined as resource flows that are provided by *official agencies*, with the goal of *economic development*, and that contain a *grant element* of at least 25%. In 2011, $134 billion in ODA was distributed in total (OECD-DAC 2013). This represents a decline in real terms (i.e., adjusted for inflation) from 2010 because of the global economic recession, although it should be noted that 2010 was the record highest year for ODA. In addition to OECD-DAC data, the World Bank provides data on development funding along with a wide range of other data relevant to understanding a nation's political economy. Political economic research into development therefore begins with the data provided by these institutions.

It will come as little surprise that the largest donors are some of the wealthiest and most highly developed nations. The United States is by far the largest provider of ODA, at nearly $31 billion a year, followed by Germany ($14bn), the United Kingdom (just under $14bn), France ($13bn), and Japan ($11bn). The UN has set a

target for developed nations to provide 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) as ODA, which many nations have agreed to meet. However, currently only Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark, and the Netherlands meet or exceed this target. This means that although some of the world's largest economies are also the largest aid donors, some of the smaller Northern European countries donate far more as a percentage of what they have than the bigger donors do (OECD-DAC 2013). So, although the USA distributes more than double the ODA of the second highest donor, the percentage of GNI it donates is one of the lowest of all DAC countries, at 0.2%. This raises issues related to fairness. Should the USA donate the same proportion of its wealth as other countries, or does the size of its economy make it a special case? What kinds of problems would occur in developing countries if they were suddenly flooded with an additional $75 billion in ODA each year? These are complicated issues, which arise from the conjuncture between politics and economics, and which are sensitive concerns within development communities.

The highest recipients of ODA in 2011 were Afghanistan, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. The United Kingdom created controversy in 2012 by cutting ODA to India. In fact, figures from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund show India's economy is larger than that of Germany, France, and the UK, and it may seem curious that it is so high on the list of ODA recipients. This relates back to questions of motivation and self-interest. On the one hand, India is technically a developing country with a substantial need for social and infrastructural development. On the other, it is an emerging economic superpower that developed nations want to curry favor with as trading partners. So while Afghanistan and the DRC receive high levels of ODA due to the need for development following war and humanitarian crises, ODA to India probably has different motivations. The DAC maintains a list of ODA recipients which divides developing nations into groups based around the GNI (average income levels per person) of people living in those countries, and it reveals that there are dozens of countries poorer than India. It is worth remembering that there is a political dimension to aid distribution, which will be discussed further under the heading "bilateral donors" below.

This points to another important issue. Countries referred to as *BRICS* (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) are considered to be the largest emerging economies (i.e., nations that are growing in economic and political power far quicker than developed nations). These countries are still developing in the sense that they have massive rural areas which have not undergone industrialization, along with urban areas which are rapidly expanding. They require infrastructural and social development if they are to reach their potential; development for which Northern countries and corporations are eager to provide services. At the same time, BRICS also provide their own development assistance to smaller countries in order to (amongst other things) develop their diplomatic and trade influence. This is often referred to as "South–South cooperation." It creates a

complex picture in which some developing countries are recipients of ODA from the West at the same time as they are also providers of development assistance to smaller developing countries. Furthermore, it complicates what actually constitutes aid, since South–South cooperation often takes different forms to accepted definitions of ODA. China, for example, has cooperated with African countries through long-term loans, trade credits, by providing laborers and raw materials for building projects, opening schools, and backing exploratory mining for strategic resources (Davies 2010).

These broad patterns of development funding may also be broken into *types* of donors. This can help explain how and why donors distribute development funding according to certain patterns.

Bilateral donors

Bilateral simply means *two-sided*, and in international relations it refers to two states directly dealing with each other. A large portion of ODA is donated bilaterally, from one country to another. Bilateral donors are therefore countries that provide ODA through their own international development agencies, their foreign ministries, and any other governmental boundary-spanning bodies, as opposed to through multilateral donors like the United Nations. Some bilateral aid is *conditional* or *tied*; this means that the donor country sets conditions for how the development assistance may be used, which usually favors trade with the donor country. At the turn of the twenty-first century, more than half of all bilateral ODA was tied, but this has reduced significantly in recent years to less than 20%. Criticisms against tied aid point to inefficiency, corruption, and higher prices. According to OECD-DAC, most of the largest donors, with the notable exception of the USA, have met OECD recommendations for the untying of aid.

Nonetheless, the main advantage of bilateral ODA for developed countries is in the potential strategic advantages such donations can offer. In this sense, bilateral aid truly has two dimensions. For example, Germany's ODA to India more than trebled since 2008 to nearly $500 million in 2011 (OECD/QWIDS 2013). A political economic approach should question the policies behind this so as to understand why it has increased so dramatically. Further research reveals that an initiative called *Year of Germany* began in India in 2011. This was created to promote the German language and education system in emerging economies, and, as a consequence, one million Indian school children will now study German. Since language is seen as a means of opening up a country's cultural, economic, and scientific spheres, one might argue that ODA has been planned cohesively with this national promotion project (Auswärtiges Amt 2011: 4–6). This could be considered mutually beneficial since Germany is effectively paying for Indian children to learn a foreign language. However, it also draws on the

principle that over the long-term a greater number of German speakers in India's growing economy will benefit Germany's interests. Bilateral ODA can therefore provide a strategic means of expressing self-interest at the same time as it represents an untied investment in a country.

Multilateral donors

Multilateral means *many-sided*, and refers to organizations like the United Nations, which represent a large number of nations or actors. Around $42 billion out of 2011's overall $134 billion of ODA was paid into multilateral organizations. The primary multilateral organizations involved in development are the World Bank and its associated regional banks, the various United Nations bodies, the European Union, and the International Monetary Fund. Just under $35 billion was paid out in ODA by these organizations, although this does not account for the administrative costs of the work they conduct (such as managing funds, data collection, and program evaluation), which is not spent as ODA (OECD/QWIDS 2013). It is common for multilateral organizations to be criticized for their inefficiency, high costs, and high levels of bureaucracy; however, such problems may also be considered as the effects of the difficulties states have in dealing with one another and in reaching consensus over major international issues. Multilaterals are inefficient because nation-states are inefficient at cooperating with one another.

Given the advantages of bilateral aid referred to above, why do nations use multilaterals as conduits for distributing ODA? It is striking how varied the figures are. For example, Japan donated just under $11 billion in ODA in 2011, and $4.2 billion (or 38%) of this was distributed via multilateral organizations. Many European countries distribute around a third of their funding to these organizations. The United States donated $3.7 billion via multilateral organizations out of a total ODA of $31 billion, which represents just 12% (OECD/QWIDS 2013). There are many reasons why countries choose to channel funds through multilateral organizations. It has been argued that Japan's history of atrocities during the World War II contributes to a sense in which legitimacy is best provided through multilateral actors (Shah and Wilkins 2006). Certainly in areas which have experienced colonialism or direct political interference from developed nations, multilateral actors can provide a less controversial means of distributing external support. European DAC countries tend to have a strong commitment to multilateral governance, and provide multilateral funding through the European Union in addition to commitments to the UN and others. The USA, on the other hand, has long-standing legislation that demands its development assistance be identified as *American Aid*. This is seen to complement its diplomatic, trade, and military projection around the world by improving favorability toward the USA (US Agency for International Development, USAID

2013). Decisions to use multilateral or bilateral channels for ODA can therefore draw on many complex, interconnected issues which political economic research can help unravel.

Non-governmental organizations

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are actors which exist in order to engage with specific problems related to development and social change. To be recognized as NGOs by the United Nations, such organizations must be independent of governments, operate on a not-for-profit basis, and contribute to the UN's overall aims. Their primary goals are raising awareness for social and humanitarian issues, fundraising, lobbying governments and corporations, and delivering aid. There are many different kinds of NGOs, but all would be expected to perform at least one of these activities. Some NGOs are local, operating with one issue in one region of a country; others are international, and work with many issues all over the world. Some of the largest NGOs, like Amnesty International and Médecins Sans Frontières, are influential and respected actors, playing an important role in the international system.

In international development, it is widely accepted that both bilateral and multilateral funding can be channeled through NGOs. This is because it is problematic for a developed country to act directly in other sovereign states. NGOs are valuable because many have an *operational* component, which means that they have people "on the ground" who can deliver aid. This may be complemented by an *advocacy* component, which refers to their ability to lobby, raise awareness, and generate funds of their own. The largest NGO is called *BRAC*, an operational NGO originally limited to developing rural areas of Bangladesh, but now operating in several other countries. It has over 100,000 employees and distributed £420 million to developing regions in 2011. Advocacy NGOs, such as *Publish What You Fund*, operate from much smaller budgets and work closely with governments and other NGOs to promote transparency and accountability. Their annual *Aid Transparency Index* is a publication that names and shames international development actors based on how transparently they operate. This helps raise awareness of transparency issues and places pressure on development organizations to reform aspects of their behavior.

Many NGOs are partly or wholly funded by Western governments, out of budgets for bilateral ODA. This is because NGOs are (in most cases at least) seen as relatively benign organizations acting independently of government interference. NGOs are often motivated by a cause, such as enhancing women's rights, providing clean water, or supplying medical vaccines. Even if they are funded by governments, they are focused on delivering their niche area of development support because they strongly believe in the value of their work, and their allegiance often resonates with the needs of communities in developing regions rather than with their

donors. As a consequence of this, NGOs often represent these communities as advocators of social change. This complex role has led to criticism on the basis that NGOs speak *for* vulnerable communities, and therefore that they resurrect structures of colonial dominance and dependence. Competition over funding can create apathy or resentment over charity work; in the UK, aggressive fundraising on high-streets has led to volunteers being termed *chuggers* – an amalgam of the words "charity" and "muggers." Furthermore, the de-radicalization of NGOs like Greenpeace has led to the accusation that NGOs are too assimilated into the contemporary international system. Their reliance on government funding and coziness with policymakers within advocacy circles has reduced the potential for large-scale social change.

Private donors

There is the perception within aid circles that private donors, such as corporations and foundations, are contributing to the privatization of aid. In fact, foundations are believed to together contribute around $5 billion to international development per year; an amount comparable to the ODA of countries like Canada, Australia, Italy, Norway, and Sweden (World Bank (n.d.); OECD-DAC 2013). However, these figures are difficult to be certain about because they are not captured by the DAC or an equivalent body. Foundations tend to hold a large pot of money and only distribute the dividends (usually 5–10%) from investment each year. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, for example, has an endowment (overall funds) of $36 billion, and distributed $2.6 billion in grants in 2010 and $3.4 billion in 2011 (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 2013). The wealth of these foundations is therefore far greater than their annual donations, which makes it difficult to precisely define their actual (rather than potential) impact upon the field.

Transnational corporations like Coca-Cola also make large charitable donations in excess of $100 million per year. However, only a small proportion of charitable grants from corporations are earmarked for international development. Corporations tend to make other kinds of investments, such as in infrastructure, factories, and companies, which is termed *foreign direct investment* (FDI). This can be a contributory factor in international development, but it is first and foremost about investing money in foreign businesses in order to secure high rates of return. These kinds of investments are important for economies to grow, and hence to development in a broad sense. It should be noted that developed countries also compete over FDI. FDI flowing into the USA alone in 2011 was worth $2.6 trillion; FDI flowing out from the USA in 2010 exceeded $4.3 trillion (*The World Factbook*, CIA 2013). These kinds of figures dwarf ODA and suggest that corporate and banking actors, working explicitly in their self-interest, are by some distance the dominant actors in international development. Critics point to tax advantages sought in exchange for investment, poor employee rights (so-called "sweat shop"

cultures), and extortionately high rates of return on loans as negative consequences of FDI upon development. At the same time, FDI creates opportunities for economic growth which can potentially have a positive impact upon developing countries.

Issues for Political Economic Research

The political economy of international development is therefore a profoundly diverse and complex series of arrangements. These structures represent the varying motivations, beliefs, and interests of actors involved in providing development assistance. As a field of scholarship for exploring these issues, political economic research points to a holistic, interdisciplinary approach to the relationship between politics and economics and several other connected issues such as morality and good governance. This allows us, as students and researchers of the political economy of development, to raise important questions about the nature of development assistance. Here I will outline some questions that future researchers may wish to engage with when approaching the international development field.

Political economy is not just about data, but about how data are interpreted and help us understand whether sound decisions are being made at the political level. Back in the days of imperialism, economic decisions were made based on the needs of the home country. Subjects in the rest of the empire had no say. The reason for this is, of course, that politicians were answerable to a domestic electorate, not to subjugated peoples in other parts of the world. Despite the rise in multilateral governance since the World War II, this is in many respects still the case. Ministers with responsibility for international development are first and foremost answerable to their own electorate, not to recipient countries or citizens. Likewise, it may be noted that little has been said in this chapter about recipient countries. Should these countries simply be grateful for all influxes of ODA, or should they be involved in planning, allocating, and distributing foreign aid within their borders? In recent years, *recipients* of aid have been termed, in some fora at least, *partners*. What would partnership over international development entail? How close are the practices under investigation to your ideas of partnership?

Aid statistics clearly tell us a lot, but the data do not capture everything. If we want to know about the actual impact of policies, we need to look beyond the figures, to the specific communities undergoing social change. How should we account for this when conducting political economic research? More specifically, how should we account for different responses to the same policies in different parts of the world at different times? This is a particularly challenging issue for those of us interested in the role of communication in social change.

Communication is a cultural phenomenon, and culture is dynamic and complex. What are the best ways to integrate the insights of cultural and communication studies into political economic research?

The ethics behind international development are also important. The origins of political economy as an extension of moral philosophy point to the holistic nature of political economic reasoning. Missionary and Cold War ideologies of modernization were based around a similarly systematic style of thought behind economic policies. Cultural imperialism research demonstrated that free trade ideologies of modernization could create structures of dependency which hindered modernization. On the one hand, many donors were working earnestly to help developing countries; on the other, some corporations saw a self-interest from supporting development. Likewise, many NGOs use volunteers to achieve remarkable things in some of the world's poorest regions; at the same time, NGO activities can, at times, resemble colonialist intervention. Helping people in need is clearly a noble goal, but how do we more fully engage with the motivations behind international development, particularly when these belong to a whole culture of thinking and reasoning about the world? What obligations do researchers have to unravel these issues?

When political decisions are made about aid allocations, what factors come into play? We saw in the case of India two varying approaches. The UK recently argued that India is no longer in need of development assistance, whereas Germany increased its assistance as part of efforts to bolster its image with BRICS. Clearly, there is a strong link between aid and diplomatic goals, and it is worth adding that although many countries have international development ministries, foreign ministries still take most of the decisions determining funding levels. This means that factors connected to diplomacy, such as political lobbying, trade, culture, language, education, and science, may find their way into decision-making processes. Therefore although the vast majority of aid is no longer conditional or tied, this does not mean that bilateral donors do not want or expect something in return. Political economic approaches to development assistance should be prepared to ask difficult questions about the motivations behind these decisions, and the deals that are reached with recipient governments. The notion of self-interest in particular is not one that should be ignored.

Institutions like OECD-DAC, the World Bank, and Publish What You Fund are among a small number that produce data about aid. How important is access to impartial, timely data about development funding? How important is it to recipient countries, to other development actors working with similar issues, to researchers, and to the electorate? The United States, for example, only publishes its proposed ODA spending once it has been ratified by Congress, which is at the earliest a year before it is spent. What limits does this place upon the ability of developing countries to plan their economies and coordinate development assistance within their borders? *Transparency* is probably the single most significant issue in development research at the moment (from a political economy perspective at

least), and efforts are underway to standardize the data produced by donor organizations of all kinds, including *forward spending*. In what ways might standardization of data improve aid allocation and delivery? Can aid transparency movements provide solutions to any of the current problems in the development industry?

Finally, given the disproportionate levels of FDI alongside development funding, the emergence of private foundations, and the activities outside of ODA associated with South–South cooperation, does traditional aid have a future? What role could and should the market play? Does development funding – outside of emergency humanitarian aid – need to be rethought? In what ways could notions like *partnership* and *international society* provide a basis for new forms of development?

As students and researchers of the political economy of development and social change, it is our responsibility to ask these kinds of questions, and to consider radical alternatives. It is our responsibility to question the politics that lies behind the grand statistics on development; not simply to accept the numbers at face value, but to ask whether the right decisions are being made. This is no simple task, but it is one that political economy research is uniquely placed to address.

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4

Advocacy Communication

Karin Gwinn Wilkins

This chapter contributes to an overview of development and social change by offering a discussion of advocacy approaches to social justice. Advocacy communication offers a critical approach within the field of development, working toward social justice. Recognizing conditions of globalization contributes toward an analysis of problems and solutions that privilege normative and structural change. First, I consider how advocacy has been conceptualized within the field of development and social change, reviewing the political foundations of development paradigms. Next, I explore the role of communication and media in facilitating and limiting the potential for advocacy. Finally, I position advocacy communication as integral in this work, concluding with future research areas that would contribute toward social justice.

Advocacy

Advocacy engages public communication in support of a particular political cause. This political process may target a variety of communities, public as well as policy makers, toward creating social support on behalf of policy change. The communication processes are strategic, resonating with the broader field of development communication and social change in which interventions are conceptualized and implemented toward a public good.

Advocacy focuses our attention on strategic programs that attempt to change policies, through mobilizing direct support as well as shifting indirect normative social support, thus differentiating its approach from social marketing and

other communication campaigns focused on individual behavior change. Servaes and Malikhao (2012: 229) describe advocacy as a "key term in development discourse," aiming "to foster public policies that are supportive to the solution of an issue or programme." Tufte calls for entertainment-education strategies to supplement individual behavior change approaches "to advocate for social change … in order to find solutions" (2012: 92). Advocacy communication engages strategic intervention with clear political positions, having no pretense toward neutrality, and resisting hegemonic dominance in valuing social justice.

Political Foundations of Development

Critical deconstructions of the development industry articulate the importance of understanding the politics of development work (Dutta 2011; Escobar 1995; Nederveen Pieterse 2009; Wilkins 2000). Focusing on advocacy allows us to consider the potential value of social change, recognizing the latent and manifest politics of approaches to intervention. McAnany reminds us of the important role Latin American scholars played in understanding communication as a tool toward activism rooted in politics (2012: 73). Politics, whether expressly stated or implicitly guiding intervention, are part of development praxis.

Several comprehensive reviews of the historical context of development and social change (Enghel and Wilkins 2012; Gumucio-Dagron and Tufte 2006; Hemer and Tufte 2005; Wilkins and Mody 2001) offer a basis for this focused discussion of the political assumptions manifest in development paradigms. This review explores the political foundations of development paradigms, beginning with modernization, as a way to introduce the role of advocacy in development.

Often referred to as the "dominant paradigm" in development, modernization privileges economic growth and consumption, through strategic interventions designed to change individual behavior. As Mattelart describes modernization, its "ultimate phase or promised land was none other than 'consumer society', the expression of progress conceived as a linear process" (2011: 64). Although communication technologies and global political contexts have changed dramatically since the time of Lerner's key publication over half a century ago (1958), modernization has maintained its presence in published scholarship in development communication (Ogan *et al.* 2009; Fair and Shah 1997). Lerner's (1958) emphasis on the importance of media in cultivating empathy in individuals, who would become more modern through voting in elections and working in private industry, assumes a pluralist process in which individuals have the ability to change their structures and circumstances. Shifting from a modernization to a more participatory approach, Freire (1983) shares Lerner's attribution of individual

responsibility for action, but differs in recognizing the importance of collective consciousness and structural change.

The participatory approach emerged in response to concerns that modernization approaches too readily imposed the political agendas of donor governments on recipient institutions. Instead, the communities "targeted" for development became seen as needing to be involved in decisions over processes of social change. Over time this mantra became well regarded as part of development discourse, but programs varied greatly within this rubric: some still engaged in more hierarchical diffusion exploiting minimal participatory processes for efficiency, while others attempted more ethically engaged processes. The underlying political value was to give voice and power to the poor and marginalized, itself a political agenda.

However, within the development industry this initially more political agenda became "depoliticized" in public discourse, to help powerful development institutions avoid confrontation with local communities (Sparks 2011: 74). Participatory communication programs, in practice, became "embedded with dominant structures and therefore are dictated by the goals of the status quo" (Dutta 2012: 61), guided by the politics of dominant donor institutions (Melkote 2012b: 29).

Critical of wealthy bilateral agencies and governments, scholars concerned with dependency recognized that national policies, particularly of poor countries, are subject to international conditions, thus bringing our attention to the global context in which programs are conceived, funded, and implemented. Some scholars raised concerns with cultural and media imperialism within communication industries more broadly (Sparks 2011), resulting in unequal access to cultural production and distribution. Although recognition of international structures and inequities had been part of critical political-economic analyses of development and of communication industries, over time what Sparks refers to as an emerging "globalization paradigm was, and still is, very much more optimistic. Its starting point is not a critique of inequality but a celebration of exchange between nations, firms and individuals" (2011: 189).

Critical of this celebration, Sparks concludes his insightful and comprehensive review of development theories suggesting that we continue to consider how communication might work in helping to alleviate poverty and inequity (2011: 194). An emerging role for development communication, Melkote agrees, is in "not just facilitating development but also to look at the present state of unequal development among global communities, document its negative consequences on people and communities, and identify reasons for such an unequal spread of development benefits" (2012a: 4). This role becomes increasingly important as inequities within and across nations grow (Dutta 2012; Rosati 2012).

Global capitalism is characterized by these inequities, produced through market systems in ways that benefit some at the expense of many. The globalization approach to development is best explained as capitalism: "The master category

that explains them all (globalization phenomena) is not globalization but capitalism, in its most recent and expansive phase" (Sparks 2011: 186). Moreover, this framework is guided by an "absolute belief in the truth of the (characteristically Enlightenment) proposition that the market is the most beneficial form of social organization possible for humanity. The globalization paradigm in communication studies is clearly part of this more general re-alignment of thought towards an uncritical acceptance of the benign nature of capitalism" (Sparks 2011: 14).

In US-based development approaches, capitalism and democracy become conflated as perceived inevitable economic and political structures in the quest for modernization (Shah 2011). Consumption, necessary for capitalism to function, then becomes a desired individual behavior in multiple venues. Mattelart thoughtfully considers historical contexts in the US, describing how in the early 1920s, advertising to promote consumption became a "natural expression of democracy," as citizens were encouraged to identify through their status as consumers rather than as workers and producers (2011: 36). His concluding concern is that we need to advocate for more than a right to consume, instead promoting a "right to work, education, housing, health care and communication – rights in whose absence there can be no human dignity" (2011: 202).

But in the current phase of globalization, capitalist concerns dominate through the promotion of "neoliberal logic," serving as "the primary organizing framework" of development (Dutta 2011: 1). Dutta defines neoliberalism as:

> fundamentally an economic principle that constitutes the opening up of global markets to corporations that operate across the boundaries of nation states, the minimization of state interventions in the operation of the market, and the increasing privatization of public sectors that are brought under the framework of the free market logic. Markets and privatization are assumed to be the natural order. (2011: 86)

Thus, neoliberal logic guides assumptions about how to engage in social change through the development industry.

Neoliberal impulses support privatization and markets as a natural inevitable framework for development, rather than a consequence of hegemonic interests. Bilateral and multilateral development agencies, funded through governments increasingly affected by economic crisis, applaud their corporate partnerships, promoting the idea that private aid could substitute for states' responsibility to address collective needs, even though official development assistance from donor countries still funds proportionately most global development work (Kremer, van Lieshout, and Went 2010). The political-economic interests of global corporations then are well served by the privatization of the development industry. Globalization of development in recent years is built upon these neoliberal principles, reinforcing what Sparks calls an "uncritical acceptance of the benign nature of capitalism"

(2011: 14). This neoliberal agenda emphasizes individual empowerment through consumption and entrepreneurship in a market-based system.

To the extent that theories of globalization recognize conscious action as a necessary element in social change, the preferred actor tends to be the entrepreneur. It is the figure of Bill Gates, or Larry Ellison, or even Rupert Murdoch, who is central to driving forward the interconnectedness of the world, of abolishing local isolation, of developing global integration and facilitating the mobility that is central to the contemporary epoch (Sparks 2011: 132).

Neoliberal policies are supported when bilateral programs, such as USAID, work to open markets for investment (Dutta 2011: 47), or multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, push for structural adjustment programs that marginalize those with fewer resources (Dutta 2011: 59, 119). Farmer suicides in India, for example, have been traced to the commercialization of agriculture making it difficult for smaller producers to repay bank loans (Sainath 2012). The agricultural industry is ripe with examples of rhetorical positions that assert corporate control over earth as a market economy (Murphy 2011).

A dialectic that allows corporate power to attempt to dominate through justifying actions within neoliberal frameworks also leaves space for resistance. Although "neoliberal politics are evident in the large-scale growth of global corporate media power and global communication resources that promote neoliberalism," we are aware as well of emerging "media activism projects that use the very resources of neoliberal hegemony to disrupt the dominant discourses" (Dutta 2011: 267–268).

Understanding development as an institutional practice engaged within a context of global inequity draws our attention to social justice. Melkote confirms that "[i]ncreasingly, the idea of establishing social justice is finding common ground among development scholars" (2012a: 25). What a social justice framework offers, where other development paradigms have failed (Sparks 2011: 193), is in its recognition of unjust power structures and resistance to hegemonic elites (Melkote 2012b: 35). Power, as Dutta explains, "becomes central to processes of social change and is theorized in terms of its relationship with social structures in bringing about openings for change and in fundamentally changing the political economic structures" (2011: 31). While elite groups may attempt to control communication as a way to maintain their power in a global capitalist context, the dialectics of communicative practices allow the possibility for resistance and change. Communication itself offers process and context for advocacy.

Communication for Social Justice

Advocacy communication builds on an understanding of communication as a socio-cultural process of symbolic exchange, rooted in material artifacts and grounded in political and economic structures that guide access to key resources.

Communicative codes represent intersubjectively created and interpreted social constructions (Wittgenstein 1953; Dresner 2006). Adding a critical layer to the function of communication as social construction, Deetz (1994) recognizes the political contributions of creating communication through actions in context, centering communicative acts as engaged through current social and political challenges.

Creating meaning through articulating cultural symbols takes place not only through direct social engagement, but also within broader global dynamics. In their discussion of Geertz's critical contributions to communication theory, Kraidy and Murphy understand "local needs" as "the space where global forces become recognizable in form and practice as they are enmeshed in local human subjectivity and social agency" (2008: 339). This agency enables people "to engage with structures that encompass their lives, to make meanings through this engagement, and at the same time, creating discursive openings to transform these structures," (Dutta 2011: 13). These structures embody a "material reality as defined by policies and institutional networks that privilege certain sections of the population and marginalize others by constraining the availability of resources. Structures define and limit the possibilities that are available to participants as they enact agency to engage in practices that influence their health and well being" (Dutta 2011: 12). Agency within the realm of social justice is called for to resist dominant rhetorical frames as well as attempt to support redistributive justice in the allocation of material goods.

Hegemonic

Contrary to a pluralist approach to communication, in which all individuals are assumed to have equal access to political capital and the capacity to enact change, advocacy communication recognizes that differences in access to resources create spaces through which some groups have more power than others to assert their perspectives, and therefore have their interests dominate public agendas and policies. These resources include not only material and financial assets, but also social and cultural capital. Working within a recognized hegemonic process, advocacy communication enables potential to negotiate and work toward changing conditions for a public good through leveraging political resources and opportunities.

While communication serves as a broad framework for understanding human connection and collaboration, media offer particular artifacts, technologies, and texts within this process. Couldry, Livingstone, and Markham remind us that media contribute to civic engagement through offering textual venues for information and discussion as well as material objects that allow these interchanges to occur (2010: 24). The materiality of media technologies needs to be emphasized,

particularly as producing environmental waste and pollution on a global scale and as exploiting workers through unfair compensation (Maxwell and Miller 2008). Moreover, media are not just texts and technologies, but these programs and products are also global commodities, highly valued among the wealthiest groups. In our current state of "contemporary capitalism," "the media play out their roles as tools for disseminating the mantras of capitalism and for carrying out the agendas of the transnational corporations" (Dutta 2011: 269). This hegemonic process allows the captains of global industry to promote their ideological perspectives and influence policies that affect human survival. But within this dialectical hegemonic process, there are possibilities for resistance, enabled through dialogic communication.

Dialogic

An underlying social justice orientation conceptualizes communication as a dialogic process, facilitating praxis, combining thoughtful reflection with informed action (Freire 1983). Communication is not perceived as limited to a hierarchical diffusion of information, or within horizontal connections across communities, but instead as facilitating activist strategies. Communication then represents a social and political process of contesting meaning in a particular historical context. A discourse of advocacy helps to convey the idea that communication can represent not just collective agreement, but also political resistance, with dignity and not subservience. This resistance is important in a framework that works to assert the rights and voices of those who are marginalized and oppressed, through supporting processes that promote justice and equity.

Dialogic communication and empowerment strategies for social justice build upon ethical foundations of mutual respect (Tufte 2012: 93). As in participatory approaches, communication processes matter. Distinct from participatory approaches, Melkote poses empowerment as a strategy intentionally addressing power inequities (2012b: 32). Recognizing the importance of understanding differences in access to material resources and social capital, dialogic and empowerment approaches, like any other intervention strategy, maintains the risk of being subject to cooptation and not merely helpful in resistance (Dutta 2011: 241). The potential though warrants serious consideration. What these dialogic processes can hope to achieve is to facilitate the creation and interpretation of meaning, contributing to and reinforced by guided, appropriate action.

Media's role within this dialogic process can be understood as contingent upon the contexts in which material products and programs are produced, distributed, and texts interpreted and then engaged. It is not helpful to focus on discussions of just one medium or communication technology at the exclusion of others (as an example, Western media have overemphasized the role of digital media in Egyptian

protests; Wilkins 2011), when what people have access to depends upon their local and economic conditions. Even in their studies of wealthier societies, Couldry, Livingstone, and Markham detail the plurality of media as having a range of potential uses for civic engagement (2010: 24). For some groups, print may matter more than digital media, whereas transnational television might also offer a variety of perspectives on an accessible channel.

Given the emerging integration of communication technologies as material formats for distribution of visual, audio, and print texts, as well as the blurring of genres, proposing media as an integrated venue for communicative practices may offer more potential within this framework. News and entertainment have become increasingly intertwined in western communities, with more people acquiring news from comedy shows than news, and news shows focusing on celebrity culture at the expense of more substantive global reporting. Instead of contributing to a false dichotomy between news and entertainment (Williams and Delli Carpini 2011), advocacy communication recognizes a need to see genres as integrated and to use a variety of formats, in the service of advocacy.

Strategic

There are several ways in which communication can facilitate advocacy. Communication can be used to discover, understand, and encourage recognition of problems, as well as of potential solutions, for those engaged in the collective effort as well as for those targeted, such as public constituencies or policymakers. In addition to educating and mobilizing, communication sites serve as a venue through which groups contest interpretations of problems and proposed solutions.

One prominent approach in communication for social change uses social marketing to target individual behavior change, either in resource-limited communities, to improve health and living conditions, or in resource-rich communities, encouraging consumption and charitable giving. Social marketing has been particularly popular in health communication programs, intending to encourage changes in behavior that improve individuals' chances for longer, healthier lives. Some of these programs have been quite successful in meeting their behavioral goals, while others have had more limited success (see Colin Chasi's chapter on health communication). Situated as a strategy within the broader development industry, this "individual-emphasis on health" distracts us from structural changes that might be needed, supporting a "neoliberal logic (that) has framed health as a commodity to be purchased through the free market. This commoditization of health has led to the minimization of basic healthcare services, and in addition, has fostered large-scale health inequalities" (Dutta 2011: 144). By focusing on individual entrepreneurs in other development

programs, poverty becomes subject to an interpretation that blames individuals for their circumstances rather than understanding employment as part of national and global conditions (Rosati 2012: 97). Situating the responsibility for social change within individuals neglects critical structural conditions that limit possibilities.

But targeting individuals is not only within the purview of resource-poor communities. Individuals in wealthy countries are also targeted in communication campaigns designed to address global poverty. Individuals in wealthy countries are encouraged to contribute to charities, and to purchase products with direct links to contributing to development sources, such as the Global Fund (Richey and Ponte 2011; Rosati 2012). This approach, like the others described above, draws attention away from the small proportion of funding allocated through bilateral aid or controlled loans managed through multilateral agencies. Consuming the right products then is seen as the responsibility of wealthy individuals, rather than advocating for more just policies and resource distribution.

Another potential role for communication addressing individuals is in raising awareness of issues, not necessarily in support of behavior change. Projects attempting to promote peace may attempt to support stability and reconciliation through media projects. Hamelink (2012) though reminds us that these projects promoting collaboration need to be understood within a broader media landscape in which voices foster "hate," suggesting that "others" pose a threat to security.

Some strategic programs attempt to raise awareness of global poverty through broadcasting transnational musical events and relying on the appeal of media celebrities. Bob Geldof's 1984 musical gathering resulted in the distributed charity song "Do they know it's Christmas?" and inspired subsequent popular culture events, such as Live Aid, raising awareness and funding for abstract causes ("poverty") and regions ("Africa") (Lule 2012: 92–93). While these events did bring attention to global concerns to those with access to their distribution, audiences were left with little understanding of the roots of conflict and poverty in an unarticulated or explained "Africa" (Richey and Ponte 2011).

Beyond media's marketing role in convincing people to purchase products, communication may offer a space for communities to articulate their positions and support dialogue. As "a dynamic and contested terrain," media texts and technologies allow groups struggling "in social change processes" some control "over the sites and channels of representation in societies" (Dutta 2011: 269). Understandings of the root causes of injustice, access to health resources, and other development concerns may be advanced through posing perspectives that compete for attention and legitimation in public discourse.

Advocacy considers communication less as a tool to change individual psychology or behavior, and more as a venue for articulation and competition over positions, rooted in broader social and political contexts. Rather than changing

people, communication introduces ideas, building on existing knowledge, helping to mobilize action. As Quarry and Ramírez (2009) explain, advocacy promotes voice among those who are marginalized, facilitating their active participation in decisions that matter in their lives.

This normative support for interpretations of problems and proposed solutions is one of the projected goals of media advocacy. Wallack and his colleagues (1999) detail an approach to using media attention from news sources to reframe positions in order to advance policy change. Servaes and Malikhao (2012) raise a concern that media advocacy tends to be oriented toward resolving immediate issues rather than alleviating long-term concerns. However, depending on the goal of the program, long-term normative and structural change can be addressed.

Media advocacy might be combined well with other approaches, as the Soul City program in South Africa has done bridging entertainment-education with advocacy work (Usdin *et al.* 2000). In this work Soul City addressed gender-based violence, mobilizing groups to support a national policy, the Domestic Violence Act, protecting women's rights as human rights. In the implementation of this project, their advocacy included direct lobbying of politicians, media advocacy, and social mobilization.

The ultimate goal of advocacy work, whether focusing on media specifically or communication more comprehensively, is to change policy (Dutta 2011; Servaes and Malikhao 2012). Programs might target policies of local or national governmental authorities, such as changing city ordinances on smoking in public settings or national policies on health care (Wallack *et al.* 1999); multilateral agencies, such as protests in Seattle against the World Trade Organization (WTO) or Zapatista challenges to NAFTA (Dutta 2011: 20); or corporations, as the British group Baby Milk Action (IBFAN) organized boycotts against Nestlé for aggressively marketing infant formula (Lule 2012: 73).

Social movements have emerged as critical actors in promoting social justice (Downing 2011; Rodríguez, Kidd, and Stein 2009). McAnany shares concerns raised by others that large development institutions have a difficult time "promoting genuine change" (2012: 7). At this juncture many critical scholars (such as Escobar 1995) call for the active engagements of social movements in a "post-development" era, promoting resistance to dominant development approaches, such as that of the World Bank. Without direct ties to a global capitalist elite, social movements have the potential to promote more resistant discourses and act in protest of policies that privilege few at the expense of many. Social movements though represent a broad category of many different types of collective organizations and communities. Such vast differences, in funding, size, organizational style, and agenda in relation to dominant cultural climate, means that we need to consider the particular contexts of social movements (Huesca 2001) if we want to consider their potential as an alternative to bilateral and multilateral development practices. Transnational social movements,

transcending national political boundaries across local concerns, are of particular interest to advocacy communication given their global orientation.

In addressing concerns with social justice, global movements mobilize constituents across national boundaries (Dutta 2011: 23). For example, the World Social Forum positions itself as a viable and valuable alternative to the World Economic Forum (Dutta 2011: 239). Communication offers a space for contesting neoliberal agendas, privileging individual competition and free market enterprise, instead promoting ideals of dignity, justice, and equity. Instead of reifying neoliberalism, the global social movements warranting our attention promote these competing ideals as a way to counter the material consequences of neoliberal practices (Willis, Smith, and Stenning 2008).

Communication about Social Justice

Advocacy communication builds strategic intervention *for* social justice, through a self-reflexive process in order to be *about* social justice as well. To be self-reflexive, strategies are informed by considerations of how competing rhetoric relates to dominant discourse. This rhetorical comprehension gains from an awareness of the political-economic context as well. Working dialogically, advocacy communication has the potential for political resistance against dominant rhetoric when implemented by groups that are structurally independent.

By not relying on concentrated funding through an external agency, structural independence allows the possibility for strategic communication to be more flexible, and even more controversial. If any particular donor disagrees with programmatic goals and ceases funding, the survival of the organization is not in jeopardy. Moreover, the need to document a particular kind of success in order to be accountable to one donor for institutional survival is reduced.

Evaluation is still crucial though to the learning process, in order to improve strategic approaches. The structural independence of researchers, and not just of the organizations, conducting evaluations will allow a more critical approach to assessment. This independence refers not only to funding, but also to researchers' investments in particular strategies, methodologies, or theories. Being open to a variety of approaches will enable a more flexible and comprehensive evaluation. By focusing on the nature of the problem, rather than limiting work to singular evaluations of projects studied, we can consider the relative successes and challenges of various approaches in particular contexts. Similarly, studies of social movement organizations may contribute more to our understanding by moving beyond examining individual organizations. The emphasis proposed here is to consider the underlying issue of concern, such as adequate health care, human rights, or gender equity. In order to resolve social justice problems within their

historical and situational contexts, research needs to assess a variety of strategies and contextual conditions over time, in order to consider long-term, sustainable solutions.

Knowledge for social justice needs to be grounded in critical research, addressing the current social concerns of our time (Calhoon 2011; Deetz and Putnam 2001). From a communication standpoint, we might explore how communicative practices serve interests of dominant groups, to enable empirical claims documenting oppression. Dempsey and her colleagues' discussions of communication scholarship (2011) offer a valuable conversation about the nature of social justice, as the subject of research as well as political engagement. They position critical scholarship that contributes to transformative change, through studying social movements as well as systems of oppression, as integral to the work of social justice. Scholars devoted to social justice may contribute to this work by making claims in academic and public spheres that support helpful systemic change. Resonating with this approach, Dutta argues that "to reclaim the agenda of social change, critical communication theorists and scholars (should) draw attention to the hegemonic narratives of capitalism and neoliberalism, and continually disrupt these hegemonic narratives theoretically, methodologically and in praxis" (2011: 291). To work against these dominant neoliberal narratives, we can engage in critical scholarship that contributes to transformative social justice.

As a strategic approach, advocacy communication attempts to address human costs of globalization, in a context of accentuated global capitalism, political imperialism, human rights violations, and environmental devastation. Although global communication industries are constrained through an increasingly privatized structure that disempowers unions and other attempts toward collective bargaining, there is potential for groups to activate responses to years of frustration and concern. Recognizing the potential for communication to operate on behalf of those in power, we need to understand communication sites as terrains of conflict and risk, engaging technological as well as political contests over control of resources. It is the purpose of advocacy communication to build strategic, dialogic approaches that can be structurally independent, and empirically based, toward improving our human condition.

Future Research

Advocacy communication as an approach to promote social justice in a context of global capitalism is itself emerging within the broader field of development communication. Critical communication scholarship can contribute to this work by situating assessments of approaches over time and across places in political and historical contexts. Reflexive engagement, working with empirical evidence as a

tool for informing communities in order to advance appropriate policies, will contribute to social justice through dialogic communication.

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5

Equality and Human Rights

Cees J. Hamelink

Inequality undermines the rule of law so that "justice for all" is replaced by "justice for those who can afford it."

(Joseph Stiglitz)

Inequality undermines communication rights so that "communication for all" is replaced by "communication for those who can afford it."

(Cees J. Hamelink)

The key argument of this chapter is that the prevailing state of inequality in the world poses a basic threat to human survival. The chapter concludes with reflections on how we can begin to rescue the future to protect human rights.

Human Rights and Equality

Throughout history, the notion of equality engages thinkers in controversial exchanges about human nature. Against arguments for a natural human hierarchy, the natural equality of all was defended. Against classical assumptions about the inequality of human beings, egalitarian positions about moral equality emerged. The French Revolution arguably provided the essential inspirational source for the prominence of equality as a political ideal. Although the concept raised more questions than it could answer and was never satisfactorily defined, it became a crucial norm in the international human rights regime that emerged after World War II. Actually, human rights imposed on processes of social development that

they be guided by the principle of "equality." The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states, "Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." And Article 1 provides that "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."

The drafting of this article went through an editorial process where the reference to the beneficiaries of its provisions evolved (in the 1947 Drafting Committee sessions) from:

> "All men shall regard each other as brothers," to "all men are brothers", to "all men … should act towards one another like brothers" to "all members of the human family" and finally to "all human beings."[1]

What remained throughout the discussions as a stable element was the reference to the equality of human dignity and human rights. However, several delegates were discontent about the notion "born free." This was largely due to this statement being seen as an assertion of facts and not as the formulation of entitlement. Eventually, the notion of born free and equal was retained and herewith the foundation for international human rights in a culturally, politically, economically and ideologically very divided world was formulated as the acceptance of the inherent freedom and equal dignity of all people. Any tradition, as long as it supports this basis, can support universal human rights (Lindholm 1992: 53).

Herewith the basic document for the international human rights regime established that all people are entitled to equality in rights and in human dignity. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht (quoted in Ramcharan 1981: 257) wrote that the claim to equality "is in a substantial sense the most fundamental of the rights of man. It occupies the first place in most written constitutions. It is the starting point of all other liberties." And the head of the Federal Political Department of Switzerland, at the World Conference to Combat Racism in 1978 observed that "Of all human rights, the right to equality is one of the most important" (Ramcharan 1981: 247). As Article 9 of the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice states:

> The principle of the equality in dignity and rights of all human beings and all people, irrespective of race, colour and origin, is a generally accepted and recognized principle of international law.

A memorandum by the Secretary General of the UN to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and protection of Minorities (1949) stated that equality refers to moral and juridical equality but not to material equality. Ramcharan (1981: 253) wrote about this:

> The principle of equality as a human right does not exclude distinctions based on differences of two kinds, which are generally considered admissible and justified:

(a) differentiation based on character and conduct imputable to the individual for which he may be properly held responsible (examples are industriousness, idleness, carefulness, decency, indecency, merit, demerit, delinquency, lawfulness); and (b) differentiation based on individual qualities, which in spite of not being qualities for which the individual can be held responsible, are relevant to social values and may be taken … account (examples are physical and mental capacities, talent etc.).

When using the standard of "equality" one should note that in the conventional human rights theories there is a bias toward an interpretation that assumes all human beings are equally capable in asserting their rights and in which the legal system is formally based upon the assumption of the initiative of autonomous citizens to defend their rights. These liberal foundations of human rights law neglect the reality of widely differing capacities to such initiative. In reality, the powerful are always better in asserting their rights through litigation than the less powerful. The conventional approach to human rights provides anti-discriminatory protection in the sense of repairing the negative effects of social differentiation. Correcting social disadvantages through the equal treatment of unequals does not however structurally change unequal relations of power. Equal treatment can even reinforce the inequality. Providing equal liberties to unequal partners often functions in the interest of the more powerful. It needs therefore to be observed that there is a deep collision between the dominant conventional and the "cosmopolitan" school of human rights thought.

In the conventional approach (very much present in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948) equality – contrary to human dignity – is not an inherent feature of humanity. Actually, human rights are based upon the inequality of power relations between the state and the citizen. There is little the citizen can do about this inequality in power. Human rights manage this inequality by correcting its most obvious negative social effects but do not fundamentally erase it. In the conventional approach human rights may contribute to minimizing the negative effects of economic inequality but do not fundamentally change this. The structural political and economic forces (state and capitalism) that are at the roots of many human rights abuses are not addressed.

Yet, the human rights regime at least proposes to limit the damage these forces – if left unrestrained – would impose on humanity. The currently prevailing conventional human rights discourse thinking emerged from a liberal tradition that is deeply influenced by the value of human autonomy and the implied freedom of the individual to speak, believe, vote, and participate in the life of society as he/she sees fit and the right to own and protect private property. This discourse had – despite the formal pretense of universalism – no strong interest in the cosmopolitan ideals of communal responsibility and collective welfare. Against this conception there is a cosmopolitan human rights discourse that stresses the need to accept reciprocal obligations among the members of a society. To realize such cosmopolitan ideals this discourse needs to combine (as Immanuel

Kant already suggested) autonomy and reciprocity (Woodiwiss 2005: 13). Since the prevailing human rights discourse prefers autonomy over reciprocity and individual freedom over collective responsibility, it hampers the realization of equality as distributive justice.

Equality in the International Debates on Information and Communication

In the earliest meetings of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, the inadequacy of information facilities in the less developed countries was highlighted. Diplomats representing these countries stressed that with the existing disparities there could be no reciprocity and equality in world communication.

Several resolutions by the Council and by the General Assembly expressed the need to improve information enterprises in the less developed countries and in 1957 the General Assembly requested the ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights to "give special consideration to the problem of developing media of information in under-developed countries."

One year later the United Nations General Assembly requested ECOSOC to formulate "a programme of concrete action and measures on the international plane which could be undertaken for the development of information enterprises in under-developed countries." The specialized agencies were invited to contribute to this initiative.

UNESCO was asked to study the mass media in the "less developed countries" to survey the problems involved in the development of communication. This was no new terrain to the organization. In its early history there had been an effort to reconstruct and develop mass communication media in war-devastated countries. At its third General Conference in 1948 a resolution was adopted that added to this "the provision of raw materials, equipment and professional training facilities … for under-developed areas." This was the beginning of assistance to Third World countries, which received special impetus when in 1958 the General Conference explicitly requested the Director General "to help develop media of information in the underdeveloped countries." In response to the request of the General Assembly, UNESCO organized a series of expert meetings (in Bangkok, 1960; Santiago, 1961; and Paris, 1962) to assess communication needs and to design ways to meet these needs. The organization also prepared a report that was presented to the General Assembly (GA) in 1961. This report on "Mass Media in Developing Countries" formulated minimal levels of communication capacity and concluded that for some 70% of the world population this minimum was not available (UNESCO 1961).

The report recommended that communication should be considered part of the overall United Nations development effort and thus be incorporated in the UN

Technical Assistance Programme. In response to the report ECOSOC suggested in 1961 that developed countries should assist the developing countries in the "development of independent national information media, with due regard for the culture of each country." In 1961, ECOSOC recommended to the General Assembly that the UNESCO program should get its place within the efforts of the First United Nations Development Decade.

In 1962 the UNGA confirmed this by stating that "development of communication media was part of overall development." Herewith a multilateral programme of technical assistance to the development of mass communication capacity was launched that was unanimously supported by the UN member states.

The technical assistance program that lasted throughout the 1960s was primarily oriented toward the transfer of resources and skills. In the 1970s, the non-aligned countries began to recognize that technical assistance did not alter their dependency status, that information inequality persisted and that in fact their cultural sovereignty was increasingly threatened. They therefore opened the debate on the need to set normative standards for mass media. The key agenda issue for this debate was the demand for a new international information order. This demand expressed the Third World concern about disparity in communication capacity along three lines.

First, there was concern about the impact that the skewed communication relations between North and South would have on the independent cultural development of the Third World nations. Actually, the first Non-Aligned Summit in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 already referred to the impact of colonialism on culture. "The existence of colonialism in many parts of Asia and Africa, in whatever form it may be, not only prevents cultural co-operation but also suppresses the national cultures of the peoples … Some colonial powers have denied their dependent peoples basic rights in the sphere of education and culture." The 1973 Non-Aligned Summit at Algiers expressed its concern about cultural colonialism as the effective successor to the earlier territorial modes of colonialism.

Second, there was concern about the largely one-sided media exports from the North to the countries of the Third World, distorting or ignoring content about developments in the South. The Algiers Summit called for the "reorganization of existing communication channels, which are a legacy of the colonial past and which have hampered free, direct and fast communication between developing countries." This disequilibrium in the exchange of information between the North and the South controlled by few Western transnational information companies began to be criticized by the Non-Aligned Movement as an instrument of cultural colonialism.

The Tunis symposium of 1976 stated "Since information in the world shows a disequilibrium favoring some and ignoring others, it is the duty of the non-aligned countries and other developing countries to change this situation and obtain the decolonization of information and initiate a new international order of information" (Ramcharan 1981). The New Delhi Declaration on Decolonization

of Information stated that the establishment of a New International Order for Information is as necessary as the New International Economic Order.

A third line of concern addressed the transfer of media technology. On balance it was concluded in the early 1970s that precious little technology had been transferred and that by and large only technical end-products had been exported from the industrial nations. This was often done under disadvantageous conditions so that in the end the technical and financial dependence of the receiving countries had only increased. As from its Algiers Summit in 1973 the Non-Aligned Movement continuously articulated its position of strong support for the emancipation and development of media in the developing nations. UNESCO became the most important forum for this debate.

Already in 1970 the minutes of the UNESCO General Conference read "Delegates from a number of developing countries stressed the need to ensure that the free flow of information and international exchanges should be a two-way operation. They asserted that the programme must continue to emphasize the rights of less privileged nations, to preserve their own culture." In a first phase (1970-1976) the debate was characterized by the effort to "decolonize." In this period political and academic projects evolved that fundamentally criticized the existing international information order and that developed proposals for decisive changes. Several years of declarations, resolutions, recommendations, and studies converged into the demand for a New International Information Order (NIIO).

The concept surfaced at the Tunis information symposium in March, 1976. With this concept (formally recognized by non-aligned heads of state in August 1976 on Sri Lanka) a clear linkage was established with the proposal for a fundamental restructuring of the international economy that was put forward in 1974 (the New International Economic Order, NIEO). Both new orders were deeply inspired by the human rights principle of equality. Although the precise meaning of the NIIO was not defined, it was evident that it raised the aspiration to a level playing field for the international information exchange.

During the 19th General Conference of UNESCO in 1976 at Nairobi, a draft resolution proposed by Tunisia was discussed and adopted. The resolution invited the Director General "to pay special attention to the activities of the bodies responsible for coordinating and implementing the information programme of the non-aligned countries … to strengthen the intellectual, technical and financial resources provided for under the Regular Programme through an appreciable and appropriate increase in the proposed growth rate for communication and information activities …" (Ramcharan 1981).

The 20th General Conference of UNESCO in 1978 at Paris adopted a request to the MacBride Commission to propose measures that could lead "to the establishment of a more just and effective world information order." In fact, this Conference was a turning point in the debate insofar as at this meeting the hostile opposition toward the idea of a new order was softened. There began to be almost unanimous

acceptance that Third World countries had justifiable complaints and that concessions must be made by the industrialized states. The original formula coined by the Non-Aligned Movement, NIIO, was replaced by the proposal for a "new, more just and effective world information and communication order," NWICO. According to the interpretation of United States Ambassador John Reinhardt at the 1978 General Conference, this new order required "a more effective program of action, both public and private, to suitable identified centers of professional education and training in broadcasting and journalism in the developing world … (and) … a major effort to apply the benefits of advanced communications technology … to economic and social needs in the rural areas of developing nations." The new order (NWICO) that was now acceptable to all UNESCO member states was mainly interpreted as a program for the transfer of knowledge, finances, and technical equipment. The problem of the international information structure was being reduced to mere technical proportions. In response to this an intergovernmental program for support to the development of communication was launched as a Western initiative in 1980.

The 21st General Conference in 1980 at Belgrade adopted by consensus a resolution concerning the establishment of the International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC).

During the UNESCO General Conferences of 1976, 1978, and 1980 the Western minority managed to achieve most of its policy objectives against the expressed preference of the majority of member states. In the end the debate did not yield the results demanded by the developing countries. Their criticism of the past failures of technical assistance programs was answered by the creation of yet another such program: the International Programme for the Development of Communication. By many Third World delegates this programme was seen as the instrument to implement the standards of the NWICO. The UNESCO General Conference of 1980 had stated that among these standards were the elimination of the imbalances and inequalities that characterize the present situation, the capacity of the developing countries to achieve improvement of their own situation, notably by providing infrastructure and by making their information and communication means suitable to their needs and aspirations and the sincere will of developed countries to help them. The IPDC was not going to meet these expectations. Apart from the inherent difficulty that IPDC did represent a definition of world communication problems that had in the past not worked to the benefit of Third World nations, the programme would also from the outset suffer a chronic lack of resources. Although the Non-Aligned Summit in Belgrade (September 1989) reiterated its support for the NWICO, the UNESCO General Conference strove hard to reach consensus on formulations that represented conventional freedom of the press, pluralism of the media, freedom of expression, and free flow of information positions. According to the UNESCO Director General (in 1989) plans for a new information order did no longer exist in UNESCO.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the principle of equality met in the literature and policy debates about information/communication with a great deal of consensus. In 1991, for example, the non-discrimination standard was applied to the use of telecommunication satellites through a resolution by the General Assembly of the UN: "Communication by means of satellite should be available on a global and non-discriminatory basis" (Res. 1721 D [XVI] in 1961).

Yet, at the same time there was general agreement in the scientific literature and in public policy statements that the information and communications technology (ICT) gap between the developed and developing countries was widening. As the UNDP Development Report of 1999 stated "The network society is creating parallel communication systems: one for those with income, education and – literally – connections, giving plentiful information at low cost and high speed; the other for those without connections, blocked by high barriers of time, cost and uncertainty and dependent on outdated information" (UNDP 1999: 63).

At the turn of the century the worldwide distribution of ICT resources continued to be enormously unequal. In terms of availability, accessibility, and affordability of equipment and services as well as the mastery of technical and managerial skills, there remained great disparities between affluent and developing countries, but also between different social groups within all countries.

WSIS and the Global Digital Divide

The information/communication inequality became one of the key issues of the United Nations World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS 2003 in Geneva and 2005 in Tunis). There was a tendency in the WSIS debates to treat the digital divide mainly as a matter of the globally skewed distribution of information and communication resources. The divide was not primarily seen as a dimension of the overall global "development divide." Since this bigger problem was not seriously addressed, a romantic fallacy prevailed, which proposed that the resolution of information/communication problems, and the bridging of knowledge gaps or inequalities of access to technologies, can contribute to the solution of the world's most urgent and explosive socioeconomic inequities. This isolated the digital divide from the broader problem of the development divide. In reality the digital divide is not more than one of the many manifestations of the unequal allocation of both material and immaterial resources in the world, both between and within societies. Its solution has little to do with information, communication or ICT. This is a matter of political will, lacking in a majority of nation-states.

Instead of the strong political commitment that is needed, the WSIS discourse focused on the possibility of a global "Digital Solidarity Fund." This is an almost scandalous proposition in view of the fact that since the 1970s all the efforts to

develop and sustain such funds for communication development, telecommuni-
cation infrastructures, and technological self-reliance have failed because of the
lack of political will. The WTO Ministerial meeting in Cancún (September 2003)
demonstrated once again that not all stakeholders are equally intent on solving
rich–poor divides. Fortunately the poor countries understood that the rich
countries (particularly the USA and the EU countries) intended to impose yet
another set of demands on them that would be very detrimental to their societies
and their people. In this sense the Cancún meeting was a great success. That same
sense of alertness did not inspire the poor country representatives at the December
2003 WSIS.

The WSIS discourse on the digital divide did not critically question whether
rich–poor divides can at all be resolved within the framework of the prevailing
development paradigm. Following this, development is conceived of as a state of
affairs that exists in society A and, unfortunately, not in society B. Therefore,
through some project of intervention in society B, resources have to be transferred
from A to B. Development thus implies a relationship between interventionists
and subjects of intervention. The interventionists transfer such resources as
information, ICTs, and knowledge as inputs that will lead to development as
output. In this approach development becomes "the delivery of resources" (Kaplan
1999: 5–7). This position was reflected in the conceptual framework of the WSIS
discourse that conceives of development as delivery. This delivery process is geared
toward the integration of its recipients into a global marketplace. There is no space
for a different conceptualization of development as a process of empowerment
that intends "to enable people to participate in the governance of their own lives"
(Kaplan 1999: 19).

A difficult problem is that if indeed greater global equality in access to
information could be achieved, this would not guarantee an improvement in the
quality of people's lives.

> Even when these disparities are recognised and new organisational models such as
> telecentres are proposed, the policy emphasis is frequently biased towards improving
> access to networks rather than towards content creation and the social processes
> whereby digital content can be converted into socially or economically useful
> knowledge. (Mansell 1999: 8)

Including people in the provision of basic public services does not create
egalitarian societies. The existing social inequality means that people benefit from
these services in highly inegalitarian ways. Actually, the growing literacy in many
societies did not bring about more egalitarian social relationships. It certainly did
have some empowering effect, but did not significantly alter power relations.
Catching up with those who have distinct social advantage is not a realistic option.
They too use the new developments, such as ICTs, and at a minimum the
gap remains and might even increase. It is a common experience with most

technologies that the powerful players know best how to appropriate and control new technological developments and use them to their advantage. In the process they tend to further increase their power.

Large disparities in access to the Internet continue to exist, particularly for developing countries. People in Africa, for example, are less likely to have access to mobile telephones and the Internet than those in other regions. One widely recognized reason for this is the high costs of international circuits for Internet connectivity between least developed countries and Internet backbone networks. A number of initiatives are under way to address this problem. These include consideration of new models for financial exchanges among operators as well as efforts to facilitate the creation of traffic aggregation within localities, countries or regions in developing countries in order to avoid the sending of this traffic over satellite or cable links used for intercontinental traffic: for example, between Africa and Europe or North America. The latter would aim to maximize the retention of local and national traffic within these regions and thus reduce the dependence on international communications links. To give a sense of the scale of the problem, over 75% of Internet traffic in Europe remains intra-regional compared with only 1% in regions like Africa. Information/communication inequality is, however, not merely a matter of access to technological infrastructures and can thus not be resolved by providing equal access to the technology. When new technologies are introduced in societies the chances to benefit from them are always unequally distributed. Some people will benefit; others will mainly experience the negative impact. This is a recurrent pattern. When a technology that promises financial benefits is introduced in social situations where unequal power relations prevail, a small group will enjoy advantages while the rest will often experience regressive development. Access to the global network society is mainly available to those with good education and those living in the OECD countries with sufficient disposable income. In most countries men dominate access to the Internet and young people are more likely to have access than the elderly. Ethnicity is an important factor and in many countries the differences in use by ethnic groups has widened. "English is used in almost 80% of Websites and in the common user interfaces – the graphics and instructions. Yet less than 1 in 10 people worldwide speaks the language" (UNDP 1999: 62). A particularly skewed distribution of ICT resources and uses concerns the position of women across the world. An immediate problem is the fact that ICT skills are largely based on literacy. Actually, "… it seems likely that the vast majority of the illiterate population will be excluded from the emerging knowledge societies" (Mansell and Wehn 1998: 35). This affects women especially, since around the world illiteracy rates for women are higher than for men. In terms of sharing ICT knowledge women are also disadvantaged since their numbers in enrolment for science and technology education lag far behind the figures for male enrollment. ICTs offer potentially new forms of communication that enable women to break through their often isolated social situation. They also create new opportunities of employment for women in jobs

that require new skills. However, the technologies themselves will not achieve this. Unless robust policies are in place and are enforced, the possible benefits of ICTs will have no impact on women's lives. The realization of opportunities that are in principle created by the deployment of ICTs will depend upon such social variables as cultural capital, class and age. "Although faced with these changing skill requirements and the need for continuous upgrading of skills, few women have access to the relevant education and training" (Mansell and Wehn 1998: 249).

The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1985) has proposed that the position of social actors is not only determined by economic capital, but also by their cultural, social and symbolic capital. Cultural capital is made up of such features and skills as knowledge about wines, fine arts, music and literature, good manners, and mastery of foreign languages. Social capital is based upon the social networks that people develop. Symbolic capital represents social prestige and reputation.

To these forms of capital, the category of "information capital" should be added. This concept embraces the financial capacity to pay for network usage and information services, the technical ability to handle network infrastructures, the intellectual capacity to filter and evaluate information, but also the motivation to search actively for information and the ability to translate information into social practice.

Just like other forms of capital, information capital is unequally distributed across societies. Its more egalitarian distribution would require an extensive program of education, training, and conscientization. To just have more "surfers" on the Web does not equate the equal possession of information capital.

It needs to be questioned, however, how realistic the expectation is that this disparity can indeed be narrowed, let alone be eliminated. It may well be an illusion to think that ICT-poor countries could catch up or keep pace with the advancements in the Northern countries. In the North the rate of technological development is very high and is supported by considerable resources. It would be wasting scarce resources if poor countries did attempt to follow a "catching up" policy, which would only benefit ultimately the designers and operators of ICTs. This does not mean that poor countries should not try to upgrade their ICT systems. But in doing so they should not have unrealistic expectations that those are ahead will wait for them. As a result, the situation may improve for the poorer countries, but the divide will not go away. As long as ICTs are embedded in the institutional arrangements of a corporate-capitalist market economy, the equal entitlement to information and communication resources will remain a normative standard only.

The present discussion on the ICT gap provides no convincing argument that the owners of technology will change their attitudes and policies toward the international transfer of technology. Throughout the past decades the prevailing international policies on transfer of technology have erected formidable obstacles to the reduction of North–South technology gaps. Today, there is no indication of a radical change in the current practices of technology transfer.

This makes it very unlikely that the relations between ICT-rich and ICT-poor countries will change in the near future.

The equitable sharing of communication infrastructures (the electronic highway systems created by telecom carriers such as satellites, cables, fixed lines, and mobile transmissions), computing capacity (computers, peripherals, networks), information resources (databases, libraries), and ICT literacy (intellectual and social capabilities to deploy ICT in beneficial ways) demands an enormous effort on behalf of the international community. Massive investments are required for the renovation, upgrading, and expansion of networks in developing countries, for programs to transfer knowledge, for training of ICT skills – in particular for women.

Social Communication and Equality

To analyze inequality in relation to social communication, I propose a framework that contains three dimensions: resources, power, and dignity.

Resources

The key task for any system of governance is the distribution of essential social resources. This implies the distribution of society's information and communication resources. The basic human rights standard of "equality" has a direct bearing on the way in which a society should deal with the distribution of resources.[2] The standard claims that no one should be excluded from access to and benefit from those resources that are essential to the participation in the community's life. The principle of equality implies that there is equal entitlement to the conditions of self-empowerment. Among the essential conditions of people's self-empowerment are access to and use of the resources that enable people to express themselves, to communicate these expressions to others, to exchange ideas with others, to inform themselves about events in the world, to create and control the production of knowledge, and to share the world's sources of knowledge.

These resources include technical infrastructures, knowledge and skills, financial means, and natural systems. Their unequal distribution among the world's people obstructs the equal entitlement to the conditions of self-empowerment and should be considered a violation of human rights.

In different forms a global "divide" has manifested itself in terms of availability, accessibility and affordability of communication resources. The international community has not been able or willing to find satisfactory solutions to this inequality issue.

Power

Whatever development paradigm one may prefer, there is a growing consensus – in current literature, policy, and practice – on the thesis that social development implies a process of participation and deliberation. Few participants in the development debate would contest that the intended beneficiaries should be involved in making the choices that development strategies require. This implies the need to democratize public decision-making structures from local to global levels. Social development requires deliberation, participation, and information. This implies that public spaces for deliberation and exchange among people should be available and accessible. Information and communications technologies have the potential to accommodate these requirements. They can facilitate the creation of public fora where knowledge and experiences are shared and public choices are deliberated. ICTs also offer channels and networks for access to unprecedented large volumes of information and to those individuals and institutions that can assist in the transformation of all that information into applicable knowledge. The trouble with ICTs, however, is that they offer the technical potential for channels, networks, and sites but they will not by themselves secure their use for deliberation, participation, and information. The actual social uses of ICTs are to a large extent guided by the political–institutional arrangements within which they are embedded. Whether the ICT potential will be realized to support social development, depends much more on the institutional organization of the technology than on its technical features per se. Therefore, the analysis of the relation between ICTs and social development has to give ample attention to their national and global policy contexts, which are characterized by hugely varying levels of access to power.

Dignity

There is around the globe a persistent unequal treatment of people in terms of respect for their dignity as human beings. The discrimination of women, homosexuals, or disabled people remains rampant worldwide. In the world's dominant news media, people are treated with different levels of respect, members of ethnic groups are too often lumped together under one stigmatizing stereotype, and many individuals and groups are left voiceless.

The experience of being left out and not being listened to stands in the way of social communication as a genuine dialogue, which is not possible between people who consider each other as inferior. It is important not to confuse equality with homogeneity. Quite the contrary, it is pointed out that the recognition and preservation of distinct identities is indeed a prerequisite to communication, since neglecting these distinctions in public communication may result in a "proliferation of communicative ghettos in which relatively homogenous audiences consume a

narrow diet of information, entertainment and values" (Husband 1998: 143, as cited in Traber 1999: 6). In order to prevent this from happening, inclusiveness is considered a necessary component of communication – especially within the public sphere.

Equality in Communication Rights

Communication rights are those human rights – codified in international and regional human rights instruments – that pertain to standards of performance with regard to the provision of information and the functioning of communication processes in society.

The communication rights that the members of the human family can all equally claim are freedom rights, cultural rights, and protection rights.

Freedom rights refer to guarantees of freedom of opinion and expression, to the right to seek information and ideas, to receive and impart information and ideas, and to the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

Cultural rights include the right to participate freely in the cultural life of one's community. This can be seen as the right to enjoy the arts; to share in scientific advancement and its benefits; to protect the moral and material interests resulting from authoring any scientific, literary or artistic production; to have fair use of copyrighted work for purposes like criticism, comment, new reporting, teaching or research; to express oneself in the language of one's choice, and particularly in the mother tongue; to have adequate provisions created for the use of minority languages where needed; to promote, protect, and preserve the identity, property, and heritage of cultural communities; and to sustain the rights of children to media products that are designed to meet their needs and interests and foster their healthy physical, mental, and emotional development.

Protection rights cover the right to the protection of informational privacy and the confidentiality of communications; the right to protection against forms of public communication that are discriminatory in terms of gender, race, class, ethnicity, religion, language, sexual orientation physical or mental condition; the right to protection against propaganda for war; the right to protection against incitement to genocide; the right of prisoners of war to the protection against public exposure; and the right to the protection of the presumption of innocence and the rights of the child to the protection against injurious materials.

The state of these communication rights in the sense of their equal availability is an essential yardstick for the democratic quality of political systems, for the cultural sustainability of societies, and for the level of human security in the face of rapid technological development. If it would be possible to develop a reliable, consistent, valid, and reusable instrument for the assessment of country performance in the field of communication rights, this would be a crucial tool for

human rights advocacy. In seeking relevant and effective models of media governance, communication rights can be seen as an essential normative standard. Advocating and designing democratic forms of local, national, regional, and global media governance does require adequate access to knowledge about the state of communication rights around the world. Ideally, this would require a regular and worldwide monitoring of the state of the art with respect to communication rights.

Communication rights are especially relevant and in need of a strong defense, particularly in domains of gender, ethnicity, children, arts, journalism, and citizenship.

- *Gender*: with 50% of the population in most societies being female, there is great urgency to achieve gender equality of representation and participation in media and advanced information and communication technologies. In the domain of gender, communication rights have special reference to the rights of women in terms of non-discriminatory representation and full participation in media decision making.
- *Ethnicity*: increasingly societies around the world are multi-ethnic. Different ethnic groups have to find ways to coexist in constructive and peaceful manners. Media offer a dangerous potential for warmongering but also may create a public forum for multi-ethnic dialogue. This has implications for participation, representation, and linguistic diversity.
- *Children*: since the 1980s children are recognized in international law as a relevant subject of human rights law. It is in the interest of future sustainable societies that children's rights are also realized as communication rights.
- *The arts*: the non-material, spiritual, and intellectual backbone of societies consists in the richness of their cultural heritage. Particularly in view of processes of economic globalization, this needs robust protection and promotion.
- *Journalism*: in emerging information societies this is a key professional activity that needs to be embedded into an environment that facilitates professional independence as well as professional accountability.
- *Citizenship*: at the core of all communication rights are the citizens who need reinforcement of their basic rights to free speech, access to information, and confidentiality of private communication.

In the domain of ethnicity, communication rights have special reference to the presence and participation of ethnically diverse groups in the media as well the promotion of the production and dissemination of contents relevant to a variety of ethnic representations. In the domain of children, communication rights have special reference to the rights of the child in terms of free speech, privacy protection, access of information, and the production and dissemination of relevant content.

In the domain of the arts, communication rights have special reference to the production and dissemination of a variety of artistic expressions and an intellectual property rights system that benefits all forms of artistic production.

In the domain of journalism, communication rights have special reference to the protection of editorial independence and socially accountable public information provision.

In the domain of citizenship, communication rights have special reference to the protection of the citizen's right to inform, to receive information about matters of public interest, to the free access to information necessary for the execution of democratic responsibilities, to the protection of the private sphere, and to the participation in society's cultural life.

The essential methodological question is obviously by which main indicators the implementation of communication rights can be measured. A possible methodological model would be to take the six cross-cutting fields (gender, children, ethnicity, arts, journalism, and citizenship) and to measure in each field the country performance with the indicators: law, policy, and practice. The measurement question then becomes what is law, policy, and practice in these fields?

- *Law* as indicator measures the formal acceptance of pertinent treaty obligations through processes of ratification. This could be a YES/NO response to questions in relation to treaty obligations in the fields of gender, ethnicity, children, culture, and journalism.
- *Policy* as indicator is already more difficult. Do countries take policy measures to reinforce their treaty obligations in the six fields? For example: do they regularly submit reports to the relevant UN Committee? Do they allocate resources to the realization of treaty obligations?
- *Practice* as indicator is the hardest to measure. Practice would measure whether there is a common practice of respecting communication rights in the six fields. This might have to be a qualitative assessment by the relevant epistemic community. Epistemic communities consist of professionals who have expertise in a domain and who can claim to have policy-relevant knowledge within that domain.

For each of the six fields the relevant epistemic community in different countries would have to be identified.

The core weakness of the international human rights regime remains the lack of implementation. For the development of a human rights culture it is essential that societies are constantly reminded of what significance they attach, in concrete sociopolitical and economic reality, to their formal human rights commitments. In particular the case of communication rights deserves a permanent monitoring of actual conditions and likely trends. If it would be possible to

develop a reliable, valid, and accessible instrument for the assessment of country performance in the field of communication rights, this could be crucial tool for human rights advocacy.

Human Survival and Social Communication

Social communication has been a driving force in human survival in the process of natural evolution. Social communication as survival communication is endangered by societal inequality. The strongest argument against inequality comes from evolution biology: inequality threatens human survival.

It does so because central findings in Darwinian biology inform us that survival of a species requires trust, diversity, cooperation, and mobility.

- In the process of evolution reciprocal altruism has been essential because entirely selfish behavior does not serve survival. This type of altruism demands that members of a species can trust each other. Suspicion creates unstable systems that in the long run will not be sustainable.
- Diversity is key to human survival because biological organisms that diversify survive better. The process of natural selection always favored organisms that diversified.
- Cooperation because to survive species have to cooperate against their inherent drive to compete.
- Mobility is important because survival requires the expansion of horizons. Without creativity and curiosity our predecessors might not have walked out of Africa.

Against these survival requirements inequality erodes trust and cooperation (Stiglitz 2012: 118–145). If the "more equal than others" in societies realize their selfish interests against the public interest, suspicion arises and the basis for cooperation disappears. The governing of highly unequal societies demands programs and strategies for the integration of the 99% of populations in the world of the top 1%. For the unequal societal distribution of resources, power, and dignity to be maintained a massive management of public perception is necessary. Inequality has to be obscured and creatively curious questions about it have to be discouraged.

Charles Darwin wrote that all species try to take advantage of the weaker structure of others and we therefore end up with winners and losers. However, he also observed that entirely selfish behavior does not serve the survival of species.

Inequality in social communication is reinforced by the prevailing forms of communication in modern societies that provide information that cannot be trusted, that continue to show more homogeneity than heterogeneity, that are

fiercely competitive, and demonstrate a scarcity in creativity as they offer more of the same.

Inequality in social communication will in the end damage all involved. Its threat to human survival links the future of the 1% at the top with the destiny of the 99% (Stiglitz 2012).

Conclusion

Inequality in resources, power, and dignity is a key feature of social communication and hampers its development as a tool for people's full and effective participation in the life of their societies.

The standard of equality requires that access to and usage of the means of information and communication are available and affordable to all without discrimination. In the current world situation this requirement is not met by far.

The prevailing commercial environment for the development of information-communication resources collides with the standard of equal entitlement. Market imperatives allocate resources according to what people can buy and not according to what they need. They defeat around the globe the aspirations of egalitarianism and equitable social development. Increasingly, social inequalities are no longer seen as structural problems, but as marginal phenomena to an otherwise benign system. All the public concerns about the global digital divide and all the lip service paid to the aspirations toward universal access and universal service do not change this.

This is largely so because most expressions of concern ignore the real underlying issues. There is little or no space for critical social analysis to understand why technology does not normally change unequal power relationships but tends to reinforce them. Even if the efforts to reduce the global digital divide were successful this would not necessarily mean the ideal of a more egalitarian society would be achieved. Actually, greater equality in access to and usage of information and communications technologies, within the constraints of the current political–economic order, is likely to even strengthen current inequalities.

In order to design a constructive approach to the persistent inequalities in social communication, a balance needs to be found between the two normative principles that represent the different human rights discourses mentioned above.

The conventional international human rights regime cannot provide a solid normative theoretical frame for distributive justice in social communication because it lacks a genuine cosmopolitan basis. This is due to the prevalence of autonomy and freedom as values over responsibility and reciprocity. Reciprocity means being aware of the effects that one's actions may have on others, recognizing that the destinies of the powerful and the powerless are intertwined. It implies

caring about the social exclusion of others and about sharing with others and about reciprocal obligations. Our own claim to equality necessarily implies the need to respect the other's claim to the same.

The deepest challenge for social communication as tool for human survival may be the question of whether human beings are capable of accepting the reciprocal obligations that a genuine cosmopolitanism requires.

On a future research agenda for social communiation, priorities would be:

- The concrete analysis of what price societies pay for inequality in access to communication resources and skills.
- The search for modalities of distributive justice in communication.
- The study of a cosmopolitan approach to the equality issue in social communication.

Notes

1   At its meeting in May/June 1948 the Human Rights Commission discussed changing "all men" to "all human beings." It also debated the insertion of the term "sisters" but this was rejected.

2   Therefore, the international community has provided through Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that "Everybody has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits." Equally, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides that the States Parties to the Covenant recognize the right of everyone (b) "to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications" (Article 15). The 1966 UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation states "… to enable everyone to have access to knowledge, to enjoy the arts and literature of all peoples, to share in advances made in science in all parts of the world and in the resulting benefits, and to contribute to the enrichment of cultural life" (Article IV.4). A non-discrimination provision was also incorporated into the Outer Space Treaty (1967) "The exploration and use of outer space … shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind" (Article I). In the Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting (1982) it was emphatically claimed that "Access to the technology in this field should be available to all States without discrimination …" (Article 5).

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6

Public Health

Colin Tinei Chasi

Public health praxis exhibits means (resources, rules, and so on) as varied and innumerable as the exigencies of practice dictate. This is to say that there is a vast range of ways in which public health practice and theory intersect or implicate each other as practitioners of public health carry out their work. The practice is associated with the strategic use of a number of tools and processes as means to achieve the goal of health for the public. As such public health can be described as a process interested in the abeyance or even the elimination of illness. Whatever modes of practice are adopted, the aim of public health is to initiate and sustain practices that produce and reproduce conditions and actual experiences of well-being.

The history of health reveals social formations produced by the interactions of people with their various recognized and unrecognized environments. On this view it is not surprising that statements on public health often involve comments on how life should be lived. Discussion of public health includes statements about the attitudes and behaviors people should have toward the environments in which they find themselves. And they also include, in the very least, the optimistic view that human lives are worth prolonging. Public health holds on to belief in the human capacity to search for truths and thus achieve practices by which citizens can deem their lives to be worth living, practices by which the goodness of health can be gained for and by the public.

How societies recognize or seek the virtue of health is praxeomorphically informed in ways that reflect the cultural possibilities and limitations of publics to recognize, name, and otherwise present matters of concern. Dubow (1995) describes how the social norms of colonialism and racism informed the history of science in South Africa, manifesting themselves in theories and practices of

eugenics. The scientific racism supported ideas of racial supremacy amid central concerns about white degeneration if the genetic pool was not cleansed of "weak" and "impure" influences. More generally, Fromm (1976) points to a trend in terms of which the norms of consumer society, already in Fromm's time, had led to people speaking less of being than of having. Thus people speak of themselves as having love and much less of being in love. In the context of health, one can similarly observe that people now seem to increasingly speak of having health rather than of being healthy. This possible conceptual drift may explain how it occurs that in today's consumer society health is often discussed as though it is a piece of clothing that one has or does not have and it is thus cut off from the whole concernful existence of the encompassing being. The concordant etiological perspective is such that characteristically the search for health leads to regimes of medical practice that are reductionist, individualistic, and empiricist.

Yet health, as a set of statements concerning the bodily base of human operations and/or concerning the part of the self that is able to stand apart from the body, is a difficult concept to define. People are a species with the symbolic capacity to look upon their own states of health, with choice. People socially construct health in cultural contexts that materially impact upon them. Statements of the health of an individual are exhausted neither by facts concerning the medical culture examined nor by facts concerning the organization of a society.

It bears noting that the legislative organization of a society reveals broad values that intersect with ideas of health as authorized by legitimated sources. The Zeitgeist can be recognized, for example, in the pronouncements of criminal psychiatry that come to authorize legal judgments against individuals diagnosed to be monsters (Foucault 2004). And it can be seen, for example, that in South Africa the epidemic of tuberculosis has a history that traces the radicalized political and economic history of the country (Packard 1989) with effects that proceed into the contemporary twin epidemics of tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS.

The idea that public health has meaning in contexts is elementary. The relevance of context is assumed, for example, in saying Fassin's (2007) reading of the epidemic of HIV/AIDS in South Africa presents a society in which communication for purposes of directing the majority to health has often inadequately involved recognition of the influences of apartheid, past and present, within which messages are experienced. Well-meaning public health practitioners can underestimate the extent to which experiences of the now are mediated by systems of knowledge and communication that are inevitably within a present that is inextricably linked to the past.

Where social political arrangements deny the individual rights of citizens, entitlements which bear on health are often denied. In ways not found in democracies, despotic regimes and their dictatorial principles undermine the ability of individuals to find ways to overcome problems with consequences for health. In this mode of conceptualization, Sen (1981) seminally finds that famines do not happen in democracies but they do befall individuals under dictatorial rule,

even when there is no shortage of food produced. What Sen finds is that in democracies individuals, having been given freedom and recognition, employ their capabilities to develop practices and present conditions that prevent famines even when there are meaningful shortfalls that arise in production.

It matters to say that to each belongs the responsibility of producing and reproducing worlds in which turning toward good health and toward healthy lifestyles is an ever active option. Thus it matters that the figure of the sovereign stands outside of the law and that when the individual is brought under biomedical regimes of control – as bare life, what is involved is denial of sovereignty in ways that undermine the right to well-being, bodily integrity and life (Agamben 1998, 2005). Attack on the possibility of sovereignty involves undermining the possibility of public health.

Attacks on the sovereignty of individuals involve denial that they have unalienable rights to respect and dignity. They involve misanthropic denial that the face of the other demands recognition in ways that would call for the establishment of social practices by which just health can be attained. To the measure that some individuals are given undue possibilities to limit and constrain others, a society's capabilities to address the needs of all its members is harmed.

Enabling people to see by the light of their truths and thus raise questions based on the problems they encounter in their lived-experiences demands establishment of relations of trust that take fatalism away. In the ontological security that can be gained by establishing conditions amenable to relations of trust, the individual can be enabled to act with ethical integrity and its productivity. For this we are all challenged to not make the question of the individual appear scandalous or unneedful. This is to say that when one recognizes individuals, one acknowledges the freedom by which they are able to help not only themselves, but society at large. Development premised on recognition of the people – their lived experiences and felt needs – is required if public health is to be gained.

The work of communication for development, or communication for social change that attains to development, involves the attempt to appropriately give individuals and communities capabilities to act on lived-needs. This work is hence directly concerned with issues of public health.

Limits to attaining the virtue of health are informed by social, economic, political, biological, and other material considerations. Yet it remains for the individual to choose the truth. How people describe themselves in terms of health is expressive of their practical attitude to the world. Even the most medically incapacitated can speak of themselves being in good health. Indeed, when one speaks of health one speaks of how individuals relate to the world; their lived experiences in material, cultural, and social milieu that variously enable or deny, subvert or make available opportunities for one to participate and thus have a share in the common welfare with claims and capacities for health. Thus, for those who pessimistically approach their own miserable conditions of marginalization and oppression, even when bodies are given to be "in good order," life can appear, as

Fanon (1970: 13) observes in what was named the North African Syndrome of racially denigrated immigrants to France, an evolution and the story of daily death:

A death in the tram,
a death in the doctor's office,
a death with the prostitutes,
a death on the job site,
a death at the movies,
a multiple death in the newspapers,
a death in the fear of all decent folks of going out after midnight.
A death,
yes a DEATH.

One's own history, practically lived step by step, arises as a horizon within which matters of health are contextualized, weighed and given meaning. On this view, one who has experienced a life of chronic pain can without controversy speak of being well when nothing but the "normal" pain is experienced. And processes of socialization bear on how people complexly reflect on matters to do with health. How one has been socialized can have bearing on the self-esteem individuals may or may not have to make positive health decisions in the face of health-related risks.

Contrasting public health with the pessimistic views of those who, including anti-natalists, hold that it is better for human beings to not exist, this chapter makes the point that public health is an optimistic practice. In this light the enterprise of public health can be seen to involve the quest to give worth to both the ideal of health and of a public composed of individuals with interests, values, and agency.

Public Health is Optimistic

Public health grants that human existence is faced with harms, including death. It does not thereby conclude, as do pessimists (Benatar 2006; Schopenhauer 2004) that never having lived would avoid such harms. In this most foundational way public health is an optimistic enterprise. It aims to *optimize* human living – *to find the best of all possible worlds.*

Public health is subject to the praxeomorphic establishment of norms, including those of normal science. Its endeavors to address the objective facts concerning health and illness are acted out amidst limitations and possibilities that relate to value-criteria in the cultures of knowledge and knowledge production of a given time. Here, as elsewhere, genuine optimism includes a set of statements about reality – that can be found false or true and it must relate to value-criteria that together that inform the positive subjective impressions of the optimist

(Boden 2004). Such reasonable optimism is a form of realism that is conducive to human happiness and flourishing because it asks individuals to choose subjectively to minimize the negative meanings they ascribe to harms that cannot be changed and to make the most of those options that are available to them (Michael and Caldwell 2004).

Yet to be a genuine optimist is not simply to notice the absurdity of human choice in the face of conditions that present objective limits; it is not merely to be Sisyphus finding meaning within meaningless conditions. Optimism is neither pessimistic resignation to the dreadful, nor is it cynically claiming that things cannot be made better (Michael and Caldwell 2004: 384–385). It is to courageously walk the proverbial tight rope between objective fact and subjective possibility as a hard creator who stamps out old forms and imprints new meanings "upon millenniums as upon wax …" (Nietzsche 2007: 89).

To risk stating the obvious, to speak of public health as optimistic is no doubt to present the work of public health as other than pessimistic. But, to state the less obvious that the shared etymology of the words *optimize* and *optimistic* reflects, to speak of public health as optimistic is to invest in ways of *making the most of available possibilities* for health. The optimistic perspective would then be one that looks forward to the outcomes of the system, understanding that a just system would deliver capacities by which members of societies can act in freedom to achieve the fruits of well-being, which include the good of health.

For many people the ethics of public health are associated with the Hippocratic Oath, which demands that practitioners act with all ability and judgment, in order to help those stricken with ill health without adding injury or committing wrong. This is a stance by which public health practice looks away from the metaphorical pessimism of the cave of ill health to make the most of the human condition.

Public health disavows pessimism and is characterized by optimism concerning human existence in the world. It disavows, for example, the views of pessimists such as Benatar (2006), who views the prevalence of disease, pain, death, and suffering even among the wealthiest people and concludes that it is better to never have been born. He emphatically states that harms far outweigh pleasures and goods in human life to such a measure that it is better to never be. This invites, for Benatar, the anti-natalist conclusion that it is better not to bring others into the world and that to give birth to another is bring this other into the way of avoidable harm.

The contrast between the pessimism and the optimism of public health is powerful. For public health invokes optimistic ideas of how life can be improved and how lives of those present and still to be born can be made *even more worth living*. Because it is such a maligned stance to public health, an excellent public health approach to consider is eugenics which Francis Galton defined as the science interested in improving heredity.

Eugenicists have long held that infections could well require germs but they believed that some people were more genetically prone to illness than others (Pernick 2002: 102). Not surprisingly eugenics and public health have often

"converged to promise the permanent eradication of morbidity" (Pernick 2002: 104). Today's debates about managed reproductive practices through medical screening and about genetic engineering continue to invoke aspects of the eugenic ideal of improving heredity. Even eugenics seeks to improve the human condition – not end human existence; the case can well be made that even its brutal solutions are underpinned by a perverted optimism that seeks to serve the interest of a portion of humanity.

Suicidal individuals and other pessimists use the poverty of existence to justify lack of concern for the continuance of life. Fassin (2007: 6) in discussing the approach of some poor people to HIV/AIDS notices the pessimistic turn by which some seek to maximize the momentary pleasure of sex by not using condoms holding that the risk of thereby acquiring HIV/AIDS is better than merely extending the span of a miserable life. On this reading pessimism is a far cry from aspirations to prolong and better human existence that characterize public health practice and research, which seek to find and use scientific knowledge to address illnesses that plague human existence with the result that medical and other interventions can continue to reduce the harms that people face.

As we seek health on the right roads of dignity we should optimistically refuse to turn away from the idea that all human beings are equally worthy of respect. In this way the emphatic hand of possibility may be raised against all human suffering and for each human hope. Among contemporary theories concerning how change toward social organisation characterized by wellness and productivity can be enabled, such optimism is well expressed in the method of appreciative enquiry. It states that positive change can be achieved through co-inquiry that optimistically focuses on the good rather than on deficits or abnormality (Watkins and Mohr 2001).

But it can be said that optimism as a strategy for achieving public health comes at the price of accuracy and even of truth that the pessimist appears better capable of gaining. Both the genuine optimist and the genuine pessimist do not avoid addressing reality or the value-criteria with which it is laden. But the realism of the optimist is through rose-tinted glasses that overestimate the possibility that success will be achieved in the face of obstacles that are thereby underestimated (Waller 2003: 191). The harsh gaze of the pessimist promises a more accurate truth but with negative implications for long-term productivity (Waller 2003).

What the humanist can work towards is a society in which all can democratically contribute with varying optimism and pessimism to achieve results that no one could achieve without contributions of the collective. The trick is to establish society in ways that allow each member to be involved according to the merits of individual abilities. For Lovallo and Kahneman (2003: 7):

> The ideal is to draw a clear distribution between those functions and positions that involve or support decision making and those that promote or guide action. The former should be imbued with a realistic outlook, while the latter will often benefit from a sense of optimism.

Allowing all members of society to contribute according to their abilities is consistent with the view that conditions for health can only be established where both optimist and pessimist are freed to contribute towards establishment of a democratic society characterized by wellness. "We need some pessimists to tell us when our illusions of control are mistaken, so that pessimists can take steps to secure genuine control. A robust optimistic sense of control …" (Waller 2003: 196).

Admitting to the need for pessimism is not admitting fatal inconsistency to the heart of the view that public health is optimistic. Optimism, even about pessimists, is required of public health practice. To refuse to admit that even pessimists or pessimism can contribute to viable acts to establish best possible worlds would be genuinely pessimistic.

Public Health is an Optimistic Call to Action

Public health is not just a call to stubborn rage against the proverbial dark night of death. It is a call for action that brings to fore an ideal of the forms of meaningfulness that can be associated with love, beauty, and great achievements. To speak of health without constraint is to describe an ideal world in which harms are held in total abeyance and goods are within reach without compromising the satisfaction of work. The health ideal is of a public sphere in which great individuals arise without conditions of constraint or other factors that corrupt, infect or otherwise cause harm. For this reason health and illness and their related ciphers are often held up as metaphorical references for the wellbeing or deterioration of political states; justice is often made synonymous with health as injustice is presented as a malady.

A pessimistic, flighty form of pessimism fails to address human finitude, vulnerability and suffering. Addressing himself to this "kitsch, superficial tenor of the present" *soapie culture*, Bert Olivier (2012) beautifully says:

> Everywhere people shy away from acknowledging the pain and death that visit the homes of every individual sooner or later. Even our cemeteries are located – in contrast to earlier ages – outside of cities and towns; the "family graveyard", which is still sometimes seen on farms, is virtually unknown, as is the "deathbed", where friends and family used to gather around a dying family member. Today the ethos is one of "deny (or anaesthetise) all pain, suffering and death" – something which, I believe, partly explains why people can't deal with anything traumatic, except through the generous ingestion of tranquillisers and psychiatric or psychological treatment for post-traumatic disorder.

One can distinguish the optimism of public health from contemporary kitsch and superficial cultures, which pessimistically lower cultural taste and standards to

exploit the basest common denominators of mass consumer needs. The kitsch and superficial are pessimistic to the extent that they do not countenance that people want more from public health appeals than to be driven by the basest fears or drawn to action by the shallowest of appeals.

One thing that distinguishes public health communication is that even its advertising campaigns that appear most kitsch and superficial can claim to seek optimistic outcomes founded in the ideals of public health. To restate the obvious: a significant distinction between social marketing for health and marketing in general, is that social marketing for health can claim to be inherently honorable and worthy because the lofty aim is public health. It involves the use of marketing techniques and strategies for work that, rather than being commercial, is focused on achieving social gains by prompting individuals to voluntarily change their behaviors. These gains are sought by addressing the target as a consumer to whom a social good is to be sold by the crafting of an appropriate message that makes use of a marketing or communication mix (Kotler 2008). Whatever similarities there may be in the means and practices, what non-public health marketers bring to the market can be distinctly kitsch and superficial and it does not have to be qualified as a social gain as is the case for social marketing messages. In addition, the social marketing practitioner is charged with being self-reflective, and hence asking if the intended program of communications creates unintended harms (cf. Robinson and Robertson 2010).

Public health is not for those who by pathetically setting themselves apart from the world of their concerns, by standing apart and watching the lives of others, interpassively individualize themselves. The action orientation required of those who seek public health is lost to those who gamble that giving up responsibility, individual choice, ethical duty, and moral concern for others will yield self-fulfillment. In this light it seems indecent to direct, in the name of producing health, the members of society to decadently act out roles of a known humanity (Derrida 1995: 36). But this is something that is lost in the strangeness of a time in which statistical large numbers are used to identify messages that people must, as they say in the military, "copy."

The hazardous outcome is that the produced behaviors are externally caused. They are acted out by people robbed of the responsibility by which authenticity and sovereignty can be claimed. Production of reproduced behaviors, even of sacralized medical forms, often involves refusal to take in valid lessons from common human experience. It involves the banalism of refusing to accept that there is anything unique and worth learning in the experiences of others (Bauman 2008: 94) and the consequence is sacrificing of absolute responsibility, of one's prided role as an individual, and of one's "obligations to other others" (Derrida 1995: 69). The toxic result is a society in which there is no real possibility for public health because the public that would compose it is too damaged to act in the personal and collective interests of health.

The challenge is to act to achieve wellness in the constrained conditions of life, between birth and death. In the face of the tremendously fearsome fact of death,

to which all life is tied, each person inevitably artfully disguises the fact that he or she is one beat away from fallibility:

> The artist disguises the incongruity that is the pulse-beat of madness but he is aware of it. What would the average man do with a full consciousness of the absurdity? He has fashioned his character for the precise purpose of putting it between himself and the facts of life; it is his special *tour-de force* that allows him to ignore incongruities, to nourish himself on impossibilities, to thrive on blindness. He accomplishes thereby a peculiarly human victory: the ability to be smug about terror … so deluded about his own condition. (Becker 1973: 59)

Advocates of cultural approaches to communication for health can point to the utility of cultural tropes, scripts, and narratives. They can point out that these cultural goods can enable individuals and societies to enact modes of interaction by which individuals can act toward health outcomes with freedom and choice. Assuming new ways of communicating that set aside patriarchal norms to enable women to have a greater voice in sex relations, for example, can enable women to use condoms or abstain from unwanted sex and reduce the spread of the human immunodeficiency virus. Here there is much to gain, for example, in acknowledging that gender norms constrain and root people in culturally defined roles that too often fail to grant freedom of expression and dignity to individuals. The benefits of seeing culture as malleable to human needs come with the freedom of seeing identity as chosen.

The practice of life is an art of what Maslow is reported to have called "being cognition," being open "to the truth of the world, a truth concealed by the neurotic distortions and illusions that protect one against overwhelming experiences" (Becker 1973: 59). To practice this art of life suggests having character – having a vital lie (Becker 1973: 47–66) with which to daily self-define, self-assert, and creatively destroy (Bauman 2008: 135–136) as part of the necessary art of disassembling and assembling cultural maps of possibility by which it is possible to "go on."

On one hand, public health communication messages that motivate change by the use of fear appeals optimistically assume that presentation of the idea of death and suffering will illicit responses that say life can be lived well. On the other hand, public health communication messages that appeal to people's hopes for beauty, health, and happiness for motivation also indirectly invoke the fear of harm and death.

Optimistically, people willingly face and experience danger, go on adventures, make sacrifices, go through motions of struggle and endure discomfort. The extent to which people choose to fight the dark night of illness and death, not merely succumbing to tragic fate, shows that it would be an error to claim that the fear of death inevitably leads to destruction. Indeed, in many instances the will to self-preservation in the face of the inevitability of death "lays the groundwork for

learning, shaping how we think and what we do," even if it can contribute to destructive practices (De Vries 2009: 169).

Public Health as an Optimistic Call for Change (and Violence)

The call to action of public health is a call for change. Understanding that violence takes place whenever something that relates to someone is taken away from him/her, this call for change is a call to violence. It would do away with extant arrangements that bear on states of public health to which people refuse to merely or tamely adapt. In this pursuit of health, as Fanon (1970: 53) noted: "the role of social structures should be to set up institutions that meet the needs of people. Social arrangements that fail to meet the needs of people should be replaced. A society in which individuals inordinately face desperate situations of ill health is a society to be changed."

This is not a call to the kind of virtuous violence that Robespierre advocated (Žižek 2007), by which even the innocent could be subjected to terror, suffering, and death. The matter at hand is that in contexts where capabilities and options for health are ill-distributed, as Bastiat (2001) seminally observed, "the sanctioned violence of law must be optimistically used to (re)assert the good and just." Here we do well to recall that:

> To ask whether or not force ought to be used in a society, whether the use of force is or is not beneficial, is to ask a question that has no meaning; for force is used by those who wish to overcome certain uniformities and by those who wish to overstep them; and the violence of the ones stands in contrast and in conflict with the violence of the others. (Pareto 1961: 589)

Now, when regimes and conditions of hygiene are disturbed, medical intervention is cast as a form of violence aimed at destroying the invading cause with minimal harm to the *milieu intérieur*. Here, as in the application of the law to society, medical intervention is advised for situations of necessity. Otherwise intervention may do more harm than good.

The theme of violence in the search for health is well captured in Greek mythology where the legendary first physician to use a knife in the practice of medical intervention is often given as Asclepius, who was later transfigured to a god. Asclepius often appears in ancient Greek accounts as the father, brother, or husband of Hygeia (the goddess of hygiene) and Panakeia (the goddess of healing with plants; the word panacea is derived from her name).

The myths of Hygeia and Asclepius symbolize the never-ending oscillation between two different points of view in medicine. For the worshipers of Hygeia,

health is the natural order of things, a positive attribute to which men are entitled if they govern their lives wisely. According to them, the most important function of medicine is to discover and teach the natural laws which will ensure to man a healthy mind in a healthy body. More skeptical or wiser in the ways of the world, the followers of Asclepius believe that the chief role of the physician is to treat disease, to restore health by correcting any imperfection caused by the accidents of birth or of life (Dubow 1995: 4–7).

What is needed is optimistic recovery of violence from the usual practices by which it is seen as something that human beings can avoid. Human living involves violence, not least the violence of always seeking to make complete fundamentally incomplete existence. Communication as an expressive mode of existence is a violent site for the *unfinalizable* emergences of the individual with the world on the slippery surface of linguistic signs that would deny unique biographically determined differences between the self and the other (Schutz 1971: 323). However much a health communication program, such as Soul City, makes use of formative research to provide feed forward, the messages that it must ultimately construct and put forth cannot take in all that needs to be said. Human communication is incapable of taking in all meaning and transporting it from one to another without violence-to-meaning in presentation and representation.

The question is not how to not invoke violence. The question is how to present violence optimistically for constructive uses. The question is not how to avoid poison. The question is how to make medicine of the poison optimistically. Consider the way Kebede sees violence as a source of freedom:

> Violence is a necessary moment in the history of the recognition of human freedom. This history initiates a contradictory outcome: It asserts freedom through the negation of freedom. However, slavery [as an example of violence] generates the conditions of its emancipation so that the process moves toward the mutual cancellation of servitude and domination. It is a negation of the negation. The negation that instituted bondage is negated in its turn. This last negation yields a developed, more universalistic notion of freedom: In place of freedom versus slavery, it offers mutual recognition. (Kebede 2001: 547)

To a great measure this is to establish violence optimistically as necessary if ill health is to be achieved. For those who seek health in contexts that limit the options for healthy living, it is necessary to speak of the violence of creating a new society in much the same way that the careful blacksmith, without denying the dangers of his practice, approaches fire as a means for forging a new material form.

The work of communication for change that would yield health seeks to destroy old conditions of constraint and to thereby establish new lived-conditions characterized by health. In South Africa, as activists seek to communicate on HIV/ AIDS, it becomes evident that a significant aspect of the challenge that faces them

is to destroy misanthropic practices and structures of male patriarchy, racism, sexism, and apartheid. It involves establishing in the stead of these systems of harm new systems of democracy characterized by recognition and dignity. In this very radical sense, public health communication is, to borrow an idea from Freire's famous *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1993), something that cannot be gainfully understood if its teleological search for emancipation is dismissed or merely considered a side effect.

The optimistic work of changing circumstances to free the constrained is essential for the attainment of health and development. This violent work involves the destruction of structures and processes that normalize conditions in which ill health strives. The challenge is that this work should form new institutions that enable each individual to contribute and share optimally in the commonwealth of a society in which public health is the norm.

Conclusion

For public health to be achieved there is need for optimism; there is need to go beyond pessimistic views that limit the scope and vitality of efforts to achieve public health. Health is a matter that cannot be conceived without taking into account the ways in which social notions, material conditions, and enacted practices impinge upon individuals. Establishing health demands reckoning with how the individual relates to his or her place in universal geography and history. It also demands consideration of the ways in which the particular individual experiences and relates to the world. Health is not limited to the presence or absence of attributes of illness. It is also composed of forms and patterns that arise in the relations that people recognize for themselves. Denial of either the individual or of the context is not sufficient for describing health and health-related concerns. It is also unjust to grant determinacy to either the individual or the context.

For realization of the possibility of health the role of the individual must be noted, with all the subjectivity implied. The whole of a society, its material forms, norms and histories, bears upon the meanings and challenges to meaningfulness that individuals face. It would be playing a perverse game of sovereignty to deny the objective, often material forms that concretely lead to, cause, and mark illness. The instance of addressing the question of health is one that calls for the overcoming of harsh and violent distinctions between subjectivity and objectivity and for the seeking of answers that more suitably describe the challenges faced. Indeed, in the quest for health, as in the struggle for education, we recognize the indisputable unity between subjectivity and objectivity in the act of knowing. Reality is never simply the objective datum, the concrete fact, but it is also men's perception of it. Once again, this is not a subjectivistic or idealistic affirmation, as

it might seem. On the contrary, subjectivism and idealism come into play when the subjective–objective unity is broken (Freire 1998: 8).

The subjective and objective facts of history, for example, cannot be removed from attempts to understand and act upon health issues. Indeed, for example, in the context of HIV/AIDS, Douglas (1992) wonderfully observed that when inadequate care is taken, and reductionism leads to messaging for HIV/AIDS prevention that does not adequately account for the complexities of the lived experiences of people, the implied rejection of the targeted people may lead to rejection of health messages. Mauss (1990) has shown that *the gift*, even of information concerning health, cannot be given with scant regard for the human relations that are formed in the giving. When there is failure to recognize the human relations formed in the act of giving, messaging on HIV/AIDS can lead to rejection that is conducive to further ill health.

The conditions for well-being are germane to the achievement of the ideal public. Establishment of democracy involves the creation of public spaces conducive to freedom of expression (Mill 1874). In the liberty of such a society medical and other means of achieving wellness can be put forward or down without fear or favor. In a society that allows freedom of expression the truth-claims of those who would burn witches at stakes or allow masses to die of curable diseases can be challenged and falsified in the face of more accurate truths-claims that can be tested. Genuine valuing of truth and health involves continuous declaration of war and cross-examination of idolized knowledges and practices. All idols should be "struck with a hammer as with a tuning fork" so that their hollowness may be heard (Nietzsche 2007: 3–4).

To speak of a public is to speak of virtuous practices by which individuals are contracted to democratic participation. The idea of the public invokes the notion of dialogical practices by which individuals communicate with others with mutual recognition. It also calls to mind ideals of deliberation by which manifold concerns can be rationally and justly dealt with such that, as Rawls (1971: 423) says, "the parties cannot agree to a conception of justice if the consequences of applying it may lead to self-reproach should the least happy possibilities be realised." Talk of a public describes the complex virtue-ideal of practices by which a multitude retains the unique interests and characteristics of individuals even as the public itself is granted to have interests and responsibilities. The public is additionally rendered as not only having responsibility for certain interests, but also as having the agency to act upon certain moral impulses that are ascribed to it.

The challenge of one who would communicate for change that (re)produces health and development demands the (re)constitution of society in ways that fundamentally turn toward meeting the needs of the public. As health is not a merely individual biological fact that relates to the absence of disease, and as health is a vital aspiration of those who seek development, it can be said that public health matters are occasions for a society to seek change toward the best possible worlds.

Areas for Future Research in Development Communication

Recent advances in psychology have led us to key understandings of how the human mind works. One of the things that this research is showing that there is a need to appreciate the role of optimism in how people make decisions. It is also showing that there are consequences for productivity if one is optimistic or pessimistic. Martin E.P. Seligman and Nobel Prize-winner Daniel Kahneman offer good entry points into this work. Scholarship in appreciative enquiry is also worth reading. In this regard the work of Jane Magruder Watkins and Bernard Mohr is a good entry point. Researchers in development communication will need to consider the roles of their communication in establishing optimistic grounds for human interaction. In the areas of social marketing it will, for example, be important to closely consider how positive emotional states and reactions to advertising influence public acceptance. It will be important also to reevaluate classic writings in the field that have historically emphasized the need for recognition and dignity, to show that such writings had the prescience to recognize the role of (optimistic) appreciation in communication for change.

Recent philosophical enquiry into the meaning of life should be of interest to scholars in the field of development communication. The research of leading scholars in this field, such as Thad Metz and Erving Singer, mostly assumes that human beings are driven to live meaningful lives. Knowing the way in which the search for and the need for beauty, goodness, and love drive and motivate human existence is surely interesting for scholars in our field. The way scholars of the meaning of life have addressed pessimism is particularly enlightening. These scholars also reflect in interesting ways on the relation of the individual to society in ways that bear on broad issues of social justice. In this regard it is useful to read the work of Nobel Prize-winner Amartya Sen. I find his 2009 book, *The Idea of Justice*, particularly enlightening when it comes to the roles of optimism. This work, together with work of people such as John Rawls, demands new answers about the normative function of communication for development and social change. For scholars interested in African implications for this scholarship, Metz and Michael Onyebuchi Eze have been writing particularly interestingly on questions of Ubuntu, justice, development, and the meaning of life.

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Indigenous Communication
From Multiculturalism to Interculturality

Alfonso Gumucio-Dagron

Communication is for the life of individuals and societies as important as water. It seems very obvious but it isn't. Like water, communication offers the fluidity of symbols that allows human beings to relate, to maintain dialogues, and to establish solidarities and networks. Like water, it is indispensable for sustainable development, for the survival of peoples and the safeguarding of cultures.

It is no coincidence that the great civilizations developed near sources of fresh water from rivers and lakes, and that those civilizations developed sophisticated forms of communication, the most advanced in their time. Those that ran out of fresh water, or were unable to preserve their environment because of mismanagement, collapsed (Diamond 2005); likewise, little that is memorable survives from those civilizations that did not develop elaborate forms of communication, such as written language.

Communication is thus strategic for communities, and by *strategic* we mean political and integral in the organization of public space in every society. The struggle for public space remains contested, where social actors lose or gain legitimacy in structures of power, and the implications of interculturality in building and strengthening the social tissue.

It may seem to be a cliché to assert that whoever controls communications controls power, but this is partially true, because communication is always a permanent process of negotiation occurring at different levels of society and through different forms. To understand communication, it is important to distinguish it from mass media alone, and it is imperative to learn to name it adequately.

Corporate media strengthen and expand their hegemonic cultural designs to justify and support their political and economic interests. Commercial or economic

needs have clear ramifications for culture and society, and the political interests influence the way power is practiced, both within the administration of the state and in the field of ideology, disputed day by day in the public space.

This explains the relevance of processes of participatory communication, which reinforce collective identities and promote the diversity and communicative competences of plural cultural expressions through horizontal dialogue. Cultural diversity and plurality are essential for building participatory democracies.

Communication is, precisely, what makes the difference between a multicultural and an intercultural approach. If *multiculturalism* is the recognition, acceptance, and tolerance of "other" cultures, *interculturality* goes further because it incorporates dialogue and interaction. It is not enough to acknowledge the cultural existence of others and continue living in separate social containers: communication becomes an essential trigger necessary to make effective knowledge exchanges and dialogues between cultures. Multiculturalism may be the peaceful sharing of a common space by several cultures, but interculturality is proactively sharing knowledge and values through communication.

Dangerous Rights: Communication and Diversity

To articulate plurality from a diversity perspective it is important to recognize fundamental rights that in the view of particular interests are "dangerous" rights. For example, it is common to confuse deliberately "freedom of expression" or "freedom of information" and the "right to communicate," the latter being often rejected because of its subversive implication: to expand without restrictions the public space where all voices of citizens can debate and be heard. Pasquali argues that freedom of expression "is an ironic *contradictio in adjecto*, since it refers only to the freedom of the informer:"

> The expression "mass communications media" contains a flagrant contradiction in terms and should be banished. Either we are in the presence of means used for communication, in which case the receiving pole is never a "mass," or we are in the presence of the same means used for information, in which case it is redundant to specify "mass."[1]

The struggle for freedom of expression is traditionally accepted and encouraged, since it is a right that journalists and media owners need to print or air their opinions without any censorship; however, the right of people to communicate with no intermediaries or tutelage is considered a threat by governments, by hegemonic media and ironically by some journalists themselves,

who, with feudal mindsets, see a risk for their jobs and leverage, too often protecting the interests of media owners.

Something similar is taking place with the recognition of cultural diversity, which the USA considers a threat to economic growth and "free market." After a fierce international debate the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions was finally approved by the overwhelming majority of nations (UNESCO 2005). The USA (along with Israel and the Marshall Islands – how not?) voted against the Convention and threatened to leave UNESCO. What can be so dangerous about cultural diversity on our small planet?

There is also a close parallel between the debate on cultural diversity of 2005 and the controversy on the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) in 1980, also promoted by UNESCO based on the MacBride Report (UNESCO 1980). The USA also fiercely opposed this initiative and left UNESCO, along with the United Kingdom.

From both historic moments we can draw a conclusion: we often forget that communication and culture cannot be separated. Culture does not exist in a vacuum of silence and confinement; culture lives because it is communicated. The communicative diversity, which is facilitated by participatory processes of communication, enables dialogue in equal conditions among cultures, whereas cultural exchanges dominated by massive information flows do not allow a balanced negotiation and may result in asymmetrical exchanges that do not support plurality.

Communities that resort to their right to communicate form a representation of their collective sense to understand the values, norms, behaviors, traditions, rituals, and habits that make a particular culture different and unmistakable for its own members and to other cultures. "Culture has two dialectic dimensions: the dimension of tradition, what exists and identifies us; and the dimension of innovation, what we build day-to-day" through the process of cultural interaction (Pech, Rizo, and Romeu 2008).

The starting point, obvious as it may seem, is that a culture cannot evolve and develop itself if it is not in contact with other cultures. A process of negotiation takes places among cultures that begin a dialogue, however this negotiation is not always symmetric and equitable. For the interaction to be horizontal, among equals, cultures need to strengthen their communication processes. A culture that is strengthened by communication, a culture that communicates and is communicable, participatory and democratic, is in best condition to negotiate with other cultures so that the exchanges within a framework of plurality are balanced.

Cultures are organized in symbolic and physical spaces with representation and imaginary borders shaped by the advances and retreats that take place in contact with other cultures. Negotiation, conflict and exchange (in other words cultural

interaction), happen in the far limits of these borders, and as a result scars are left, which may be absorbed by the cultural tissue (Gumucio-Dagron 1987).

"The key to intercultural communication is, therefore, the interaction with what is different, meaning everything that objectively and above all subjectively is perceived as distinct, whatever may be the motif of distinction (race, gender, social class, sexual preference, etc.)," Marta Rizo (2009) reminds us, while suggesting that communication research "has privileged the understanding of communication as transmission; namely, communication has been studied above all because of its media dimension, in detriment of other forms of understanding it."

There are ethical dimensions that need to be taken into account, which include values such as veracity to assess the objective reality with coherence of thought; the freedom that implies auto-determination and the right to communicate; and justice, which includes open access to information and knowledge.

Gabriel Jaime Pérez (2009), from the Universidad Javeriana de Colombia, emphasizes the ethical aspects in relation to diversity:

> The acknowledgment of the dignity of people and cultures involves, in turn, the recognition of plurality, diversity and difference with its ethical connotations of tolerance, not in the sense of complicity with crime or behaviours and effects that go against the rights of all, but of an inclusive and proactive attitude of respect for the different conditions, skills and life choices by the ideas and feelings of others, in a climate of openness to dialogue, based on the positive assessment of dissent or disagreement.

Media Diversity Matters

Alternative media, or "alterative" as called by Rafael Roncagliolo because they alter and challenge the verticality of hegemonic media, are part of the third sector of information, which guarantees horizontal communication between cultures. Alternative, alterative, community, participatory, horizontal, popular or citizen media, among other names that we could endlessly debate, are part of the third sector of information, which has a key function in the strengthening of peoples' identities and cultural diversity. Their objectives are varied: from offering information that is relevant to the needs of the community and open room for participation to reinforce the voices of those marginalized, to establishing dialogues with external partners. The communicational platform is mirrored in the type of programming and the generation of local content that is pertinent to culture, and contributes to a wide spectrum of plurality towards intercultural dialogue.

Public media, the second information sector, which should also serve the purpose of covering the needs of the general population, is often utilized by

governments with partisan political purposes. In the best scenario, public media contribute to development, education, and culture; they can be plural if political wills exists, but often from a narrow perspective, fatally homogenized, because they may be designed to inform but not to communicate cultural diversity, due to their wide population coverage and its intention to speak "to all."

New information and communications technologies (ICTs) are rapidly evolving actors that are transforming the patterns of cultural relations among communities that have access to these instruments. Again, in the context of technologies that are increasingly accessible both from the point of view of their low cost and easy adaptation, the distinction between information and communication is essential.

For Jesús Martín-Barbero (1995), plurality in communication runs the risk of becoming a sham, "a purely tactical democracy," where the underlying problems are cancelled:

> Perhaps we are also talking about the post-modern levities of a communication *dis*-charged by the technological miracle of the heaviness of conflict and the opacity of the social, in which 'the differences are released', where everyone 'communicates' without meeting face-to-face, and from which many expect even an outcome for the social and political crisis.

Martín Barbero (1995) mentions as positive experiences of the expression of plurality, the emergence of independent video groups, which offer diverse views on the political and social reality of Latin America.

Jesus Galindo sees two contrasting scenarios: the information society that is dominant, and the communication society that is emerging. "The information society has very low communication culture and is more interested in the data flow in certain direction, than constituting social forms of encounter and dialogue. The reason is simple: an organization with vertical trends does not include horizontal traits more than at a secondary and subordinate level" (1998). Facing this scenario is the communication society, open and "composed of free and participative citizens, critical and reflective individuals. … Democracy is the central quality of this social type, for its movement it requires dialogue of equals, the agreement between different but tolerant" communities to achieve forms of government that effectively serve the citizens horizontally (Galindo 1998).

Media and Discrimination

Media usually reveal attitudes of discrimination and racism even when attempting to hide them. The denial of the existence of such attitudes in society is also a way to take position on the issue. The mere absence of cultural, sexual, or ethnic

diversity in media (not only in what it publishes, but also within its production structures) is an indicator of its behavior in relation to discrimination and racism.

Information and dissemination mechanisms either perpetuate cultural patterns or contribute to changing them. During more or less extended periods of democracy there is a tendency for media to settle comfortably into the status quo, and to reproduce the patterns of social and community relations. Representatives from mass media claim that they only reflect what exists in society, and they are not there to change it. However, they select from reality what suits their political and economic interests, and interpret it according to the ideology that dominates its editorial policy. Thus, cultural marginalization becomes a vicious circle that is played out ceaselessly.

Analysis of the behavior of media in relation to discrimination and racism are regularly conducted in the Latin American region. In line with international agreements and declarations, seminars are also held from which criticism and recommendations on mass media behavior usually come out. Many studies point to the growing public distrust of media. Some states have taken action by passing laws or establishing mechanisms to exert pressure on the media to self-regulate or legal measures to sanction discrimination and racism in the media.

The reactions and proposals for action on media social responsibility regarding cultural discrimination and racism usually emerge from civil society. Governments yield to the pressure of organized citizenship or international agreements to establish national standards and encourage public media to broadcast programs and information sensitive to cultural, sexual, or ethnic diversity.

During the first decade of this century, numerous civil society media observatories have been created in universities and specialized agencies, which monitor the behavior of media. Several of these observatories specifically emphasize issues of discrimination and racism, and while their reports do not enforce or directly influence editorial policies, at least they express what society thinks of media and prompt them to be more responsible for what they publish or broadcast.

Still, the power of private media is huge and does not yield to restrictions. It is the only productive sector in society that does not accept any legal provisions. Facing any attempts of regulation by the national state, private media wield the counter-argument of censorship and gag. And while it is true that sometimes governments profit from legal loopholes to exercise control over the media, it is also true that in most cases the laws and decrees regulating media genuinely represent the aspirations of citizenship, generally mocked by the omnipresence of media and the lack of control.

To the extent that citizens do not feel represented in media, community media emerge as an alternative where communication processes are self-managed, and where there is greater cultural and linguistic relevance through the generation of local content. No need to dwell on this well-known subject: there are no less than 10,000 community radio stations currently operating in the Latin American region.

International Agreements

In terms of discrimination, racism, and social exclusion, the United Nations has completed through its specialized agencies and other international instances, a significant body of conventions that should govern all our societies and yet does not fully. We don't need to look too far; we already have international standards on this matter, but national policies are not eager to follow.

The most recent and perhaps the most comprehensive is the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, adopted after a heated debate in 2005. The Convention, which entered into force on March 18, 2007, after being ratified by a large number of countries, has as its main objective to "strengthen the five inseparable links of the same chain: creation, production, distribution/dissemination, access and enjoyment of the terms contained in cultural activities, goods and services" (UNESCO 2005).

To the extent that this Convention covers all processes related to the generation and maintenance of cultures, it is a significant milestone both in terms of cultural diversity and social inclusion. The declarations on equality and the respect for differences are set forth in the constitutions of all Latin American countries, many of them as required for the ratification of international conventions, and others reflecting the ideals of the French Revolution and the emergent social processes that took place during and after the two decades of nefarious dictatorships during the 1960s and 1970s.

Beyond the statement of principles included in the national constitutions, countries in the region have made efforts to align their laws with the international conventions on discrimination, racism or disability. Some have passed specific laws protecting cultural, sexual or ethnic diversity, and punish those who commit acts of discrimination or racism.

In general, everything looks fine on paper in the national constitutions, but we know that in reality it doesn't always happen, and this is reflected (or not reflected) in the role of media and broadcasting, affecting the cultural transformations of society and setting standards of behavior, sometimes at odds with the family or community traditions.

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is another major international treaty on human rights. It was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 21, 1965, and entered into force on January 4, 1969, after it reached the required number of ratifications. Article 7 says:

> States Parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination and to promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial or ethnical

groups, as well as to propagating the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and this Convention.

Broadcast media are guilty of discrimination and racism for various reasons, ranging from ideological and circumstantial political positioning, to carelessness in the professional training of reporters and editors. The other side of the coin: in some cases the media are accused of racism for political reasons. In recent years, the discourse of Bolivian President Evo Morales frequently targeted journalists and media houses, accusing them of racism because they criticize the president or specific government actions. In this case, the label of "racist" is used lightly, but has a significant impact at the international level, where the president's statements are taken at face value. This does not mean that media in Bolivia, particularly television in the eastern part of the country, have not shown clear attitudes of discrimination and racism, particularly related to the government or the president's actions.

The issue of racism in media is severe in countries with a majority of indigenous population, to the extent that indigenous people claim a share of power that the ruling *mestizo* class of European origin do not yield. This has traditionally been the case in Bolivia, Ecuador, and most dramatically in Guatemala, a country where the physical extermination of the indigenous population has been replaced by its obliteration or misrepresentation in the media.

Nevertheless, racism in the media continues to be equally important in countries in the region where Indian natives are a minority and suffer discrimination and repression because of their claims for land and territory. The examples of Indians of the Brazilian Amazon and the Mapuche in southern Chile are iconic because they have suffered discrimination and repression from supposedly leftist governments (Lula and Bachelet); however, these countries are not alone: in Colombia and Mexico the indigenous population receives a similar treatment when expressing social demands.

Argentina created the National Institute against Discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism (INADI) a state agency responsible for the implementation of the Anti-Discrimination Law No. 23592, and also responsible for implementing the National Plan against Discrimination. "The role of mass media is to report, not to communicate," said Gonzalo Marroquin, the director of *Prensa Libre*, the largest daily newspaper in Guatemala, during an international seminar on media and racism. "The primary function of the press is to inform," he added: "The best press is the one that better reflects the reality of the country."[2] The question is whether media have a social responsibility in changing a reality that clearly proves imbalances, discrimination, racism, and violence. Are media doing their best just by portraying racism or reporting on discrimination, or should they take a more proactive role?

Indigenous issues are marginal in media, even in countries like Guatemala, where indigenous culture is omnipresent because the Maya communities amount for over 60% of the total population. When the Maya people appear in the media they appear as "objects" of reporting and not as subjects or social actors. The 1992 Nobel Peace Prize-winner Rigoberta Menchú said, at the same seminar mentioned above, that in her own country she does not exist and only appears in the media when she does some "mischief." She added that to avoid media scandals that burst when she says something that might irritate the circles of power, she has often self-censured herself.

Making indigenous people invisible in the Guatemalan media is part of the passive discrimination strategy, a way to symbolically "disappear" Indians who were not long ago disappeared physically. It is common for the Guatemalan media to use images of Indians devoid of content, no thicker than the paper on which they are printed or the screen where they appear. These are images without oxygen, pure appearance; a reprise of the paternalistic treatment that was given to the "noble savage" in the European press two centuries ago.

What can journalists do to reverse this perverse situation? Journalists constantly face a dilemma because the media outlets where they work respond to interests that do not allow dissent, unless dissent corresponds to discrepancies among power groups that are gaining ground in society and may have a rebellious role without threatening the core structure of mass media companies. There are many well-meaning journalists, sympathetic to indigenous causes (which usually they do not know in depth) but cannot do much within their media structures because they are only a small bolt in a machinery, they cannot access levels of decision where the editorial policies are defined.

Several other forms of discrimination are part of the discussion on interculturality. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol was adopted on December 13, 2006, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, and opened for signature on March 30, 2007. The Convention was ratified with 82 signatures and the Optional Protocol obtained 44. Never before had a United Nations convention met such a large number of signatories on the day of its opening for signature, but it does not mean much, because the political will of states takes place only with the ratification of international instruments and the adaption of national legislation.[3]

Article 8 of the Convention, on "Awareness," calls for: "c) Encouraging all organs of the media to portray persons with disabilities in a manner consistent with the purpose of the present Convention;" and Article 21 on "freedom of expression and opinion, and access to information," states that:

> States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities can exercise the right to freedom of expression and opinion, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas on an equal basis with others and through all forms of communication of their choice.[4]

Stigma and discrimination are the two most rooted concepts in society and in the media, and are manifest through attitudes and behaviors sometimes subtle and other times overtly aggressive. There has been important progress in the recognition and definition of certain terms used carelessly in the media: stigma, discrimination, symbolic stigma, disability, diversity, inclusion, and integration.

From Regulation to Observatories

Media do not only exclude readers, listeners, or viewers, but also working journalists, who are often only accessories, moving parts in a large machine. Journalists are proud of their media credentials outside the walls of the company where they work, but once inside they must be careful not to leave the maze others have designed for them.

To understand these limits to freedom of expression we have the example of journalists who work at Grupo Clarin and are willing to express themselves on the Law of Audiovisual Communication Services approved by the Senate of Argentina. How much can they say without bothering their employers? When information is a business with political and economic implications, there is little room for journalists to express what they think. We could say the same on partisan media with direct political connotation, whether left or right, who share the same stigma: the tacit or explicit ban to disagree.

A long time ago, during the short progressive government of Alfredo Ovando Candia, Bolivia issued in February 1970 the Supreme Decree 09113, by which unionized journalists could rely on the provision of a "union column" to publish their views, even if adverse to the editorial line of their newspapers or radio stations. That space conquered by journalists is emblematic of the situation of marginalization and exclusion of those working in the media. On May 20, 2009, the Evo Morales government approved Decree No 0136 reinforcing the previous presidential decree of 1970 and extending its validity for television: "It is mandatory for all media companies to provide room on a daily basis in their opinion pages, the equivalent to the editorial space, so that their editors and reporters, members of the Press Federations, can freely express their ideas through signed columns."

Since the 1970s in Latin America media *ombudsman* have emerged to represent media consumers against corporate monoliths. The experience of the media ombudsman originated in Sweden as early as in 1916, as a collective board. It is since 1967 that it appears as a single person in the USA and later in Spain. Each ombudsman is part of a media house and receives letters from readers expressing disagreement with published articles or news, whether to signal inaccuracies or professional misconduct. The ombudsman must mediate between readers and the management to resolve conflicts.

There have been success stories, for example Javier Dario Restrepo in El Tiempo, of Bogota and in El Colombiano, of Medellin, particularly because the business group had a genuine political will to learn from experience. Nevertheless this story did not have a happy ending: Restrepo was fired from El Colombiano in March 2009. "He valued information as a service and a right of readers. Not as power or a commodity. He praised the role of the newspaper to reach readers with quality information, as opposed to the option of immediacy, lightness and sensationalism offered by other media," wrote Victor Leon Zuluaga Salazar.[5]

The wearing-off of the ombudsman status gave birth to another figure, the media observatories. Somehow, these are a response, or coincide ideologically, with the approach of Ignacio Ramonet, former director of *Le Monde Diplomatique*, who in a brief but sounded text, "The fifth power" stated that the so called "fourth power," which for many years represented the "voice of the voiceless," due to the character and commitment of seasoned journalists in recent decades, "was emptied of meaning, slowly losing its essential function of counter power" to become an ally of the political and economic interests of the ruling classes (Ramonet 2003). Ramonet suggested creating media observatories representing the changing needs of citizens in the face of the media.

That's what media observatories are; they have appeared over the past decade in several countries in Latin America, made up of specialists and communication scholars, independent journalists, and political analysts above suspicion. Their role is surveillance and constructive criticism. Observatories *observe*, meaning that they reassess what is published in the media (press, radio or television), and then issue their observations, which in many cases are positively taken into account by the media.

Around 40 experiences, more or less successful, of media observatories existed in the Latin American region. There is a network that brings together 11 observatories in 10 countries: Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Guatemala, Argentina, Brazil, Nicaragua and Colombia. Some are dedicated to exclusive themes, such as ANDI in Brazil, an observatory specializing in children's issues. However most of the observatories have a broader perspective and address in their research the media representation of political or electoral processes, and issues critical to society: violence, poverty, environment, etc.

According to Omar Rincón (2004) media observatories allow us to (a) know the media landscape, (b) create comparison and validation studies, (c) develop monitoring on agendas, narratives and aesthetics. Methodologically, they deal with surveillance and monitoring of the effects ("media says, people do"), representation (content analysis), to assess the meanings and discourses, to study the audiences (perceptions and uses), to become the "moral traffic light" in their analysis of the professional ethics of the mass media, emphasizing the importance of civic journalism and training of journalists.

Media observatories are fashionable, and very rightly so, to counter the disproportionate influence of private mass media, considered untouchable. The

information sector is the only cultural and economic sector in Latin America that rejects any kind of regulation, and instead offers "self regulation," which in fact never worked.

There have been initiatives from national states to favor civil society and citizenship in the search for equity and greater participation in the media. It is a national state responsibility, indeed, to be the guarantor of the interests of citizens in the face of mass media when it does not exercise social responsibility as it should.

The Argentinean government promoted the Observatory on Discrimination in Radio and Television, as "a space for institutional cooperation," made of the Federal Broadcasting Committee (COMFER), the National Institute against Discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism (INADI) and the National Women's Council (CNM). This interesting observatory analyzes in detail radio and television programs, and even commercial advertising, and issues monthly reports to point to acts of discrimination against women, youth, or homosexuals, which are common in electronic media. It also provides training services to journalists, journalism students and media houses. Something similar was proposed by the President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, in August 2009, with the aim of establishing a mechanism to "expand the debate" and "social control" of mass media, because "it is the Ecuadorian people who should take the lead on this issue."

The problem is that these government initiatives clash with powerful conservatives who have the means to implement campaigns that distort the debate. Arguing "threats to freedom of expression" protests from the private media in Argentina rose when Cristina Kirchner announced the creation of the Observatory on Discrimination in Radio and Television, and an even more virulent international campaign was orchestrated by the Clarin Group, affected by Law 26.522 on Audiovisual Communication Services, which sets limits to media concentration.

Sometimes the political handling by certain governments does not help to understand the need for regulation and the positive steps taken in this regard. It has been the case of Venezuela and Bolivia. The RESORTE Venezuelan Law (Law on Social Responsibility in Radio and Television) contains control measures similar to those in force in European countries, particularly in relation to child protection, but was received as "gag rule" by private mass media, because the president's discourse and the government actions putting pressure on opposition media, contaminated an objective analysis of the law. In Bolivia, the government of Evo Morales holds a discourse between plaintive and aggressive against private media, which has confronted him with journalists and media houses throughout his two terms. However, apart from the virulent language and episodic aggression against journalists by social movements supporting the Bolivian government, it cannot be said that there is a government strategy to silence or censor the media. In recent years political control has been achieved through acquiring media houses and restricting government advertising to "friendly" media.

Examples of Key Observatories

Argentina
- Observatorio de la Discriminación en Radio y Televisión, www. obserdiscriminacion.gov.ar/web/.
- Observatorio de Medios, elobservatoriodemediosdeargentina.blogspot. com/.

Bolivia
- Observatorio Nacional de Medios (ONADEM), www.unirbolivia. org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2&Itemid=20.

Brazil
- Observatório da Imprensa, observatorio.ultimosegundo.ig.com.br/ index.asp.

Ecuador
- Observatorio de Medios, www.observatoriodemedios.com/.

Guatemala
- Observatorio Racismo en los Medios de la Universidad Rafael Landívar, www.racismoenlosmedios.com/.

Mexico
- Observatorio Ciudadano de los Medios Electrónicos (OCME), www. medioselectronicos.org/

Nicaragua
- Observatorio Nacional de Medios, www.cinco.org.ni/medios.php.

Venezuela
- Observatorio Global de Medios, www.observatoriodemedios.org.ve/ index.asp.

Community Media: The Voice of Interculturality

There is no democracy without dialogue and there is no development without cultural inclusion. Faced with the situation of exclusion that the media tend to perpetuate, alternatives of community media emerge that can become genuine "communication media" to the extent that promote horizontal processes of dialogue and participation, and not just "information media" that focuses on dissemination of information generated by those that hold on economic or

political power. It is one of the most important tasks of community media to promote social inclusion, that is, to strengthen the voices of those that are the voiceless in the commercial media. These alternative approaches include such broad sectors as women, indigenous nations and minority sectors that also want to exercise their right to communicate.

Even in countries where the indigenous population is a minority, such as Colombia, there have been established standards for communities to exercise their right to communicate. In Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, the principle that indigenous communities have the right to manage their own radio stations for cultural, educational and social change is encouraged or at least acknowledged. However, in countries like Guatemala where the Maya population is the majority, their radio stations are labeled "pirates" by government and private media, and often are being fought with more violence than drug traffickers. To get a broadcasting license in Guatemala the Maya radio stations have to compete in public auctions with the rich and powerful, a system made to restrict the right to communicate.

There seems to be no intention to legislate in favor of the right to communicate in Guatemala. Ironically, the Peace Accords signed in 1996 are very clear about the need to promote and strengthen the means of expression of the Mayan communities, but little has been done about it, apart from assigning a television frequency to the Academy of Mayan Languages, a complex and expensive project that has not quite worked. Part of the problem is the lack of clarity about the meaning of peoples' communication rights, and the confusion related with "freedom of information." The aforementioned Antonio Pasquali, wrote that freedom of information is an ironic contradiction in itself since it only connotes the "freedom of the informer."

Why so much fear of the right to communicate? For some powerful interests, the expression is frightening beyond the meaning, even more than the right to health or education. Among the entire set of human rights the right to communicate is one of the most controversial because it touches one of the most powerful sectors of modern society, the one that controls information and deeply influences public opinion as well as decision makers.

Exclusion, marginalization, and discrimination are perpetuated when dialogue is not genuine, when the voices involved in dialogue do not have the same level and the same possibilities of expression. Therefore, cultural inclusion and its expression through media entail strengthening the communication rights of all citizens and strengthening the processes of communication and critical thinking skills in civil society.

There are emblematic examples of indigenous peoples and other human collectives that have taken the challenge of living the lives of their communities through the practice of interculturality. It has not been a theoretical or academic choice, but an ideological position derived from the need to communicate with others.

Voices from the Magdalena

The Middle Magdalena region of Colombia is traditionally known as the territory of confrontation between guerrillas and paramilitaries, causing over several decades huge economic, political, and social damage in the region. However, the population has organized to make their voices heard through community radio stations that promote regional peace and development, through the strengthening of communication and cultural identity. A number of community radio stations have grown in small town along the Magdalena River, in localities such as Puerto Wilches, Gamarra, Simiti, San Rosa, and others, which are part of a network, AREDMAG.

A team of academics and activists from various universities and the AREDMAG network of community radio stations conducted together a research project on this experience, revealing how the stations contribute to peace and development, but also providing new tools for assessing participatory communication processes.

Video in the Villages

Video in the Villages (VNA) is an audiovisual adventure that reached 25 years of existence in 2011, with support from Vincent Carelli, creator of the project, who shared along this path with the group that makes up the NGO, a generation of 34 Brazilian Indian directors and its 37 indigenous peoples, plus partner-makers and researchers in 127 workshops. Carelli's participation in the process occurs behind the scenes, because he rarely participates in the process of filming. The work is a collective and collaborative effort between Indians and non-Indians, a progressive process of learning and producing.

When VNA started 20 years ago, they produced films that were rejected even by the public television networks: they argued that the films made by Indian filmmakers were not in the right format, did not have the right length or lacked the proper language. However, one of the successes of this experience in terms of intercultural relations is that it has opened new roads for cultural diversity through the television show *A'Uwe*, which regularly features films about indigenous reality, made by indigenous filmmakers. Presented by actor Marcos Palmeira, the TV program aired more than 40 titles from the VNA catalog, in prime time, on Sunday evenings. Thousands of DVD sets have been distributed in schools.

Ojo de Agua Comunicación, Oaxaca

It is difficult to understand the processes of indigenous community media in Mexico without acknowledging the work of Ojo de Agua, a center, a meeting place, and a learning community for various independent indigenous media

centers. Ojo de Agua produces videos for indigenous and educational organizations, provides periodic training to indigenous video makers, and participates in regional initiatives. The organization's objectives are to spread a dignified image of indigenous peoples; to promote the growth of community media processes; to contribute to the democratization of the media and society in general, and to boost understanding and celebration of cultural diversity.

The Ojo de Agua team is made of indigenous filmmakers and journalists engaged in the project. They work with communities and organizations in the development of processes of community media, and support intercultural initiatives for democracy in the media and in Mexican society. Ojo de Agua encourages communication processes that promote the respect, the recognition and the celebration of cultural diversity in the country, a culture of peace, gender equity, sustainability and care of the environment, and the development of indigenous peoples according to their own perspectives and projects.

Not a Conclusion

The above three experiences, briefly described, among many other examples, highlight the importance of interculturality in communication experiences that use either radio, video, or a mixed communication approach, to address the interactions between local and indigenous communities, with the national society in their respective countries: Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico.

Community media offer the voice of interculturality, because they demonstrate the importance of building a sharing and caring society among equals, where cultural diversity is not an obstacle but the main strength. Interculturality is the notion of cohesive, harmonious and balanced understanding between peoples. Living together in peace is possible only by acknowledging equal rights for all cultures and also by promoting communication for all as a human right. Communication should be seen as not restricted to access or dissemination of information, but as a process of participation and dialogue that has an important role to play in facilitating understanding and knowledge sharing.

It is increasingly clear that development, including economic development, is not possible without acknowledging cultural diversity, and participation in the national and regional efforts for development is only possible through intercultural communication.

Notes

1   Antonio Pasquali's seminal text on communication theory was only translated into English in 2006, and appears in *Communication for Social Change Anthology: Historical and Contemporary Readings*, edited by Alfonso Gumucio-Dagron and Thomas Tufte.

2   During his presentation at the seminar "Hacia la construcción de un espacio público incluyente," Guatemala City, July 22–23, 2009.
3   Naciones Unidas, ENABLE: www.un.org/spanish/disabilities/countries.asp?navid= 18&pid=578.
4   http://seniales.blogspot.mx/2009/05/el-defensor-del-lector-de-el-colombiano.html.
5   www.obserdiscriminacion.gob.ar/?page_id=24.

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Communication, Development, and the Natural Environment

Elske van de Fliert

Introduction

Let's start with an anecdote.

I grew up in a rural area of the Netherlands not far from "De Hoge Veluwe" National Park, which is the largest privately managed conservation area in the country. The park covers 5,400 hectares of woodland, heathland, peat bogs, and drift sand, and hosts, among other interesting cultural places, the renowned Kröller-Müller Museum, which contains a large collection of paintings by the famous Dutch post-impressionist artist Vincent van Gogh (1853–1890). The park and museum were established by Anton and Helene Kröller-Müller in the early twentieth century, growing out of two collections the couple had acquired over time: a range of hunting grounds by Mr. Kröller-Müller and a large number of art works by Mrs. Kröller-Müller. They shared the vision to bring culture and nature together and make it available to the public. And so they did.

My mother used to tell stories about her childhood time on a farm that was owned by the Kröller-Müllers, located just outside De Hoge Veluwe National Park. Mrs. Kröller-Müller would ride a horse to the farm every month to collect the rent. The natural conditions with poor sandy soils that made the park's ecosystem so unique caused life on the farm to be hard. The family had to invest a lot of labor and resources to make the soil fertile enough to grow crops successfully. When more than half a century later, in 1990, the Dutch Government introduced the National Ecological Network program, aimed at developing a coherent network of natural areas connected by ecological corridors through the conversion of strips of agricultural land into natural land (Jongman and Bogers 2008), my mother

shook her head. After decades of hard work to improve the land and make it suitable for food production, she felt it was a sin to now leave those lands to waste again. While she had learned to appreciate the ecological and recreational value of De Hoge Veluwe National Park as a confined protected area, it was not her idea of development to send good agricultural land back to what she considered square one. And with her were many families that earned a living or lived a lifestyle on those lands in the prospective ecological corridors, as they did not see immediate benefits or viable alternatives for themselves.

For years now, the provincial governments involved in the program have been battling with landowners to agree to sell land assigned to become ecological corridors. Barely 23% of the original conversion plan for the National Ecological Network was realized in 2008, 18 years into the program (Jongman and Bogers 2008). It became clear over the years that stakeholder engagement in the identification of issues, consequences and alternatives, in terms of economics and livelihoods, was essential, followed by professional planning that takes all perspectives and options into consideration and maps out the resources required to accommodate all parties involved in an as compatible way as possible. Such processes of consultation, planning and change management do not happen overnight.

This anecdote is a typical example illustrating the complexities arising in development that involve the management and use of natural resources. Functions of natural resources management range from protection and recreation to production and exploitation, each of them serving a role in society. Each piece of natural environment can, in most cases, serve more than one function, but different functions are likely to be incompatible, not allowing simultaneous implementation, hence requiring a choice over which one is to be pursued. The question is then who has the power and capacity to make that choice and implement the measures that come with that choice? And how will others with different priorities agree to that choice and be part of the change process?

Different stakeholders set different objectives to pursue certain functions based on their views on the balance required between individual and collective needs. These perceived needs, which can be of an economic, social, political or cultural nature, are influenced by previous experiences, existing capacities and worldviews, and future aspirations of individuals, organizations and societies. Any choice made in the allocation of a function to a natural resource base would ideally be based on a shared understanding of, and agreement on, options and consequences among stakeholders in order to achieve effective, voluntary engagement in the implementation. This is where communication comes in, as good communication is required to provide the information to understand the options and consequences, have all views heard, and negotiate the planned actions. In reality, however, this often does not happen. The sections below will unravel the modalities of the different development and communication paradigms when addressing natural resource management issues, and review how different communication functions can be mobilized to support more sustainable and equitable natural resource based development.

Nature and the Environment in a Development Context

The natural resource base is at the core of all human activity. We need the physical environment to conduct our activities, whether it be home, work related or recreational activities. We use land to produce food and fiber, we exploit minerals as raw material for a wide range of products we use, and we expect the environment to be of good quality, involving the cleanliness of water and air, an abundance of biodiversity and landscapes, and the sustainability of resources for future generations. That is to say, we who can afford to worry about all of that at the same time. For many people in marginal areas in developing countries, it is a daily struggle to produce or access enough food and water to just stay alive.

To date, the degradation of the resource base as a result of exploitation is more serious than ever in many areas, and aggravated by the ever increasing population pressures particularly in marginal areas in developing countries. Pressing short-term economic needs often outweigh long-term sustainability goals. With agricultural technologies becoming more accessible even in remote areas, the stagnation of production increase due to depleted soils is masked by increasing doses of chemical fertilizers, but not necessarily making farming more profitable. In addition to soil degradation, deforestation, overgrazing, and water shortage are continuing to hit the poorest of the poor most, causing increasing inequity. Poverty and environmental degradation are closely interrelated, which has been described as the "Poverty–Population–Environment" spiral (Marcoux 1999; United Nations Environment Programme 2012). A downward spiral can eventually lead to social and economic instability. We need to review the dominant paradigms of development to understand where we are now and how to direct communication strategies to contribute to a more sustainable development from economic, ecological, and social perspectives.

Modernization and Transfer of Technology

Development, in the sense of better-off nations supporting the development in the less economically accomplished societies, has its roots in the success of the Marshall Plan, or officially called the European Recovery Program, through which the United States of America aided Europe to revive after World War II and concurrently prevent the spread of Communism (Servaes 1999). Organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund responded to this model by providing aid to many newly independent countries, applying the same modernization paradigm of development. Modernization was founded on the ideology that science, technology, expertise, and education are the primary

solutions to fix weaknesses of a society, and the Western capitalist model of development was the only one proven effective to increase people's standard of living. Transferring these models of economic growth and technological development to underdeveloped countries was believed to cause the same impacts as they had on the West (Escobar 1995; Ellis and Biggs 2001).

The technology push of the modernization paradigm was accompanied by exploitation of natural resources. Intensification of the manufacturing industry required intensified extraction of raw materials. Agricultural production was boosted both through expansion of arable land and intensification of cultivation methods involving the use of improved seeds resulting from modern plant breeding techniques, and chemical fertilizers and pesticides (Hazell 2009). These technological developments in agriculture initially lagged behind in the developing world. However, once the increasing populations began to suffer from widespread hunger and a growing dependence on imports and food aid in the 1960s, a large-scale research program was established that focused on production increase of tropical staple crops, with an initial emphasis on rice and wheat. The movement was called the Green Revolution, which over the years expanded to other crops. As of the late 1960s, the use of high yielding varieties and chemical inputs in combination with the expansion of irrigation infrastructure caused substantial yield increases of these two crops, particularly in Asia and Latin America. Indonesia, for example, after having been the world's largest rice importing nation for many years, became self-sufficient in rice production in 1983, although not for long (Röling and van de Fliert 1994).

The economic growth and technology centered development approach came with undesirable environmental, social, and cultural side effects (e.g., Servaes 1999; Pingali 2001). The negative environmental impacts included pollution of waterways and soils due to excessive use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, a decline of biodiversity in agricultural areas causing increased pest outbreaks, salinization, and depleted fertility of soils sometimes followed by abandonment of farm land, and water scarcities in major river basins. Chronic disease and catastrophic epidemics in livestock operations have occurred as the result of high densities and low diversity in animal husbandry. Dependency of farmers on multinational companies for the purchase of inputs, including seeds that they used to produce themselves, has taken off a substantial chunk of the profit margins for smallholders (Shiva *et al*. 1992; Pretty 1995; Uphoff 2002).

Some authors attribute "inadequate extension systems and training of largely illiterate masses of farmers" as an aggravating factor causing many of these problems (Hazell 2009). The largely top-down communication approaches applied to the transfer of technologies during the Green Revolution, indeed, did not allow for specific targeting of farm families operating under certain conditions, but rather aimed at promoting a "one size fits all" package. It was not uncommon that substantial pressure was put on farmers to obtain and apply the full package of technologies, regardless of whether they wanted or needed them, or knew how to use

them (Röling and van de Fliert 1994). Concomitant to investment in agricultural research during the Green Revolution era was investment in agricultural extension systems.

The World Bank, in particular, promoted the so-called Training and Visit System in more than 50 developing countries during the period 1975–1998 (Anderson, Feder, and Ganguly 2006). The focus of this system was technology diffusion to large numbers of farming communities and hence the design was top-down and linear. Village extension workers were trained on a biweekly schedule after which the chunks of information obtained at training were to be transferred to contact farmers who in turn were expected to pass it on to follower farmers in their community, disregarding whether they needed that specific information at that specific moment or not. Farmers' needs were defined based on national goals, such as food security and poverty alleviation, rather than their individual livelihoods, goals, and aspirations. Impact was measured in terms of "adoption rates," and based on the speed of adoption farmers were classified as innovators, early and late adopter, and laggards. The Diffusion of Innovations theory (Rogers 1962) underpinning the transfer of technology mode of communication explained how potential users of an innovation go through five stages in the adoption process: knowledge, persuasion, decision (accept or reject), implementation, and confirmation (or internalization). It also identified five characteristics of an innovation that determine its adoptability: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity (versus simplicity), trialability, and observability. In all, the focus was on the innovation, not on the human beings whose capacity and specific situations make it possible, or impossible, to integrate a new technology into their existing system.

As a result of the unidirectional and technological approach to development, social inequity increased in many rural areas in developing countries as the technologies mainly suited the already better-off farmers and the reliance on trickling down from contact to follower farmer was often not more than wishful thinking, for two reasons. First, the conditions of the so-called follower farmers tended to be quite different and more limiting from the contact farmers, so different solutions to different problems were needed. Second, as knowledge is power, it was not uncommon that contact farmers were reluctant to share their new knowledge as they would lose their competitive position. A technological approach to change encourages competition and discourages collectivity.

This approach was criticized when the negative environmental and social impacts of the Green Revolution became more evident and the realization sunk in that a fixed technology package did not fit all situations (e.g., Röling, Ascroft, and Wa Chege 1976). It became clear that laggards were not merely people incapable or unwilling to absorb new knowledge, but rather people who most likely had a valid reason not to change as directed. With the movement towards more sustainable modes of development came the shift to more participatory approaches to development communication, although it shows over and over again how much

the modernization paradigm and top-down communication approaches are still engrained in the policies and implementation plans of many development organizations.

Sustainable Development and Participatory Approaches

In an attempt to address the deterioration of the environment and natural resources resulting from the modernization era, the United Nations established the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1983. This Commission defined sustainable development as "development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Bruntland 1987). While this definition mainly considers assumed privileges and responsibility of humankind in relation to nature, the understanding of sustainability evolved over the years to include the short- and long-term perspectives on the balance between environmental, economic, social, cultural and political aspects in people's livelihood. In the case of agriculture, sustainability has simply but comprehensively been captured with the terms "ecologically sound, economically viable, and socially just" (Reijntjes, Haverkort, and Waters-Bayer 1992).

A change to more sustainable development models involved a major paradigm shift. New indicators, standards and hence certification systems were needed, policies had to be adjusted, science had to become more interdisciplinary, and stakeholders in the same ecosystem had to learn to deal with greater dependence on collective decision-making and action. Reckoning with these specific characteristics of sustainable development has huge implication for communication processes applied to facilitate such development initiatives. A monologic approach typical for the one-way, top-down models associated with transfer of technology would not be able to accommodate such processes. Numerous cases have shown that the process of sustainable development is not served by technology-oriented, top-down interventions from governments or development agencies through which standard sets of recommendations and packages are imposed on rural communities to be implemented unquestioningly (van de Fliert 2007). To induce meaningful change benefiting all parties concerned, a people's orientation allowing involvement of communities at all stages of planning, implementing and evaluating the development process has become the preferred mode of action over the past few decades (e.g., Chambers, Pacey, and Thrupp 1989; Röling and Wagemakers 1998). Sustainable development calls for a dialogic mode of communication, one that is based on interactive, participatory approaches. It is about sharing knowledge to understand options for change and their implications. It's about exposing contrasting perspectives as a basis to resolve

conflicts and achieve consensus. Communication is central to the task of facilitating engagement at every level of society (Mefalopulos 2008).

Particularly when dealing with the management of the natural environment, where conflict of interest often occurs, adhering to the principles of sustainability requires actors at all levels who understand why a certain change will benefit them as individuals and as a community, and who are in charge themselves of the change process. In the case of agricultural development, for instance, this requires farmers to become knowledgeable and skilled managers of the agro-ecosystem, who obtain optimal output of their enterprise while safeguarding the environment as to support present and future production, and maximizing their share in the market. Particularly where landholdings are highly diverse but generally small, financial capacity of farm families is limited, and labor is relatively cheap, as is the case in many developing countries, farmers need to be able to adapt, rather than blindly adopt, information and innovations. The more sophisticated societies become, with improving infrastructure and access to information and communication technologies, such information is conveyed to people by a variety of sources, such as extension and development agents, input retailers, mass media and increasingly the social media. Making the right decision for one's specific situation has become a complicated process in today's world with on the one hand so many options available but on the other so many requirements and conditions that need to be considered. Good critical skills are required, involving, for instance, information seeking, experimentation, and the ability to do an economic analysis, that help individuals to work out how change would affect their specific situation from either an environmental, social, economic or cultural perspective.

Collective decision making and action are favored where people's actions are interdependent, such as in the use of the natural environment for a variety of functions, or where inherent competition is implied such as in accessing markets. Particularly, the entrance into the World Trade Organization of an increasing number of developing countries has had major implications for the smallholder producers in these countries. Farmers will need to become more market oriented to survive, undertake collective action where this would strengthen individuals' position, and be able to analyze and manage their on-farm enterprises in an integrated way. This reinforces the need for the establishment and maintenance of social platforms addressing development issues within rural communities, and a highly diversified, demand driven support system.

Additionally, empowerment has become increasingly crucial for stakeholders at all levels of society in a world that is more and more interconnected and where local action relates to global consequences. Empowerment is defined by the World Bank as "the process of enhancing the capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes" (http://go.worldbank.org/V45HD4P100). We all face a variety of contending forces related to technology, politics, environmental management, world

markets, and society, which can marginalize us if they are not proactive. People need to be able to make their voice heard as the need for sustainability becomes more urgent.

An expression of empowerment that particularly relates to environmental and natural resources management is the Green Movement, defined as "organized attempts by modern associations to change attitudes, values and perceptions about the relationship between human beings and nature" by Schreurs and Papadakis (2009: xxxv). While environmentalism is engrained in many traditional cultures, such as the Aboriginal culture in Australia where people feel a deep spiritual connection to the land and see themselves as guardians of the land, as a concept or activist movement it emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s out of the realization of the public that modernization had led to tremendous decline of the quality of the natural environment and products that came from it. It could become a mass social movement at that point in time thanks to the rapid changes in access to media and other communication mechanism over the past half century, supporting people to become well informed and facilitating collective action. The Green Movement is typically active in societies where depletion of the natural environment due to excessive economic functions is evident but at the same time people can afford to worry about it, and afford to have a choice of what to buy and how to spend their time. This happens predominantly in the developed world and the upper urban class in emergent economies. From initially a social movement, the Green Movement had its offspring in politics in most developed countries, with the formation of Green Parties, but only in a few countries did this result in any sustained impact during election time (Schreurs and Papadakis 2009).

With environmental issues under the influence of climate change increasingly pressing, it becomes more and more important to provide platforms for and facilitate processes of good information sharing, critical skill development, and collective action for the public, in general, and specific vulnerable groups, in particular. Development communication experts are well suited to assist in this area.

Communication in Support of Sustainable Management of the Natural Resource Base

Communication strategies and methods that accommodate the requirements of enhancing knowledge, critical skills, collectivity, and empowerment should be characterized by people-, community-, and livelihood-centered objectives and approaches, rather than an economy- and technology-centered focus. These strategies would need to be designed and implemented in such a way that they allow for global perspectives, local involvement, dialogue, and provision of tailored

solutions. This is easier said than done. Unraveling communication functions by categories of communication objectives may help us get our heads around what the possible implications are when practicing or studying communication for development in the context of environmental issues.

In their very accessible book *Communication for Another Development: Listening before Telling*, Quarry and Ramírez (2009) present a useful notion of identifying communication functions of a certain initiative, rather than defining communication in itself. By building on earlier writings by Röling (1994), they distinguish between six functions and group them into the "telling," or monologic, functions and the "sharing," or dialogic, functions of communication. The telling functions, and the ways they contribute to development communication, are as follows:

- *Policy communication* This function is mainly used by governments, development organizations, and funding bodies, and serves to make the rules and policies known to the general public. It is important for people to know what their rights and duties are and through this provide a basic ingredient for empowerment. In addition, it helps to know the legal and administrative opportunities and limitations of the context one operates in so as to design initiatives that realistically can achieve impact.
- *Educational communication* This function contains the provision of information on new ideas and technologies and could include the offering of opportunities to practice skills. It often serves to build capacity and change behaviors, but can also be a mere contribution to empowerment, as knowledge is power. Events serving an educational communication function may apply primarily marketing principles to get a message across and influence people's decision making, or a more participatory approach allowing for dialogue and adaptation of the message as part of the learning process.
- *Public relations or strategic communication* This function is used to let the outside world know about an organization or an initiative in order to raise awareness and gain support. This support can be in the form of financial commitments by funding agencies or private donors, or institutional, administrative, and/or public opinion support allowing events to happen. This function is commonly understood best as "communication," and consequently, as a development communication specialist, we often have to explain upfront that this is not what we mainly do.

The second set of communication functions are the sharing, and hence listening, functions:

- *Participatory communication* This is about giving voice to stakeholders to express their perspectives and needs, and negotiate complex issues. It can also provide the platform for collective decision making and action, and it reinforces

individual or group confidence underlying empowerment. Designing activities that apply participatory communication principles is an art in itself that should not be underestimated. No single process will work in a variety of situations using the exact same formula. Regardless of the many useful manuals and toolkits, there are no blueprints and each activity will have to be designed taking into consideration the specific nature of stakeholders, issues and solution involved, and the context of time and place. Each time the process will need to be adapted in consistency with the situation at hand.

- *Advocacy communication*   This function implies lobbying for the rights of specific groups or individuals, for attention to adverse conditions of people, or for changes in policies. Through the facilitation of an organization or event, the issues or perspectives of particular groups can be advocated, be it through traditional media, like newspaper, radio, and TV, or through the new media like mobile phones and the Internet, and increasingly through social networking sites. It provides the basis for dialogue and possibly conflict resolution between stakeholder groups that are typically not communicating with each in any direct way. It can reinforce collective action, and the process and results of advocacy communication can also provide a powerful experience that encourages empowerment.
- *Organizational communication*   This function serves a coordination purpose by establishing information and feedback systems within an organization or project so all stakeholders know what the plans, issues, and agreements are and have an opportunity to express their views. A participatory monitoring and evaluation system can help operationalize this function.

A specific development communication initiative is likely to use more than one of the above functions and the mix will depend on the overall scope and the nature of the initiative. An environmental communication initiative is likely to apply policy communication to convey legislation relating to the use of the environment to relevant audiences, strategic communication for awareness raising on issues and desirable practices relating to the use of the environment, and educational communication for knowledge and skills creation relating to the proper use of the environment. A communication strategy to support an environmental management initiative will heavily rely on participatory communication for the facilitation of stakeholder engagement in planning, implementation and evaluation of environmental use and management, while educational communication will be crucial to upgrade the knowledge and skills of stakeholders to a level that meaningful participation is possible. The design of a communication strategy that aims at resolving conflicts relating to an environmental issue is likely to be dominated by participatory communication for the facilitation of dialogue and may require advocacy communication to lobby for changes in policies.

Irrespective of the communication functions, the use of different processes and channels can be complementary in initiatives addressing complex environmental

management issues. Interpersonal and intergroup communication methods will need to be employed to enable meaningful knowledge generation and exchange, skill development and establishment of a platform for collective decision making and actions. The use of media should mainly be seen as serving a support function to these processes by helping to raise awareness, set agendas for debate in the public sphere, and reinforce the learning and implementation process (van de Fliert 2007). With the rapid spread of the new media, Internet-based social media are likely to assume an increasingly large role in the participatory functions of communication on environmental issues. However, it should be treated with caution that engagement in social media is by definition participatory, as exposure in the social media does not necessarily imply dialogue. As with all communication methods, a multitude of voices is not by definition dialogue. Good dialogue only occurs when voicing as well as listening is involved, which requires good facilitation. This is where development communication might make a difference, through the facilitation of carefully crafted communication strategies to serve a range of functions to instigate sustainable change.

Conclusion: Making Communication Count

It has been argued that for the facilitation of sustainable management of the natural resource base, communication strategies, platforms and processes are needed that allow for effective information sharing, critical skill development, and collective action. Deliberate and careful planning and design of such strategies and processes are important as we are dealing with complex issues involving multiple stakeholders with often conflicting interests. A good communication strategy that can address all that, however, only becomes fully effective if it operates in a favorable policy environment and supporting institutional setting with people who are willing and capable to engage. Capacity may need to be developed first and institutional or political barriers removed. Impact assessment should not only consider immediate economic gains, but also how to identify human and social impact factors and assess how these contribute to sustained economic and environmental impacts (van de Fliert 2010). When we work with established research and development organization in this field, we often realize how embedded the modernization and transfer of technology paradigms still are. It tends to be much easier to ignore complexity and think in linear models, particularly when indicators for success are merely scientific and economic. The paradigm shift can only fully happen when impact is assessed from a livelihood perspective and genuinely considers the human, social, environmental, and cultural capitals in society as much as the economic. We can only hope that this realization will have found enough ground worldwide before it is too late and the natural resource base is beyond rescue.

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9

Emerging Issues in Communicating Development and Social Change

Karin Gwinn Wilkins

Communication for and about development, engaging intervention toward social change, integrates critical research with thoughtful practice towards social justice. In the first section of this overview, we have devoted attention to the broader historical, structural, and normative contexts within which development communication has been articulated and engaged. The next two sections focus on the particular approaches in which development programs, social movements, and community organizations use strategic communication for social change. This introductory set of chapters highlights critical analyses in which we explore communication about development in the process of social change. Concluding this section, I synthesize emerging issues that these authors have described in their considerations of development, globalization, human rights, advocacy, natural environment, multiculturalism, and health.

Communicating about development builds on critical analyses of discourse in historical, structural, and social contexts. Key to current emerging themes in the field is attention to global conditions, including political as well as economic characteristics of structures. Communicative discourse is then positioned as critical rhetorical engagement situated within political-economic structures in historical and global contexts. Recognizing the contexts of the development industry and global conditions offers us a valuable first step in understanding these processes and their potentials, before turning to emerging attention to sustainability, equity, and social justice.

Historical and Global Contexts

Two key themes articulated in this section include the importance of historical and global contexts. Thomas's introductory chapter on development communication offers an insightful history of the field, describing an approach to social change that has privileged pluralist, individual frameworks over others given particular political alliances. His critical spirit is echoed by Miller's thoughtful chapter on the global conditions structuring development discourse, demonstrating the consequences of political agendas of dominant nations and the economic imperatives of global capitalist industries. Pamment nicely brings together these political critiques with economic concerns in his discussion of the political economy of the development industry.

Emerging trends in the field include increasing attention to globalization, though our use of the term is often conflicted and ambiguous in development discourse, despite attempts at clarification (Lule 2012; Sparks 2007). Against a more enthusiastic articulation of the glories of globalization, the rise of regional powers, and the liberating potential of transnational digital communications, concerns with inequity in power and resources remain. Political domination is evidenced in current military interventions and imposed leadership without consent of citizens, critical to our interests in democratic and participatory governance. This political power is connected with a global economic elite, relevant in our observations of communications industries, that profits from material inequities within and across nations. In the process of working to maintain control, global elites attempt to manufacture consent through dominating cultural production, in terms of language, content, and more (Dutta 2011). An additional concern is that of the environmental consequences to these artifacts (Maxwell and Miller 2012). In her chapter, van de Fliert advocates for including environmental capital, along with human, social, and cultural capital, as just as important in considering economic resources as central to emerging approaches to development. Considering power in global contexts, we see that the ability to make decisions is limited to that of a few. In each case, we need then to consider which groups have that power, how they attempt to engage in maintaining control, and what might be the consequences. Frameworks of power begin with recognizing structural constraints.

Political and Economic Structures

Instead of conceptualizing development in a narrow sense of hierarchical centralized planning or of localized participation, we see social change structured through political and economic conditions. These political, economic, social, and

environmental resources structure possibilities for social change. Development communication and social change theories, as recognized by Thomas in his chapter and Pamment in his, benefit from attention to network analyses and structural considerations.

The political-economic context of development guides the allocation of resources, and along with these transfers of finances and goods, ideological approaches. An emerging trend within the development landscape entails the privatization of development agencies and programs (Wilkins and Enghel 2013). While bilateral and multilateral agencies still dominate the industry in terms of overall spending (see Pamment, this volume), private organizations and wealthy individuals, running foundations and using celebrity status, are becoming more visible in development work. Given the growing prominence of private agencies and social movements, we need to consider how profit over non-profit agendas may resonate with particular approaches to social change.

Recognizing the diversity of funding schemes and missions of private agencies and individuals, the rhetorical exuberance of privatization in development calls for critical questioning and thoughtful evidence (Edwards 2010; Kremer, van Lieshout, and Went 2010), particularly given rising income inequities on a global scale (Milanovic 2011). Development programs may reinforce existing boundaries toward mobility and establishing difference, but have the potential to offer progressive approaches to social change.

Economic conditions necessarily structure the allocation of resources, but politics should not be neglected as central to understanding structural constraints. Political legitimacy is itself a resource, while political context highlights negotiations within and across donor and recipient communities, in which certain problems and solutions are privileged over others. Constructing concerns with health services, gender equity, and environmental preservation, for example, requires understanding the political contexts in which pharmaceutical, manufacturing, and other types of corporations attempt to influence or circumvent public policies, in relation to resistance from social movements and civic organizations.

These various agencies create and are constrained by structures of power within the global development industry (Dutta 2011; Escobar 1995; Wilkins 2008). Miller's review of the historical conditions of development remind us of the importance of global context as well as of hegemonic conditions of power in information and communication production and distribution in the global market and development spheres (Boyd-Barrett 2006; Sparks 2007). Although political conditions within our global sphere have shifted over time, including a rise of regional powers and of corporate players, the underlying assumption that global and political contexts matter remains relevant to this field (Dutta 2011; Sparks 2007).

The rise of corporate power and celebrity philanthropy in the development world, facilitated through the profitable success of global communication industries, recognized by both Thomas and Gumucio-Dagron in their respective chapters, marks a critical shift in not only financing structures, but also in terms of

privileging particular approaches to social change. While these programs may not actually succeed in reducing poverty or promoting equity, they have a different kind of achievement worth noting: promoting a neoliberal agenda (Dutta 2011; Peck 2008; Richey and Ponte 2011; Smith, Stenning, and Willis 2008; Wilkins and Enghel 2013). These neoliberal agendas serve to legitimate capitalist global communications industries as well as to limit social change approaches implied in development discourse.

Development Discourse

While structures do matter in terms of limiting parameters of development, actors and agencies have the potential to move discourse over time and across institutional contexts. Critical approaches to development communication highlight the importance of understanding discourse, or how we socially construct what we do, in relation to political agendas. Authors in this section have proposed more holistic approaches to development discourse, as a way of moving beyond more narrowly defined conceptualizations of effects of communication interventions. Hamelink shares this sense of the importance of discourse in his chapter on human rights, situating these issues in terms of their postcolonial, cosmopolitan character. Similarly, Chasi conceptualizes health not merely in the behavior-specific terms of campaigns, but as a more broadly conceived sense of well-being, constituted within social and cultural communities. Shifting our discourse to consider goals beyond individual change then means we need to include advocacy work seriously in our frameworks, in our efforts to shape the conditions in which beneficial change can be promoted.

Development discourse builds on our assumptions regarding the causes of social problems, and by implication, their solutions. The social construction of development relies on political legitimacy, contested as groups compete to promote their political agendas. At issue can be a determination of a problem, such as health or human rights, as best approached through individual behavior change, normative shifts, or structural transitions. These approaches to social change build on theoretical models based on pluralism versus conflict, and concerned with short-term or enduring effects.

Critical analyses of how dominant groups attempt to maintain their hegemonic control in relation to competing agendas demonstrate the potential for collective voice to enable resistance. Thomas brings attention to the role of voice in his analyses of the Role of Voice in Right to Information movement in India. Similarly, Hamelink's attention to cosmopolitan cultural climates and van de Fliert's acknowledgment of environmental capital offer creative ideas on different ways groups can build on resources to advocate for social change. Gumucio-Dagron's thoughtful discussion of diversity in communication critiques arguments for

"freedom of expression" for ignoring peoples' "right to communicate." Instead, the former arguments help legitimate free market systems thus perpetuating neoliberal agendas.

One key theme in emerging discourse on development highlights attention to sustainability (Servaes and Malikhao 2007). Van de Fliert discusses the importance of this concept in her chapter on discourses about our natural environment. Sustainability represents a critical discursive transition, positioning humanity within our natural worlds, and privileging long-term trends over immediate effects of communication campaigns. Moving our discourse toward sustainability resonates with emerging agendas toward social justice.

Social Justice

Communication for social change serves as an all encompassing trope meant to include divergent substantive areas, from agriculture and health to democracy and governance, in a broader vision of strategic intervention. While social change marks a critical move toward including social movements from narrowly defined development, associated with an industry of well-established institutions, this articulation itself lacks enough attention to equity.

Equity has emerged as a central theme in this section as well as among several recent publications in the field (Dutta 2011; Melkote 2012). Many of the authors in this section, including Thomas, Hamelink, and van de Fliert, recognize the importance of equality, particularly in terms of access to communication resources and skills, as well as other forms of financial, social, cultural, and environmental capital. Guiding this value on equality is a sense of social justice.

Social justice represents another emerging trend, building on attention to equity in distribution of resources, capitals, and rights. It is not just individual change that matters, but shifts in resources across groups. Social justice allows us to foreground our concern with inequity in access to key resources and our interest in supporting resistance through advocacy communication. Advocacy communication works for social justice when attempting to shift social norms and change policies in ways that support marginalized communities and resist dominant agencies.

Social justice marks a significant recognition in our field that equity and rights matter. Critiques of development communication have inspired attention to participatory, community, and alternative approaches to strategic communication (Huesca 2002; Gumucio-Dagron and Tufte 2006; Quarry and Ramírez 2009; McAnany 2012). Issues of democracy, governance, social movements, and civic engagement are part of our working to broaden our scope to be more inclusive in our conceptualization of the field (Escobar 1995; Shah and Wilkins 2004; Nederveen Pieterse 2009). At this stage we can highlight social justice and equity seriously in future research, engaging a more critical sense of accountability.

Accountability, as Pamment reminds us, is increasingly being used in development discourse within the industry to highlight applied research that assesses the effectiveness of development programs. But evaluation can do more than assess short-term effects of singular programs. Research can be used to situate programs within their broader contexts, along with similar trends and interventions, over longer durations. In this way we can consider accountability as not being donor-driven, but as a valuable sense of responsibility to our communities toward solving issues.

Instead of accepting donor-driven accountability, critical analyses are possible through dialogic research, in which the politics of the research process itself become part of the conversation. If we are able to focus on understanding the historical contexts of problems and comprehensive attempts toward resolution, then we should move away from focusing on individual projects that are predicated on pluralist frameworks, and toward constructive dialogues based on understanding hegemonic control and resistance of strategic communication for and about social justice. We need this emerging sense of critical accountability if we are to address the key issues of social justice.

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Part II

Developing Strategic Communication for Social Change

10

The Strategic Politics of Participatory Communication

Silvio Waisbord

This is a time of renewed interest in communication for human development and social change. The combination of innovations in information technologies coupled with widespread citizen mobilization have energized the debate about the role of communication in promoting social change. Fast-changing transformations in global information ecologies and political effervescence have produced multilayered communication practices. Simultaneously, the proliferation of global, regional, and local initiatives in support of human development have brought to the fore the question of social change across academic disciplines. Social change has overflown its original sociological banks. It has become a matter of inquiry across disciplines, a topic of conversation in high-level government and business meetings, a vast conceptual umbrella that includes from corporate social responsibility to grass-roots activism, and a rallying cry for social movements around the world.

The field of communication for development and social change (CDSC) is well-stocked with theories and studies to tackle critical questions about the way people communicate, express demands, and act upon critical social problems. It is uniquely positioned to understand the increased centrality of voice and rights as guiding principles of social change. Amidst political and information transformations, and the growing presence of social change in academic, development, and policy agendas, communication studies is uniquely positioned to make significant contributions.

A key issue that needs attention is the links between CDSC and strategic collective action. If people's active engagement in social change is both normatively desirable and pragmatically imperative to produce sustainable changes, it is necessary to discuss how communication, strategy, and participation are linked.

Despite the sentiment that social change is unpredictable and random, as resistance movements against power structures "suddenly" materialize in the West and the Middle East, other examples amply demonstrate that change is planned with plenty of turns and twists. Just as strategy is central for powerful political and economic interests, it is also fundamental for citizens mobilized to promote social justice. Social change doesn't simply happen, but it results from patient, calculated, long-term efforts in which communication and strategy play crucial roles. If strategy is "how we turn what we have into what we need to get what we want" (Ganz 2004: 181), it is crucial for CDSC to consider strategic issues in analysis and practice.

The goal of this chapter is twofold: to dissect the relationship between CDSC and strategic communication (SC), and to make a call to reassess SC from a perspective that places communication and collective action at the center of social change.

SC refers to the study of how public and private organizations conduct internal and external communication to maximize success – profits, recognition, credibility, votes, and others. SC has been commonly identified with public relations, advertising, and marketing and their applications in commerce and electoral politics. As a field of research and practice, SC has been present in many fields of communication studies, such as public relations (Botan 1997), organizational communication, and political communication (Manheim 2011; Pfetsch 1998). SC, however, hasn't had a similar presence in CDSC. Despite the lack of consensus definitions and approaches (Waisbord 2000), CDSC can be defined as the study and the practice of communication for the promotion of human development and social change.

Unlike other communication specializations, CDSC hasn't fully explored SC – theoretical insights, empirical findings, and implications. This gap is remarkable considering that CDSC has always maintained a close relationship with applied research and practical experiences, particularly global programs in human development. The field has always maintained a healthy interest in understanding the implications of theoretical arguments and research studies for program design and implementation and, in turn, assessing the analytical lessons from actual interventions. Strategic questions are always present even if they are not explicitly formulated in those terms. Debates about the contributions of "edutainment" (Singhal 2012), social mobilization (Obregon and Waisbord 2010), advocacy (Servaes and Malikhao 2012) and social networks (Valente 2012) to development and social change essentially deal with strategic issues. They ask important questions about suitable tactics and strategies to promote interpersonal communication, gain new knowledge, persuade others to participate, and to disseminate information. Given the constant dialogue between academic work and practice, it is necessary to move strategic questions to the center of the analysis.

A strategic perspective offers a way of formulating problems, making decisions and learning about the impact of programs. It raises questions that are critical for

effective planning. It underscores the power dimensions of communication and social change. It positions CDSC within the broader political context in which media, information, and mobilization strategies are common to influence power and decisions in households, neighborhoods, and societies. Strategy is hardly the property of specific actors or ideological positions; it is fundamental for institutions and organized citizens to influence social change.

My argument is that insights from SC need to be incorporated in a participatory perspective that links communication, collective action, and politics. It is hard to envision any possible, meaningful, and sustainable social change without addressing power. Wrestling with power to encourage large-scale social change inevitably demands strategic politics.

Strategic Communication in the Persuasion Paradigm

The relationship between SC and CDSC needs to be analyzed in the context of the "paradigm divide" in the latter. CDSC has been split between informational and participatory paradigms. This divide is grounded in fundamental theoretical differences that articulate competing understandings of communication, models of social change, and research questions. Given these differences, it is not surprising that each perspective has engaged differently with SC.

The informational paradigm has been premised on the notion that information is the gateway to social change, and that social change results from the accumulation of individual, psychological changes. It assumes that information is a core component of behavioral decisions – that is, people make specific decisions based on knowledge and attitudes. The presence or absence of information explains current behaviors and potential changes across sectors (economics, health, education, or politics). Consequently, it is expected that if people's informational environment changes, their decisions about a range of issues will change, too. From this perspective, SC is identified with the diffusion of information on people's knowledge, attitudes and behaviors. It seeks to understand the nexus between ideational factors and behaviors. Consequently, the strategic dissemination of specific information is considered crucial to modify people's intention and ability to perform certain practices. The task of communication is to persuade people to modify practices through informational campaigns intended to correct and expand knowledge and attitudes.

The persuasion paradigm views strategic communication positively as a set of planned actions aimed at equipping people with information to make "better" choices. For Piotrow and Kincaid (2001: 231), "strategic communication is based on a combination of facts, ideas, and theories integrated by a visionary design to achieve verifiable objectives by affecting the most likely sources and barriers to

behavioral change with the active participation of stakeholders and beneficiaries." The purpose of SC is to disseminate information to specific populations and through selected channels to persuade people to modify behaviors. Undoubtedly, this has been the central principle of numerous campaigns across development and social sectors. It underpinned campaigns to promote high-yield seeds and agricultural methods. It has been used to promote primary education. It has framed health communication programs to change nutrition habits, family planning practices, and sexual behaviors. They were also used to promote health care services (diagnostics and treatment) and the adoption of specific technologies (from vaccines to insecticide-treated nets).

Considering the challenges for human development and social change, the informational approach to SC suffers from two major limitations.

One limitation is a narrow conceptualization of the relationship between communication and CDSC. It basically assumed that the job of communication is to address informational deficits. Information is the analytical prism to interpret the link between communication and development. If people favor large family size, feed low-nutrient foods to babies, or didn't send their daughters to school, it was because they held incorrect beliefs or lacked information about alternative practices. Because problems were interpreted to be basically informational, solutions would require changes in people's knowledge and perceptions. Communication is assumed to be able to change people's decisions by modifying their informational environment. The "information campaign" mindset that has characterized CDSC reflects these premises.

Such conceptualization is insufficient to grasp complex problems in human development, particularly those that disproportionately affect "the bottom billion" (Collier 2007) – people living in abject poverty around the world. Economic opportunities are scarce, and unemployment is chronic. Social services (health, education) and basic systems (electricity, water, sanitation, roads) are nonexistent or are plagued by multiple problems. Social indicators are abysmal. Social problems grounded in structural exclusion and appalling systems are enormously complex. Given these conditions, it is foolish to expect that making people knowledgeable about specific behavioral options would spur significant changes. For example, even if people become more informed about disease transmission and prevention, there is no basis to expect major transformations in health indicators as long as health care services remain notoriously underresourced and understaffed, and social determinants of health are ignored. It would be truly revolutionary if increased knowledge would single-handedly spearhead substantive, long-lasting changes without the improvement of structural conditions and services.

Certainly, addressing informational deficits may result in positive outcomes under specific conditions. When structural obstacles are minimal – social services are decent, are accessible, and people have minimal resources to provide health, food, and education, then, information campaigns may help people make different

choices. When the "enabling environment" is in place, it is expected that informational shifts may result in positive changes. Likewise, when people are favorably predisposed to practice certain behaviors (e.g., use specific agricultural techniques, attend formal schooling, eat foods with high nutritional value, immunize their children), information campaigns may have positive consequences. Indeed, meta-analyses of campaign effects have shown that well-designed and executed informational actions may produce changes if structural barriers are minimal (Bertrand *et al.* 2006; Kiwanuka-Tondo and Snyder 2002). Instead, when people are strongly opposed to certain practices, or face structural problems (poverty, power inequalities, poor services), it is short-sighted to reduce SC to modifying individuals' informational environments.

Information campaigns per se are unlikely to spur significant transformations in social structures and systems. What is necessary are two sets of strategic considerations. First, SC should be guided by a broad, nuanced, problem-based analysis that considers obstacles and challenges at multiple levels – individual, community, structures/systems. Rather than assuming that information is the problem (and the solution), it needs to understand the comparative weight of different factors that explain the social problem at stake. The recent adoption of the "social ecology" model in in CDSC is promising, for it offers an analytical method to conceptualize problems more broadly.

Second, nuanced analysis of social problems would suggest that individual changes are neither sufficient nor are they always the best "point of entry" to promote wide transformations. Changing social structures that affect people's opportunities to improve their social condition demands redressing systemic inequalities in the distribution of power and resources. Likewise, improving the quality of basic systems and social services is basically a question of politics and policy. Addressing such problems require much more than disseminating information among individuals about ideal practices. They are inconceivable without significant political transformations. Consequently, communication and SC need to be understood beyond information and individual knowledge. They need to be approaches as strategic collective actions through which communities identify problems and design solutions, a point to which I return below.

The Participatory Critique
of Strategic Communication

The participatory paradigm has approached SC differently. It has been skeptical, if not vigorously opposed to SC in the context of its distinction between information and communication.

The participatory model understands communication in terms of human dialogue. It espouses the etymological roots of communication – the cultivation

of a sense of community and commonness through dialogue and action. It upholds a notion of democratic communication identified with the free exchange of ideas among community members. It is primarily interested in understanding conditions that favor or discourage community dialogue, mutual learning, solidarity, and collective agency. It puts forth the notion that communication should contribute to openness, human agency, and criticism in development and social change. Consequently, it opposes understanding communication in terms of information, persuasion, and influence.

The participatory paradigm offers a pessimistic diagnosis about current conditions for democratic communication. Here lies one of its key differences with the informational paradigm. Whereas the former interrogates (and is concerned about) the conditions for communication, the latter is primarily interested in identifying opportunities for effective influence. Participation theories are premised on the notion that democratic communication, development, and social change demand egalitarian conditions for the exchange of ideas. Those conditions are lopsided in favor of powerful actors, namely political and economic elites as well as technical experts. The modernist promise of democratic communication has degenerated into manipulation, misinformation, and mind-control in late capitalism. What passes for communication is controlled, interested information designed to reinforce power inequalities. The systematic use of persuasion techniques and technologies perfected by governments and big business coupled with the dominant position of media industries perpetuate informational inequalities.

From a participatory perspective, SC embodies the perversion of democratic communication. "Strategic communication" is an oxymoron. It is mistaken to attach "communication" to the pursuit of strategic goals by powerful interests in society through the massive glut of information churned out by the media and conventional informational campaigns. By fostering one-way, top-down practices, they stand opposite to democratic values such as dialogue, participation, horizontality, and critique. The concept "strategic" is inevitably hamstrung by the principles of instrumental rationality that dominate contemporary societies.

The participatory paradigm in CDSC shares the critique of SC offered by other communication scholars. It criticizes the identification of communication with economic goals and top-down visions in organizations (Deetz, Tracy, and Simpson 2000). SC is another name for corporate communication (Deetz 2007). The idea that organizational communication is better served by wide participation and collective innovation dovetails with participatory approaches to development and social change. A similar argument has been made by critics of traditional public relations who argue that the field needs to switch to "dialogic communication" (Botan 1997) to foster democratic goals.

What these arguments have in common is the multipronged critique of SC. They see it as loaded with ideological assumptions that are contrary to democratic

communication. It foregrounds few active talkers and many passive audiences. Campaign designers enjoy a privileged position of telling others what to think and do. Audiences are simply asked to pay attention and do something. The latter aren't conceived as active protagonists of communication, but, instead, are receivers of messages sent by strategists. What is conventionally called communication actually disguises manipulation.

SC's use of military rhetoric tilts communication into a direction that is contrary to participation and democracy. The wide use of concepts such as tactics, campaign, and targets steers "communication" into hierarchical planning and away from dialogue. Therefore, communication is understood as occasional, top-down information campaigns, decided in a centralized fashion by planners and funders who conceive audiences are passive receivers of pre-packaged information. From this perspective, SC is not conducive to horizontal exchanges, mutual learning, and critical dialogue.

Democratic communication is antithetical to SC. Communication should encourage citizens to take an active part in communities through the discussion of issues, problems, and challenges. There's no "strategy," so to speak. Strategic implies that someone has already delineated goals and tactics. The guiding principle should be fostering communication without specific, predetermined goals. Democratic communication, instead, assumes the absence of preconditions and plans. Communication that nurtures critical consciousness and evaluation of social conditions is antithetical to goal-oriented actions. Put in Habermasian terms, participatory communication is the opposite of strategic action. It aims to foster ideal speech acts that free from the constraints of domination. Instead, strategic action is anchored on unequal opportunities for citizens to talk. Consequently, strategic communication is not really communication if the latter is conceived as the absence of power differences and the force of the best argument. Power inequalities distort communication. Truth and emancipation are only possible when real democratic conditions for speech exist.

Participatory approaches foreground the notion that communication should activate critical reflexivity, dialogue, and consciousness-raising. Communication opportunities are not conceived as "strategies" to modify informational ecologies and motivate people to abandon practices. Instead, they are tools designed to facilitate community dialogue to articulate demands and solutions, and stimulate social mobilization.

Is participation antithetical to strategic action? Participatory communication has rightly questioned expert-driven definitions of problems and solutions, and called for leveling opportunities for dialogue involving affected communities, the protagonists of social change. Participatory communication, however, goes beyond the issue of redistributing voice to ensure that diverse positions are represented. Experiences show that social mobilization takes participation beyond local dialogue and engage with multiple factors to promote social transformation (Campbell and Scott 2012). Participation entails the formation of

"counter-publics" – citizens who form alliances to demand rights and redress systemic social inequalities and the improvement of services. Participatory communication is more than the presence of democratic conditions of speech. It is about questioning power inequalities in general, and transforming institutions (from legislation to funding) to produce structural changes.

Collective mobilization is not just the result of spontaneous, random actions (Ganz 2004; Johnston 2011). It is not the accumulation of "unstrategic" decisions devoid of calculations about goals, tactics, publics, opponents, arguments – the stuff that defines SC. Successful (and failed) efforts to promote social change demand strategic thinking – planning and implementation. Efforts to trigger community discussion are driven by strategic thinking. Edutainment formats are deliberately promoted to stimulate conversations around specific topics with the hope that they will lead to subsequent changes.

Linking community dialogue with actions to modify circumstances and overcome obstacles requires coherent and organized actions to affect decisions. From building favorable opinion in support of certain issues and demands to putting pressure on authorities, collective action uses key ideas from SC. From the Civil Rights movement in the US to contemporary health social movements, SC is central to collective mobilization to demand major changes in social, economic, and political structures (Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004). Discussions about goals, key publics, messages, and appropriate tactics are central to any form of collective action. Actions based on the principles of voice, participation, and human rights do not seem necessarily opposite to SC.

In fact, while the participatory communication literature has typically avoided "strategic" issues, or even using the word strategic, studies in social movements are filled with references to tactics and tools. In the latter, the analytical shift to studying the "political process" indicates the growing importance of strategic issues in collective action: how movements develop, borrow, and refine tactics, and make calculations depending on goals, actors, and particular political junctures. Strategic issues have been discussed in the context of framing problems, alliance formation, partnerships, and resources leveraging (to understand the evolution, achievements, and failures of movements across the world).

The preceding analysis shows that the informational and participatory paradigms offer different ways to think about SC.

Informational approaches think of SC as information activities intended to convince people to change individual behaviors and social norms. Strategy basically refers to planning various aspects of information campaigns – goals, audiences, channels, messages, spokespersons. Informational campaigns, however, lack a broader approach to understanding the influence of structural factors on individual behaviors and the role of communication in addressing systemic problems by mobilizing local participation. What happens when individuals do not have the power to act upon information? What happens when structures are tilted against

people acting upon newly gained information or changed attitudes? What is the impact of information campaigns if messages do not resonate with people's priorities and demands?

In contrast, participatory approaches have different strengths and limitations. By emphasizing notions of public, voice, and dialogue, they embrace a politicized conception of social change that highlights the need for structural transformations in the way problems are defined and acted upon. Its narrow identification of SC with top-down, manipulative actions, however, offers few insights into strategic participation – the processes and tactics that mobilized citizens use to promote and achieve change. The antinomy between strategic action and participation seems unwarranted. Both essentially entail careful consideration of goals, tactics, and publics. It is wrong to assume that participation is possible without key strategic considerations – time, place, history, traditions of civic engagement. It is unnecessary to continue to identify SC narrowly with the actions of governments and business.

Communication and Collective Strategic Action

A first step to reconsider SC in CDSC is to parse two meanings of "social" in social change: social as "what" changes and social as "how" change happens.

The "what" refers to numerous societal dimensions that are the subject of change – what differentiates social change from economic, political, and cultural change. "Social change" is a diffused concept. It refers to changes in norms, attitudes, socioeconomic structures, policies, beliefs, information, behaviors, and so on. No single definition of social change captures the richness of a cross-disciplinary field of inquiry and practice. Unlike concepts such as development, modernization, reform, and revolution, which were once proposed as the normative horizons of social change, the notion of "social change" lacks concise, unanimous definitions. Although it is commonly associated with efforts to address social ills, those problems aren't obvious nor is it clear that they fit into a broad vision about the "good society." "The social" is fragmented. It is formulated in endless social problems: poverty, discrimination, gender inequity, access to health and education services, public safety, food insecurity, water scarcity, labor slavery, poor sanitation, climate change, and so on.

What is change if there are no unified theoretical questions or single goals? Is social change about transforming power, rights, and social justice to improve opportunities particularly for socially marginalized people? If so, how do we link power to questions about norms, beliefs, ethics, participation, which are typically at the center of recent communication research? Is redressing power relations always necessary for improving education, health, labor, housing, or the environment?

The second meaning of "social" in social change refers to "how" change happens – the strategy of social change. From a participatory perspective, here I propose that "social" needs to be understood in terms of action-oriented, collective transformations. The notion that change is a social process, by which people come together to define problems, identify solutions, and carry out actions, is central in the study of collective action, social movements, and political participation. Social change reflects the activation of institutional and social networks to promote transformations at individual, community and structural levels. These issues are at the core of contemporary interest in networks and participation – how people develop, nurture, and sustain connections to construct and act upon social problems (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). Any process of change entails the development and activation of informal and formal networks. CDSC needs to be understood within constructivist, agency-centered approaches that foreground "strategic collective actions" (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 2012) in social change.

What are the contributions of communication to social change? If participation and collective action are the subject of various disciplines, what does communication bring? Simply put, the field foregrounds communicative aspects of collective action. A critical understanding of SC seeks to understand how people communicate demands, beliefs, and norms to support and implement change – the processes by which demands are transformed into (or fail to become) public issues. Communication is central to the transformation of "phantom publics" (Lippmann 1925) into real, mobilized actors with concrete strategies to push for social change.

SC needs to be reconceptualized in CDSC from a perspective that foregrounds collective action. This requires us to reassess the conceptual edifice of SC for its central concepts, such as targets, channels, messages, and campaigns, are embedded in the informational paradigm. Strategic considerations can't be simply imported from a tradition that identifies communication with information transmission, sets up clear divisions between "senders" and "receivers" as well as experts and the lay public, and approaches strategy mainly as information media campaigns.

In the next section I offer a brief discussion of strategic issues from a perspective that foregrounds strategic collective action in CDSC: problem definition, goal selection, strategic junctures, tactics, and motivations for change.

Problem Definition

A first step is the definition of development and social change problems. Conventional SC assumes the presence of organizational goals such as governments, political parties, and business. As Zerfass and Huck (2007; 107) argue, strategic communication focuses on "the core drivers of organizational success."

Organizational missions – gaining support for policies, winning elections, maximizing profit, increasing stock value – determine the problems and goals of SC. Problems are intelligible in the context of existing organizational goals. For example, consumers' lack of knowledge about products negatively affects profit-making. Adverse publicity about business practices may drive stock prices down. The low popularity of heads of state may discourage parliamentarians from supporting official bills or undermine reelection prospects. Because goals are clear, problems are clearly defined.

The situation is different in CDSC. Goals are not already established; they are debated and negotiated among various actors. Definitional struggles over problems are common because social change involves multiple actors whose interests are not necessarily aligned. The definition of social problems – poverty, women's lack of access to economic opportunities, low immunization rates, or poor access to safe water – is a complex, evolving process. Participation demands that all options are open, and that no particular vision determines problems and solutions beforehand. Obviously, actors such as governments, intergovernmental agencies, and multilateral funders have specific institutional missions: solving health problems, providing technical assistance, offering low-rate loans for assorted projects, expanding access to technology, and so on. Undoubtedly, institutional missions and preferred strategies weigh heavily in the definition of social problems.

Problem definition, however, goes beyond the institutional mandates of government agencies, funders, and non-governmental organizations. The rise and fall of public problems, at national and global levels, attest to the dynamic nature of problem and goal definition. Just to mention a few examples: improving sanitation, eradicating poliomyelitis and river blindness, and tackling HIV/AIDS became global programmatic priorities as a result of arduous, dynamic processes of problem definition.

In this regard, a key contribution of participatory studies has been the critique of the narrow definition of human development and social problems. They attribute the failure of ambitious development initiatives to the way in which problems (and subsequent solutions) were defined. Problem definition has generally reflected the perspectives and priorities of the few rather than the interests and needs of the many. Because few actors, such as powerful government officials, funders, and experts, typically wield power in the definition of social problems and goals, solutions necessarily reflect distorted priorities. Actions are bound to fail if they do not adequately incorporate various views of multiple, affected publics.

Studies have shown what happens when certain goals do not resonate with local problems and demands. Consider the cases of opposition to polio immunization campaigns in India and Nigeria, low proper use of insecticide-treated nets in districts with high rates of malaria infection, and the persistent low number of girls enrolled in primary education. What some actors may deem important

problems, such as the negative consequences for human development of polio-myelitis, endemic malaria, and low female education, do not necessarily match what other publics believe is important or should be prioritized. Communities affected by a host of health and social problems view anti-polio vaccination programs as insensitive to their needs. Risk perception about malaria is low among populations concerned with economic survival and living in regions with endemic malaria. Rural families struggling to make ends meet believe that sending girls to school takes away valuable hands from economic activities.

The participatory critique has three important implications for strategic collective action. First, problems do not exist outside social processes by which they become defined. Virtually anything that happens in society – automobile accidents, addictions, gender-based violence, school drop-out – may eventually become articulated as a social problem. The "constructivist" nature of social problems raises questions about the characteristics of the "definition" processes. Who participates in the construction of social problems? Whose interests and goals do they serve? Who is affected by a given problem? Who owns the problem? Whose power is affected by whether any issue is defined as a "social/public" problem? Problem definition is basically about power relations – who participates in the process. Because societies comprise multiple interests, and problems affect multiple populations, problem definition may be contentious as various actors strive to prevail and impose their views.

Second, problem definition is a first and decisive moment for it affects subsequent strategic decisions. The way problems are defined directs the identification of solutions. If automobile accidents are defined as negligence by car manufacturers, insufficient public budget assigned to road building and maintenance, lack of drivers' information, or reckless behaviors by specific segments of drivers, then, goals and actions are defined in certain ways. If low enrollment of girls in elementary schools is defined as the result of families' low value for female education, costs, religious principles, insufficient numbers of female teachers, or lack of safety on the way to and in schools, strategic goals would be significantly different.

Third, problem definition requires the expansion of communication opportunities for a wide range of actors. Because any problem affects a variety of actors and interests, collective assessments are needed. What is needed is grounded, granular understanding of social problems in order to identify goals and actions. By defining problems, publics become articulated in terms of their interests and demands. It is through this dialogic process that "communities of problems," those who feel that they have interests and positions vis-à-vis any given issue, become constituted. Problem definition, then, is not only about competing understandings of social problems, their causes and dimensions. It is, too, about the constitution of actors as "issue publics" – mobilized publics around certain demands and problems.

In summary, problem definition implies a communicative process in which multiple actors produce situation diagnoses and negotiate the identification of

social problems. Principles of democratic communication such as voice, dialogue, inclusiveness, diversity, and tolerance are critical in this process. Actors identify problems through various platforms such as community discussions, news coverage, congressional debates, street rallies, online media, and so on.

Goal Selection

The next strategic step is goal selection. Because most development and social problems are multifaceted and complex, it is not uncommon for actors to identify goals in multiple levels. Following the socioecological model (Kincaid, Figueroa, and Storey 2007), the causes of social problems can be identified across individual, community, social, and structural levels. These levels are "fields of action" (Filgstein and McAdam 2012), that is, social spheres where "issue publics" act to encourage and maintain changes.

Consider the case of polluted waterways. This can be the result of lack or incorrect knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes among individuals about proper ways to dispose of polluting agents; or low risk perception about improper disposal practices and established social norms that foster negative behaviors; or societal trends such as increased use of pollutants in homes; and/or structural causes such as lack of efficient services for proper home management, inadequate legislation to monitor industrial activities, or poor law enforcement that allows industry to dispose of pollutants improperly.

Or consider obesity, a health and social problem that has gained visibility worldwide in recent years. As recent studies demonstrate, obesity is a complex problem grounded in biological and social factors. There are competing definitions of the problem, its causes, and possible solutions. Some favor individualistic explanations – limited knowledge of nutritional value of various foods, lack of awareness of healthy foods, personal choices, low risk perception. Other arguments highlight community/social factors – eating habits perpetuated by families and immediate "influencers," and the endurance of social norms about "healthy" and "unhealthy" foods. Finally, structural explanations prioritize causes such as systemic factors that encourage the production, marketing, and consumption of food with high fats and sugars: policy and industrial incentives (tax breaks, subsidies), ease of access to certain foods in supermarkets, neighborhoods, and schools, massive advertising, shrewd marketing, and prices. Given the magnitude and multicausality of the problem, there are no obvious, simple paths to action. No single goal comprehensively captures the complexity of obesity as a public health scourge and social problem.

These two cases show the complexity of social problems and the possibility of tackling them across "fields of action". In the case of obesity, communication

can be aimed at increasing people's knowledge and awareness about caloric content and food choices or modifying risk perception about specific foods. Communication can also be intended to promote changes at the community and societal level: promote changes in eating norms, encourage residents to grow healthy foods, activate neighborhood discussions about eating and healthy life practices, champion reducing portion sizes at home and restaurants, and so on. Communication can also be utilized to advocate for policy changes (such as subsidies, regulations, tax incentives) to affect prices as well as access to healthy and unhealthy foods.

Goal selection isn't politically innocent. Rather, it is loaded with specific assumptions about responsibilities for the problem and desirable solutions. If the emphasis is put on individuals, it is implicitly assumed that individuals are largely responsible for the problem. Instead, if goals focus on the production and distribution of food, then attention is directed to policy and business actors. The selection, prioritization, and funding of any of these goals are contingent on the organization and influence of various publics (from health care actors to the fast-food industry) on key policy and funding levers that affect subsequent actions. Making the public aware about calorific content, fostering "grown your own food" movements, or cutting subsidies to fast-food business reflect not only different organizational priorities but also the political power of mobilized actors. These are strategic, political decisions that steer human and monetary resources toward certain issues and actors, and away from others.

From a critical, participatory perspective, the selection of strategic goals is a political process by which stakeholders identify and choose objectives at multiple levels. Goals are not limited to information or persuasion. Certainly, they may include making individuals aware about issues and options, and/or convincing them about certain ideas, beliefs, and behaviors. But they also include promoting changes in social norms, policies, services, and organizational practices. Expanding strategic goals beyond the informational premises of the persuasion paradigm is necessary to assess multiple causes of problems and identify levers that can be pulled.

Strategic Junctures

Strategic thinking requires careful consideration of specific political contexts for the implementation of actions. Strategic choices do not happen in a vacuum, but rather, they take place within local traditions of communication and collective action as well as current opportunities and obstacles. These are "strategic junctures" that affect the choice of actions. This issue has received significant attention in studies interested in understanding the "political process" that affects social movements – the conditions and resources that facilitate or impede successful collective action (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1996).

One issue to consider is local traditions of communication and collective action – how people have defined, dealt, interpreted, and reacted to challenges in the past. Sociologist Charles Tilly (1986) included these factors as part of social learning and experiences – the "repertoire of contention." These experiences are accumulated in practical knowledge, collective memory, institutions, and social capital, which come into play when people plan and implement actions to address social problems.

From a strategic perspective, acknowledging contextual factors is necessary to situate strategic choices. New actions to confront problems inevitably need to tap into existing experiences and be sensitive to past efforts and results. Tackling old problems necessarily needs to consider the history of past attempts to deal with the same or similar problems. So, for example, fresh attempts to address child malnutrition need to integrate lessons from the past – how people have defined and tried to solve it previously; what has worked and what hasn't. The purpose is not only to avoid mistakes or insist on strategies that have proven to have limited impact. It is also to build upon existing resources and gained knowledge. Likewise, actions to address "new" problems need to keep past experiences in mind. "New" problems are rarely strictly new. New challenges (such as pandemics generated by new viruses) are likely to be dealt with by following previous experiences. Proposed changes that clash with old practices (such as abolishing child marriage or female genital cutting) are linked to fundamental social issues such as religious beliefs, authority patterns, common rights, and accepted customs. These factors shape how communities understand, prioritize, and act upon new problems.

Another set of issues that needs to be taken into account are opportunities and obstacles that affect strategic plans. Particular circumstances may offer unique opportunities for certain actions. Powerful actors willing to support changes, favorable government policies, positive "secular" trends, and supportive opinion offer favorable "points of entry" into specific problems. For example, administrations committed to passing legislation, changing social notions of masculinity, the presence of organizations dedicated to women's rights, and popular entertainment that addresses gender roles offer opportunities for making gender-based violence a public priority. Likewise, specific obstacles make it necessary to reshuffle goals and interventions. Recent legislative failures, negative public opinion, and strong opposition need to be considered to determine the strategic logic of interventions, actions, timing, and so on. These factors form "strategic junctures" that need to be considered to adjust actions and levels of intervention.

Opportunities and obstacles offer strategic dilemmas about convenient, smart paths to action (Jasper 2004) that need be integrated in action plans. Without a careful consideration of "strategic junctures," SC may miss opportunities that could play out favorably, or instead, run up against obstacles that reduce the chances of success. These junctures remind us that collective action needs to be flexible in order to adapt goals and actions to particular, unexpected circumstances.

Tactics

A strategic participatory approach to CDSC also needs to rethink tactics – how collective actors use specific platforms to achieve intended goals, or, to put it differently, what they do to achieve change. Tactics are commonly associated with campaigns organized and conducted by a range of political, economic and social associations to achieve various goals (Manheim 2011).

In the tradition of SC, tactics have been typically associated with informational media campaigns. These are short-term, time-bounded interventions intended to persuade populations about ideas, goals, and decisions. This approach is best illustrated by commercial advertising and election campaigns. They have a finite timeline to achieve specific results (e.g., message recall, brand recognition, increase in sales, influence on voting behavior). Impact is expected to affect specific decisions – purchasing a new product and voting on election day. This notion of campaign has been common in standard information campaigns in development and social change. Campaigns to drive up immunization rates, promote safe sex, or increase birth spacing fit this type of information interventions – single information campaigns to educate and influence populations. The campaign is synonymous with the "communication" tactic – how actors envision they will achieve change.

In contrast, an alternative notion understands a campaign as a rich set of long-term tactics. Because social change is a slow, lengthy process, it is absurd to expect that short campaigns would bring about significant and quick changes. Persuading people to change deep-seated habits or transform structures of authority and power requires more than one-time efforts. It would be quite surprising if months-long campaigns would effectively motivate people to defy social norms, question power structures, engage in new practices, and so on.

Communication actions, then, need to be embedded in a different view, one that conceives campaigns as permanent, long-term, multichannel actions. Following Manheim (2011: 18), campaigns need to be approached as "systematic, sequential, and multifaceted effort … [They] are complex, longitudinal acts of communication." This conception is found in classic cases of citizens' mobilization to promote social change in the West, such as the campaigns to abolish slavery and support eight-hour day legislation in the nineteenth century, and campaigns to promote nuclear disarmament, support civil rights, and champion sexual diversity rights in the past century. More recently, tobacco control actions around the world also attest to this understanding of campaigns as long-term, participatory, multileveled tactics.

These examples also show that campaigns shouldn't be understood narrowly as informational, mediated activities. Campaign tactics are contingent on specific circumstances and may include advocacy, persuasion, news framing, awareness-raising, consultation, and other activities. Nor should campaigns be solely identified

with media campaigns. It is necessary to break away from the "media-centrism" that has long identified "communication" campaigns with mass media activities. Communication is about dialogue, connections, and persuasion. These activities happen in multiple platforms or "channels" – from interpersonal spaces to parasocial interactions, from streets and public squares to online "social media." Social, technological, and industrial developments constantly redefine the spaces of connectivity where people communicate.

People's Motivations for Change

The final strategic issue to be reconsidered is the question of why people are or may be inclined to engage in change. In orthodox SC, this question boils down to messaging – what information "senders" tell audiences in order to change their knowledge, views, or behaviors. This is the core of persuasion – to provide people with information (from numbers to images) and different appeals (from fear to humor) to stimulate changes.

Given these premises, it is not surprising that motivation and messaging haven't been extensively discussed by participatory approaches. Messaging and the study of effective appeals are associated with administrative research, with information in the service of manipulating people. They have focused on finding ways to expand communication spaces – to enlarge the infrastructure of dialogue and social change. Questions of content and motivation are viewed as matters that belong and are decided in community dialogue. They are the outcome of local participation, rather than something that can be determined beforehand or that follows specific principles. Participants decide collectively the content and appeals of certain activities – edutainment formats or educational materials – to motivate others to engage in social change.

Yet this view of motivation and persuasion is changing. Recent participatory experiences have been interested in understanding what motivates people to change. They have produced valuable lessons to understand the dynamics of motivations in community participation. For example, community-led total sanitation programs in Bangladesh and other countries have stressed the importance of shame and disgust as effective motivators to change social norms and practices (Movik and Metha 2010). Initiatives to address gender-based violence decided to appeal to an alternative sense of masculinity ("real men don't beat up women") in community-level discussions to reframe questions of manhood and violence (Pulerwitz, Barker, and Verma 2012). These experiences not only illustrate increased sensitivity to motivations to change among participatory approaches. They also suggest that persuasion remains central to CDSC. Persuasion is critical not as top-down messaging to command others, but rather as collective efforts to find ways to motivate people to action.

Participatory analysis allows populations to gain insights into why certain actors resist change and how they could be engaged in positive transformations. Efforts to foster women's micro-financing have addressed husbands' resistance to identify suitable motivations ("family welfare") to encourage their support. Confronted with resistance from Muslim communities in India and Nigeria, grass-roots mobilization tried to gain support from religious leaders to frame immunization as a matter of care and family based on sacred principles (Obregon and Waisbord 2010). These cases show that persuasion should not be narrowly associated with informational approaches. Rather, it needs to be fully integrated into strategic collective actions. The issues of persuasion agents and arguments can be incorporated into participatory perspectives.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined how informational and participatory models in CDSC have approached SC. I have argued that it is necessary to reassess the place of SC from a perspective that identifies CDSC with strategic collective action. Participatory communication needs to seriously consider strategic politics – how mobilized citizens plan and execute actions based on collective analysis and solutions. SC brings up issues that are critical in collective action: problem framing, objectives, local traditions, opportunities and obstacles, coalition building, and appropriate tactics and motivations.

The adoption of the framework of strategic collective action has implications for academic scholarship. It calls for engaging CDSC with studies about collective action and political processes. Once participation and strategy are put at the center of communication and social change, they inevitably tread into questions about collective action, a subject extensively discussed in sociology (Johnston 2011), political science (Keck and Sikkink 1998), international relations (Bob 2005) and psychology (Brown, Gaertner, and Wright 2001). They are not only about local engagement and dialogue; they also refer to the uses of information platforms and technologies to foster participatory strategic planning.

Taking a strategic perspective in CDSC also has important implications for applied work. By conceiving CDSC as collective actions engaged with power dynamics and political calculations, communication should not be narrowly viewed in terms of information dissemination or top-down persuasion. Instead, it is redefined as strategic political action that needs to be mindful of stakeholders, interests, opportunities, and other issues. This shift may not sit well with funding and technical agencies that typically avoid the hard-knuckled politics of development and social change (Waisbord 2008). The organizational cultures of public agencies and private organizations working on human development and social change may not be immediately receptive to approaching communication as

strategic collective action. They find it more comfortable to remain oriented toward technical, informational, apolitical approaches to communication.

But even if organizations decide to avoid communication as strategic collective action, politics doesn't go away, as illustrated by recent examples. Immunization programs may want to approach vaccination simply as a medical technology and/or technical intervention, but they are likely to confront politics at a time of global debate about immunization, ethics, and choice and controversial arguments buzzing on the Internet. Water and sanitation interventions may want to stay away from the politics of public infrastructure, a sore theme related to good governance and massive capital investments. Such politics, however, may be unavoidable amidst the privatization of water services and intense debate about management of common resources. Promoting women's rights through economic and educational programs may strictly follow technical paths, but they may quickly become matters of strategic political communication as they clash against male-dominated hierarchies and power inequalities grounded in tradition, religion, and law.

Future studies need to foreground strategic dimensions in participatory communication and social change. What is needed is to produce theoretically sophisticated and empirically rich studies that show why and how the analysis of strategic communication helps us to better understand the relationship between participation and social change. If we assume that social change does not "just happen," but, rather, it results from deliberate, long-standing efforts, then, participatory communication and strategic communication should not be kept as separate fields of inquiry. Although their analytical genealogy and normative premises are grounded in different frameworks, they offer complementary insights.

Rather than maintaining CDSC and SC as separate fields, or insisting that they are necessarily opposed, we need to ask questions that bring together participation and strategic communication. What if there can't be effective SC without participation, and participation without strategy? Is social change necessarily the result of calculated attempts to change power relations by strengthening opportunities for participation? Can there be successful participation without strategic politics? How does SC help us understand opportunities for participation?

Finding common points between participation communication and SC is a potentially fruitful path for moving CDSC forward with new questions and arguments.

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Rethinking Entertainment-Education for Development and Social Change

Rafael Obregon and Thomas Tufte

The story of entertainment-education (EE) is that of a highly successful communication strategy that has achieved global recognition as a useful and effective approach to tackling contemporary development challenges. From its origins in agricultural extension services and move into family planning, education, public health, and HIV/AIDS prevention, EE has spread to all walks of development practice. EE-based communication strategies are currently used to address human rights (Rodríguez 2005), the environment (Escalada and Heong 2007), and peace and reconciliation processes (Gesser-Edelsburg, Guttman, and Israelashvili 2010), and are well established in all facets of the health, education and sustainable development sectors. In 2004, Singhal and Rogers identified more than 200 ongoing development projects that use EE as a communication strategy (Singhal and Rogers 2004).

EE has consolidated itself as a key communication strategy for change. Case-based and peer-reviewed articles document the successes of EE and reflect its growing theoretical perspectives. However, in this paper we argue that EE retains a strong bias towards the functionalist communication paradigm rooted in media effects studies and oriented towards an articulation of individual behavior change. This was confirmed in an analysis of the theories that informed empirically evaluated EE programs in 24 peer-reviewed articles published between 1990 and 2002 (Sood, Menard, and Witte 2004). Sood, Menard, and Witte identified seven key theoretical constructs that drove the EE interventions: (1) the steps or stages that individuals pass through in a behavior change process; (2) social psychological theories related to behavior change; (3) psychological models related to behavior change; (4) drama and role theories in relation to how people script or enact their own lives; (5) audience-centered effects studies;

and (6) hybrid models combining elements from various theories while maintaining a central focus on individual behavior change.

The seventh and emerging theoretical construct, "contextual theories," moves beyond a focus on individual behavior change to include theories of power and social constructionism (Sood, Menard, and Witte 2004). This theoretical construct has expanded and diversified since 2002 and we argue that it is producing the most significant innovations in EE practice and research, as well as changes in epistemological approaches, applied theories and practice.

This paper discusses the observed diversification of the science produced around EE. First, it maps out the practice of EE as documented in peer-reviewed publications, book chapters and unpublished theses completed in the period 2002 to early 2010. We then deconstruct the theoretical elements that inform the practice of EE, guided by a series of questions: What epistemological principles inform the practice of EE? What are the explicit development goals it aims to tackle? What theories inform the conceptual and strategic approach to EE?

By unpacking the ontology of EE, we attempt to identify conceptual and practical shortcomings vis-à-vis the development challenges identified in the studies. We have two points of departure. First, that the currently dominant discourses on EE contain a number of conceptual and theoretical limitations that prevent EE from demonstrating its full potential for tackling the development challenges it is brought in to work on. Second, in addition to culturally sensitive strategies, a series of emerging or previously ignored theoretical approaches and innovative practices that are used in EE reflect the growing call for the pursuit of a development agenda based on explicit norms on social justice, equity, and human rights. This leads to the emergence of a different epistemology with a strong social change agenda, and calls for a new direction in EE scholarship.

Three fundamental concepts guide our analysis, which contribute to our understanding of the social change dynamics that can be articulated through communication. Our understanding of communication and its potential strategic role in social change processes is about analyzing implicit *notions of subject, notions of culture and notions of social change*.

Three Claims

Based on the above reflections, we make three claims about the conceptual limitations of mainstream approaches to EE. First, while EE originally emerged as a fresh contribution to the field of development and health communication, and rapidly became a common feature of international development communication programs, it has been slow to incorporate the new theoretical perspectives and models of intervention that address the underlying causes of poverty, underdevelopment and health inequities. Second, the application of EE remains

strongly driven by perspectives that focus on creating change at the individual level, as opposed to a focus on the determinants of health and other structural development issues. This has, in many cases, been the result of the short-sighted agendas of international donors and funding agencies. Third, evaluations of EE interventions have failed to take account of the richer, culture-driven communication perspectives that could help to examine how EE serves as a platform for individuals and collectives to make sense of their own realities, create and circulate meanings, and mobilize to transform their environments. These limitations implicitly explain the need for increased interdisciplinary action, and call for increased attention to be paid to the epistemological and theoretical alternatives emerging in EE scholarship.

Methodology for Our Review of Recent Academic Output on Entertainment-Education

For our analysis, it was essential to assess current EE scholarship and practice, with particular reference to its theoretical refinement and growth. As is outlined above, this article starts where Sood, Menard, and Witte (2004) ended their review. Our focus is on the EE scholarship produced in the period 2002 to early 2010, inclusive (excluding the 2002 publications included in the 2004 study). We identified 82 publications that specifically dealt with development and social change issues using some form of EE. We focused primarily on searches of online databases for abstracts and full-texts of peer-reviewed journals and book chapters, or works presented as Masters' theses or PhD dissertations in academic databases in English, Spanish, and Portuguese.

We also took a broader view of what constitutes EE and expanded our search to accommodate other media forms or approaches that could reflect the use of various forms of entertainment for development and social change. We used multiple search terms that included, in addition to different articulations of entertainment and education (edutainment, infotainment, enter-educate), the keywords games; theater; development theater; participatory theater; computer games; video; video games; digital games; drama; soap operas; television; TV; radio; comic books; telenovelas; comics / cartoons; film; social change; social development; health; education; and HIV / AIDS. Our analysis only included texts that specifically focus on an entertainment medium for social change or development. For example, if the author only discussed a particular communication or media issue (i.e., telenovelas) without a specific focus on a development or social change element, it was excluded from our study. Two graduate students in communication and development studies, highly familiar with edutainment strategies and literature, studied and coded each article using a coding instruction guide.

Research Trends in Edutainment

Our analysis showed three important trends: the emergence of broader and converging theoretical perspectives, an increasing number of interdisciplinary perspectives on the use of EE, and the application of EE principles to various formats beyond media and communication. Consistent with the analysis of Sood, Menard, and Witte (2004) concerning the emergence of *contextual theories*, our review shows that new theoretical perspectives continue to be incorporated into EE scholarship. Such emerging theoretical concepts are organized into three areas: (1) critical perspectives such as subaltern theory, critical feminist and gender perspectives, and Foucaultian concepts; (2) empowering and participatory approaches that draw on Freire's dialogic communication perspectives and emphasize civic engagement and citizen participation; and (3) greater attention to cultural dimensions that build on cultural studies, with some attention to the role of narratives and sense-making, and to notions of cultural mediation such as Vygotsky's.

However, it is too early to argue that there has been a shift in theoretical thinking on EE. On the contrary, our analysis also confirms that the use of theories of individual behavior change remains widespread in EE scholarship. A number of papers reviewed subscribe to the social psychological theories that have dominated EE work, particularly Social Learning Theory, as well as behavior change models such as the Health Belief Model and the Stages of Change Model. It is worth noting, however, that unlike Sood, Menard, and Witte (2004), we found a greater diversity of theoretical approaches, combined with some attempt to develop more eclectic EE work that draws on behavior change and participatory approaches and theories.

Another important trend in our analysis is the move towards increasingly interdisciplinary perspectives in EE work. From its traditional base in psychology and social psychology, in particular, we identified several works rooted in disciplines such as education, political science, computer science, media studies, sociology and anthropology. Thematically, public health continues to be the dominant area of concern, although EE has been used in many other areas of development, including the environment and climate change, conflict and emergencies, peace-building, agriculture and education. Public health EE projects address a variety of issues, including gender equity, women's empowerment and the promotion of healthy behaviors on topics ranging from HIV/AIDS, to female genital cutting, to nutrition. This thematic diversification and, in particular, the interdisciplinary nature and conceptual development of the science informing EE practice, are positive trends that should provide greater opportunities for a deeper understanding of EE practice – and thus a more solid conceptual growth of EE.

We also identified a series of important trends in EE practice. The prevalence of innovation and of the application of EE to new mediums and formats is

understandably defined by regional capacity. For example, community theater and radio serial dramas continue to flourish in countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Vietnam. In Latin America, most authors focused on television (i.e., telenovelas) and radio, with limited reference to video games or virtual reality (i.e., the use of video games in child education). In North America and Europe, by contrast, we observed EE innovation in digital games and in the use of EE on prime-time television. Our sample also contained an important number of "theater for development" studies, in part due to our specific focus on this topic. Popular culture, such as popular music in Kenya and popular film in India, also served as EE media. The multimedia approach of Soul City, the health and development communication NGO in South Africa, continues to heavily influence multimedia EE approaches, and it is studied or specifically referenced in several of the articles.

In sum, the academic literature reflects the sustained importance of EE as a key strategy in public health especially and, increasingly, in other development areas. In terms of epistemological, theoretical and methodological approaches, our review reveals an increasing interest in rethinking the theoretical and epistemological basis of EE. We argue that for EE to continue to increase in importance as a development communication strategy, EE scholarship must move beyond some of the more conventional theoretical approaches that have dominated it to solidify and expound a more holistic, interdisciplinary, culture-centered and audience-sensitive theoretical basis.

The *Known* Story of Entertainment-Education

EE dates back as far as the 1930s, when US industry used the cartoon character *Popeye* to promote consumption of spinach by malnourished children. A dominant discourse of the *known* history of EE has emerged from the wide experience of using entertainment for development and social change agendas. We flesh out below the main highlights and then turn our attention to the lesser known aspects of EE, in developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in particular, but also in the European context.

The rise and proliferation of entertainment-education, 1970–1998

David Poindexter (2004) traces the origins of EE to 1958, when he worked on the production of a series of short dramas for a local project led by the Methodist Church. This supports an existing consensus among most EE scholars (see the contributors to Singhal *et al.* 2004) that the use of entertainment for

educational purposes has historically occurred in almost every society. However, only in the late 1960s and early 1970s did EE begin to incorporate the more elaborate theoretical perspectives, concepts, and methods that eventually led to its growth and pre-eminent position as a core element of development and social change communication.

Most of the dominant EE research and scholarship remains rooted in exploring behavior effects by drawing on social psychological theories. In contrast to this research agenda, the epistemological aim of communication for social change (CFSC) emphasizes the human rights, citizenship, and social justice agendas. CFSC digs deeper into the relationship between communication and empowerment, communication and collective action, and communication and the articulation of critical thinking. The epistemological aim and the underlying ontology are distinct from "mainstream" EE as it has developed until recently.

The *Unknown* Story of Entertainment-Education

The European, Latin American, African, and Asian experiences with EE presented below reveal a great breadth in epistemology, theory and practice. They are well-known in their own regions and/or academic environments. In the international, primarily English, discourse on EE, however, significant parts of the full EE story remain relatively untold and thus unknown.

Europe: Public broadcasting
for agricultural development

After World War II, Europe struggled to regain its economic strength and productivity. One area of concern was agricultural development. In the United Kingdom, the Ministry of Agriculture initiated what was one of the earliest known examples of EE. Based on early ideas of agricultural extension and the use of communication for the dissemination of information, in 1951 the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) broadcast an EE-oriented radio drama *The Archers: An Everyday Story of Countryfolk* as a 15-minute daily radio drama. It ran until 1972 in its educational format, when the Ministry of Agriculture discontinued it. As a radio serial it is still around today.

This EE-story is well-known and has been written up in both the organizational (Fraser 1987) and the academic (Singhal and Rogers 1999) literature. *The Archers* is distinctive in many ways from Miguel Sabido's (2004) storyline on the history of EE insofar as it is a post-1945 European initiative initiated and supported by the BBC and the British Ministry of Agriculture, and it focuses on agriculture, specifically the dissemination of information to help increase the productivity of

small-scale farmers. It pre-dates Everett Rogers's work of the mid-1950s, which led to the popularization and diffusion of innovation theory in communication and development studies, and connects with the European focus on the use of communication in agricultural extension developed in the Netherlands at Wageningen University, where Everett Rogers spent time in the late 1950s.

The Archers marks a distinct European pathway in the early days of EE – that of the early involvement of government-supported public service broadcasting to reach a national European audience. In many ways the development challenges of post-war Europe shared characteristics with those of developing countries: small-scale farmers and family holdings handed down from generation to generation, and a large proportion of tenant farmers renting land from hereditary landowners (Fraser 1987). The institutional set-up was significantly different from the EE experience emerging 15–20 years later – a market-based, commercially driven health-focused pathway informed by Sabido's theoretical proposal of the early 1970s.

Sesame Street, which began in the United States in the late 1960s before gaining an international profile with worldwide programming including in the Middle East and South Africa, where HIV-positive puppets appeared in the early 2000s, provides another example. The histories of *The Archers* and *Sesame Street* are well documented. It is less well known in the history of European EE that a strong educational strand continued in children's entertainment programs in public service broadcasting, particularly television, in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Although it has been an area of research among European media education researchers (see, e.g., Kotilainen and Arnolds-Granlund 2010; Bazalgette 2008; Christensen 2006; Vemmer 2006), it has not been framed in the logic of the market and behavioral change – with the explicit focus on effects, efficiency and ratings seen, for example, in the USA with *Sesame Street*. As a communication strategy for change and development, EE in Europe did not move beyond the early experience of *The Archers* until the 1990s, when it gradually gained ground in the field of European development cooperation in the agriculture and health sectors. It also entered the domestic health sector in, for example, the Netherlands and the UK where edutainment has been used in schools to promote the consumption of fruit and vegetables.

EE was "rediscovered" in the Netherlands in the late 1990s through the work of Martine Boumann in the field of public health (Boumann 1998). Boumann has been instrumental in the development of a number of Dutch EE-driven television series on public health-related issues for youth. In 2007, Boumann established the EE Centre for Research as a European hub which gathers together numerous scholars, increasingly also from Eastern Europe, and has broadened its activity to include, for example, climate change communication. The Sweden-based HIP Edutainment Foundation, which supports Femina in Tanzania, is a similar but still quite new initiative. European scholarship framed as EE research has been rather limited (Lubjuhn and Pratt 2009; Tufte 2001, 2004, 2005, 2008; Fuglesang 2005;

Boumann 1998, 2002, 2004), although MA theses are being produced in the Netherlands (EE Centre for Research), Denmark (Roskilde University), the UK (London School of Economics, University of East Anglia) and Sweden (Malmø University).

Entertainment-education in Latin America

The use of drama to articulate social and political change has a long history in Latin America. It is the most distinct feature of the Latin American contribution to the epistemology, theory, and practice of EE. The many variations of this Latin American experience include radio (radionovelas), theater (i.e., Forum Theatre) and film (action-cinema). The Latin American EE experience is embedded in two strong development trends in the region: the fight against military dictatorships in the 1960s to the 1990s, and the ongoing struggle to counter socioeconomic polarization in the region. These two trends are reflected in EE practice, as is illustrated in the three experiences set out below.

Cinema and video for social change   In the 1960s, Octavio Getino and Fernando E. Solanas developed a cinema style which can be seen as a deliberate struggle to increase the visibility of marginalized populations, seeking to give them voice by telling their stories on screen (Getino and Solanas 2006). This cinema style called for active audience sense-making and was action-oriented.

However, throughout the 1970s action-cinema lost ground to the growing commercial television industry, which had mass appeal, although some continuity can be identified in "video popular" which was widespread in the pro-democracy social movements of the 1980s (Ceccon 1994, 2009; Gumucio-Dagron, 2001). In the 1980s, TV Maxambomba organized mass film screenings in public squares in the most marginalized neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro, using comics and humor in their awareness-raising, in addition to public debates and advocacy. TV Maxambomba appointed Paulo Freire as its first chairperson in the mid-1980s.

Theatre of the Oppressed   A parallel movement was the theater-based communication strategy developed by the Brazilian theatre director Augusto Boal in the 1960s. Boal developed formats and strategies for a participatory, political, and social change-oriented theatre, which can be seen as an entertainment-education strategy. Strongly opposed to Aristotelian rhetoric and forms of communication, he proposed a reverse theatrical strategy for change, set out in *Theatre for the Oppressed* (Boal 2006). Using a rather Brechtian orientation to active engagement of the audience, he went a step further in encouraging full audience participation in the formulation and evolution of storylines and in the pursuit of solutions to the dilemmas posed by the drama.

Boal was inspired by his friend and mentor, Paulo Freire, and the principles of dialogic communication and conscientizing pedagogical strategies (Freire 1994) are apparent in his work. Today, Boal's Forum Theatre has gained global recognition and his methods are applied in multiple forms all over the world.

Broadcasting fiction for development   A third line of Latin American EE, virtually unknown to a non-Spanish speaking academic readership, is the use of television fiction for the articulation of social change. Its most prominent proponent is the Chilean former priest, reception theorist, and long-standing research director at the public broadcasting television station TVN in Chile, Valerio Fuenzalida (2006a: 715). Drawing on narrative theory, rhetoric, and the theory of dramatic prominence, Fuenzalida argues for the integration of the cognitive and affective dimensions of personal behavior, while developing a strategic approach to the broadcasting of fiction for development in which one of the key features is work with "social prominence", that is, a social group's ability to act to overcome its poverty (Fuenzalida 2006b: 644).

In Latin America, radionovelas and telenovelas, in particular, have a strong tradition in cultural studies and are equally strong in the field of reception studies (see, e.g., Vasallo de Lopes 2009; Jacks 1999, 2008; Martín-Barbero 1993). This represents possibly the strongest alternative pathway to the construction of a new epistemological alternative to the dominant paradigm in EE.

In sum, three distinctive features cut across Latin American scholarship in this field:

- The empowerment process, framed in Freirean terms as conscientization, emphasizes the liberating educational and pedagogical dimension of many of the Latin American EE experiences. The epistemology driving this knowledge production speaks about exposing power relations in society, tackling social injustice, and promoting human rights, participation and social inclusion. Embedded in this approach is a social constructivist notion of the subject, which is often a political subject that emerges both as discourse and as social action – both rooted in the practices of everyday life.
- The rehabilitation of popular culture as a location for negotiation, sense-making and identity formation (spearheaded by Jesús Martín-Barbero, Nestor Garcia Canclini, and Renato Ortiz, and continued by, for instance, Nilda Jacks and Maria Immacolata Vassallo de Lopes). This speaks to and provides a deep conceptual foundation for the culture-centered approach to EE that we – referring to the work of Mohan Dutta – argue in favor of below.
- Finally, Latin American scholarship and practice on EE grows out of social movements, the struggle to enhance citizenship, and the social change agenda of civil society. This scholarship is embedded in particular in a participatory and post-development paradigm of social change, which leads to a strong notion of agency and emphasizes voice and the representation of the marginalized in mainstream public debate and development discourse.

Entertainment-education in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East

EE in Africa has intertwined a genuinely homegrown pathway with the strong intellectual, institutional and financial presence of, especially, the US tradition of EE through development cooperation. On the one hand, there is a long-standing tradition that draws on what Ugboajah (2006a: 293) conceptualized as "oramedia," reflected in musical traditions and the use of particular instruments such as the drum (Ugboajah 2006b: 59). Theater for development also ties in with the oramedia tradition (Irobi 2006; Kamlongera 2005; Airhihenbuwa 1999; Nyoni 1998). Within theater for development are strands such as "theater for and an aesthetics of necessity," a term coined by Cameroonian practitioner Werewere Liking (Liking 2002, in Irobi 2006).

The African tradition of working with theatre as an EE strategy for empowerment and development has gradually been institutionalized in university curricula, such as MA programs at the University of Malawi, Zomba, University of Calabar, and Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria, and the University of Dar es Salaam.

On the other hand, radio has increasingly taken a high-profile role as a key instrument of EE campaigns and programs. Many of the radio-focused and other mass media EE interventions were originated by US-based institutions engaged in this field. This is also the case with some of the academic institutions that have developed EE-related curricula, for example, at the University of Kwazulu-Natal, which has the region's only MA in edutainment, and at the University of Witswatersrand, Johannesburg, where a concentration on social and behavior change communication in the Masters of Public Health program has been developed with support of the FHI-coordinated and USAID-funded Communication for Change (C-Change) health communication project. This presents challenges for the region, even though the University of Witswatersrand program is the product of an autonomous initiative between Soul City and the School of Public Health at the University.

Despite the abundance of EE campaigns and interventions in Africa, African scholarship and scientific academic outputs remain somewhat limited. New initiatives are emerging from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, which has an almost decade-long experience with an EE university-based program, and in Kenya, where Twaweza Communications has published a series of books dealing with issues of storytelling, performance and social change (Njogu and Oluoch-Olunya 2007; Njogu 2008a, 2008b).

In the Middle East, use has been made of entertainment-education since the early days of radio and television (Abdulla 2004: 303). Since the 1960s, Egypt, the regional leader in television and film production, has had a strong educational discourse in television drama, with a clear orientation toward pro-social drama (Diase 1993, in Abdulla 2004). Highly popular television dramas have been exported to countries throughout the region. Anthropologist Lila Abu-Lhugod has critically

analyzed the role of television drama in modernizing Egypt and its people (Abu-Lughod 2002a, 2002b).

More traditional EE initiatives in the region have targeted development issues such as family planning, waste disposal, bilharzias, healthy eating, hygiene, and sanitation – again with Egypt in the lead (Abdulla 2004). Abdulla's work in this field provides an illustrative example of an ORT (oral rehydration therapy) campaign from the late 1980s and early 1990s, conceptually based on social marketing, the diffusion of innovation and social learning theory, and funded by organizations as JHU, the Ford Foundation, and IDRC (Abdulla 2004). More recently, Helena Nassif has been engaged in studying the pan-Arab television drama *Bab el-Hara*, which is produced in Syria for a Saudi pan-Arab Satellite channel. During Ramadan, and in line with the traditional Egyptian use of melodrama, it deals with a broad range of themes from "Arabnness" to confrontation with colonial powers, gender identity and roles, forms of governance, social hierarchy, and religiosity (Nassif 2010).

In Asia, the Philippines pioneered "development communication," which had a strong conceptual framework that was purposive, value-driven, and pragmatic (Jamias 2006). The "theater arts" were used extensively in development communication practice in the Philippines in the 1970s (Valbuena 2006). Quebral (1972), Mercado (1976), and Rosario-Braid (1979) are some of the other key Asian thinkers. India in the 1980s saw the internationalization of the Sabido model of EE promoted by David Poindexter who, in the institutional context of PCI (Population Communications International), developed large-scale EE initiatives there. There has been a significant expansion of EE practice since, but, with few exceptions (Capila 2002), EE scholarship in the region remains limited, at least according to the results of our review. Many articles with an Asian focus – on Indian and Nepalese experience in particular – are published at US universities. The University of Los Banos remains a leading Asian source of research and practice on EE in particular and development communication more broadly.

The "unknown" history of EE demonstrates a wide range of practice and a fairly broad output of academic writing on its strategic use. On the one hand, resourceful US-based institutions, both academic and cooperation agencies, have developed a strong and established presence, in Africa in particular but also in parts of Asia and Latin America. These regions also have home grown traditions, as is seen in Latin America in particular but also in the traditions of folk media and oramedia in Asia and Africa. However, Africa, Latin America and even Europe seem weaker at producing scientific outputs on EE. Connecting this narrative on the unknown story of EE with the three conceptual trends discussed above makes a substantial contribution to rethinking notions of *subject*, *culture*, and *social change*. These could well form the contours of a research agenda for EE which is far more interdisciplinary and plurivocal than the known agenda, and one in which anthropology, political science, sociology, and education all emerge as fundamental stepping stones.

The Paradigm Shift: From Communication for Development to Communication for Social Change

The dissemination of the known story of entertainment-education has been part of larger efforts undertaken in the context of international development and health communication work. As such, entertainment-education has been part of the broader communication for development field both as an academic research field and as a communication practice (Waisbord 2001). The communication for development field has moved through periodic paradigm shifts that have echoed the shifts in international development, which are well documented elsewhere (Morris 2003; Tufte 2000).

In the late 1990s, the Rockefeller Foundation devoted significant resources to push a new concept called communication for social change (CFSC). It argued that communication for development needed to move beyond individual behavior change to instead focus on facilitating the conditions and an environment that would facilitate social change processes (Grey-Felder and Deane 1999). This idea garnered support in the communication for development community, which had become particularly concerned about the lack of progress in curbing the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

UNICEF also developed a new conceptual framework that argued for communication from a human rights perspective, a notion that brings into consideration key aspects associated with people's rights, citizenship, and agency (Ford and Yep 2003). Other international organizations revisited the dominant conceptual approaches to development. All shared a common vision: to move beyond individual behavior change to focus on the structural determinants of development, and the assumption that empowering communities through effective communication processes makes individual and collective change possible.

Critiques of Entertainment-Education

Increasingly, definitions of EE acknowledge the need to focus on both individual and social change (Singhal and Rogers 2004; Tufte 2005). Typically, EE programs and outputs form part of a larger communication intervention that can include other communication efforts, such as social mobilization and advocacy. Nonetheless, existing definitions of EE do not necessarily take account of other sociocultural dimensions critical to the process of social change. Perhaps more critical is the perceived philosophical approach and theoretical context under which EE operates. For instance, Waisbord (2001) characterizes entertainment-education as part of the dominant paradigm of development. Although promoters

of EE have become increasingly open to incorporating other social dimensions into their programs, the approach remains anchored in behavior change models. Waisbord suggests a need to look for a convergence approach that allows communication and development researchers and practitioners to integrate various communication strategies.

Tufte (2005) has developed a heuristic model, which identifies three generations of EE practice. The first generation refers to those experiences embedded in the early paradigm of behavior change communication. The second refers to experiences oriented towards life skills development, articulating an emerging critique of the limitations of the behavior change communication (BCC) paradigm. The third generation reflects the growing focus on issues of empowerment, participation and structural change – linked to what is now known as the CFSC approach to EE. Each generation represents a different understanding of a series of core concepts in EE: entertainment, culture, catalyst, education, audience, and so on. One distinctive feature between the generations is how they perceive the problems to which they were a communication response. "First generation" responses focused on the core problem as an information problem. The third generation defined the problems as structural inequalities, power relations and social conflict. The second generation interpreted the problems as a lack of skills, but also related to both a lack of information and structural inequalities.

Sherry (1997) reviewed 20 soap opera interventions around the world and identified a number of methodological limitations and theoretical implications. At the theoretical level, he argued that the complexity of social learning explains why changes in behavior had not been fully captured in the operationalization of the entertainment-education projects analyzed. An even more striking observation was the limited understanding of audience interactions with entertainment-education content and messages, as well as of negotiation and sense-making processes in the reception studies tradition. Sherry suggested the need for further studies in this area, an observation that has been echoed more recently by public health professionals (Petraglia 2007).

Dutta (2008a: 33) calls EE approaches primarily a "one-way flow" of communication. Dutta is critical of the episodic nature of entertainment-education interventions and states that they have served as a conduit for the promotion of Western values in developing country contexts, and as a platform for prioritizing certain health issues over others. Furthermore, they pay limited attention to the contextual and environmental factors that determine people's behavior. Dutta argues that the emphasis should be "on developing a meaningful and profound relationship without the thrust of achieving campaign objectives within short-term periods." This perspective resonates with ideas espoused in communication for social change, whereby communication must focus on the creation of communication spaces for people's voices.

New Theoretical Perspectives

Where should EE go from here? Our analysis has identified a series of challenges, which lead us to suggest a three-pronged research agenda for EE scholarship. These challenges include: the lack of incorporation of established communication traditions that can arguably contribute to a more holistic and interdisciplinary conceptual basis for the practice of EE; a need to better understand not only what EE does for audiences, but also how audiences interact with EE content and messages; and a deeper reflection on how the emerging social change perspectives in development communication could and should be reflected in EE scholarship. These challenges highlight three theoretical notions that we believe must be better conceptualized in order to advance EE science and scholarship and consequently improve the design of EE practice: the notion of subject, the notion of culture, and the notion of social change.

Notions of subject

Different philosophical perceptions of the subject result in different understandings and expectations of what communication is about and what a communication intervention may entail. If, inspired by Kant, one conceives of the subject as unitary and autonomous, one is likely to perceive the subject as a rational one that, in accordance with linear communication models, can be used to change behavior as long as the communication is clear, well planned, and in line with what formative research shows. In terms of communication theory, the notion of subject is linked to a functionalist school of thought, be it effects studies, social learning theory or behavior change communication.

If, inspired by Althusser, Foucault, and Bourdieu, one views the subject as a social construct in which the construction of the subject occurs in the discourses that emerge in the interplay between (media) texts, audience, and context, one will find a theoretical resonance within reception studies. Consequently, one's notion of the subject will be aligned with the sense-making models and theories of communication which conceive of the subject as an active player in the production of meaning. This notion of the subject is seen in reception theory from about 1980 (Hall 1980; Radway 1984; Morley 1986) and the related proliferation of qualitative audience studies. We argue that this notion of the subject is one of the key distinctive features to emerge from the new EE studies. It characterizes reception studies as in opposition to earlier audience studies and gratification and effects studies, and it is a growth area in EE studies.

The uncontrollable and unpredictable sense-making process is a distinctive feature recognized in reception theory, in contrast to the concern for predictability and control of sense-making inherent in many EE initiatives. However, reception

theory is not the only theoretical take on the social constructivist notion of the subject. The political subject, linking the subject to identity politics, is seen in the work of Michel de Certeau (1984) and Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe 1993; Laclau and Mouffe 1985). This is tied in with the emergence of cultural studies in the UK, Scandinavia, Australia, and Latin America in the 1980s, and in the USA in the 1990s. The determining role of everyday life as the locus for the construction of the subject is central to the work of both Michel de Certeau and Chantal Mouffe. It is the social construction of a political subject which emerges as discourse and as a social action but is rooted firmly in the practices of everyday life.

The notion of subject in mainstream EE thinking, however, remains unitary, autonomous, and rational. This fits primarily with the functionalist school of thought and fails to connect with the notions of subject reflected in reception theory and political theory outlined above. We see this as a limitation, which in part explains the emerging social constructivist notion of subject in EE.

Notions of culture

An inspiring perspective that helps clarify our proposed notion of culture is espoused by Dutta (2008b) in *Communicating Health: A Culture-centered Approach*. Dutta applies a culture-centered approach to health communication, which reflects the emergence of cultural studies as articulated by the Birmingham School in the early 1980s and has since spread throughout the Anglo-Saxon academic world. The Latin American School of Cultural Studies[1] developed along similar lines, making popular culture a nexus in the articulation of subjectivity and identity formation. The key difference between the British and the Latin American schools was the strong Latin American focus on connecting the proliferation of popular cultural forms of expression with social and political critiques. This was present in early British Cultural Studies, but tended in the 1980s to dissolve into a mere celebration of active audience sense-making and cultural expression, with less emphasis on social critiques and a required orientation toward social and structural change. Dutta's articulation of his culture-centered approach to health communication makes explicit the interaction between structure, culture, and agency.

In the early 1970s, Williams (1975) called culture "a way of life." Dutta speaks of culture as "the local contexts within which health meanings are constituted and negotiated … . Culture is constituted by the day-to-day practices of its members as they come to develop their interpretations of health and illness and to engage in these day-to-day practices" (Dutta, 2008b: 7). Rather than working with a static notion of culture as an essentialist category, where culture becomes a container of static practices in the lives of people, he emphasizes the way people engage and negotiate in dynamic ways with local cultural practices, interpreting phenomena of everyday life, be they illnesses, campaign-based media texts, famine or music. Culture consequently becomes a lived and negotiated social practice.

In relation to EE and the notion of culture, the most important difference between the dominant discourses in EE scholarship and the emerging paradigm becomes apparent when identifying the starting point of an EE initiative. In the former, the focus is on a pre-established goal to which culture-sensitive communication strategies are applied. In the latter, the starting point is an analysis of everyday life (cultural practices) from which key development challenges emerge.

Consequently, our claim – when it comes to the notion of culture in mainstream EE thinking today – is that EE strategies, rather than making an in-depth analysis of everyday life, culture, and cultural practice as the starting point from which to develop the goals to pursue with the help of EE, tend to pursue pre-established goals with the help of culture-sensitive applications of a basic EE model. We see this as a limitation which in part explains the emerging reorientation of the notion of culture in EE, a reorientation which aims for a culture-centered approach to communication.

Notions of social change

Finally, the notion of social change has become what we call an abused buzzword, in that it has come to be used about any form of change which lies beyond behavioral change. It is therefore crucial to clarify and thus conceptualize social change in the context of development work and EE. This conceptualization is about aligning the concept with the different paradigms of development. The prevalent paradigms each imply a particular notion of social change, a conceptualization of what social change is about, and a definition of who the key stakeholders of that social change are and the social dynamics the change process entails. In general terms, it is possible to identify four notions of social change, reflected in four different development theories:

1. The linearity of the modernization paradigm, and its conceptualization of social change as a one-way development process primarily linked to economic development and a market-oriented economy.
2. The critiques of the modernization paradigm, which retain a linear conception of social change primarily as economic growth but emphasize the central role of the state – reflected in dependency theories.
3. The participatory paradigm (or multiplicity paradigm), which is open to a sense of agency and recognizes the role played by communities in development processes.
4. The post-development paradigm, with its emphasis on voice and representation of the marginalized in the mainstream discourse of development.

These distinctions highlight the different conceptions of social change processes, but there are interrelations. On a more concrete level, social change

can be about changes in social norms, the development of social capital or changes in the social determinants of, for example, health situations. However, the main purpose of this chapter is to establish that social change is not a neutral concept, but a concept embedded in theories of development and change, and in social science theory of, for example, social norms, social capital, and social determinants. Organizational theory, system theory or complexity theory are all pathways currently being explored in order to theorize particular dimensions of social change.

As argued earlier, we believe that these three notions should be further explored in EE research and practice, including a focus on the new scenarios created by social media and other new communication technologies. This will require both innovative thinking and flexibility by key stakeholders in international development and by communication for development scholars and researchers. In either case, EE will remain a critical strategy in the years to come.

Note

1   The Latin American scholars who contributed to what we call the Latin American School of Cultural Studies have never identified themselves with such a school. However, in retrospect, looking at what happened in Latin America from the late 1970s, we find patterns of thought and epistemological concern which justify such a label in similar terms as what has become known as the Birmingham School and as British Cultural Studies. These were parallel intellectual trends in the 1980s and as such pre-date the US interest in cultural studies that emerged in the 1990s.

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12

Storytelling for Social Change

Kate Winskell and Daniel Enger

"We dream in narrative, daydream in narrative, remember, anticipate, hope, despair, believe, doubt, plan, revise, criticize, construct, gossip, learn, hate, and live by narrative …" (Hardy 1977: 13). Not only are stories pervasive in our consciousness, but they actively shape our memories, knowledge, and beliefs (Bruner 1991; Schank and Berman 2002). It is increasingly argued and acknowledged that our ability and desire to tell stories is what makes us human (Gottschall 2012) and that *homo sapiens* may be more aptly characterized as *homo narrans* (Fisher 1987), the storytelling animal (MacIntyre 1981). Narrative is so fundamental to how we make sense of the world that even identity is now widely understood as the story we tell about ourselves "in order to know who we are" (Hall 1996: 346).

Given that narrative permeates – if not constitutes – the fabric of our social and intellectual life, it is natural that the use of story-telling to influence social and behavioral change "is at least as old as Aesop and is deeply ingrained in Western as well as non-Western cultures" (Slater 2002: 158). Recent decades have seen a dramatic increase in interest in narrative approaches in global health communication, primarily via entertainment-education (EE). Traditionally, EE has taken the form of narratives in modern media (principally radio or television) which draw on behavioral theory to promote socially desirable behaviors (Singhal and Rogers 1999). Growing acknowledgment of the importance of more traditional media and more participatory storytelling approaches has thrown into relief EE's *social* change agenda (Singhal *et al.* 2004). This serves to link it to a hitherto largely separate body of literature focusing on narrative as a resource for empowerment, critical pedagogy, and community development.

In this chapter we argue that narrative can be particularly well suited to transcend the unhelpful polarizations – behavioral versus social change, diffusion versus participatory approaches (Tufte 2001; Morris 2005) – that have characterized and restricted global health communication to date. This convergence around narrative-based communication is part of the broader rapprochement between the strategic behavior change communication associated with public health and the social change agenda associated with development communication. It has been suggested that no area of study in this field "suggests growing interest in theoretical integration as clearly as research on 'entertainment-education'" (Waisbord and Obregon 2012: 23).

The convergence is associated with a confluence of factors. At the programmatic level, it is informed by growing recognition, fueled by the manifest challenges of the HIV epidemic, that complex behavioral change can scarcely be initiated, let alone sustained, in the absence of broader processes of social and cultural change. At the applied research level, it intersects with growing interest in going beyond the study of behavioral and media effects of strategic EE interventions to better understand the social, community-level, and interpersonal mechanisms that underlie these effects (Papa, Singhal *et al.* 2000). At the sociopolitical level, it coincides with changes in political and media environments in many low-resource settings that have facilitated an increase in citizens' media. At the technological level, it is linked to the growth in interactive information technologies that have transformed the potential for community-based storytelling to reach wide audiences.

In the first part of this chapter, we describe a series of theoretical rationales and cases that can be enlisted to support the conceptualization of storytelling for social change practices and their effects at multiple levels of analysis. We draw on perspectives from communication for behavioral change, educational and cultural psychology, critical pedagogy, feminist and post-colonial theory, and community development and social movements to delineate narrative: (1) in behavior change communication, (2) in processes of cultural change, (3) in the cultivation of critical consciousness, and (4), via consideration of questions of voice and representation, in processes of social change. In the second part of this chapter, we consider this theoretical base vis-à-vis "Scenarios from Africa" (Winskell and Enger 2005; Global Dialogues 2012), a narrative-based HIV communication process that is both participatory and mass-mediated. In Scenarios from Africa, young people are invited to write stories about HIV for submission to an international scriptwriting competition. The winning ideas are transformed by leading African directors into short fiction films. Available in a wide range of languages, these films are widely broadcast, viewed on the Web, and used as a discussion tool at community level.

In light of the vast multidisciplinary literature on narrative and narration, this overview is necessarily selective and illustrative. Our focus is on conceptualizing storytelling within the context of global public health and/or development

communication. By this we understand the construction by participants and public sharing of narratives with the goal of informing and/or catalyzing dialogue-based processes of social change. Our perspective is that of reflective practitioners working on HIV in sub-Saharan Africa and operating within a global public health environment.

Narrative in Behavior Change Communication

While definitions abound, there is broad consensus that narrative at its most basic constitutes the representation of a series or sequence of events (Rudrum 2005). Most theorists draw a distinction between narrative and "paradigmatic" thinking, or modes of thought based on propositional logic. No culture is without both forms of cognitive processing, although different cultures privilege them differently (Bruner 1996). Narrative is closer than non-narrative communication to lived experience in its simultaneous appeal to multiple senses, to reason and emotion, to intellect and imagination, and to fact and value; it is also easier to understand and therefore more accessible or "democratic" (Fisher 1987).

Within the field of communication, scholars have tended to focus on individual-level cognitive, emotional, and behavioral effects of narrative, and on its unique advantages as a tool of persuasion (Green, Strange *et al*. 2002; Hinyard and Kreuter 2007), as illustrated by the following brief examples. Narratives are easier to remember than non-narrative communication and have the potential to generate in us real and powerful emotions (Oatley 2002; Green 2006), which include empathy and identification: these allow us to live, experience, and learn vicariously. The process of transportation – whereby individuals are carried away imaginatively into the narrative's world – appears to distinguish the processing of narrative from non-narrative communication (Green, Brock *et al*. 2004). Narratives are more difficult to resist, counter-argue, or refute (Slater 2002). In persuasive messaging, these multiple characteristics of narrative interact, thus for example, "Through engagement in the storyline, individuals come to identify with characters, counter-arguing is reduced, and the individuals are more open to persuasive messages" (Hinyard and Kreuter 2007: 781).

Within this paradigm, narratives are seen as a "relatively subtle" form of persuasion (Kreuter, Green *et al*. 2007: 224), which has the advantage of reducing the perception of manipulation and making the health information they contain "not only less objectionable but also more contextual and meaningful" (Hinyard and Kreuter 200: 788). Given the focus on delivering persuasive messaging, the potential subtlety of narrative as a mode of communication raises the risk that audiences might miss the point. This has led some to propose the inclusion of an epilogue at the end of an EE drama to spell out the intended message (Singhal and Rogers 1999; Slater 2002). While such approaches may be pragmatic and facilitate

unidimensional measurement of effects, they fail to consider the possibility of capitalizing on the polysemy of narrative in the interests of community dialogue and negotiation.

A critique from within the behaviorist paradigm stresses the importance of the rich contextualization, cultural resonance, and perception of authenticity which narratives constructed with due cultural sensitivity can convey (Petraglia 2007, 2009). It also extends the aspirations of what narrative can achieve to providing "an 'exploratorium' within which people can try on new behaviors" (2009: 180) and "promot[ing] a kind of cognitive traction: a densely textured surface on which members of the public can engage their prior experiences, feelings, and attitudes" (2009: 180). This critique nonetheless remains situated resolutely at the individual level of analysis. Characteristically, interest in the social domain within the persuasion literature rarely extends beyond parasocial interaction (the intense one-sided relationships that viewers may develop with characters on television). As Waisbord and Obregon point out, "Absent is the conception of communication that stresses the exchange of ideas and participation in public life and the development of critical consciousness" (2012: 19).

Beyond its focus on the individual level of analysis, the behavior change through communication and persuasion literature on narrative often makes universalist presumptions about the applicability of its theoretical premises outside of a Western context, failing to adequately account for the cultural embeddedness of narrative archetypes, structures, and interpretation. Nonetheless, we would be unwise to reject out of hand the contributions it makes to our understanding of the potential of narrative to catalyze processes of social and behavioral change.

Jerome Bruner: Narrative in Processes of Cultural Change

Since the late 1990s, there have been repeated calls for HIV communication programs to pay greater attention to social norms, "culture" and community, instead of focusing on the delivery to "target audiences" (conceived of as aggregations of individuals) of messages which – though couched in local idiom – are predetermined by outside experts in conformity with Western behavioral models (UNAIDS 1999). All too often within health communication, culture has been conceptualized as a "static set of never-changing values and norms" (UNAIDS 1999: 36) to which individuals are subject, rather than as "a complex, dynamic, and adaptive system of meaning" (Kreuter and McClure 2004: 440) that is constantly evolving under the influence of individuals and collectivities. The application of this latter social constructivist perspective in leading-edge HIV communication practice is well summarized by anthropologist Richard Parker:

Because action has increasingly come to be understood as socially constructed and fundamentally collective in nature, earlier notions of behavioral interventions have given way to ethnographically grounded AIDS education and prevention programs that are community-based and culturally sensitive – programs aimed at transforming social norms and cultural values, and thus at reconstituting collective meanings in ways that will ultimately promote safer sexual practices. (2001: 167–168)

The theory of narrative and education proposed by cultural and educational psychologist, Jerome Bruner, provides a compelling grounding for this social constructivist perspective. It presents the possibility in applied communication to use the power of narrative to intervene at the dynamic interface between the individual and normative culture in pursuit of broader sociocultural change.

A key role in the process of sociocultural change is reserved for individual and collective agency. For Bruner, "a culture is constantly in process of being recreated as it is interpreted and renegotiated by its members" (Bruner 1986: 123), while stories are "a culture's coin and currency" (Bruner 2002: 15). Inherently dialogical, narrative is a primary tool in the continuing social renegotiation of meaning. As something that is literally co-constructed by teller and audience, brought to life by drawing both on the lived experience of the listener or reader and on common cultural models, narrative lays bare the dialectic of human agency and structure in communication.

Narrative brings cohesion to a culture: "it is through its narratives that a culture provides models of identity and agency to its members" (Bruner 1996: xiv). The narratives with which a culture equips individuals make up what Bruner calls "folk psychology," a form of common sense or collection of cultural scripts. But these narratives are also tools of social negotiation and adaptation. When people behave in ways that depart from the normative, we search for meaning in these exceptions by means of narrative. "The function of the story is to find an intentional state that mitigates or at least makes comprehensible a deviation from a canonical cultural pattern" (Bruner 1990: 49–50). Narrative thus has the capacity to arbitrate between cultural norms and exceptions to them, helping us to extend our understanding and empathy to non-normative behaviors or states and, ultimately, to accommodate cultural change.

One way Bruner articulates the dynamic dialectic between structure and agency is through the metaphor of culture as a forum: "a culture is as much a *forum* for negotiating and renegotiating meaning and for explicating action as it is a set of rules or specifications for action" (Bruner 1986: 123). Every culture has fora such as storytelling, theater and jurisprudence, for "exploring possible worlds out of the context of immediate need":

It is the forum aspect of a culture that gives its participants a role in constantly making and remaking the culture – an *active* role as participants rather than as performing spectators who play out their canonical role according to rule when the appropriate cues occur. (Bruner 1986: 123)

Creativity, imagination, speculation, hypothesizing, and negotiation – within the structure of existing culture – make sociocultural change possible. Bruner advocates that education encourage "culture-making," allowing the student to become an agent of knowledge making as well as a recipient of knowledge transmission. Culture-making is, by extension, a form of active citizenship: if a young person "develops a sense of self that is premised on his ability to penetrate knowledge for his own uses, and if he can share and negotiate the result of his penetrations, then he becomes a member of the culture-creating community" (Bruner 1986: 132).

A form of pedagogy, be it didactic or participatory, does more than simply nurture certain ways of thinking: it communicates to the learner the image she should have of herself, for "Pedagogy is never innocent. It is a medium that carries its own message" (Bruner 1996: 63). It also serves a political function, undermining the role of authority within the culture. A participatory approach in education, then, prepares learners to be culture-builders, vectors of social change and, by implication, active citizens in a participatory democracy. This is a very different approach to narrative from that espoused within the behavior change paradigm.

Narrative in the Cultivation of Critical Consciousness

Bruner's commitment to a constructivist pedagogy based on narrative-based reflective learning and problem solving aligns him with thinkers from Aristotle to Dewey, to Paulo Freire. Both Freire and Bruner hold that meaningful learning occurs when individuals are engaged in personally relevant social activities, and that learning should be cooperative, dialogical, and address open-ended problems. However, where questions of social, political and economic power relations and the limitations they place on agency are elided by Bruner, they are foregrounded by Freire. In its popular application, Freire's pedagogy involves the collective analysis of discussion starters or "codes" which are designed to help people analyze together the root causes of problems and clarify collectively causal relationships between the various factors that may contribute to a problem or issue (Freire 2003). The code may be a narrative or may function as the trigger for the collective development of a narrative. In this section we consider the use of narrative to foster critical consciousness around youth sexual health, focusing on a program in Brazil.

In her use of "sexual scenes," Vera Paiva proposes to address the social vulnerability that compromises the efficacy of HIV prevention programs, by "promot[ing] citizenship while encouraging sexual agency" (Paiva 2000: 217). Central to the conceptualization of this small-group program is the construct of the "sexual subject" which integrates the idea of citizenship and implies an

individual capable of regulating his/her own sexual life by, for example: developing a negotiated relationship with the sexual/gender culture and with family and peer group norms; being able to say no and negotiate safer and pleasurable sex; and having access to means to make reproductive and safer-sex choices. A second key component of the program is the "sexual scene," a narrative describing a specific sexual experience or scenario which is constructed and contributed "by the person who was part of it, or imagined it, or observed it," and is deconstructed within the small group using Freirean processes of "coding and decoding" (Freire 1970). Sexual scenes can be elicited through individual interviews, group interviews, and discussions, or through staged and dramatized performance and students' writing. The activity allows participants to identify together how the sociocultural context constrains their ability to control their sexual lives.

For Paiva, it is the internal contradictions identified in each sexual culture that "are the open doors for agency, for individual, and group cultural innovation" (Paiva 2000: 235). The approach thus not only provides a tool for critical consciousness, but also a means to "identify mechanisms for transformation" (Paiva 2005: 348). While Paiva argues that traditional behavior-change programs which fail to address cultural scripts and socioeconomic constraints are doomed to fail, she also ensures that critical consciousness is not an end in itself, but is overtly linked to the development of agency both in individual sexual behavior and via community organizing to address structural constraints:

> We used self-observation and scene-observation to help the students understand what was individual responsibility and what was a role of context that might be better transformed by social organizing and mobilization – the difference between self-regulation following self-observation, such as deciding for abstinence, and self-regulation plus social agency, such as demanding condom distribution in the health clinic (Paiva 2000: 231).

Too often, programs that embrace Freirean consciousness-raising fail to take the process to its logical conclusion. PhotoVoice is a community-based participatory research process in which community members record their realities in photographic form, select photographs for discussion, contextualize them in stories in small-group discussions, then present their images and stories to local policymakers in community advocacy fora. The facilitation of the PhotoVoice process revolves around the SHOWeD acronym, five questions grounded in Freirean perspectives: "What do you **S**ee here? What's really **H**appening here? How does this relate to **O**ur lives? **W**hy does this problem or this strength exist? What can we **D**o about it?" (Wang, Yi *et al.* 1998). Although they routinely stop at advocacy, PhotoVoice programs can extend their impact by incorporating a follow-up community organizing component (see www.dirtytruth.org).

Programs embracing critical consciousness around youth sexuality may also run the risk of failing to address the short-term, pragmatic needs for information

and skills-building of young participants. While it is imperative to deconstruct harmful sexual norms and engage with structural determinants such as poverty and gender inequality, it is equally important not to lose sight of the importance of fostering potentially lifesaving skills and innovative solutions that can work around or within the boundaries of slow changing social norms. Within contexts of extreme vulnerability, critical perspectives must be linked to the means to become sexual subjects and address both the individual-level and the structural constraints to sexual health.

Narrative, Voice and Representation in Processes of Social Change

Paiva acknowledges that her scene-based approach is resource-intensive. Participatory approaches have often been presumed to be incompatible with "going to scale," while large-scale programs have tended to be viewed as "inherently antiparticipatory" (Storey and Jacobson 2004: 418). Storey and Jacobsen argue that where lives are in the balance, for example, in the context of the HIV epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa, "the time required for small scale, intensively participatory approaches becomes a questionable luxury" (2004: 418). With recourse to Habermas' theories around communicative action, ideal speech and the public sphere, they propose that efforts to strengthen democratic processes at both the local and national levels can be meaningfully facilitated through mass-mediated EE and that EE is particularly suited for these purposes "because it can foster discourse on a large scale and at many levels". Dutta is skeptical of programs, including the one described by Storey and Jacobson, that use "participatory rhetoric to couch the one-way flow of information and persuasive strategies" (2006: 227). Drawing on Spivak (1988), he draws attention to the ways in which the dominant discourse of EE excludes the subaltern voice, denying the marginalized the opportunity to identify their own problems and solutions. In this section, we consider narrative in the context of voice and representation, with particular focus on the potential role of new technologies and distribution platforms in processes of social change.

    Proponents of the transformative power of narratives argue that telling one's story has potential effects at multiple, mutually reinforcing levels of analysis, from the individual therapeutic (Epston and White 1990), through the interpersonal, to the sociopolitical levels. Narratives help us to organize and represent experiences and are linked to understanding and cognitive and emotional processing. Extensive psychological research around the "Expressive Writing Paradigm" indicates that constructing coherent and emotionally expressive narratives about personal stressful experiences is related to well-being (Smyth 1998). Storytelling in the public sphere is furthermore seen as an expression of power and agency; a means to build

trust and community (Rappaport 1995; James 1996), to energize public narratives (Japp, Harter, and Beck 2005); an assertion and validation of "subjugated knowledge" (Foucault 1980), identity, culture and values; and a challenge to dominant social discourses (Williams 2004). Appropriately facilitated, it is argued that the act of giving public voice to one's own story can provide a catalyst for critical reflection, action planning and advocacy by the community (Wang 1997; Williams, Labonte *et al*. 2003).

Rakow and Wackwitz advocate using the term "voice" to mean "the means and ability to speak and to have one's speech heard and to be taken into account in social and political life" (2004: 95). Concerns with questions of voice, then, call upon us to distinguish between narrative and the act of narration, to ask whose narratives enter the public sphere, what form those narratives take, via which platform they are communicated, and which potential beneficiary (the narrator and/or the audience) should be privileged in processes of storytelling for social change.

Within feminist scholarship, a tension exists between the recognized need for women to tell their own stories and the fear that the traditional narrative structures and interpretive frames available to them reflect patriarchal norms and systems of representation.

> Not only do we find that there are disjunctures between women's experiences and the language and narratives in which they can be told, but also we find there can be disjunctures between what women make of their own experiences and what feminists make of these women's experiences. (Rakow and Wackwitz 2004: 97)

These latter concerns about representation and ideology tend to be eclipsed by respect for the value of cultural and identity stories as a source of cultural memory and survival for marginalized groups. However, they should alert us to the risk that storytelling, while therapeutic at the individual level, may produce negative effects in the civic arena. There is, in short, a risk of overly romanticizing and reifying the voice of the marginalized (including the risk of ignoring power dynamics at play within the community which can determine whose narrative prevails). There is also a risk that community members themselves can, in the absence of critical consciousness, be the mouthpiece for ideology that is antipathetic to social change. Public narratives, then, are by no means inherently positive: they may function just as easily to reinforce as to challenge dominant ideologies. This perspective should give us pause as we contemplate the opportunities that new information technologies and social media present for storytelling to reach vast audiences.

A particularly thoughtful approach to the dialectic between the individual therapeutic and public advocacy benefits of storytelling for social change comes from the field of digital storytelling. Through a process comprising personal reflection and growth, education and awareness, movement building, and policy

advocacy, the Silence Speaks project is "committed to fostering individual and collective healing and justice by nurturing the production of personal media narratives and bringing these narratives into carefully considered public spheres" (Silence Speaks 2012):

> We believe that with skillful presentation and strategic thinking about audience, first-person voices can bring attention to the systemic causes of chronic poverty, ill health, and violence in ways that demand accountability and prompt change at community, institutional, and government levels.

Sensitive facilitation is designed to ensure that the digital stories do not reinforce the misconception that problems reside within individuals "but instead implicate broader social, economic and political structures." Meaningful approaches to distribution, meanwhile, avoid the risk of voyeurism or exploitation. Skeptical about the social change potential of isolated individuals viewing the digital stories on the Web, not least in light of the explosion of online video, the Silence Speaks project views the Internet as one among multiple distribution platforms.

In one project, Silence Speaks is collaborating with Sonke Gender Justice in South Africa to challenge the stereotyped representations of gender and HIV that encourage sensationalism and pity, promoting instead a new kind of storytelling to promote understanding, accountability, and civic action among viewers. Carefully facilitated screenings seek to educate local communities, train service providers, influence policymakers and promote broad-based civic engagement.

> Sonke's purpose in sharing these stories is to make real people's voices and images the centrepiece of local campaigns to promote new visions of gender equality, masculinity, and community health in Southern Africa. (Sonke Gender Justice 2012)

Scenarios from Africa

In the final part of this chapter, we bring the theoretical base and cases on narrative and narration into articulation with the "Scenarios from Africa" process. Between 1997 and 2011, more than 150,000 young people from 47 African countries took part in these scriptwriting contests. The films based on the winning ideas are widely broadcast across Africa, viewed on the Web, and used in a range of languages as a discussion tool at community level.

By collaborating with Africa's leading filmmakers to produce short fiction films with high production values, the Scenarios process seeks to maximize emotional impact on individual viewers in the interests of generating empathy, identification, and transportation. In this way, the Scenarios films humanize the epidemic, elicit empathetic understanding to combat stigma and debilitating gender norms, and allow for vicarious learning. While the narratives are naturally constructed to

privilege interpretive frames that are consonant with the project's public health objectives, no attempt is made to constrain interpretation by means of an epilogue: this would undermine viewer ownership of the narrative, perceptions of its authenticity, and active – individual and collective – audience engagement in sense-making. The films are not conceived as vehicles for messaging, but rather as discussion-starters that invite communities to address the epidemic on their own terms. This has particular relevance for communication around the sensitive issue of HIV in a post-colonial context, not least in the wake of instances of ideologically driven policies being prescribed as a condition for donor funding. The Scenarios production process brings the narrative worlds of young Africans into articulation with those of world-class film directors, mediated via an editorial process led by local HIV specialists. It thus seeks to avoid earlier pitfalls of audio-visual materials on HIV which, when produced by public health professionals, frequently lacked emotional impact, authenticity, and cultural relevance and, when produced by film professionals, could convey inaccurate information or stigmatizing perspectives vis-à-vis HIV.

Viewed through the lens of Bruner's cultural psychology, the Scenarios from Africa methodology seeks to move HIV-related pedagogy away from paradigmatic modes of thought into the realm of narrative thought, from didacticism to participatory pedagogy, and from rote-learning to a community-based negotiation of meaning and values. The process thus seeks to empower young people not only to play a role in efforts to prevent HIV, but ultimately to help build a culture of new social, sexual, and gender norms. Scenarios from Africa's community-generated narratives are not only widely disseminated via the mass media: they are also used as resources for community-level discussion.

In Scenarios from Africa contests, local partners have worked to develop narratives with literacy classes, nomadic populations, theater troupes, street children, maids, sex workers, refugees, orphans, taxi drivers, metalworkers, gardeners, poetry clubs, music groups, support groups of people living with HIV (PLHIV), groups of young men who have sex with men, and entire school classes. The contests have proved successful at generating dialogue among peers and across generations. The majority of contest participants take part as members of a team and the majority of teams are mixed-gender. The collective writing of narratives can be construed, per Bruner, as a cultural forum, an opportunity for young people to negotiate new meanings together and build new group norms.

The contest leaflet provides a list of suggested situations, which participants can, if they choose, use as a starting point for their stories. This list is developed through a consensus survey of Scenarios from Africa team members. Suggested situations cover a range of themes. Story-starters have included one where participants were invited to write a monologue from the perspective of a person who has recently learned that she is HIV-positive and is looking in a mirror. Another story-starter elicited stories about someone who is attracted to people of the same sex. These exercises draw on the power of narrative to elicit empathetic

understanding to combat stigma and debilitating gender norms; to make one "perfink," or perceive, feel, and think at once (Bruner 1986); and also to develop critical thinking around the root causes of HIV infection.

Story-writing can also provide opportunities for "cognitive rehearsal" (Maibach and Flora 1993), catharsis, and understanding. Increasingly priority is being placed on providing the participants with access to mentors who are a source of guidance and help with writing. Mentors can also challenge stereotypical representations, encouraging participants to focus not just on what happens in the story, but on characters' thoughts and feelings, and on problem-solving skills. Emphasis is also increasingly being placed on encouraging participants to develop their stories through role play, improvisation, and other forms of experiential learning to encourage them to act their way into new ways of thinking.

Narrative is a testament at once to the supreme individuality of creative imagination and to the pervasiveness of cultural norms or scripts. In their creative writing about HIV, young people contextualize the abstract information they have received about HIV within a story of their own invention. This exercise tests their understanding of the basic facts and reveals strengths and weaknesses of the HIV response community's past communications work, acting as a needs-assessment exercise and highlighting priority areas for action. It also calls upon them to draw on their own lived or imagined experience and on other culturally determined sources of social understanding to create context, meaning, and values. The stories thus provide unique insights into young people's explanatory models about HIV, and into their appropriation and negotiations of dominant cultural norms around gender, sexuality, and stigma.

A research project analyzes samples from the 50,000+ stories submitted since 1997 with a view to identifying prominent social representations or cultural scripts and deviations from them (Winskell, Beres *et al.* 2011; Winskell, Obyerodhyambo *et al.* 2011). In this way, Scenarios from Africa films and other narrative-based HIV communication programs can generate community dialogue to deconstruct and challenge existing, harmful cultural models, or propose alternative ones that are authentically embedded within young people's cultural frameworks and experience. One of the reasons why the team-based selection, adaptation, and film production process is so important is that some of the narratives explicitly reproduce dominant ideologies: for example, representations of intentional infection by PLHIV were found to recur in narratives from Senegal from 2005 (Winskell, Hill *et al.* 2011), while those written by young women from southeast Nigeria were often found to blame young female protagonists for "immoral" behaviors that results in HIV infection (Winskell, Brown *et al.* 2013). This mediated form of voice is thus most meaningful and beneficial in this context and in a process operating at this scale.

The winning ideas in each Scenarios from Africa contest are selected by juries made up of PLHIV and other specialists in HIV prevention, treatment and care; young people, including former contest winners; and communication specialists,

including the top African directors and their production teams who go on to transform the winning ideas into short fiction films. In reading and discussing the stories together, jurors gain rich insights into young people's understanding of HIV and into pervasive social representations of the epidemic. The jurors record their observations on the information and representations they find in the young people's narratives and make recommendations for improvements in programmatic practice via a community-based participatory research process (Winskell and Enger 2009). These findings inform subsequent script adaptation in addition to other components of the process, such as the development of "Discussion Guides" and the list of suggested situations for the following contest.

The Scenarios from Africa films, based on the winning ideas in the contests, have been extensively broadcast across the continent and beyond, and via the Internet, reaching hundreds of millions of people. This mass distribution of the films makes young Africans' role as culture-builders a reality in an unprecedented way. It gives them the symbolic capital of a means to have their voices heard and identifies them as vectors of social change, thereby reinforcing their civic engagement. Concepts or metaphors drawn from the films – and conceived by young Africans in their narratives – are known to have entered youth culture in several countries and to provoke ongoing dialogue (Winskell and Enger 2005).

The use of audio-visual materials in health education has most often been theorized with reference to behavioral modeling and the development of self-efficacy and skills. Narrative in the Scenarios from Africa films is also intended to provide a forum for culture-building. The Scenarios from Africa films are designed to be short enough for effective and efficient use as dialogue triggers in time-limited educational sessions, but long enough to contextualize behavior, generate real emotional engagement, and thereby increase identification and risk perception. They are highly effective at generating collective dialogue in group settings where norms can be debated and negotiated. They provoke contemplation and deliberation on issues of relevance to young people:

> Nancy and Kady [female characters in two Scenarios from Africa films] inspire our women to contemplate what they want out of relationships. The men in our groups also appreciate these strong women: as one male seminar participant recently noted, "I want a woman like that, because then I'll know that when she says yes, she really wants to be with me." (Personal correspondence, Scenarios from Africa national coordinator, Mozambique 2003)

Facilitators encourage audience members to engage with the narrative and its characters in a variety of different ways, including using the SHOWeD acronym, in order to encourage the collective negotiation of meaning and critical thinking around the root causes of HIV infection and appropriate ways to respond. Where Vera Paiva is able to nurture sexual subjects over an extended time with participants in her group-based program, Scenarios from Africa – operating on a much larger scale – relies on story-starters, mentoring, the films, and their facilitation to

cultivate critical consciousness. One story-starter invited participants to put them-
selves in the shoes of someone of the opposite sex and imagine a situation where
they were put at risk or where they put themselves at risk. In the film that resulted,
the protagonist is a truck-driver who loves his wife, but has several sexual partners,
on whom he spends money that could have been used to send his pubescent
daughter to school. A nightmare, in which he turns into a woman and is able to see
the vulnerabilities of both sexes through different eyes, changes his perspective
and allows him to identify both short- and longer-term actions to safeguard his
health and that of his family. The film combines great humor with critical perspec-
tives, providing opportunities for community discussion about meaning, values,
and norms.

One clear advantage of the individual-level behavior change paradigm lies in
ease of measurement. Storytelling for social change practices aiming for effects at
multiple, mutually reinforcing levels of analysis are inevitably more challenging to
evaluate and need to use multiple, triangulating monitoring and evaluation
strategies. In the case of Scenarios from Africa, these strategies include pre- and
post-contest surveys of young people; time-series data on service provision by
partner organizations; focus group discussions and individual interviews with
various stakeholders; formative evaluation and pre-testing; extensive reporting by
partner organizations; exchange evaluation visits between national coordinators;
and tracking online views of the films. Participatory approaches are particularly
attuned to the philosophical foundations of storytelling for social change
approaches and can serve to reinforce their effects.

While beyond the scope of this chapter, there may be a place for clearer differen-
tiations between the concepts of narrative, narration, and storytelling in future
considerations of storytelling for social change. It may also be useful to distinguish
between different types of narrative or narration and their potential effects – for
example, testimonials versus fictional accounts; narratives delivered via different
media; synchronous storytelling to a live audience versus asynchronous storytelling
using audio or audio-visual media to a presumed future audience. In reality,
however, these distinctions may prove to be less clear cut than they might appear,
not least in the age of online digital media.

Conclusion

Co-constructed by teller and audience, brought to life by drawing on the lived
experience of the viewer, listener or reader and on shared cultural models, narra-
tive is inherently dialogical. Storytelling is similarly a testament to the dialectical
relationship between the subjectivity of personal experience and the creative
imagination, on the one hand, and our reliance on cultural norms and systems of
representation to create meaning, on the other. We argue here that this inherently

dialogical quality makes narrative-based communication particularly well suited to transcend the unhelpful polarizations that have characterized and restricted global health communication to date. Narrative therefore has special relevance for communication efforts with the goal of promoting change at multiple intersecting levels of analysis.

Literature on the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral effects of narrative alerts us to the potential of narrative to cultivate empathy and compassion and to the importance of transportation in achieving these effects. Jerome Bruner's cultural psychology provides a framework for conceptualizing the importance of narrative in accommodating sociocultural change and the agency, empowerment, and sense of citizenship that "culture-building" can confer. Drawing on Paulo Freire, Vera Paiva's scene-based sex education deconstructs sexual scenarios contributed by participants to cultivate sexual subjects who are able to both control their own sexual behavior and, via community organizing, to address structural constraints. Finally, the Silence Speaks digital storytelling workshops provide a thoughtful perspective on questions of voice, representation and distribution platform, guiding participants through a process that is both personally therapeutic and produce stories that, when carefully disseminated and facilitated, can be resources for civic engagement and social change. While operating at a different scale from Paiva's scene-based education and the digital storytelling of Silence Speaks, Scenarios from Africa shares with them a dialogical narrative-based process that seeks to bridge effects at the individual, interpersonal, community, and social levels of analysis. We argue that to neglect one of these levels would be to limit the potential of storytelling for social change processes.

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13

Theater for Development

David Kerr

Theater for development can loosely be defined as a nexus of theater methodologies, which are linked to social interventions by one or more communities to improve the people's quality of life. The movement is opposed to elitist models of communication; it seeks to empower subaltern communities by using their own language and culture to strategize solutions to their problems.

"Theater for Development" (henceforth "TfD") has never been comfortably ensconced as the most suitable term, despite its wide acceptance. For many theater practitioners the term carries a patronizing air of outsiders attempting to uplift or develop communities, which is actually opposed to the theory, if not the practice of this theatrical movement.

Other terms have emerged as rivals to "TfD." Some authors, particularly in southern Africa and India, have used the term "popular theater," but this phrase can be linked to a much broader range of theater. "Community theater," "social theater," and "folk theater" are widely used terms, but they too can be applied to theater forms lacking the activist implications of TfD. "Interventionist theater" describes the purpose of TfD quite accurately, but does not seem to have caught on. More recently "applied theater" has found favor (Preston 2009). This term has the advantage of sounding less patronizing than "TfD," but the disadvantage of sounding rather academic. It remains to be seen whether "applied theater" or some still-to-be-invented term will dethrone "TfD."

Another durable issue is whether TfD should be applied exclusively to "developing" or "Third World" nations, where the term has found most favor, or whether it can also be applied globally. For the purpose of this article I have used Africa (where the term is most firmly entrenched) as its main focus, but pay considerable attention to similar theater movements throughout the Third World.

At the end of the chapter, I also look at some modes of social theater, which articulate with, TfD globally.

Two other contentious terms are "indigenous" and "traditional." Both of them carry essentialist baggage, but still retain discursive value, even though readers need to decode them with full awareness of their complex and contested nature, since traditions do not always grow organically in a homeostatic society, but are capable of sudden collapse, cross-fertilization, revival and invention (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).

This chapter first looks at historical and cultural factors in both the pre-colonial and colonial periods, which may have encouraged the rise of TfD. It then examines more immediate influences, mostly in the post-colonial period, and how they have created diverse forms of social theater in different continents and regions. After an attempt to elucidate key theories concerning the practice of TfD, the article considers some of its articulations with a broader range of global communications.

Historical and Cultural influences on TfD

Ritual and secular performances in Africa going back many centuries helped generate the cultural conditions, which made TfD popular in the late twentieth century. Ancestral masquerades such as the Yoruba *Egungun* and the Zambian/ Angolan *Makishi* had masked men assuming the spirits of dead ancestors. Their dances had many functions, but prominent among them was to purge the communities of physical, spiritual and moral impurities. A common way of achieving this was through stereotyping of masks, costumes, and dance mime – parodying types of dysfunctional behavior such as laziness, and the breaking of sexual taboos. As Dandaura (1995: 15) asserts: "In most pre-colonial African societies theatre … served as a medium through which deviant behaviors were checked." Comic didacticism, with varying amounts of dramatization, is found in other cultural genres such as storytelling and spirit possession.

Many of the features of pre-colonial, performance traditions have influenced TfD. They include:

- Comic stereotyping in dramatic characterization (e.g., the prominence of trickster heroes);
- The comic license of performers to criticize members of the audience (not excluding powerful elites) for purposes of social control;
- The integration of various genres, such as narration, song, dance-mime, acrobatics, and community discussion into performances;
- The participation of audiences, which might be at a simple level of joining in songs or "dashing" outstanding actors, but may also include audience debate about issues (e.g., in a dilemma tale).

Some of these characteristics have merged organically by cultural transfer from a surviving genre, others have been revived by facilitators specifically for a TfD context in order to make the performances appealing to local audiences.

African examples of such revivals include the *Pungwe*, a Zimbabwean anti-colonial, all-night performance, which TfD artists tried to recuperate for performances in the 1980s (Abah 2003: 89). However, there are many examples from other continents. For example, In Nicaragua in the 1970s, Alan Bolt and his Nixtagolero group encouraged the mainly native American communities of Masago "to recapture their own indigenous tradition and to see [them] as valuable" (Versényi 1993: 165).

Clearly the revival of "traditional" performances in a modern context inevitably leads to the creation of hybrid forms. There is no space here to catalogue different cultural policies, nor the variety of indigenous societies, which interacted with the colonial cultures, but it might be useful to sketch a spectrum of hybrid performance types. These range from indigenous forms that remained functionally intact, but appropriated certain motifs from the colonizing culture, to those where the colonizing culture almost replaced the indigenous. An example of the former is the *Egungun* masquerade, which incorporated satires of *ojimbo* (white) men and women in the masks and dance steps; similar satires can be found in *Bata Fuji* musical skits (Klein 2009: 151–153). At the other end of the spectrum examples of cultural domination can be found in Central America, where, through a combination of sixteenth century conquistador aggression and Jesuit imposition of a syncretic form of Christianity, Spanish/Catholic rituals and cultural performances managed to almost erase indigenous Aztec, Inca, and Mayan culture in the space of two or three generations (Versényi 1993: 1–23). Between the two extremes are uncountable modes of cultural concessions, maneuvers, and disguised resistance.

TfD is clearly a syncretic form, which borrows from colonial pedagogies, but also from indigenous didacticism, and there are numerous strategic choices which TfD activists make that place them, however temporally, either towards the resistant or compliant poles of hybrid expression.

Colonial cultural agents, such as teachers or agricultural extension workers created instrumentalist drama that taught indigenous communicators "modern" methods of thinking and working (Gibbs 1999: 21). Such drama has had a major impact on post-colonial practice and has been most successful when it imitated indigenous forms. One colonial dramatic technique, which had a powerful impact on post-colonial TfD was that of stereotyped characterization. In numerous plays from the colonial period the plot situation was dependent on a conflict between a "Mr. Wise" and "Mr. Foolish," which was inevitably concluded by the discomfiture of Mr. Foolish. The plot motif became more widespread owing to its use in films, especially made by colonial film-makers for "native" audiences. (Burns 2002; Kerr 1997: 89–110). Another common film plot motif attempted to warn rural audiences against the dangers of migration to towns and cities. Such plays and films were

described as the "Jim Comes to Jo'burg" genre after a 1949, 50 minute South African film titled *African Jim* (Wikipedia 2012). This motif too became deeply ingrained in TfD plot construction.

The simplistic didacticism of colonial instructional plays and films sometimes articulated smoothly with the similar, if more densely articulated messages of hybrid theater forms created by African rather than colonial artists. Ghanaian Concert Party (Bame 1985), Yoruba Popular Travelling Theatre in Nigeria (Jeyifo 1984), Malipenga in Malawi (Kerr 1997: 46–69), and Tanzanian *Vichekesho* (Lihamba 2004: 237–238) condemned vices such as witchcraft and drunkenness, while endorsing the virtues of community solidarity and respect for elders. Unsurprisingly, many of these virtues and vices reappear in TfD.

Another form of top-down theater, which has influenced TfD is that associated with Communist cultural policies. Agitprop theater developed in the USSR in the 1920s as a way of teaching peasants Soviet policies about agriculture and other economic issues (Mumford 2010: 13). A variant of this was developed in China in the 1950s, when the traditional theater *Jing ju* was modernized and given patriotic, Communist Party messages (Cheng 1978). Even some democratic countries used agitprop, such as the Indian Government in the 1960s, which created agitprop "folk" troupes to "propagate family planning, national integration [and] rural savings" (Kidd 1984a: 19). In Zake Mda's comprehensive catalog of theater for development, the author lists agitprop as probably the least effective method of TfD (Mda 1993).

Educational Institutes and the Birth of Theater for Development

Arguably the most direct progenitor of TfD can be found in schools and University Drama. Colonial schools drama competitions in French African colonies, especially Senegal, had provided an incubator for Francophone African dramatists such as Bernard Dadié and Keita Fodeba (Traoré 1972: 29–54). In the immediate post-colonial period Schools drama competitions organized by the British Council and Alliance Française encouraged drama in English and French respectively as a form of encouraging learning in the former colonial languages.

In the post-colonial Universities there was more freedom to experiment. In the early years, mainly due to the influence of expatriate lecturers, there was a tendency for performances to be of European classic texts, usually modified by grafting African elements onto the productions. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, some Anglophone universities, such as Ibadan (Nigeria), Legon (Ghana), Makerere (Uganda), Zambia, and Malawi, moved towards local authors writing plays in English and local languages. From here evolved a technique of devising locally relevant plays and touring them around rural areas, often under the slogan,

"Taking theatre to the people." The plays were devised through a technique of improvisation, which lecturers and student leaders tried to make relevant to rural audiences away from the capital cities. Likewise in the Caribbean, high schools provided the creative womb not only for well-known literary dramatists, such as Errol John and Derek Walcott, but also community theater activists like Trevor Rhone, Alwin Bully, and Pat Cumper (Stone 1994: 59–70).

Many of the observant participants in Travelling Theatre trips quickly realized that there were serious limitations to their methodology of creating plays at the educational institutions. It gave rise to problems as plays which appealed to an audience with one cultural background, were found obscure or even offensive in another. As a result, University drama groups found ways of researching the issues, which would be found relevant to the target audiences. The most convenient way of doing this was by holding a play-creation workshop in the target community. This methodological transition is illustrated by the University of Zambia's Chikwakwa Theatre, where facilitators abandoned the remote control research and devising technique. In the 1975 tour of Western Province, facilitators held a one-week theater workshop at Senanga Secondary School on the East bank of the Zambezi, at which five devised plays in Silozi were created, that were very popular with audiences (*Chikwakwa Review* 1975).

This shift in emphasis prepared the way for the emergence of TfD. The institution which is usually credited with making the crucial transition earliest is the University of Botswana with its Laedza Batanani project organized by the Department of Adult Education in the mid- and late 1970s. The Laedza Batanani project has been discussed at length (Hurly 1977; Kidd and Byram 1979). So I would simply like to extract from a training manual the most influential aspect of the program, its structure of research, performance, and evaluation.

> Steps in organising the Laedza Batanani Campaign
> *A meeting to the district extension team*
> *A community workshop at which local people decide on the issues to be presented in*
> *   the campaign performances and select the actors*
> *An actors' workshop at which the performances are planned and rehearsed*
> *A campaign tour – a series of performances and discussions in different villages*
> *A follow-up programme*
> *Evaluation* (Popular Theatre Committee 1977: 9)

This process became almost a template which was circulated among African theater groups through a series of international workshops in (among others) the following countries: Botswana, Molepolole, 1978 (Kerr 1995: 153), Zambia, Chalimbana, 1979 (Chifunyise, Dall, and Kerr 1980), Lesotho, Maseru, 1982 (Mda 1993), Malawi, Mbalachanda, 1981 (Kamlongera 1984), Nigeria, Benue, 1982–1983, (Harding 1999), Zimbabwe, Murewa, 1983 (Kidd 1984a), and Cameroon, Kumba, 1984 (Eyoh 1984). The frenzied activity of these workshops did not simply

reproduce the template; there was intense self-evaluation and criticism of the *Laedaza Batanani* model as theater activists tried to adapt the theories to the practical realities of their various countries.

One of the most important observations coming from this process of experimentation and continental cooperation concerned the brevity of the short workshop, which made it almost impossible for the facilitators to truly immerse themselves in the culture of the "target" community. The very meta-phor of "target" implied an aggressive transfer of information and attitudes. Penina Mlama, who led the Malya project in Tanzania, noted that having a much longer time frame (several weeks) and repeated returns to the community helped to build a close, long term relationship between the group of University animators and the Malya community (Mlama 1991). Kamlongera made a similar point in a comparison between a two-week project in Mbalachanda (Malawi) and much more intensive and extensive process for two years in Liwonde (Kamlongera 1984).

This brief history of the spread, critique, and refinement of the TfD methodology in Africa is one which has largely neglected similar movements in other Third World countries and their mutual interactions. Several of the organizers of the African workshops were aware of the educational philosophy and praxis of Paulo Freire in Brazil and saw its relevance to the superiority complex displayed by many University lecturers and students in their interactions with subaltern communities. One of these, lecturers, Ross Kidd, a pioneer of the Laedza Batanani movement in Botswana, consciously used Freire's educational philosophy in the planning of the workshops during the 1970s (Freire 1972). However, by the early 1980s he realized that the widespread invocation of Freire's name by TfD practitioners was simply putting a cosmetic gloss on a basically top-down communication model (Kidd and Kumar 1981: 28).

This auto-critique was part of a wide-spread process of methodological and ideological cross-fertilization of ideas between activists in Africa and those in Latin America, the Caribbean and South Asia. An international workshop at Koitta in Bangladesh (1983) with participants from all four of these regions was a significant catalyst in this sharing of ideas. This, therefore would be a useful point to compare some theater movements in other continents with African TfD.

TfD, Patronage, and Ideology

One of the major differences between TfD in Africa and in the rest of the Third World lies in patronage, the source of funding and its direct or indirect impact on the ideological stance of theater activists. These can be roughly divided into government, faith-based and NGO funding.

Government sponsorship was quite common in the early days of social theater. In India the Song and Drama Division (SDD) of the Ministry of Information supported a performance-based campaign to provide information about national development plans (Kidd 1984b: 270). In Malaysia the Federal Land Development Agency (FELDA) has been used by the government to build community spirit in new resettlement schemes (Kidd 1984b: 272).

In China Maoist cultural workers tried to create "Revolutionary operas," based on traditional Feudal Operas, but transformed to conform to Communist Party ideology (Cheng 1978). Not all ideological theater, however, is rigidly dirigantist. Some governments have been more flexible than others. In Cuba revolutionary theater workers played an important part during the 1960s and 1970s in spreading communist programs and ideas. Theatro Escambray spearheaded a drive to convince peasants to participate in "Plan Luchera," a piece of social engineering that tried to collectivize farmers (Versényi 1993: 169). Perhaps more interesting was a series of plays which Theatro Escambray created, using participatory techniques, to convince Jehovah's Witnesses to participate in revolutionary activities (Versényi 1993: 171–172).

An even more flexible approach was shown by the revolutionary, Sandinista government of Nicaragua in the 1970s. It allowed Alan Bolt's group, Nixtayoloro (Nahuatl for "new dawn"), considerable latitude in their use of theater to mobilize the mainly native-American population of Masaya, where Bolt was brought up (Bolt 1984). The group's technique was to live within the community for several months in order to research not only the social problems, but also the cultural performance and art forms. A national group, Movimento de Expression Campesino Artistica y Teatro (MECATE), had similar aims and methods (Brookes 1982: 8; Bustos 1983: 194; Murillo 1984). What really distinguishes the Nicaraguan theater methodology from agitprop, street theater is the participatory techniques, the length of time the theater activists spent in the community, and the willingness of the companies to criticize non-functioning aspects of the revolutionary bureaucracy (Bustos 1983: 200).

Gradually, however, Government-sponsored social theater work began to decrease, especially as IMF policies of structural adjustment began to bite in the 1980s. This had several repercussions. One reaction to this was the rise of faith-based theater companies, which had the advantage that they could usually command commitment from the theater activists.

Christian companies in Central America have played a prominent role in addressing social issues from as early as the 1930s. More recent examples of faith-based, socially conscious theater can be found in Trinidad in the 1980s in the work of My People Incorporated, led by Hal Greaves (Stone 1994: 63). Probably the best-documented example of faith-based, socially conscious theater can be found on Mindanao Island (Philippines) in the work of the Philippine Educational Theater Association (PETA). This program was initiated in 1977 by the Catholic Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Conference Secretariat, as a form of resistance to the

injustices created by the Marcos dictatorship. The theater was designed as a grass-roots, community theater opposed to the propaganda distributed by the mass media (PETA n.d.: 10–25). A sign that PETA's concentration on human rights was successful is that its leader, Karl Gaspar, was arrested by the Marcos regime and detained for over a year without charge (Gaspar 1985).

The removal of Government subsidies to University sponsored theater led to academic troupes seeking partnerships with NGOs. An example of that is the University of Malawi's partnership with GTZ in the mid-1980s through the delivery of communication about primary health-care issues in Liwonde District. German medical staff trained Malawian theater practitioners in the health issues that they needed to incorporate into their plays (Kamlongera 1984). Universities, however, have a built-in problem in that the facilitators are often changing, thus preventing continuity, and they also need to keep to the University calendar, which may interfere with the communities' cycle of activities. This has led to independent theater groups attempting to source funding from faith-based organizations or NGOs.

Gaps in social services brought about by World Bank restructuring policies have been filled, if at all, by NGOs. The level of commitment to social causes of NGOs is to a large extent dependent on the funding agencies, which finance them *and* the ideologies that imbue them. Some of the opportunities and potential conflicts, which NGO support for theater gave rise to, were identified quite early in South Asia.

In Bangladesh during the 1970s, an independent theater group called Aranyak, established soon after the war of liberation against Pakistan, performed left-wing literary drama in Dhaka. Dissatisfied with this urban orientation, the practitioners decided to present their theater to the rural poor for which purpose they built a partnership with a left-wing Bangladeshi NGO, Proshika. The advantage of the partnership was that Proshika had its own field workers living with landless laborers in villages throughout Bangladesh. The Aranyak practitioners quickly realized that with their urban background, they could not create authentic plays on behalf of the landless laborers. Instead, they discovered that the laborers themselves were very creative in making plays about their problems, and began to use drama to set up other Proshika-aided cells. Obviously, this process created tension and sometimes violent conflict between the landlords and the landless laborers; Proshika's task became a balancing act between giving the laborers the confidence to stand-up to the landlords, but without putting the laborers' lives in danger. This, along with Proshika's political move toward the center, may have been a reason for the relationship between Aranyak and Proshika breaking down in the late 1980s (Kidd and Kumar 1981).

Very few African TfD projects had the same amount of overt class conflict as was found with the Aranyak/Proshika work. An obvious exception is the work which Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o (Kenya's most prominent author) and adult educationist Ngũgĩ wa Mirii created with a peasant community in their own village of Kimariithu (Ngũgĩ 1986; Ngũgĩ and Ngũgĩ 1982). The two Ngũgĩ cousins worked for a long time encouraging the community to research the contemporary and

historical roots of the poverty and lack of confidence in the community. The Kimariithu peasants gave the two facilitators many stories, songs and dances, out of which they created a Kikuyu play, *Ngaahika Ndeenda* (I shall marry when I want). They also built an open-air theater as part of a campaign of community renewal. The play was a scathing satire on the capitalist practices, which enriched the bourgeois inhabitants of the village and the neo-colonial ideology, which allowed them to function. The villagers provided music and dances as well as taking most of the dramatic parts. *Ngaahika Ndeenda*'s success caused a national stir. In December 1977 the local District Commissioner removed the license for the play, and shortly afterwards Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o was detained without trial for a year. After his release he continued his work with the Kimariithu community Educational and Cultural Centre. They created a dance drama, *Maitu Njugira* (Mother, Sing for Me) which had packed audiences for its dress rehearsals but which was not allowed a license. Police confronted protestors and in March 1982 razed the theater to the ground (Bjorkman 1989). The Ngũgĩ cousins continued to be harassed by the Kenyan authorities and many Kenyan intellectuals were imprisoned; by 1983 both Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o and Ngũgĩ wa Mirii, as well as several others associated with the Kimariithu project, had gone into exile.

One of the major influences on the Kimariithu movement, as well as on some of the other radical theater movements I have dealt with in the last few paragraphs, has been the work of Brazilian theater theorist and practitioner Augusto Boal (Boal 1979). Boal himself had been influenced by the theories of Freire and developed a system of theater in the 1960s and 1970s, which he called "Theatre of the Oppressed." The radical nature of Boal's approach is based on his conviction that the audience should not be passive receivers of entertainment/information, as in the Aristotelian tradition of catharsis, or individuals goaded into action after the performance (as in the Brechtian tradition), but participants in the action, that is "spectactors" (Boal 1979).

Although *Theatre of the Oppressed* had already been published in English in 1971, it was really only in the late 1970s and early 1980s that it made a major impact on TfD workers in Africa, as they began to have contact with practitioners from other continents. Theater groups, led by facilitators who were not overtly attempting to create revolutionary theater, started to use Boalian techniques in several African countries. "Simultaneous pedagogy" (often called "stop and start") was particularly popular. In this technique actors would create "cut-off" points in a play at moments of critical choice for the characters and the "joker" (facilitator) would ask the audience to guide the actors on how to proceed. A few also tried to use "Forum theater" in which members of the audience take over parts in the play. African oral traditions such as the *dilemma tale* sometimes made such creative participation surprisingly successful.

There is a fundamental contradiction, however, between the revolutionary aims of Boal and the reliance of TfD groups on NGO funding. The function of NGOs is not to challenge governments, which have become too indebted, corrupt or

fragmented to provide adequate service delivery, but to fill those gaps. Owing to the failure of conventional forms of developmental communication (such as lectures, pamphlets and community meetings) many NGOs turned to theater for its use of local languages and dialogical methods of communication. For cash-strapped theater groups, NGO support became a lifeline, which helped them to become professional troupes, not restricted by organizational links to educational institutions. Naturally, however, the funding came with strings, which have often restricted the groups' creativity.

One of the main problems is that the professionalism of theater troupes does not necessarily lead to an increase in quality of the theater. Some groups, desperate for funding are cobbled together without adequate training. They thus create a "rough theater," which consists almost entirely of improvised dialogue, while neglecting the strong traditions of mime, dance, masquerade and puppetry that exist in indigenous forms of African performance. Other theater groups have skills, but struggle with the bureaucracy of project proposals and monitoring/evaluation reports. Sometimes groups are tempted to gloss over failures of the workshop or play production, since they fear such frankness might jeopardize their chances of obtaining funds in the future (Preston 2009: 306).

A major drawback of NGO support is its sectarian nature. So, an agency specializing in agriculture tends to demand plays that concentrate exclusively on issues concerning agriculture. HIV/AIDS drama is frequently restricted to shallow characterization that is only interested in a character's sexuality. This, in turn, tends to encourage the kind of Mr. Wise and Mr. Foolish characterization that was common in colonial drama, thus neglecting the complex social factors that might influence characters' choices. The plots of NGO-sponsored plays are often simplistic, having little interest in the historical factors which have contributed to current problems. Some funders provide templates to script-writers of radio or TV soap operas about HIV/AIDS, to plot the various choices that characters need to go through for educational clarity (Mooki 2005).

NGO funding also affects the research process. Usually NGOs have very tight budgets, in order to reach donor targets, and so, instead of establishing the intensive and extensive research contexts, which the Malya Project in Tanzania or the Nixtagolero group in Nicaragua enjoyed, the research is too often superficial. A similar problem applies to participation. Some NGOs, such as health-oriented Population Services International (PSI) manipulate the participation so it conforms to pre-planned events (such as condom demonstrations) or having PSI employees planted in the audience to manipulate the discussions. In other contexts, there is no participation at all, owing to the importance of meeting donor targets (e.g., for numbers viewing videos), which would be hard to meet if there were after-video discussions. Some TfD activists have expressed their displeasure at how certain types of NGO sponsorship reduces the artistic merit and holistic perspective of "genuine" drama (Ravengai 2011: 76–78).

Recent Tendencies in TfD

The above references to radio, television and video are indicators that TfD is moving in different directions from its rural, "low-tech" origins. Even during the colonial period there was a considerable industry of media products, especially films and radio dramas, designed to teach "natives" the advantages of Western life and institutions. By the mid-1980s there were numerous videos, radio soap operas and TV drama series, which covered the same issues as those dealt with in TfD; popular themes include gender violence, HIV/AIDS, human rights, and nutrition.

Some of the features of TfD are difficult to achieve with mediated drama, especially addressing a geographically compact community, and using techniques of participation to involve the audience in reflection and decision making. In their origins the "old media" of radio, print and television, despite such techniques as phone-ins and vox pops, provided almost exclusively unidirectional communication channels. The tendency has been for radio and video drama activists to steer clear of stage drama and its carefully developed techniques for cultivating participatory audiences. This has created a perception that the "old media" were controlled by elites rather than by popular communities. Nevertheless, there are counter-tendencies even within the "old media." For example, some dramatists have used Radio Listener Groups, linked to community radio dramas in order to create participatory contexts (Gomia 2012: 251–252).

A major advantage of mediated drama is its popularity with young, urban audiences in the Third World. This is linked to internal and external migration resulting in rapid urbanization, social factors which favor mediated rather than face-to-face communication. The increasing popularity among the urban bourgeoisie of "New Media" such as cell phones and the Internet, has encouraged developmental media to create virtual communities which are able to provide feedback to radio or TV dramas through blogs and twitter accounts. This has proved quite popular, for example, in the One Love campaign against multiconcurrent partnerships (through radio and TV drama and other media) organized by the South African-based Soul City (Soul City n.d.). Whether this can be called "Theater for Development" is a matter for debate.

The rising influence of virtual community audiences is linked to a tendency towards sector specialization. This arises when funding agents target specific types of audience, arguably the biggest of which is drama created by and/or for women. The rise of feminism in the 1970s had a considerable impact on women's involvement in theater. Most of the early TfD involved women or projected the difficulties they face. This is because issues of development, such as agriculture, sanitation, and primary health care, are areas that, in most parts of the Third World, tend to be considered the domain of women. Frequently, theater animators who facilitated plays on these topics found that they quite unintentionally evoked an audience response that pitted men against women.

This factor, along with donor support for women's issues, gave rise to specialist companies supporting women rights.

Since one of the issues which women in the Third World have identified is lack of confidence, it is not surprising that much theater is based on reinstating indigenous female culture. Some African feminists, such as Nigerian Ifi Amadiume (1997), have researched pre-colonial gender relations, finding that modern subjugation of women by men is not an indigenous cultural factor, but was gradually imposed during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Christine Matzke (2002) has traced how urban female singers in Eretria built their confidence by reviving traditional Eritrean musical instruments.

Some Third World women have tried to adapt Western feminism to the conditions of the Third World. For example, in Jaipur, India, an organization called Jan Kala Sahitya Manch Sanstha (JKSMS), with the help of the French Caravan Theatre Association, provided theater performances in 20 villages about "dowry death, the abuse of girls, child marriage, alcoholism and domestic violence" (Pande 2007:157). In Jamaica in 1977, 13 grass-roots working-class women from Kingston, established, with the help of theater activist Honor Ford-Smith an all-female theater group, Sistren. They dealt, among others, with issues of women's labor rights and mental health, using African rituals of drumming and dance. (London International Festival of Theatre 1983: 25). Ford-Smith says, of the empowerment that their theater achieved, "Through dialogue, through encounters with others, we have discovered that the possibility of our power can shape forces which at present shape us" (quoted in Stone 1994: 64). As theorists and practitioners make a reappraisal of TfD achievements, some African feminists have made a critique of the male orientation of much existing TfD. Esi Dogbe complains about the tendency to categorise characters either as "total victims" or "empowered actors," while the real situation is much more complex than these binaries suggest (Dogbe 2002: 85).

Another major specialization is theater by and for children. Perhaps the most successful African example of this is CHIPAWO (Children's Performing Arts Workshop) founded in 1989 to support the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It uses drama, dance, storytelling, videos and other media to give children pride in their own culture, as well as to deal with issues that affect children (Chinyowa 2004: 45–48). Other organizations in Africa catering for children are the Yaounde Children's Theatre Collective in Cameroon (Eyoh 1984), Juventud y Luz (Youth and Light) in Angola (El Bushra 2004), and Youth Health Organisation (YOHO) in Botswana. A more widespread organization is Clowns without Borders, which has headquarters in San Francisco, but branches throughout the world, including a very active section in Johannesburg. According to its mission statement it is "dedicated to improving the psychosocial conditions of children and communities in areas of crisis through laughter and play" (Clowns without Borders 2012).

One of the most interesting features of theater aimed at children is the linking of campaigns to United Nations protocols. A very well-supported campaign was organized by Save the Children (UK) from 1998 to 2001 (Etherton 2004). It was

aimed at empowering children in various South Asian communities in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, India, and Sri Lanka through the media of live theater, puppetry, and video. The whole campaign was an attempt to find ways for children to create their own drama so they could learn how to negotiate with adults, and ultimately to initiate a global children's movement (Etherton 2009: 154).

Apart from these large specialist groupings based on gender or age, there are other theater organizations aimed at specific groups of vulnerable people, such as prisoners. Theater aimed at young and mature offenders has become a major intervention for prisoner rehabilitation, for example by Geese Theatre in the USA and UK (Watson 2009). However, it has also become popular in Third World countries. Boalian techniques have been used by activists such as Paul Heritage and Barbara Santos in Brazil, while Miranda Young-Jahangeer, Mbongiseni Buthelezi, and Christopher Hurst have done similar work in Westville Prison in South Africa (Buthelezi and Hurst 2005).

Facilitators in prison theater often use metaphors to explain the issues they face. Geese theater emphasizes the need for inmates to distinguish the constructive masks which help their survival from the destructive masks "which are used to encourage offending" (Watson 2009: 53). Paul Heritage describes his work in Brazilian prisons through the metaphor of keys and doors: "(T)he real keys of prisons are only half as effective as the social and cultural means by which the doors are locked and unlocked" (Heritage 2004: 189).

Another group that has attracted funding is that of people traumatized by war, rape or ethnic violence. In an interesting example, Jonathan Fox, the founder of New York based Playback Theater, held a workshop with Tubiyage, a mixed Hutu–Tutsi theater group that specialized in using theater to allow the survivors of violence in Burundi to face their traumas, and to live with people of ethnic groups who had been opponents in the past (Fox 2008: 243).

A related form is theater for refugees and asylum seekers, which has been a much favored area for social theater groups in the USA, Europe and Australia (Jeffers 2011), a site of consciousness-raising that Giroux (2008) calls "Border pedagogy." There are some groups in Africa that have also directed theater toward this issue, notably the Cape Town based Magnet Theatre, which created a play about Congolese asylum seekers, *Every Year, Every Day I Am Walking*. Its main aim was to unmask the "trope of victimhood … [which] too often does little more than reinforce powerlessness" (Cox 2012: 122).

Refugees and Asylum seekers are frequently victims of ethnic or religious marginalization, and quite a few First World theater troupes try to tackle the root causes of ethnocentrism by setting up theater companies that specialize in doing cross-border theater, in order to promote multiculturalism in the west, and, at a broader level, interculturalism between First and Third World communities. Prominent among these are Border Crossings based in London and the Intercultural Theatre Institute in Singapore, founded by Kuo Pao Kuy, which offers a three-year diploma in Intercultural Theatre (Wikipedia 2012). Drama workers in this field

face huge ethical problems about representation. Centuries of open and disguised racism are capable of creating often unintentional types of othering. If activists from either side of the othering process are to successfully cross borders they may, as Bharucha (2000: 42) says, "have to give something up … [which implies] the multicultural necessity of betraying one's culture of origins." Since so much of TfD involves outsiders trying to mobilize insiders, this challenge applies not only to conscious, cross-border work but to the bulk of social theater.

There are other developments that indicate that TfD is moving beyond its amateur base in rural African communities. One indication of this is the creation of international diplomas, degrees and post-graduate qualifications obtainable to students who wish to make TfD a profession. Academic programs or individual courses are available at numerous universities in both Third and First World Universities. These training opportunities fill career paths, which, due to declining subsidies and audiences, are closing in the conventional professional theater.

This professionalization of TfD has led to specialized varieties of social theater. For example, at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, the Drama for Life program has a component of psychologically oriented theater (Nebe 2009: 1). It has a strong link with Playback Theater Institute of New York, including a Playback group that uses the stories of individuals in the audience to create improvised re-enactments of life-changing events. Other students and lecturers are more oriented to the psychodrama techniques popularized by Moreno (Moreno 1972).

At the opposite end of the psychological/sociological spectrum is the short course training that takes place in various parts of the Third World in rural communications, employing PRCA (Participatory Rural Communication Appraisal) techniques popularized by Robert Chambers (1992). The aim of this approach is to put "the people back in the centre of their own development process rather than … training … brought in from outside" (SADC 1998: 49). For PRCA, drama is only one of these communication methodologies which, along with other techniques, is enclosed in the trainee's "tool-box."

It will be noticed that most of these institutional methodologies for training originate in Europe or the USA, a phenomenon almost certainly associated with the acceleration of globalized technologies in the 1990s and first decade of the twenty-first century. Clearly the wide variety of approaches to TfD adopted by these educational institutes relate not only to functional requirements but also to pedagogical and ideological differences.

Conclusion

This conclusion looks tentatively to the future partly by offering thoughts about research agendas, illustrated by the training programs summarized above, that may need to be implemented.

- *Mapping*   As my struggle in this article to contain all the varieties of TfD clearly shows, there is a need for an intellectual map of TfD and its articulations with related communication methods. Such a map ought to contain a variety of matrices. One would be to look at the spectrum between very local, semi-spontaneous community theater expressions at the micro-level and the large, well-funded organizations at the global level. Of course, between those extremes lies a variety of "middle level" organizations and interventions, which act as vehicles for the complex, multichannel process of "glocalization." A related matrix would be the funding and institutional infrastructure that supports TfD globally and locally. Yet another refers to the variety of methodologies, ranging from cognitive theories of Bandura (2009) to the radical sociological approaches of Boal, or from those which are restricted to live theater to those which are part of multi-media interventions. Whatever matrix is examined, the mapping would need to include a strong evaluative and comparative element.

- *Contextual studies*   This area of research positions theater projects within a broader, historical, cultural, religious and economic context. Now that educational institutions at a global level are training TfD activists, often through internships involving Northern students attached to Southern TfD projects, there is a danger of such trainees making cultural gaffes, which could undermine the validity of the project. Contextual research would link political/economic histories of "target" communities to ideological and aesthetic analyses of cultural forms. At the other end of the "glocalization" spectrum, contextual studies would make searching analyses of the funding and delivery agencies' strategies. Among the historical perspectives that require research is that of social theater itself, to prevent young activists from "reinventing the wheel." In addition, there is a need for facilitators to escape the sectoral traps laid by special interest NGOs, in order to ensure that TfD strategies are based on holistic views of society.

- *Impact studies*   There has been much research already into the vexed area of impact assessment, through application of M&E (monitoring and evaluation). NGOs that support TfD need to convince their funders that interventions are financially justifiable. Much current research into M&E is very positivistic in nature, since it involves ticking boxes of indicators, such as size of audiences (Etherton and Prentki 2006). There is a need for research that has a long time-frame, preferably by having a baseline study followed up by research into the impact of the intervention. The process requires a complex process of negotiation to ensure that, as Heritage (2004: 295) says, there is a "balance between quality and quantity."

   I finish this conclusion with some speculations about the future of TfD. The global reach of much recent, socially oriented theater is a correlative of broader globalization trends. Just as economic globalization entails a tendency for Northern and Southern entities to become economically linked, the same is partly true of

cultural factors. Many Southern theater troupes are becoming globally articulated with Northern cultural or developmental organizations. Likewise, market segmentation (Moneyterms 2012), which is a prominent feature of late twentieth- and twenty-first-century media, is paralleled by the increasing fragmentation of TfD messages, targets and theatrical styles. Another feature of globalized economies, the proliferation of franchises in supermarkets, restaurant chains, and TV series, is replicated to some extent in the templates for soap opera script-writing, promoted by Johns Hopkins University or in the "franchising" of techniques developed by Stepping Stones (n.d.), Playback Theater (Fox 2008), or Clowns without Borders (2012). Finally, the "total market" saturation through a variety of media, which characterizes recent PR and advertising campaigns, is similar to the multimedia (radio, TV, magazines, comics, blogs, and Internet sites) used by Soul City in its HIV/AIDS work.

It is important, however, not to oversimplify this trajectory towards globalized tendencies in social theater and media. Like all aspects of globalization it is necessary to examine the contradictions within global sensibilities, power structures, training and cultural products. Among the contradictions are the counter-flows from the South to the North as well as South–South. Nor is it necessary to think of all global influences as negative. Some of the TfD links with Northern agencies have positive aspects, provided the Southern theater activists are able to deconstruct the power relations within the cultural transactions.

It is difficult to predict whether TfD has an assured future or not. Certainly there are numerous NGO-sponsored TfD workshops aimed at rural village communities, using techniques, which have changed little since the *Laedza Batanani* workshops of the 1970s. However, such work now has to coexist with other theater genres, media and methodologies aimed at specific groups or concentrating on quite restricted areas of developmental communication. It may well be that TfD becomes a narrow strand of theater within a broader variegated cluster of socially conscious media and theatrical modes of communication. Or it may develop its own form of branding and methodological policing. Ideally, it would retain its flexibility and openness to subaltern interventions, even within the confusing plethora of global communication methodologies.

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14

Media Development

James Deane

Conceptualizing Media Development

Positioning the field of media development within a handbook focused on communication for development is not without its risks. Significant conceptual and ideological tension has tended to characterize the two fields.

Communication for development has been defined elsewhere in this handbook. Those definitions reflect its history of having emerged from diverse origins ranging from the largely US rooted modernization and diffusion of innovation theories that characterized much development thinking in the immediate decades (Rogers 1962) following World War II through to more participatory models of development originating mainly from developing countries and particularly from Latin America (Gumucio-Dagron and Tufte 2006), the Philippines (Quebral 1971), and elsewhere. Its focus has been on how communication can be used to advance the well-being (e.g., through health communication), or interests (e.g., through community radio) of people, especially those who are politically or economically marginalized.

There are many definitions of media development but it can be usefully characterized as working to support the establishment and evolution of free, plural, professional and sustainable media especially in closed societies or where media freedom is restricted. Its origins are principally journalistic and its objectives at its purest are aimed at support to such media as an intrinsic component of an effective and function democracy regardless of broader development concerns or objectives. It is a field defined by its focus on support to the functioning of the media – such as through institutional strengthening, capacity building

and training – rather than being confined to the defense of media freedom. For the purposes of convenience I have not here focused on another major set of organizations, those who exist to defend and support the rights and freedoms of journalists around the world, even though there is much cross over to the media development sector.

The tensions between communication for development and media development are complex. Communication for development advocates often argue that media development should be considered as one part of the broader communication for development community seeing it as an area that clearly works with media in the interests of the public good (Feek 2008). They often find it puzzling when media development practitioners resist being categorized in this way. Media development advocates often argue that communication for development is bent on using – and for some coopting or subsidizing and therefore potentially manipulating or distorting – independent media to achieve specific development objectives. When defining or referring to communication for development, media development advocates will often simplify its role (most typically by focusing on its role in seeking to achieve behavior change within HIV programs). Communication for development advocates in turn find descriptions of their field by the media development community overly simplistic.

Media development has become more tightly defined in recent years, partly due to efforts such as those led by UNESCO to create greater consistency of approaches to media development. The UNESCO *Media Development Indicators* (UNESCO 2008) provide a clear articulation of the central components of an established media development strategy: support for the development of a clear regulatory system conducive to freedom of expression, pluralism and media diversity; encouragement of a transparent media system capable of ensuring diversity of ownership and of a media capable of providing a platform for democratic discourse; the development of a professional media with strong training and other support institutions as well as a strong media infrastructure.[1] Media development in this sense is designed to achieve a set of principally journalistic and democratic objectives rather than a set of development ones.

There are different traditions within media development which stereotypically see the US as focused on support to commercial media and European media development organizations focused on public service media. Such stereotypes can be misleading. US organizations such as Internews, IREX and the International Centre for Journalists do tend to encourage liberalized media systems focusing on supporting the development of independent, sustainable, commercial media. Measures of success focus on the health of media as a set of institutions in society rather than broader social or development goals. However, such organizations have also often had programs focused on support to community media or on training programs to support better coverage of specific issues such as HIV/AIDS.

Organizations like BBC Media Action and Deutsche Welle, which have their roots in major public service broadcasters, are often perceived as advancing a European model of media development focused on how publicly subsidized broadcasting models can be introduced in emerging democracies. In reality these organizations tend to focus on a broader range of interventions with various types of media. Many European media development organizations, such as Danish based International Media Support and the Dutch based Free Press Unlimited are also heavily focused on supporting free and independent media that is not dissimilar to US efforts. Nearly all media development organizations have had programs supporting community media, a field which is also a mainstay of communication for development concerns.

Clear categorization of what is media development and what is communication for development is, therefore, often problematic and much of this chapter is focused on continuities that exist across the fields whilst acknowledging there are genuine, well-argued, and real reasons why there should be a strong conceptual distinction between the two.

Tensions and Commonalities between Media Development and Communication for Development

While there is significant cross-over between the communication for development and media development communities, the tensions between them are significant. There are two main international sector networks or associations with little (despite some efforts) clear collaboration between them, with the Communication Initiative (comminit.com) acting as a key fulcrum and network for the communication for development community, and the Global Forum for Media Development (www.gfmd.info) providing the same function for the media development community. Several organizations, such as BBC Media Action and the Panos Institute, belong to both networks emphasizing the difficulty in sharply delineating the two fields. Both support media but also work to achieve development objectives.

Indeed, many organizations belonging to GFMD work to achieve social or development objectives, and even those who only work to support media in and of itself often provide a rationale – such as enhancing the accountability of government to citizen – that many development organizations value as a key objective.

While such typification has lapsed into stereotyping in the past, more recent characterization of communication for development by media development organizations has become more sympathetic in recent years. In 2012, the National Endowment for Democracy Centre for International Media Assistance published its authoritative survey of media development, *Empowering Independent*

Media: US Efforts to Foster a Free Press and Open Internet Around the World (Kaplan 2012). It argued that:

> Within the field, a distinction is sometimes made between "media development" and "media for development." Media development is focused largely on building an independent, professional media, whereas media for development (also known as "communication for development") uses the media to educate and change behavior on specific issues, such as health care, poverty reduction, good governance, and environmental protection. Much of the funding available for media development is, in fact, for issue-specific, media for development programs. But there is considerable common ground between the two approaches, with both incorporating professional training and best practices. Done smartly, say veteran trainers, media for development programs can pour needed resources into helping professionalize an indigenous press corps.

Potentially arcane discussions around the difficulties of definition around the two fields in fact reflect deep-seated worries. The growing use of media by the development community, especially for advocacy programming, has accentuated concerns that media is increasingly being coopted by a development sector who have the funds to determine content (Page and Siddiqi 2012). In many developing countries, media programming is substantially determined by those who can most afford to subsidize content, and those often tend either to be development actors with donor funds at their disposal, or political or other factional actors determined on shaping media content to reflect their agendas. Many media development actors fear often fragile media freedoms and already heavily threatened independent media are not always helped by a development sector most interested in advancing issues of most concern to them without investing in the health of the media sector itself.

While these concerns are justified, communication for development actors often argue that such concerns misunderstand their field. Media development commentators tend to characterize the communication for development field as focused on mass media messaging with the most frequently highlighted component being HIV/AIDS social marketing programs. Neither this characterization nor one focused on using the media to advocate organizational positions is one that is recognized as sufficiently reflecting the range of communication for development initiatives by those who practice it. Just as media development has become more clearly defined through exercises such as the UNESCO media development indicators, so has communication for development following the World Congress on Communication for Development in 2007 when the participatory and social character of the field was privileged over its messaging component and where an organizational advocacy agenda was specifically marginalized. The statement, the Rome Consensus, defined "communication for development" as:

> a social process based on dialogue using a broad range of tools and methods. It is also about seeking change at different levels including listening, building trust, sharing knowledge and skills, building policies, debating and learning for sustained and meaningful change It is not public relations or corporate communication.

Getting a clearer understanding of what the delineations are between media development and communication for development and whether those delineations matter can best be achieved by understanding what constitutes a media development organization, what purpose it was originally established to achieve and the function of those organizations now. It is often assumed that most media development organizations were established in the wake of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War in 1989 and that its main purpose has been to export to the rest of the world essentially US or European models of media (Hume 2004). Media development has also often been associated with a democracy-building agenda particularly accompanying the large-scale funding spent on democracy promotion efforts following the military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003.

While it is true that media development grew rapidly in the 1990s, especially as the US and European donors created budgets to support democratization processes in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and in the developing world, almost all the main media development organizations had their origins before then, many of them long before. The roots and motivations underpinning the foundation of different media development organizations are useful in understanding their longer term values, priorities, and identities.

Media Development: An Attempt at Categorization

Categorizing media development actors is complex and inevitably open to dispute but it is useful in understanding the sector and indeed determining whether it is a sector, and it is instructive in understanding better the links and distinctions between media development and communication for development. With some trepidation, and with little consultation with the organizations mentioned, I suggest that, working in part through the lens of how these organizations were founded, four traditions of media development can be discerned.

Supporting media as a set of democratic institutions in society

Those organizations working towards the purest definition of media development are, I would argue, established with the purpose of and measure their success purely by how independent, professional, and sustainable are the media they support. The International Centre for Journalists was founded in 1984 as an organization "run by journalists for journalists." Its international work was initially to enable US journalists and media experts to support journalism by providing

professional advice, especially in communist states or emerging democracies. This work preceded the fall of the Berlin Wall but it grew substantially in the 1990s, not least because of the backing of the Knight Foundation, which had started to invest in international journalism support in the early 1990s.

IREX (the International Research and Exchanges Board), publishers of the Media Sustainability Index and implementers of many large-scale media support programs, had its origins in academia in the 1960s but began its media and communication technology support work in the 1990s with support to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It has since broadened its work geographically. The Media Sustainability Index, which provides an analysis of the "conditions for independent media" in 80 countries around the world provides a clear example of what media development in the US tradition is typically designed to achieve.

The Media Development Loan Fund is another organization working to support media as democratic components of democratic society. It has its origins in the experience of democratic transformation in Eastern Europe being founded in 1995 by Sasa Vucinic, formerly of B92, Serbia's independent radio station, and Stuart Auerbach of the *Washington Post*. It prides itself on providing loans rather than grants to free and independent media around the world in the belief that political independence combined with commercial sustainability of a private media is critical to the democratic wellbeing of countries. There are regional and national organizations that work on a similar model, including the Southern African Media Development Fund (SAMDEF).

Many other organizations fall into this category, including Free Press Unlimited in the Netherlands and International Media Support in Copenhagen although they tend to focus explicitly on the role of media in conflict situations, and in the case of IMS also work with media in humanitarian emergencies. These organizations tend (with the exception of the latter example) to describe their work purely in terms of where they see their success as supporting independent journalism and effective media organizations capable of supporting independent journalism. They tend to resist arguments that might link their work to broader social or development objectives.

Such efforts have depended on the financial support of a very small number of donor organizations who are committed as part of their mandate to supporting a flourishing media in and of itself. These have typically been USAID, the Knight Foundation, the Open Society Foundation, and Nordic donors such as the Swedish International Development Agency and a few others.

Independent journalism with a purpose

A second category might be called independent journalism with a purpose.

Internews, the largest US media development organization, was founded in 1982 by David Hoffman with the aim of working with media to reduce tensions

between the USA and the Soviet Union. Its first activities were to use satellites to enable direct communication between the citizens of the two countries. Its aim has expanded since then to, in the words of its current President, Jeanne Bourgault:

> To embrace media and information as key solutions to the broadest range of development issues, from empowering communities to building better governance to addressing global health and environmental issues. At the root of his (Hoffman's) vision was empowerment, which extended to our organizational culture as well.[2]

Another major media development player, the Panos Institute, had not dissimilar origins. While Panos was founded in 1986, it grew directly out of another organization, Earthscan, which was originally founded in 1975 by Jon Tinker. Tinker was the first environmental journalist in the world working for *New Scientist* magazine since the 1960s and Earthscan was founded on the belief that journalism was capable of generating knowledge and debate around neglected or poorly understood environment and development issues. It had a particular focus on making information on these issues available to those most likely to be affected by them, particularly those in developing countries. Working mostly through print media, a similar parallel organization, the Television Trust for the Environment, worked with TV to generate greater awareness of such issues.

None of these organizations described themselves as advocacy organizations and all of them argued that their work was underpinned by fundamental journalistic ideals of independence, balance, accuracy and accessibility in their work. Increasingly these organizations moved from simply providing information internationally to working to support journalists in developing countries to report more effectively on environment and development issues. Other organizations, focused on news journalism such as the Inter Press Service and Gemini News Service, both of which were formed in the 1960s, also have long histories.

The boundaries between pure journalism, advocacy journalism, media development and communication for development can be blurred. Earthscan, and Panos after it, clearly had an agenda to place environment and development issues to the forefront of public and policy opinion, but they did not seek to determine the outcome of those issues. When, in 1990, for example, Panos launched an information and public debate program with its report "Miracle or menace? Biotechnology and the Third World," it provided compelling arguments why this controversial technology could benefit as well as harm the poorest people. This was good journalism and was designed to support good journalism. Panos bought journalists from developing countries together to be briefed on these issues, always in ways that presented a range of perspectives so that journalists could put before their audiences the issues that most affected them. These and many other programs like them said clearly yes, this is an important issue but it is up to you the audience to make up your mind on how to respond to it.

Was this role media development or media for development? For those of us – and I was one of them – working for the organization at the time, the question did not arise and if it had it would not have mattered. We worked to enable developing country publics to understand the issues that confronted them and take greater control over their own destiny in the process. The work, funded largely by development agencies, had a clear development purpose. The tools used to achieve that purpose was journalism, the means media. It built the skills, knowledge and experience of journalists in developing countries in the process. The kind of reporting that journalists were able to do on these kinds of issues in many countries in the 1980s and 1990s in often very restrictive media environments constituted for some the best opportunity to carry out proper and sometimes investigative journalism.

Panos has covered many issues in its time, but it is best known for its work on HIV/AIDS and, because many media development commentators associate communication work on HIV/AIDS as the epitome of communication for development, the organization is generally seen as a C4D organization. In fact its work on HIV/AIDS was mostly journalism. Panos effectively broke the story of HIV/AIDS in 1985 when, in its first publication as a new organization after changing from Earthscan and splitting from IIED, it published *AIDS and the Third World*. This was the first proper analysis of the implications of HIV for developing countries and was strongly disseminated in Africa and other countries where the epidemic had an impact.

This work was journalistic and not focused on seeking to shift behavior or change people's minds, but it did have a development purpose. In this sense the work of Panos and of Internews is arguably journalistic but, while advocating specific solutions or positions, its success was measured by how much specific issues were debated and understood.

Since its foundation, Panos has decentralized with different parts of the Panos network (with Institutes in West Africa, Southern Africa, Eastern Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean as well as London, Paris, Canada and, at one stage, Washington DC) tending to have identities which, while recognizably the same organization, consist of distinct activity portfolios. At the time of writing, Panos London had announced its bankruptcy but the work of other Panos Institutes is continuing.

Cross-over organizations

There are numerous cross-over organizations, which are clear in their support to both media development and media for development and whose activities cover a broad spectrum of activities. BBC Media Action, formerly the BBC World Service Trust, is the largest of these, providing training and institutional support to public service broadcasters, commercial and community media, whilst also designing and delivering programs with media partners to achieve specific development

objectives. The organization had its origins in the long-running training and education work carried out by the BBC World Service, and in the "BBC Marshall Plan for the Mind," which was established following the end of the Cold War explicitly to support newly democratic media in post-Cold War countries. This hybrid history reflects its hybrid practice. BBC Media Action takes as much pride in ensuring that life-saving information is available to mothers looking after newborn children in the poorest parts of India as it does in training journalists to the highest standards, supporting community or commercial radio or facilitating the reform of a state broadcaster toward public service broadcasting values. It has large-scale communication for development and media development programs. It shares with its host, the BBC, a strong belief in media freedom and works to support that goal around the world, but shares also a belief that it is people (in BBC parlance, "audiences") that should be at the heart of its work. Its impact therefore tends to be defined significantly at measuring change at the people, rather than just the institutional, level.

It assesses its impact by working at four levels, the system (such as improving the regulatory structure or an organization or supporting the improvement of communication capacity within government health systems), the organization (such as transforming a state broadcaster into a public service broadcaster or improving the capacity of partner radio stations to engage rural farmers), the practitioner level (such as support to training of journalists or training health outreach workers) and the audience or people level (such as engaging millions through public debate programs or in educational dramas). The starting point for the organization is often understanding the information and communication needs and aspirations of people and incorporates much of its capacity building into attempts to meet those needs. In other words it tends to focus as much on (and often more on) people or audiences as it does on institutions.

Developing country media support organizations

A significant implication of the term "media development" is that it inherently involves one set of actors, implicitly from outside a society, supporting or developing another set of actors – journalists and the media – within it. As this handbook infers elsewhere, much of the energy, innovation, and good practice in the field of media development and communication for development has emanated from developing countries. The framing of both fields – media development and media or communication for development – by largely Western organizations is increasingly challenged by developing country critics who point to an arguably longer tradition of practice in these issues in the non-Western world (Gumucio-Dagron and Tufte 2006) and to a conceptualization that is overly rooted in Western models of media and Western models of development (Paneerselvan and Nair 2008). While international organizations have much to be

proud of, it would be a mistake to frame these debates principally in how they are conceived at an international or global level.

The 1990s saw the growth of many developing country organizations established to support media, such as the Media Institute of Southern Africa which was established in 1992. It was founded following the adoption of the UNESCO Windhoek Declaration, itself a landmark assertion of journalistic freedom in Africa which played a key role in accelerating democratization in Africa following the Berlin Wall's collapse. Other organizations followed, such as the Media Foundation for West Africa, established in 1997. Other organizations reflect a further wave of democratization being driven by the economic growth in Africa and elsewhere, and the increasing commercial investment in Africa. The Africa Media Initiative is an example of this, established out of recommendations from the Commission for Africa report published in 2005. Hundreds of other organizations exist across Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East and elsewhere to support media, some of them with very long histories, many of them more recent. Some of these are entirely rooted and driven from within their societies; others (an example is the Tanzania Media Fund) have been created in part to coordinate and disburse financial support to the sector from donors.

There are also countless other categories of organizations, including community media support organizations, that support media as part of broader human rights programs, journalist unions, media freedom and defense organizations, news safety organizations, organizations working with ICTs to support media, and many others. The field is a complex and crowded one and that complexity suggests a richness of innovation and variety as well sometimes as duplication and competition.

This chapter is too short to capture the full richness of innovation occurring from within developing countries in these fields but it is worth noting that the fissures which seem to divide media development and communication for development among international organizations appear to this author less pronounced in countries where development concerns are so urgent.

Some Trends Shaping the Future of Media Development

As this article has shown, the history of media development is complex and multiple but while many media development organizations had origins before 1989, the field's greatest growth came after 1989 with the focus of many donors – private philanthropic, governmental, and multilateral – on supporting democracy in post one-party states. More contentiously, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s also paved the way for massive investment in media development as part of nation-building and reconstruction efforts in those countries.

As argued above, the delineation between media development and communication for development is blurred. There are many reasons to think that the future will make such distinctions more blurred. The next part of this chapter looks at current trends likely to make these distinctions less useful, and suggests a terminology that might be more useful in describing the very real conceptual differences between the two fields.

Technology

The first trend is technological. Media markets in most developing countries are booming and media institutions share few of the commercial challenges confronting their Western counterparts. Advertising markets are nascent and there are many commercial as well as editorial incentives to expand into new markets, including in rural areas, local language, and other niche markets. However, a phenomenal growth of mobile telephony and, to a lesser extent, the Internet, is, as elsewhere, meaning that communicative power is moving from institutions to networks. Media development as a sector focused on building up media as a set of institutions in society seems an increasingly partial strategy as a means of ensuring and supporting democracy and democratic inclusion. This suggests that success that is determined by focusing purely on the establishment of a set of professional, independent, and sustainable media institutions in society without also focusing on how people are accessing, using, and communicating information is overly limiting.

The cross-over between a communication for development approach, which looks first and foremost at the information and communication needs and aspirations of people, especially people living in poverty, appears greater than in the past. Furthermore, to the extent that media development had its origins in applying and tailoring to newly democratizing countries following 1989 a model of journalism that characterized news journalism in the West for centuries, that model is under existential threat. While media markets in most developing countries are booming, those in most Western countries are in crisis as advertising revenues flee online.

This shift of communicative power from institutions to networks was most dramatically seen in the Arab Spring revolutions of 2010–2011. The influence of online media on the one hand, and newly satellite-enabled accessibility of international independent news media such as Al Jazeera and the BBC on the other, saw networked citizens exert organized resistance in ways that they had been unable to do before. Social media and networked communicative power is transforming and driving democratization processes, which is not only making a focus on institutions less useful as a prime strategy, but is also making a focus on citizens critical.

For some, this shift away from institutions should not obviate a continued focus on journalism, but should mark a clear shift towards supporting different

models of journalism, especially citizen journalism. Guy Berger, then director of the Rhodes School of Journalism and now responsible for freedom of expression and media development at UNESCO, has argued that the purpose of support to media should be conceptualized as support to media density, a key component of which is the increase in the number of journalists in society – what he calls journalism development – regardless of their institutional positioning or affiliation (Berger 2010).

For others, including this author, the shift from institutions to networks enabled by new technologies also and additionally suggests a need to better and more insistently understand how people are using and accessing information and understanding what their information and communication realities, needs, and aspirations are. A focus on supporting journalism through transformational times is essential to securing the democratic vibrancy of any society, but is not incompatible with understanding and responding to how people are and want to access information and communicate on the issues that shape their lives. To the extent that new technologies are shifting mediated communication from institutions to networks, it suggests that the field of communication for development – which has always focused on the societal level – has increased connection to the concerns of traditional media development (and vice versa).

Media cooption

The second trend is the growing cooption of media in many developing countries, particularly in fragile states. Such cooption, which is not well researched or mapped, is an increasing concern of media development practitioners, is manifested by political parties, or ethnic, religious or other factional interests increasingly buying, establishing or otherwise controlling media explicitly to further their own interests in society. There may increasingly be what Professor Monroe Price (1994) has termed a market for loyalty emerging in what was hitherto understood to be a market for audiences. Such cooptation suggests on the one hand an increased need for media development and its efforts to support an independent and genuinely plural media, but also raises questions about many of the strategies pursued by media development organizations. In particular, a strong focus on journalistic training, which has tended to be mainstay of media development strategies, is not necessarily appropriate if the only outlets through which such training can be practiced exist to pursue essentially political rather than journalistic objectives.

A connected trend is a small but growing number of critics of conventional media development approaches, particularly from academics focused on state-building or from the fragile states research community. Such criticisms, most concisely articulated by Dr. James Putzel in his 2006 paper "Why templates for media do not work in crisis states" (see Putzel and van der Zwan 2007), argue that

media development organizations have failed too often to understand the political complexities of the countries in which they work, especially when these are fragmented and affected by conflict. Both of these trends suggest that an overly normative approach to media development, rooted in a belief that a free and plural media will always achieve positive democratic outcomes, is at least open to question and that those, including this author, who subscribe to the positive normative role of such a media need to engage with those in the twenty-first century who critique that position.

Non-democratic media development

A fourth trend is the growing influence on non-democratic media development actors, with China in particular playing an increasingly influential role in support to state broadcasters in Africa and in other developing countries. Other such actors, such as Iran, appear to be investing significantly in media in countries such as Afghanistan. Media development seems likely to become an increasingly contested field in future years.

Such theories suggest that media development is insufficiently informed by a sophisticated analysis of the political complexities and realities of the countries in which it operates. Media development organizations deny this but acknowledge with pride that they are generally underpinned by an essentially normative approach rooted in a value system that values democracy, freedom of expression, and voice.

Results and impact

A fifth trend is the growing requirement from almost all donors, including traditional donors who have supported media development (such as the governments of Sweden and Norway, and of the European Union), for clear quantifiable results of their investment. Greater investment in impact evaluation by organizations, like BBC Media Action and Internews, are driving a focus on demonstrating the impact of media support on, for example, increases in political accountability. This requirement has arguably driven significant erosion between the boundaries between these fields, not least because democratic and development objectives have increasingly coincided. Most media development organizations will argue that, in supporting independent media, their objective is to ensure that governments become more accountable for their actions to their citizens. Mainstream development organizations have made enhancing such accountability one of their principal objectives in recent years. While funding from the mainstream development sector to media development initiatives has tended to be comparatively small (relative to other sectors), the rationale used by media development organizations to access such funding has tended to focus on their capacity to

increase accountability. When DFID supports a media development organization to improve the level and quality of accountability in a country, it is doing so principally to achieve a development objective.

The boundaries are blurred further when media development organizations have increasingly trained journalists to worked with media to cover specific issues, such as HIV/AIDS or climate change or economic issues. The World Bank, the biggest development organization in the world, has over the years been a significant investor in media training, much of it focused on encouraging journalists to cover issues relevant to its development mandate, with a particularly strong focus on economic and financial journalism. Large media development organizations, such as Internews, have placed a significant emphasis on building journalistic networks and training initiatives around issues such as HIV. These organizations would argue that they are training journalists to follow good journalistic practice around specific issues of urgent concern to the countries in which they are working and would make a clear distinction between this kind of work and advocacy campaigns or efforts to persuade people to adopt specific behaviors (such as to wear a condom during sex to prevent the spread of HIV). Nevertheless, there are clear coincidences of interest between those development organizations that see a value in working to support journalism to meet development objectives and those media development organizations.

The pressure for results, often manifested in donor logical frameworks populated by quantitative rather than qualitative, measures also runs the risk of pushing media development organizations to achieve results which media organizations within the countries may not value. Such results are often less easily achieved within a media development framework than a communication for development one, although most practitioners in each field and across these fields have demonstrated signs of a commitment to focus on results that matter to those they are seeking to serve rather than to a sometimes imagined donor agenda.

A New Framework is Required

The tensions between communication for development and media development are increasingly neither constructive nor conducive to innovation. They are also arguably increasingly outdated in a newly networked world. The fault lines between them are, however, real and need to be acknowledged so that they can be more clearly navigated and, where appropriate, transcended.

This paper suggests a better typification that sees these fields along a continuum. At one end of this continuum would be what might be termed a largely *instrumental* use of media where media is used, and sometimes even paid for, to communicate development messages or other information designed to achieve a development objective. Social marketing of condoms through mass

media would be an example of this. At the extreme end might be considered the role of social marketing of condoms.

At the other end of the continuum would be the *intrinsic*, support to independent, professional, plural, and sustainable media as an intrinsic democratic good in and of its own right. An example of this would be the Media Development Loan Fund.

Between these two ends of the continuum would be an exploding dynamic field of highly innovative, geographically dispersed, impactful initiatives cutting across both the media development and communication for development communities where media at one end of the spectrum are supported purely in terms of a set of institutions in society regardless of their social or public interest role. At the other is support defined purely in terms of how the media can be advanced to meet what the investing organization determines is a public good irrespective of whether this supports or nurtures the role of the media themselves.

Such an essentially descriptive, rather than normative, continuum would be respectful of all fields, reduce the opportunities for mischaracterization and potentially create better foundations for a more constructive dialogue between the two fields that could potentially – and optimistically – enable mutual lesson learning of the kind that could best serve the needs of those they exist to support.

Notes

1   A similar typology was used by the BBC World Service Trust (now renamed BBC Media Action) in research carried out in 17 African countries as part of the African Media Development Initiative (AMDI) (Power 2007).
2   *Washington Business Journal* (February 10, 2012) www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2012/02/10/30-years-internews-empowers-local.html?page=all (accessed November 5, 2012).

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Economics and Communication for Development and Social Change

Emile G. McAnany

There are indications in the current discourse on communication for development and social change (C4D henceforth) that seem to diverge from the discourse being carried on elsewhere in the development community. Perhaps I am focusing too much on the development industry (large institutional funders, both public and private) where economists have dominated the discourse for the past 60 years. But even at the grass roots there has been an increasing turn toward, or a return to, economic issues of jobs and economic empowerment. This has been related as well to the recognition that women play a critical role in development and social change. This chapter attempts to do several things. First, it reminds readers interested in C4D that the roots of our field have ties with economic concerns from the beginning and that over the first 25 years economic issues were prevalent in the discourse. But this interest slackened in the past 25 years or so as interest turned more personal and internal. The chapter examines some parts of the larger development discourse that still retains some of the original economic interests and argues that there are reasons to revive these concerns. Out of this discussion, a new paradigm for C4D is suggested and briefly outlined.

C4D Paradigms and Economic Issues

There was a time in communication for development and social change that economics loomed larger in the thinking about what role communication and its technologies might play in social change, both engineered or spontaneous, that was afoot in the world after WWII. The very early definition of C4D that led to

what became the first real approach or paradigm of the field, *modernization and diffusion*, did not, as is commonly held, come from either Daniel Lerner or Everett Rogers and their seminal books on, respectively, modernization and diffusion (Lerner 1958; Rogers 1962). It was more likely the early efforts by UNESCO to define communication's role in the development discourse of the 1950s that resulted in communication being directly linked to development (see McAnany 2012a, Ch.2, for extended treatment). At the time, there was an effort within the UN and its specialized agencies to define the crucial inputs for social and economic development. By the mid-1950s these inputs had been defined as key infrastructure investments to help nations grow: namely, education, telecommunications, transport, roads, and so on. But mass communication had not been considered as a critical investment until UNESCO made the argument in its favor. In an early document it argues that the "mass media has often been regarded solely as a 'consumption,' with the primary emphasis on its cultural significance. Yet, in a broad sense, *development of media may itself be treated as an essential element in pre-investment, and thus forms an integral part of any programme for economic and social progress*" (UNESCO 1961:16, emphasis added). The point being made is that from its earliest articulation, communication technologies (i.e., the mass media of the 1960s but today's social media as well) were seen as part of an economic as well as a cultural component for change. Thus, UNESCO was the first to define the need to invest in mass communication as a vital input and thus placed communication into its plan for social and economic progress. Thus, the theories of Lerner and Rogers would first be translated into practice by UNESCO and the UN. This was the first paradigm of C4D to be concerned about the social and economic progress of people, but it was not the last.

The subsequent paradigm that scholars have identified as *dependency* also focused on economics, both in development thinking about "distribution with growth" that the World Bank would adopt in the mid-1970s and with the critical writing of the economist Andre Gunder Frank (1969), arguing this time *against* modernization–diffusion thinking. It was only with the beginning of the third recognized paradigm of *participation* that much of the emphasis on economics in C4D theory and its application would give way to the cultural turn that would focus more on the content of the various communication technologies and their impact on cultural processes of individuals and groups in promoting liberation and empowerment. Economics has not been central to much of C4D thinking over the past two decades and more.

This third C4D paradigm, identified by scholars as *participatory* (e.g., Jacobson and Servaes 1999), took a "cultural turn" that began to focus on culture, values, and empowerment of people rather than on technology, evaluation of outcomes, and economic costs and benefits. There remained some political economic analysis of technology but C4D began to concentrate on the process of participation of people and communities and less on what mainstream development economics had considered important, like jobs, agricultural

output, and the growth of household income. The argument of this chapter *is not for a return to the thinking of the 1960s or 1970s* in an attempt to turn back the clock, but a suggestion that a return to some of the thinking about economic issues in C4D would create a better balance between the cultural concerns of the participatory paradigm and a return to some concerns of the economic and material base of developing societies. The remainder of this chapter will outline some of the current economic discourse on development and social change that has largely been excluded from C4D concerns over the past several decades. Toward the end of the chapter, I will suggest another paradigm that would broaden the approach of C4D to include both cultural and economic concerns.

New Millennium, New Goals, and Development Economics

With the turn of the new millennium, the United Nations undertook to rethink its development and change strategy with an initiative called the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that focused on eight very broad problems of economic and social change. These goals were: (1) to end poverty and hunger, (2) achieve universal primary education, (3) promote gender equality, (4) reduce child mortality, (5) improve maternal health, (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, (7) achieve environmental sustainability, and (8) build a global partnership for development. This strategy required increased contributions from more developed economies, but it also did two things differently from the UN's former decade-by-decade strategies of the past. First, it set a deadline of 2015 and it included metrics to measure the achievement of the different goals; and, second, it got the strong support of the entire UN body of nations. As UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon has reminded us, these goals:

> also embody basic human rights—the rights of each person on the planet to health, education, shelter and security. The Goals are ambitious but feasible and, together with a comprehensive United Nations development agenda, set the course for the world's efforts *to alleviate extreme poverty*. (UN.org/mdg)

C4D should have a major stake in the achievement of these goals, and more than one of the many UN experts' voices have been raised about the role of information and communications technologies (ICTs) in achieving them. The challenge, however, seems almost too large to consider as a feasible endeavor. Leading development economists seem to be divided on the issue of how best to achieve the millennium goals. Should it be a major effort to scale solutions all at once, or should it consist of a number of smaller projects that work across sectors?

One economist to affirm the first option or the "transformative" approach is Jeffrey Sachs, a professor at Columbia who helps to lead the Millennium Village Project (2008). This project (millennium-project.org), due to be evaluated in the near future, consists of a number of individual as well as clusters of villages in sub-Sahara Africa that have been given substantial funds and outside expertise to eliminate the worst levels of rural poverty and poor health. If the results of this multiyear effort are positive, then they will help to create a model for other countries in Africa to implement these strategies with help from outside funds. The premise that Sachs is following is that there is enough money and expertise in the developed world to make a major change in levels of income and health in rural villages in Africa and parts of Asia once a functional model is developed. This is a "transformational" view of development that argues that in order to make significant changes in the lives of people in the bottom billion, there needs to be large-scale input of money and expertise to create that change. This approach, however, has its critics, both inside and outside of the development economists' discourse (for criticism from inside, see Easterly 2005). From the perspective of C4D tradition, the project seems to be an outside and top-down approach that reminds us of the modernization–diffusion paradigm.

From another development economist's perspective, William Easterly has long opposed the transformational approach (Easterly 2005, 2006), arguing that funding from large institutions like the UN or the World Bank have produced mostly failures. What Easterly seems to intend is an approach that favors not only more modest projects, but ones with economic incentives for them to participate. The more modest approach he called "incremental or marginal" development. It is not that Easterly is against funding development but that under the institutional structures of the development industry, most funds do not reach people in need. If the large aid-giving institutions could fund smaller projects, closer to the ground (which seem unlikely in his analysis), then perhaps outside financial aid could be beneficial.

A third development economist, and perhaps standing between Sachs' optimism and Easterly's pessimism, is the Oxford economist Paul Collier (2007). Collier's argument focuses more on the politics and corruption issues of aid-receiving countries, the "traps" of underdevelopment that have kept a billion people at the bottom. His approach is to analyze how countries have been able to escape these traps, some economic and others political, with a special focus on Africa, where most of the Bottom Billion reside. Unlike Sachs, Collier sees a need to examine the structural and political institutions that hinder outside financial aid from having an impact and working to promote, and even mandate, changes in countries which receive aid. Sachs rather sees the issue as one of getting people rather than governments to change and to adopt different behaviors to promote development. Sach's approach is closer to what C4D often does in its projects.

So, what lessons would C4D take from these three broad approaches and why should it pay attention? The short answer is that if C4D is to translate its paradigms

and its research findings into policies that are relevant to the global development discourse, then it must have a voice in the broader development field. It can have a voice if it is part of the discourse and not limiting itself to its own more narrow set of interests. This concern was echoed clearly in the final report of The World Congress on Communication and Development, held in Rome in 2006 (Communication Initiative *et al.* 2007). This meeting was the largest conference on C4D ever held and represented the field of practitioners, academics, and policymakers. It is instructional to read the report because it argues strongly for communication for development and social change to be incorporated into development wherever it takes place, including large public and private aid-giving institutions. Since development economists and planners are central to how development is defined, it may be time for C4D to have its voice and ideas heard by economists and policymakers. Before this can happen, however, the field needs to pay attention to the voices that often set development policy in these institutions. Do economists reciprocate by paying attention to our field? Yes and no. Sachs has a chapter early in his book about ICTs and their critical role in change (2008). Collier points out at the end of his book (2007) that if there is to be policy reform in large aid-giving institutions and change in developing countries, then there is a critical role for the media in advocating for the needed reforms in global aid-giving and receiving. Easterly, however, says nothing about communication or ICTs. If C4D is to make its contribution to development policy and not simply remain a separate field focused on communication studies, it needs to enter the discourse that drives the Millennium Development Goals. Even with a recognition of the importance of communication and its technologies on the part of some policymakers, the field of development seems largely unacquainted with the sixty year history of C4D, its paradigms and its accomplishments. Where are the overlaps that might bring the larger field of development policy and C4D together? One suggestion is the record of how C4D judges "success" in its work.

The Methodologies of "Success" in Development

There is a question that both the broader development field and C4D share: was the investment of resources in a change effort worth while? This question has been around since the 1950s and it remains today. There continue to be discussions of how to judge success in both the broader development community as well as among C4D scholars. There is agreement that how success is defined and what methodologies are appropriate is key to motivating governments and the public to support change efforts like the MDGs. The problem within C4D as well as the broader development field is that there has been a great deal of discussion but little progress in resolving the problem. Some development economists, however, have been making major efforts in a direction that fits their way of conceiving change. An example

will help to clarify this approach. Subsequently, we will examine C4D efforts and how these might or might not fit with what development economists have defined as appropriate methodologies and what difference that makes for C4D.

The recent book called *Poor Economics: A Radical Way of Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty*, by two development economists from MIT, Banerjee and Duflo (2011), received strong positive response from the development community and the press. One of the main messages of the book concerned the *nature of evidence of success in change projects*. The question of whether a project has been successful is not easily answered, but it remains a key question for everyone who works for change. The answer that these authors propose and a methodology they have often applied themselves in the field is *randomized controlled trials* or RCTs. This approach, as Banerjee and Duflo argue,

> gives researchers, working with a local partner, a chance to implement large-scale experiments designed to test their theories [about whether the approach works]. In an RCT, as in studies on bed nets [for prevention of malaria], individuals or communities are randomly assigned to different 'treatments'—different programs or versions of the same program. Since the individuals assigned to different treatments are exactly comparable (because they were chosen at random), any difference between them is the effect of the treatment. (2011: 14)

They add that the book does not focus on any one RCT but on the number of RCTs that have been done by their group in many developing countries. It is based on the collection of such kinds of data from 18 countries, with which they have created a website showing the available data from RCTs and other forms of quantitative data collection. The book then proceeds to explore questions dealing with the poorest people concerning issues of the MDGs, including poverty, hunger, health, education, and population. Many of the conclusions about policies and strategies concerning the poor (living on $1 a day) in these areas are based on this data set and the RCTs specifically.

Several comments are needed to clarify what might be learned for C4D. First, there is the question of whether a *quantitative approach* to answering the question of success *is even appropriate*. To development economists, the answer is not whether it is appropriate but *whether qualitative data are appropriate*, or whether the latter are simply a series of anecdotes that cannot be used to judge success. I think the answer to this question depends on what kinds of projects one is examining and whether the objectives of the projects are best answered by a quantitative, qualitative or a mixed approach. To their credit, the authors, after making a strong case for RCTs, spend a good deal of the book relating their direct field experience that provided them with qualitative data/experience for the interpretation of some of the quantitative results. One gets the impression that the authors have combined their direct field experience with a focus on their data to come to an interpretation that is stated in verbal rather than quantitative terms. Still, as

economists they return to metrics that most often are quantitative and do not distinguish the data from the interpretation.

Another issue about the RCTs is that of external validity of whether the findings of a single trial can be generalized to all other projects in other environments. The authors argue that with enough RCTs carried out in different contexts, this question can be answered. They do not dwell in the book on the treats to internal validity of any of the specific trails where comparability of the randomized individuals or groups is key. But these are only some of the technical and method-ological questions that could be raised.

The more important question, perhaps, is whether the results of RCTs and other kinds of quantitative data are the best – or, for economists, perhaps the only – way for success to be judged and resources to be committed to future strat-egies. This touches on the relevance of measures of success for C4D as well. If the questions asked by C4D often touch on questions of power, then the answer is clear. It is very difficult or even irrelevant to quantify the outcomes to issues of power and empowerment unless thought is given to the particular situation in which unequal power is the issue. Yet are not the MDGs themselves statements of the inequality and power relationships in the world and how to change this? This issue is raised by the authors of the book in their later chapters and may return us to the problem of a general approach to development as either the big push/ transformational effort or the marginal and incremental approach to a given social problem. It also might suggest how we focus C4D work. Here the question may be raised: does C4D focus on the role of communication and ICTs in solving a given problem (education, health, poverty and jobs, transparency in governance, and so on) or does it, rather, try to use communication for advocacy purposes (changing public opinion, influencing policymakers, influencing politicians and other such motives) in an effort to change power relationships? Part of what is at stake here is how academics in C4D focus their work, but part is to realize that C4D is a larger field than academic work and includes policy and field work as well as direct advocacy in the form of journalism and other forms of social media.

One lesson from reading in the broader field of development is that we share common concerns about development and social change with other disciplines, but understandably we come at these problems from the perspectives of our own field and the reigning paradigm. During the modernization–diffusion paradigm, the use of quantitative data for judging success was assumed and the aid-giving institutions concurred. The use of cost-effectiveness or cost–benefit models meant that economics was often built into the success formula. In the dependency paradigm for C4D the formulation of political economy was invoked so that in addition to economics and the structure of ownership was added the political/ power issue of benefit. Again a quantitative aspect of the research was often included. It was with the Participatory paradigm that peoples' participation in their own development tended to focus on questions that were less related to economic and quantitative analysis, and questions of power posed challenges to

judging success. To argue that people are *empowered* by a given intervention is often understood as internal and mostly a qualitative matter of judgment. Still, the question of power relationships is most often concerned with institutions, government, business, police, schools. The shift in power is often with the institutional structures of a society and its ability to serve peoples' needs.

This issue brings us back to the last part of the Banerjee and Duflo book, where they talk about policies and politics. They argue that the development economists are divided between those like Easterly who say that development from outside can do no good and those like Sachs who are convinced that the big push (as in the Millennium Village project) can create wide scale change. The authors want to separate themselves from both sides and return to the field data that advocates neither side but sticks to what helps people in a given sector of their lives. They stay away from the grand arguments between Sachs and Easterly saying that there is no role for them in this argument. It seems obvious that C4D feels differently because a critical approach often identifies the institutional culprit and shows how the problem is the fault of governmental corruption or incompetence or the greed of business or religious/caste bias. The role for change in C4D for academic work most often is advocacy. For policy and applied work in the field, this may not serve their purposes. Some recent writing to which the general development field has begun to pay attention, may be of interest for C4D as it gives an added option to critique in suggesting how peoples' problems may be confronted.

Microfinance, Markets, and Entrepreneurship

In this section, I want to review a trend that has increasingly looked directly at issues of economics and finance for the poor in developing countries and especially for poor women. These trends do not mean that there is a simple and singular route out of poverty or the achievement of other important MDG goals. Nevertheless, there are indications that a good deal of change has occurred and millions of people have been incorporated over the past three decades into a series of new development processes that did not exist when the C4D paradigms were initiated. Although there is no evidence that all of these efforts have been successful in decreasing poverty, they share this goal and are worth considering as to what they might add to C4D efforts in the next decade.

Microfinance

Microfinance as it has been conceived during the latter part of the twentieth century is often credited to Mahammad Yunus and his Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. But despite the fact that Grameen popularized the idea of microcredit

(small unsecured loans to the poor and especially women), it is now only one of many different institutions (called Microfinance Institutions or MFIs) operating in almost every developing country. What many of these MFIs have in common is their goal of serving the poor for various financial needs and for small loans. To this original function several more have been added in recent years such as savings accounts, insurance, and financial education. For purposes of inclusiveness, we will call this effort *microfinance* because it encompasses credit, savings accounts, and sometimes forms of insurance as well as training. Besides the well-known Grameen Bank, another early name in what now is a widespread phenomenon is the Women's World Banking (wwb.org), currently a network of 35 independent financial institutions (both non- and for-profit) in 27 countries. The difference of WWB from Grameen is that it is an affiliate structure and not centralized and is explicitly devoted to poor women's economic advancement and empowerment since its creation in 1980.

A major recent issue about MFIs is a notion mentioned in the previous section: are they successful? The "success" of the idea started by Yunus and WWB has been tested in the last few years (Yunus and Weber 2007; Banerjee *et al*. 2009; Zinman and Karlin 2010) with results from RCTs that called into question whether participants could "emerge from poverty" as a consequence of getting microcredit. These and other studies were followed by reports in the press (*The Economist*, *Financial Times*, *New York Times*, and others) that highlighted the negative points raised in the research (most women did not emerge from poverty into a middle class; women did not seem to be empowered, nor did they have more children in school than others not in the microcredit system). Even though some of the authors made it clear that there were some good impacts in a subsequent article (Banerjee *et al*. 2009; Banerjee and Duflo 2011: 172), the media seemed to highlight the negatives. Grameen commissioned a paper from an economist in 2010 to review the research and independently summarize the findings of these and other studies of microfinance. This paper reminds the reader that even RCTs are not foolproof, but neither are less rigorous assessments. The conclusion of this paper is that "microfinance is good for microbusinesses" but that "the overall effect on the incomes and poverty rates … is less clear, as are the effects of social well-being, such as education, health, and women's empowerment" (Odell 2010: 6). There was a tempest in a teapot for a brief period, but the questions raised although not invalid called for further looks at social, cultural as well as economic consequences not captured by typical quantitative measures.

Two lessons emerge from this exchange about outcomes. First, it is important to question with good research the success of general development as well as C4D projects and not allow bias to distort the outcomes one way or the other. And also we can see the need for some *assessment of results* from development efforts and not simply substitute *reports of development activities* for carefully executed evaluation results. The other observation on these reports is that empirical results should include qualitative assessments as well as the quantitative (especially

"empowerment," which RCTs seem unable to capture). Second lesson: journalism is an important institution for getting out development information to the general public, but it also can get things wrong. There are few C4D studies so far that have taken a close look at the microfinance industry (now estimated to be $25 billion per year) even though communication and ICTs are critical factors in MFIs growth and operation. Another aspect of microfinance that touches our field is the assumption that the money for financing poor peoples' needs should be repaid, or, put another way, that development could pay for itself and not always depend on government or outside aid. This in turn raises the question about the role of markets and entrepreneurship in development as ways of creating more independent social change projects.

Markets and development

Since the end of the Cold War, the vast majority of people, including the poor, live in market economies, albeit of different kinds and levels of efficiency depending on the country in question. The poor are more often conceived of as those who are outside the market and who need to be subsidized by government or through outside resources. This notion has been contested in the past few years by two types of economic thinking. Intuitively, it seems clear that poor people are those who are most disadvantaged in a market economy precisely because they lack enough money and therefore power to alter their economic situation. The solution to poverty for some development economists like Collier and others is to change the bad institutions (government, bureaucracies, taxing institutions, political parties, and suchlike) and force the poorest countries to become more democratic, efficient, and fair. Another position from economists like Easterly and Moyo (2009) is to simply leave nations to solve their own problems and let market forces make the needed changes. In between is the traditional approach, exemplified by Sachs, that argues that large outside aid and expertise can help make large-scale change possible for the poor without directly changing faulty institutions.

There are two kinds of writing that have recently challenged these assumptions. The reason for a new approach is that with all of the efforts over the past 50 years from international lending and aid-giving institutions, relatively little has changed from outside investment of resources and political pressure to limit corruption and inefficiency in helping poor people. Two efforts to confront poverty that have been created in the last few decades that do not fit the patterns of outside aid are microfinance and markets at the "Bottom of the Pyramid." The approach of microfinance institutions is to reach poor people with small loans to improve their lives and their economic opportunities rather than to attack inefficiency or corruption in other institutions. Bottom of the pyramid sees an important role for the private sector in conjunction with MFIs and other NGO activity in confronting poverty in developing countries.

One of the efforts that was instituted less than two decades ago was by the management scholar C.K. Prahalad at the University of Michigan. The author, a native of India, began in the mid-1990s to speculate about how his work with large Western companies might be relevant to serve not just large Indian companies that catered to the small minority of wealthy but to the poor majority. He asked the question: "Why is it that with all our technology, managerial know-how, and investment capacity, we are unable to make even a minor contribution to the problem of pervasive global poverty and disenfranchisement?" (Prahalad 2006: xiii). His answer was his thesis that the market could also cater to the poor at the bottom of the pyramid and still promote viable and even profitable businesses. His book points out how this could happen and is already happening in some developing economies like India. This may seem like a counterintuitive conclusion for theories of structural or cultural barriers of societies from writers like Marx and Bourdieu, but Prahalad makes an argument that one of the first priorities for poor people is economic opportunity as the gateway to social and cultural transformation, goals that he shares with the microfinance movement (cf. Yunus's argument for social business: Yunus and Weber 2007). He says that commercial businesses can add to MFI financial efforts with the provision of products and services that are not encompassed by typical MFI activity.

Briefly, what is the basis for this assertion? Prahalad's argument has two audiences: the first includes commercial firms that already serve the top of the pyramid in many developing countries. In this case, he wants to convince them that there is a viable market for them at the base of the pyramid where they have not typically been active because they do not believe they can make a profit. The second audience includes those who are already working with the bottom of the pyramid: governments that provide services for the poor (primarily in rural areas in countries like India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, and others), MFIs, NGOs, cooperatives, and social enterprises (Prahalad 2006: 65). The premise that he advances for the first audience is that under the right circumstances, commercial firms can make a profit by serving this much larger market of people who often reside in rural areas. He points out some characteristics of the poor that would suggest that they would be likely customers for appropriate products and services partly because of the huge size of this sector and the basic needs of this group. He argues that with the right kind of products and services, this market can provide a profit for businesses. But then he turns to businesses with the challenge that calls for fundamental changes in their product development, managerial structure, distribution system, and marketing approach. A good portion of the book is spent in convincing managers that serving this market is not only feasible but rewarding. He points out that it is the commercial firm's drive for efficiency and innovation of product development that has made the top of the pyramid a profitable market even in developing countries and argues the same process can be translated to the much larger market for the poor. He uses 12 of cases where success has been achieved (the second half of the book) by commercial firms in such areas as

finance, eye care, energy, retail, and so on. These cases and some of his general arguments need to be examined more closely if readers are to be convinced of the merit of this approach.

Two core arguments by the author are that successful businesses are driven to be efficient and to develop products that customers will buy and, secondly, that commercial firms are also the only institution that can attain sufficient scale to serve the large number of poor people in many countries. The problem with the first argument is the challenge to businesses to adapt to this new market. Parhalad says it can be done because he cites the cases he later details in the book. But the problem with the cases is that they illustrate some successes but in circumstances that may be special to a given context. There needs to be evidence that would motivate most businesses to make the significant changes necessary to cater to this new market. As the author admits, it would take fundamental changes in scope and scale and restructuring in management, marketing, and product development. The argument about scale makes more sense only if a business could undertake the internal changes already mentioned in his cases.

Another argument that is at the heart of Prahalad's thesis is the availability of new technologies that make it easier to reach large rural markets and make both distribution and marketing easier and cheaper. On the other hand, he also sees the increasing availability of these ICTs by poor people (especially mobile phones but also Internet access for farmers and other rural people) as helping them become more empowered to find information of benefit to them, whether in agriculture, health, finance, voting, among other areas. Their possession of these ICTs make businesses' innovation to reach this market more feasible according to the author.

It becomes clear that Prahalad is leading a movement of managers and business leaders to promote an innovative idea that challenges most business practice since WWII. The cases are examples of success stories that are meant to help persuade firms to make the difficult changes in both theory and practice. Despite the many challenges to this argument, there have been others who have begun to argue *that private business must adapt to the challenge of the poverty* of more than 4 billion people who live on marginal incomes in today's world. Among others, perhaps not surprisingly, is Yunus, who argues for "social business" as a new form of capitalism (Yunus and Weber 2007). Here the emphasis was on social enterprises, like many of Grameen's efforts, to be able to make a limited profit so that they can scale as Parhalad has argued but that social benefit should be the bottom line. There are, in addition, other more recent arguments that extend this debate over whether private enterprise can contribute to social benefit.

Two more recent arguments exemplify the development of the argument and its relevance to the notion of a market economy that responds to social needs. The first advances Yunus' experiment of what he calls a social business and his suggestion of a different kind of capitalism. Yunus has turned theory into practice with his experiment with the French yogurt maker Danone that started a business

in Bangladesh with Grameen to make a low-cost yogurt for poor people and still make a limited profit. Following from this articulation by Yunus was an article by Bill Drayton and a colleague in the *Harvard Business Review* (Drayton and Budinich 2010) in which they argued for a proposed combined a social and a traditional business in what they called a "hybrid value chain" where the social bottom line is combined with the traditional bottom line of profit. They give a number of examples where this has already happened, mostly in developing countries. The discussion is largely based on the successful examples of social enterprises that have been created by the 3,000 social entrepreneurs sponsored over 30 years by Drayton's Ashoka organization (ashoka.org). But this seems to be more an example of people working to help the poor not as business but as social institutions. Is there a genuine interest from business or simply NGOs trying to solicit the help of private enterprise?

The final example published at the beginning of 2011 is not from the developing world but from one of the most famous business gurus of old-fashioned capitalism, Michael Porter of Harvard (Porter and Kramer 2011). Here Porter and a colleague argue for what they call the role of private enterprise in "creating shared value." The thesis of the article is a call for a recasting of the business model of short term focus on profits driven by expectations of Wall Street to a kind of business that creates *both* economic value (profits) *and* also social value (benefits to society). Porter makes similar arguments that Parahalad had made in his book about India and other developing countries, but Porter focuses on the US and other developed economies. He argues that businesses must include society's needs as part of their basic strategy because it is in the social arena that the most promising markets exist in health care, environment, energy, and so on. But he further argues that the future of capitalism must include social benefit if it is to thrive (and recover from the serious doubts that have arisen since the recession of 2008, which was brought on by business itself). He also details the ways in which this might come about, using many of the notions he had developed for market economies over the past three decades. The fact that Porter claims widespread attention from businesses around the globe is indicated by an immediate and somewhat critical response on the part of global economy's watchdog, *The Economist* (2011: 78).

Where might this lead in a discussion of C4D in the future? One common thread of discussions of social and blended businesses by the cited authors, whether in developed or developing economies, is an emphasis on the need for innovation to solve social problems. In this case, innovation is very broad: innovative products meant for the poor, or innovative products to solve developed economies challenges over health care, energy, or jobs; innovation in the restructuring of private enterprise, social business or NGO institutions. It involves changes in thinking about how to structure an organization, how to develop a new product or service, how to distribute these in a new and more efficient way and how to inform people

of these products and services. Finally, if social value is to be a bottom line (along with profitability or not), it needs to be incorporated into the ongoing assessment of the operation. One approach in this search for innovation is what has been termed "social entrepreneurship" in recent development discourse.

Social entrepreneurship and C4D

We may need to begin a rethinking of C4D as some others are doing in development policy and even in the nature of market economies. The notion of connecting the two terms "social" and "entrepreneurship" may seem counterintuitive or even contradictory unless it is seen in some historical perspective as indicated in the development of institutions like Grameen and Ashoka over the past 30 years. Both are examples of successful social entrepreneurship, as I have outlined elsewhere (McAnany 2012a, 2012b). The practice of social entrepreneurship preceded any theorizing (Bornstein 2007; Bornstein and Davis 2010; Martin and Osberg 2007). Although the idea of social entrepreneurship has not focused on communication or its technologies, its practice has included them either implicitly or sometimes explicitly. The argument in this section is not to detail much of what social entrepreneurship may mean, but to briefly explore how some of its practices might be useful for our field of C4D to consider as it moves forward in the new millennium.

The basic idea of social entrepreneurship is that such organizations as development NGOs need both creative new solutions to old problems and someone to champion their application to solve problems. For too long large development institutions have been the main source for funding and the main source for policies and projects to solve development problems. Social entrepreneurship is a grass roots effort by people to create new solutions that they may be able to scale to help larger numbers of people. The creative idea that seeks to solve a social problem is tested in the field, as Yunus showed when traditional banks refused to lend to the poor with small unsecured loans. He created his own bank and built an organization that currently serves more than 7 million poor people in Bangladesh with a variety of services including telecomms. In addition to innovation, Grameen has exemplified the idea of financial independence: it has not needed outside funding for more than 15 years. Ashoka (ashoka.org) is another kind of social entrepreneurship organization that does not directly promote innovation but seeks out *people who innovate* and who show entrepreneurial skill to create institutions and help serve more people while continuing to demonstrate success and promote social change. But what might all of this mean for C4D? In addition to these two prototype organizations, there are numerous smaller efforts that define the paradigm (cf. McAnany 2009; Center for Science Technology and Society (scu.edu/csts)).

For the present, the term communication for development and social change seems to mean primarily a participatory approach to change that emphasizes the central role of people in seeking their own empowerment through the use of communication and its technologies. *This focus need not change by adopting some of the characteristics of social entrepreneurship*. For example, innovative thinking about social change does not come, by definition, from large institutions (Arab Spring) but from individuals who are able to test their ideas in the field and who can build their own institutions that are independent (as much as possible) from outside funding to be sustainable. I have given some examples of this with C4D type organization in other writing (McAnany 2009, 2012a, 2012b), but the basic argument is that *in addition to* the participatory approach, the innovative and entre-preneurial thinking can help build a variety of institutions that survive over time without being overly dependent on outside funding but also that can scale to a level that serves a maximum of participants in a variety of environments. These institutions would be local creations that can also be replicated by others in other cultural contexts.

These ideas may sound like speculation but they are backed by a large number of field-tested projects that have produced results over time as the track record of this approach makes clear. Are there flaws in this approach? Certainly. Microfinance results have been critiqued by economists using RCTs, and Grameen has been critiqued by Bangdaleshi politicians. Easterly (2006) has critiqued almost all of the development efforts by large aid-giving institutions over the past 50 years. There is also the danger that social enterprises can become simple profit-making organiza-tions and lose track of their social goals. New social ideas can become worn out and disappear. Given the reality of any social change effort, no idea is a magic bullet. The argument of this section is that with a gathering of more examples of grass-roots innovation that pursue innovative approaches to solving social/development problems within an effective organizational structure that can become self-sustaining and free of dependency on outside funding and can demonstrate achieving its goals, then this may be a model worth considering for communication for social change projects as well.

Conclusion

This chapter calls for people in the field of C4D to examine whether other kinds of approaches to solving pressing social change issues can be examined. In addition to the current participatory paradigm, some of the tenets of social entrepreneur-ship might benefit our field: grass-roots innovation, sustainable organizational structure, financial independence to the extent possible, regular empirical assessment of the social goals of a project. None of this will be easy, especially for smaller organizations, but there is a growing body of data from the field that can

help. The entire field of development more generally is moving in the direction of economic and social innovation as a spur to change as the literature cited has suggested. There are serious challenges to the way development aid has been accomplished over the past 50 years. It is time for a change.

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16

Peace Communication for Social Change
Dealing with Violent Conflict

Ana Fernández Viso

When societies are affected by huge inequalities in gaining access to resources, power, and decision making concerning social coordination, the changing processes required to facilitate an integral, participatory, and inclusive development can be met with some resistance. Depending on how societies deal with it, this can develop into violent conflicts. While the number of interstate wars has decreased progressively since the end of World War II, increasingly, since 1989, the amount of armed confrontations and civil wars within states has skyrocketed (Kaldor 1999; Themnér and Wallensteen 2011).

Intrastate and internationalized intrastate conflicts have been the predominant type of war for the past six decades. As Kalevi Holsti explains, they are "not about foreign policy, security, honor, or status; they are about statehood, governance, and the role and status of nations and communities within states" (1996: 21). The world map of armed violence overlaps with the atlas of poverty and inequality. In 2010, 53% of the major 15 active armed conflicts (SIPRI 2011) took place in African and Asian countries with human development levels amongst the lowest in the world. A further 20% of them occurred in medium–low[1] development countries. The war phenomenon has accompanied the processes of independence, national construction and development of the majority of the states born during the decolonization period after World War II, as examined by Monty Marshall (1999), who refers to these types of conflicts as "Third World War."

Intrastate wars have reached higher levels of violence than interstate wars since the 1960s and show a worrying tendency to re-emerge (Hewitt 2010). Nearly 80% of active conflicts during the first decade of the twenty-first century were recurring conflicts, that is to say that they occurred in societies considered to be in a transitional post-conflict situation, and where no episodes of armed violence had

been registered for a minimum of one year. "Slow economic growth, badly timed international aid, and lack of attention to social reforms, are key factors that lead to recurrence" (Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr 2010: 2). Several studies have shown the existence of strong correlations between the onset of political instability or armed conflict and poor performance on key factors such as governance and development (Marshall and Cole 2011). There cannot be development without peace, nor can it be sustainable peace without development. If that is the case, communication for development and social change must be also a communication for peace and conflict transformation.

It is surprising though, that the field of communication for development and social change has barely paid any attention to conflict, armed violence and peace-building, despite its more than six decades of existence (Gumucio-Dagron and Tufte 2008).[2] The same way that, in spite of the centrality of communication in the structuring and transformation of human relationships, conflict resolution and peace studies have evolved with their backs to the field of communication for development and social change since they emerged in the 1950s, as Clemencia Rodríguez (2000) already observed more than a decade ago. The proliferation of intrastates' violent conflicts in societies with the lowest development indicators urges us to overcome that distance and to examine the phenomena of development, social change, conflict, and communication from an integral approach, with a view to build a common body of knowledge and strategies.

Work on armed violence and peace-building of scholars and practitioners like Kenneth Boulding, Johan Galtung, Adam Curle, Edward Azar, John Burton, and John Paul Lederach on one side, and some citizens' experiences of communication for social change that emerged in armed conflict and post-conflict contexts from the 1990s, like in Colombia (Rodríguez 2008) or in the African Great Lakes region (Search for Common Ground 2009, 2010), on the other hand, reveal the existence of unexplored meeting points between both disciplinary fields. Nevertheless, the dialogue between their theories, concepts and premises progresses slowly, possibly because interdisciplinary work is complex. It requires transcending the boundaries of our fields of knowledge and experience to penetrate into unknown disciplinary territories, as well as learning to grapple with new conceptual and analytical practices and tools.

This chapter aims to develop an exploratory analysis of the intersections between the processes of communication, social change, development, conflict and peace, through the combined use of the lenses and the premises of two theoretical perspectives: peace and conflict resolution studies, on the one side, and communication for social change, on the other side. We will highlight areas of complementarity or overlap, as well as spaces of contradiction, with the aim of broadening the understanding of the role of both communication and conflict in the processes of social change, development and sustainable peace-building.

Communication and Change at the Heart of Conflict Analysis and Conflict Resolution

Conflict is an intrinsic element of human relations and for many authors it represents a stimulus and an opportunity for social change. It takes its origins in a sense of grievance resulting from economic inequality, political organization and the cultural system. The formation of conflict parties, which believe to have mutually incompatible goals, turns the conflict into an open and visible one. Depending on the capacity and the mechanisms a society relies on to manage conflicts, they can develop into constructive or destructive processes (Deutsch 1973). Thus, sociopolitical conflicts reveal the existence of problems of social coexistence and urge us to face them and resolve them.

Even though the intellectual history of reflection on war, peace and conflict dates back to the origins of philosophy and thinking on politics, the development of conflict resolution as a specific academic field had to wait until after World War II. It began in the United States, as a reaction of a group of academics who shared pacifist convictions to the limited ontology and objectives of war studies traditionally made by International Relations – which understood the war phenomenon, in accordance with the famous aphorism by Clausewitz, as "the continuation of politics by other means."

The interest in studying human conflict as a general phenomenon gave rise to the establishment of several research groups in the 1950s. Kenneth Boulding and his colleagues at the University of Michigan launched in 1957 the first specialized Academic Journal, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* (JCR), which gave the name to this new discipline. Two years later they set up the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution (CRCR). Their initial premise was that conflicts are *settled* but not *resolved* by coercion.

They held that the collection of a data set – as indicators of human behavior and conflict – and their further processing with quantitative techniques, would allow us to anticipate the potential outbreak of violent conflicts and, therefore, to prevent them. At this first stage of conflict resolution studies, communication was equated with the generation and transmission of information. The present technological development has revitalized the idea of articulating "early-warning and response systems" to detect and stop violence before it happens (Bock 2012).

Europe set a new research agenda in this field in the 1960s, which included the topics of peace and social change. Up to the middle of the twentieth century, the studies on war had traditionally focused their attention on the use of coercive power and military force. From this perspective, peace was defined as the state of "no war", in other words, the absence of direct, systematic, and organized violence. Consequently, conflict resolution studies initially aspired to contribute to reduce the incidence and the duration of war, in particular, by improving diplomatic efforts.

Johan Galtung, founder of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), rejected this limited and *negative* definition of peace and violence. He carefully studied the complexity of both phenomena and ventured to describe their multidimensional nature. According to Galtung, conflicts can be seen as a triangle, whose three vertexes are: an underlying structural contradiction, the attitude and perceptions of the parties, and their behavior. These three components keep changing and influencing themselves, making the conflict a dynamic process. As far as violence is concerned, it would have also three dimensions: direct violence, manifested through human behavior; structural or indirect violence, exerted through the social, economic, political, military, and cultural structures which prevent the fulfillment of human needs (Galtung 1969); and cultural violence, constituted by ideas, beliefs, and values that legitimize and justify both direct and structural violence (Galtung 1990). Galtung warns that the different forms of violence feed on each other, forming a vicious circle.

From this point of view, *positive* peace would be the absence of the three kinds of violence and "the context for conflicts to unfold non-violently and creatively" (Galtung 2003: 31). This requires fair and supportive social relationships, social justice and respect for human rights. The mass media, as cultural producers and transmitters, play a significant role in Galtung's model of peace-building, because they can either reinforce or challenge not only the cultural violence, but also the structural one – for example, cultural imperialism (Galtung 1971). He insists on the importance to overcome the structural contradiction at the root of the conflict formation, in order to prevent its recurrence.

At the structural level, peace manifests itself as symmetric, symbiotic and equitable social relationships, which lead to acts of cooperation, friendship and solidarity. This is why communication – the way in which human beings interact and socialize among themselves – is a central element to this peace-building approach (Galtung 2003). The scholar and mediator Adam Curle developed this idea in depth. He differentiated between symmetric and asymmetric conflicts, depending on whether the existing power relations amongst parties are balanced or unbalanced (Curle 1978). Curle argued that conflicts of interests among relatively similar parties (symmetrical conflicts) have a better chance to be resolved in a negotiated, creative and satisfactory way for the parties involved.

When the conflict arises between dissimilar parties (asymmetrical conflicts), such as a majority and a minority or an established government and a social sector who denies its legitimacy, its source stems not from particular issues or interests that may divide the parties, but from the very relational structure that determines their power positions and the nature of the interactions between them. These types of relationships, characterized by domination and imposition, causes suffering and hardship and hinders development (Curle 1978). As long as members of the weak party are not conscious of the injustices they are subjected to and their causes, the conflict remains latent. If this is the case, building a lasting peace

requires restructuring social relationships, so that they become balanced, peaceful and collaborative. Curle forewarns that this may need to awaken consciences and to adopt confrontational tactics, as necessary steps to reach a position from which to negotiate.

Curle also underlined the importance of the values and attitudes of societies and individuals for a non-violent conflict resolution. He was a firm advocate of peace education and a pioneer in the use of techniques such as extra-official conciliation and mediation. Mediation, in his opinion, should begin by establishing and improving communication among the parties in conflict, to provide them with information that would enable them to counteract their prejudices and mistaken ideas.

Another important distinction about the causes of conflicts was drawn between human interests and needs by the scholar and former diplomat John Burton. Interests are primarily about material goods (land, natural resources, and suchlike), which are susceptible to trade, bargaining, and negotiating. Needs, on the other hand, are intangible things (such as security, recognition, and identity) that cannot be traded or fulfilled by power bargaining. However, non-material human needs are not scarce resources, therefore conflicts based on unsatisfied needs can be resolved with an understanding around a peaceful change which meets the needs of both parties in conflict (win–win outcome). The key lies in translating the conflict into the human needs that prompted it.

Burton also associated the emergence and the evolution of conflicts with communication. He believed that armed conflict occurs as a result of inefficient communication between the parties, with the understanding that communication comprises messages and interactions. Therefore, just as Curle, he viewed the external intervention in the communication flows and system where parties are inserted as a strategic resource to unblock intractable conflicts: "Communication is a tool of conflict as much as it is a tool of peaceful relationships" (Burton 1969: 49).

According to Burton, conflicts have a decisive subjective dimension, linked to factors like the parties' assumptions, perceptions, selection of goals and means of attaining them, and assessment of costs of conflict. Experience and knowledge can alter these elements, hence the importance of communication. At the same time, this implies that the resolution of a violent conflict is a process that can only come from the decision making of the parties, and not from an external imposition. He therefore proposes the technique "controlled communication," which consists, essentially, in gathering a small group of representatives of the parties in conflict to analyze and counteract together the perceptions, interpretations and misunderstandings, which prevent them from even considering the possibility to negotiate. This technique would also allow identifying the problem and the causes underlying the conflict and considering resolution options that had not been regarded. The aim is to develop a base for mutual understanding and trust.

The importance he granted to communication, perceptions, assumptions, values, and stereotypes was ahead of arguments regarding the role of culture and the *media* in violent conflicts, which other scholars developed later on – for example, to put forward a "peace journalism" (Galtung 1986; Varis 1986; Mitchell 1989; Gilboa 2002).

The Lebanese researcher Edward Azar was one of the first experts to apply systems theory to conflict analysis and resolution. He focused his work on the protracted social conflicts (PSC), apparently unsolvable, such as those in Lebanon, the Philippines, Israel, and South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. Azar linked the violent conflict to underdevelopment, distributive injustice, and exclusion in all its forms; he associated national problems and the international system; he pointed out the multiplicity and dynamism of the factors causing conflicts, and he concluded that the most useful unit of analysis in PSC situations is the identity group, which is based on shared values (racial, religious, ethnic, cultural, among others), rather than the nation-state or the individual. According to Azar, the source of intractable conflicts is the denial of those essential elements required in the development of all people and societies, and whose pursuit is an ontological drive in all: "These are *security*, *distinctive identity*, *social recognition of identity*, and *effective participation* in the processes that determine conditions of security and identity, and other such developmental requirements" (Azar 1986: 29). What is of concern are the *societal needs* of the individual, which embrace both material and the psychological well-being.

PSCs are increasingly arising within States, because they have either lost, or never had, such is the case of many African States, the capacity to integrate the different groups that constitute them, to manage satisfactorily their demands and to inspire loyalty and civic culture. Quite the contrary, they have tended to impose institutions that reflect sectarian interests. Consequently, as far as multiethnic societies are concerned, PSCs don't improve with centralized power structures – which they are, in their own right, a source of conflict – because they reduce the opportunity for a sense of community among groups and tend to deny to groups the means to accomplish their needs. The way to unblock these conflicts is to establish open, participatory, and decentralized political structures, since these increase groups' feelings of identity, participation and security. War wouldn't represent the continuation of politics by other means, as Clausewitz declared, but the failure of politics.

To sum up, the analytical and practical approach of conflict resolution doesn't ignore the coercive power or "hard power," but rather considers that the most influential and important form of power is what Boulding called "integrative power": the power to weave relationships, to bring people together, and to create legitimacy (Boulding 1989: 30). Integrative power relies on a complex network of communication and unlimited learning, which is opened to expand the comprehension and the representation of both the present reality and the future. It is based on reciprocity, trust, respect, and cooperation.

Transforming Conflicts to Transform Societies

As an analytical framework and as a peace-building strategy, conflict transformation emerged at the beginning of the 1990s. It incorporates part of the premises regarding conflict resolution that we have examined above, although it goes beyond the resolution of particular problems and the reconstruction after the ceasefire. Peace-building is understood "as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships" (Lederach 1998: 48). And peace is seen as a dynamic social construct, an ongoing process of change from negative to positive relations, behavior, attitudes, and structures.

This approach emerged as an answer to the increase of both PSCs and the use of violence as a tool for change in societies profoundly divided and where political structures barely offer peaceful and effective mechanisms to channel the collective demands in favor of the fulfillment of basic human needs. These societies are characterized by long-standing and deeply rooted hostilities between social groups, which are reinforced by strict stereotypes, feelings of fear and hate, high levels of violence, and first-hand experiences of atrocities.

John Paul Lederach's proposal (1998) to transform the conflict is based around three main factors: the change actors, the depth in which transformation is dealt with, and its time framework. With regard to the change actors, the process of conflict transformation is the responsibility of the entire affected society. This involvement can be represented as a three-level pyramid of leadership and approaches to peace.

The top of the pyramid contains a reduced amount of people: the military and political leaders. Their search for peace is focused on the establishment and management of negotiations aimed at reaching a ceasefire and creating mechanisms for a subsequent political transition. This is a "top-down" peace-building approach, which assumes that there is a monolithic and hierarchical power structure operating in the conflict, and that therefore, the agreement between the elites will be immediately accepted and implemented by the other levels of society. It fails to recognize the de facto interdependence of the different social levels, and the existence of multiples tiers of leadership and participation in the process (Lederach 1998: 74).

At the bottom of the pyramid we find the ordinary citizens who form the base of a society. In settings of protracted and violent conflict, their lives are marked by fear, suffering and a daily struggle to survive, yet they are able to promote valuable practical efforts to achieve peace. These are initiatives led by influential members of local communities, who witness and deal with the everyday aspects of the crisis. Lederach reminds us that the transitions toward peace in El Salvador and Ethiopia in the 1990s were driven largely by the pressure for change coming from the grass-roots level. This "bottom-up" approach to peace-building is often based on the work of local peace commissions.

The medium-level is of strategic importance for the conflict transformation, because it is connected with both the top and the bottom levels and thus represents a potential bridge between them. It comprises people who hold leadership positions in the conflict scenario, but who are not controlled by the government structures or by the major opposition movements. They are known and respected leaders in fields like education, culture, religion, humanitarian organizations, indigenous movements, etc. Their status and influence derive not from their public visibility, but from their relationship networks, that cut across the lines of conflict. As they maintain respectful relationships with their peers from the other side of the conflict, they represent privileged communication channels amongst both parties. Medium-range leaders benefit from having more freedom to maneuver than do top-level leaders.

For Lederach (1998) that dense network of vertical and horizontal contacts, which is embedded in the physical and human cartography of the conflict, puts mid-level leaders in a strategic position to boost a "middle-out" process of peace-building. Their active involvement can be promoted through problem-solving workshops, conflict-resolution training and peace commissions. The Centre for Conflict Resolution in South Africa, for example, undertook an extensive program of this type in order to contribute to the post-apartheid reconciliation.

A second fundamental question from the conflict transformation perspective is the distinction between particular and immediate problems, on the one hand, and the underlying and wider aspects of conflict, peace-building, and social change, on the other hand (Kriesberg 2011). Máire Dugan's nested paradigm (1996) distinguishes four interrelated dimensions of conflict: the immediate micro-issues, the relational context in which conflict is embedded, the subsystem from which it arises and the systemic structures that create and perpetuate the conditions for its emergence. The subsystem, being a medium-level activity area, connects all dimensions and thus opens up possibilities for spreading change "middle-out" and "bottom-up."

The image of the nested paradigm model, as a group of concentric circles, is also useful to visualize the progression of the transformation process toward the desired change. Each circle symbolizes a time framework and a level where to think, plan, and act (Lederach 1998). The first circle represents the urgent response to the immediate crisis, for example, by delivering humanitarian aid to the affected population and by taking actions to stem the ongoing violence and to achieve a ceasefire. The second circle refers to the short-term intervention, which focuses on the conflict and crisis analysis and on preparing people to deal with conflicts non-violently. Training is essential at this stage, which lasts between one and two years.

The long-term perspective, the desired horizon towards which to move forward, is located in the fourth and last circle. This stage involves envisioning and promoting a project of a commonly shared future, as well as establishing structural, systemic and relational objectives on which social coexistence will be founded. This transformation requires the time of at least one generation. Between the long- and short-term approaches we find, again, a medium-term perspective. Therefore, the

third circle represents the stage where both social change and the mechanisms that enable the sustainable transition toward it are designed. This process can take up to a decade and takes place parallel to the rebuilding of society's integrative power. Lederach (1998) underlines that the key to constructive conflict transformation lies in keeping the responses that address the issues at each stage with a long-term perspective of change.

Moreover, the transformation has to operate at four interdependent levels of change: personal, relational, structural and cultural. The first one includes the emotional, perceptual and spiritual aspects of human experience over the course of the conflict. The transformation strategy will aim to minimize the destructive effects of social conflict on people and promote their physical, emotional and spiritual progress. On the relational level, the goals are to change the negative patterns of communication and interaction underlying the conflict and to maximize mutual understanding, compromise and solidarity (Dukes 1996). The structural level encompasses the changes required to satisfy basic human needs and implement mechanisms that guarantee people's participation in decisions that affect them, as well as the non-violent resolution of conflicts. Finally, the cultural level of the transformation focuses, on one side, on countering the cultural patterns that contribute to the appearance of violence, and on the other side, on fostering the cultural resources and mechanisms available in the society to handle its conflicts constructively.

The integration of all the actors, dimensions, stages and levels of change that we have just described constitutes the infrastructure for the constructive conflict transformation. Lederach describes it as a *process-structure*: "A phenomenon that is simultaneously dynamic, adaptive, and changing, and yet has a form, purpose, and direction that gives it shape" (1998: 113). The transformation doesn't consist of a single operational solution, but it rather rests on multiple levels and types of change. It is also both a linear and a circular process, made up of a set of experiences and cycles of change that feed on each other. Sometimes, things move forward and progress; other times, they remain stagnant; and other times, they even seem to go backwards, due to resistances to change, but this step backwards may allow us to discover alternative ways to move towards the desired change.

Communication for Social Change in Fragile and Conflict Contexts

Despite the undeniable presence of communication in peace-building theories and practices, the field of conflict resolution and transformation lacks an integral approaching to communication, as a multidimensional phenomenon that goes beyond media and their messages. Beginning with the early studies on war propaganda during World War I, the impact of the conflict's media coverage on its

emergence, evolution, and resolution has been of interest and concern for peace-building researchers, actors, and activists (Barry 2004; Galtung 1986; Gilboa 2002; Hamelink 2011; Varis 1986).

This interest, increased by the awareness of the damaging role played by some media in the escalation of violence in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia during the 1990s (Article 19 1996; Thompson 1999), has favored the formulation of a series of recommendations for putting into practice a peace journalism (Galtung 1998; Manoff 1998; Wolfsfeld 2004; Lynch and McGoldrick 2005; Shaw, Lynch, and Hackett 2011). If we are to assume that media can worsen tensions, we can likewise think that they could play a positive role in the conflict by actively favoring its prevention and moderation, on one side, and fostering peace and tolerance, on the other side. However, in order to do this, it is necessary to change journalists' norms and routines for covering peace and conflict.

In the past decade, peace-building scholars and practitioners have started to realize that the peace-building potential of the media goes further than both news and mass media. It also embraces other genres, narrative languages, and formats, closer to community communication and entertainment (Tufte 2012), such as popular music, participatory theatre, radio series, soap operas, documentaries, public debates in local media, and community-produced programs (Howard *et al*. 2003; Melone, Terzis, and Beleli 2002).

A third and last approach to the use of media as a peace-building tool is peace advocacy. For Servaes (2011: 39), mass media can play two kinds of advocacy roles: disseminate messages that encourage the public to support peace-building and development projects, and provide the decision-makers with information and feedback needed to reach a decision for action. The starting point of this strategy lies within the citizens, who organize themselves into coalitions and social alliances to demand and propose to political decision makers solutions to conflict and violence. These advocacy platforms search for the mass media's complicity with their objectives.

Behind every peace-building initiative, there is at least one theory of change; in other words, a set of beliefs about how change happens. The three ways of incorporating media communication in peace-building strategies that we have just described respond to a model of change theory, which is focused, particularly, in the cultural dimension of change. The underlying assumption is that the desired change can happen if we succeed in getting a critical mass of people to adopt new attitudes, values, and objectives favorable to peace and cessation of violence, and that they put pressure on political elites to taking the necessary actions to resolve the armed conflict.

Communication, nevertheless, is a relational and symbolic process, which is not confined at all to the transmission of media content (Pasquali 1978). It is the substratum of social life and human relationships; a social process that affects the perception, knowledge, affectivity, and conduct of those who take part in it. For this reason, communication constitutes an element of paramount importance to

tackle not only the cultural dimensions of conflict transformation, but also the personal, relational and structural ones. The long-term change perspective requires analyzing and enhancing the communication processes, relationships and networks; this is still a pending issue for the theoretical reflection and the praxis of this approach to peace-building.

Such a comprehensive approach to communication as both *focus* and *locus* of change was proposed in the field of communication for development more than three decades ago, in a context of redefinition of the concept of development as structural change, and of characterization of emancipatory communication as horizontal, participatory and dialogical (Melkote 1991; Servaes 1989; Gumucio-Dagron and Tufte 2008). In practice, however, the initiatives of participatory and community communication for social change promoted in the 1980s were confined to projects of a limited geographical and sociopolitical reach. They concentrated excessively on the subjects and put aside concerns for articulating a macro-level view of society and its destiny: "the communicative proposal did not emphasize the significance of integrating into society: this perspective did rather arouse suspicions. In this way the idea of 'no contamination' was stressed; we had to be amongst people like ourselves or with similar ideas and groups" (Alfaro Moreno 2006: 121). Those experiences had an enormous value from the viewpoint of the conscientization of oppressed social groups, but it wasn't until the mid-1990s when a political vision of change started to forge itself, as a democratic project of peaceful, respectful and fair social coexistence.

The transformation of social, political, economic, and cultural structures in order to guarantee social and procedural justice. The latter refers to decision-making processes, the respect and dignity of human beings, and the survival of ecological systems of our planet requiring that we face up to the emergence of conflicts amongst unequal and deeply divided parties, which ultimately can evolve towards different forms of direct violence. On the other side, exclusion, poverty, and armed violence shape the landscape of the societies with the lowest levels of human development. In these contexts, the incorporation of communication in social change strategies must be sensitive to conflict; that is, understand as operational dynamics and the possibilities for its constructive transformation.

The Freirean and Habermasian dialogical models, which inspired the proposal of participatory communication for social change (White, Nair, and Ascroft 1994; Jacobson and Servaes 1999), presume the willingness of both individuals and groups to set aside their power imbalances, in order to engage in a dialogue aimed at reaching consensual decisions and agreements. However, this requirement can't be taken for granted when the social and power relations between those individuals and those groups are enormously unbalanced, as confirmed by the increase of protracted social conflicts and intrastate wars in the last decades.

Participatory communication entails the redistribution of power and communicative resources. Likewise, empowering people, communities and citizens, so they can claim and exercise their fundamental rights and therefore transform their daily

realities, involves disempowering those who are benefiting from their deprivation of rights and freedoms. In both cases, resistance, tensions and conflicts will arise. Even admitting that dialogue processes could be set up, they will not always be realms of straightforward rational deliberation or smooth spaces of unforced and peaceful agreement.

The academic field of communication for development and social change has tended to dodge the question of the conflictive nature of the change towards social and environmental justice, although it should be pointed out that in the last years some authors have highlighted the need for an analytical and operational framework that takes into account the problem of power and its structures (Wilkins 2000). Yet a conflict-sensitive approach to social change remains to be developed. It needs a theory of conflict and another one for its constructive transformation, as well as examining and analyzing the role played by the multiple dimensions of communication in empirical processes of social change in contexts of violent conflict.

In this regard, over the past two decades Clemencia Rodríguez has contributed suggestive keys to rethink links between communication, peace building, and social change. Her insights are grounded in her field research on local initiatives of citizens' communication that rebuild the social fabric in armed conflict contexts (Rodríguez 2008). With a long history of direct violence, Colombia provides numerous examples of social innovations that have emerged from the realm of communication as mechanisms of resistance to the relational and destructive logics of violence. One of the projects that has received national and international recognition is the *Colectivo de Comunicación de Montes de María Línea 21* (Communication Collective of Montes de Maria Linea 21), an initiative of participatory radio and television that embraces 17 municipalities located in Colombia's Caribbean region.

Since the 1990s, the arrival of the different conflict actors to this area, already afflicted by high levels of structural violence, has contributed to armed violence, destruction, massacres, and forced displacement of civil population. The Collective was born in 1994, as a vital response of a group of young intellectuals from the municipality of El Carmen de Bolívar to the prevailing climate of terror and violence. They began by establishing a school of community journalism for children and adolescents and with the first group of students they launched a 20 hour weekly production of local news for radio and television. The purpose was not media production per se, but the transformation of the collective imaginaries and the reparation of the damage caused by the violence on the local social fabric (Rodríguez 2008: 29).

Following Rodríguez (2008: 30–31), as a result of both a precarious state unable to guarantee civil rights and the strong presence of violence and armed groups, the inhabitants of Montes de María had increasingly become more individualistic, fearful, suspicious, and aggressive in their interactions. One of the Collective's initiatives that succeeded in breaking this spiral of isolation and mutual distrust

was the street film project. It consisted of open-air film projections in the main square of the village, as a pretext for people to gather together, share experiences again, and reappropriate the public space, defying the collective fear. Interaction patterns *normalized* by the war were slowly modified, not with persuasive messages on peaceful coexistence and peace culture, but rather through the experiencing of peace and solidarity in their daily lives. The same philosophy of building up democratic and peaceful relationships and transformative subjects characterizes the internal functioning of the Collective (Rodríguez 2008: 24).

Another Colombian experience worth mentioning is *Tejido de Comunicación* (Communication Tissue). It was created in 2005 by the Association of Indigenous Cabildos of Northern Cauca, as part of its strategy to defend the rights of indigenous peoples in this region: to live peacefully in their ancestral land, to preserve their identity, and to freely design and advance their "life plan." Northern Cauca has been for more than half a century an area of strategic importance for the conflict actors, who have turned the region into a war zone and indigenous people into their victims. The indigenous communities, however, declare themselves to be outside this armed conflict and thus they demand from the conflicting parties to stop attacking them and to demilitarize their territories. They confront the power of weapons with the power of the collectivity and the power of the word.

In this context of resistance to war, violence, the invasion of their lands and the militarization of their lives, the indigenous communities of Northern Cauca promote an active process of peace-building and change that adopts communication as one of its basic pillars. *Tejido de Comunicación* was born to gather, preserve, and encourage the traditional forms of communication of the indigenous people – the assembly, community meetings, the *minga* (collective community work), tales and legends, the cosmogonic communication, and so on – as essential elements in the growth of their life together and in the designing of their "life plans" (Otero 2008). This initiative, as explained on its website, does not place technology – which indigenous people know and appropriate – at its center, but the strength and richness of the cultural knowledge, the community senses, the rituals and the various events where the joy of living is expressed and from which the strength to defend their life's projects emerges.

The combined use of forms and means of communication allows them to work on information, reflection, debate, recovery of the memory, and activation of participatory decision-making processes, at the same time as they weave a web of communication inwards and outwards between their communities. Beyond forging solidarity links with other indigenous peoples and with social movements that denounce multiple forms of oppression and injustice, they also search for spaces of encounter and dialogue with political authorities and with the rest of society. They are fully aware of the importance of building coexistence on the basis of respect for difference and recognition of the other as a valid and necessary interlocutor.

Understanding differences; Acting on commonalities is Search for Common Ground's (SFCG) motto. This North American NGO has three decades of experience in

peace-building and conflict prevention in more than 30 countries around the world. An essential part of its intervention strategy consists of television, radio, and Internet programming to transform the way individuals and societies deal with conflict – away from adversarial approaches, toward cooperative solutions. It is not merely a question of diffusing useful information and edutainment contents, or even persuasive messages on peaceful coexistence, but rather of getting across that the content production process reflects the type of cooperation and entente that the programs themselves advocate and promote. Therefore, SFCG places a great importance on local ownership and management of media projects. For example, both the staff and the editorial board of one of its most emblematic projects, *Studio Ijambo*, a radio production studio set up in Burundi in 1995, at the height of the civil war, are balanced in terms of ethnicity (Hutu–Tutsi), religion (Catholic–Muslim), gender, and political backgrounds. These professionals work together in mixed teams and they produce a wide range of content (news, series, open debates, documentaries, and the like), which features and analyzes all aspects of the conflict, highlights commonalities, and promotes dialogue.

In the past few years, SFCG has worked on non-violent resolution of conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and in Rwanda (Search for Common Ground 2010) with a methodology inspired in Augusto Boal's "Theatre of the Oppressed," which SFCG has named "Participatory Theatre for Conflict Transformation" (Search for Common Ground 2009). On the basis of real problems that are portrayed in the plays, actors interact with the public to adapt, change or correct situations or behaviors that are developed during the show. This gives the audience the opportunity to dialogue about problems central to their communities, explore together different ways to solve them and engage creatively in the process of conflict transformation. Moreover, SFCG aims to repair social relationships in DRC also through joint activities using media, culture, sports, conflict transformation trainings, festivals, and communal projects. The search for common ground of coexistence promotes constructive change.

Final Considerations

As we have seen in this chapter, there is a general consensus within the field of conflict resolution about the idea that building positive peace involves essentially building trust and relationships within communities. Communication lies at the root of this process. A different relationship requires a different communication. That is why, beyond balancing the flows of information and cultural content in the public sphere, it is vital to open spaces and situations for people to meet, get to know each other again, assume their interdependence and forge peaceful and respectful bonds between them (Rodriguez 2004). The desired horizon is the establishment of a mindful communication (Hamelink 2011), which enables

creation of new collective meanings and to imagine and design a shared future by regarding the others as valid and necessary interlocutors.

One of the keys to the relational dimension of social change lies in the quality of those spaces and opportunities for encountering, dialoguing, and participating. According to Lederach,[3] it is crucial that they foster vertical and horizontal links among different identity groups and social levels. He warns that change does not come from spaces nor from relationships where people think alike, but from the confluence of *improbable* processes and people, where partiality is the starting point to work with the counterpart to understand the human needs underlying the emergence and violent expression of their conflicts. These are slow and multidirectional processes, which encompass numerous movements forward and backwards. Nevertheless they must be sustained and nourished by a long-term vision of the desired change.

Changing the interaction patterns *normalized* by armed conflicts, which are characterized by logics of individualism, egoism, aggressiveness, and violence, has a significant positive impact also on the personal level of change. Conflict and violence change the way people perceive themselves and others. It is hence important that they can *experience*, collectively and individually, alternative and constructive ways of interacting and coexisting (Rodríguez 2010).

The new spaces of interaction on a local–national–global scale afforded by new technologies, and the blossoming of citizens' media in countries with armed conflict have opened new possibilities and opportunities for civil society to actively participate and involve itself in the different phases of the conflict cycle. This fact is transforming the nature of the communication flows and dynamics that contribute to the systemic prevention of and response to conflicts (SFGG 2011): they become more horizontal, open and continuous. This forces the de facto decentralization of peace-building and development processes and makes it easier to put into practice the "bottom-up" and "middle-out" approaches to social and conflict transformation (Tongeren *et al.* 2005; Clark 2009) and the multitrack diplomacy initiatives (Notter and Diamond 1996; Rupesinghe 1998).

The transformation of violent conflicts requires, in short, a structural, relational, personal and cultural change, which goes beyond the satisfaction of the particular interests of the parties involved, whose number increases as the conflict evolves. Peace is development in the broadest sense of the meaning. It is not a fixed or a final estate, but an ongoing changing process, able to meet constructively new needs, interests, and conflicts in a changing environment. Lederach regards it as a "process-structure" of social change.

Communication for peace and social change therefore encompasses a set of multiple strategies, processes, and interactions aimed at addressing, where possible, existing communication flaws and failures between the multiplicity of actors who interact in the conflict and who influence its dynamic, while being in turn influenced by it. Ultimately, it intends to contribute to the establishment of peaceful, balanced, and constructive relationships between these actors. Such relationships

would enable the collective designing of processes of emancipatory social change. Although the roots of this approach to peace communication lie in the philosophy and the practice of communication for development and social change, elucidating the potential of the latter for preventing, resolving and constructively transforming conflicts requires analyzing and systematizing experiences from which to generate new knowledge.

Communication for development and social change scholars and researchers need, therefore, to observe and pay attention to changes when they happen, in order to understand and explain how change happens in a given context of violent conflict. It is not simply a case of analyzing how parties negotiate and dialogue or what agreements and initiatives result from these conversations, but rather paying attention to the framework where these processes take place and, most of all, to the patterns and networks of human relationships that hold them. The real support base for sustainable peace and social change is the very fabric of society. Yet multiple levels and types of change converge in conflict transformation, operating at different space-time scales and mutually affecting each other. Mid-level actors, subsystems, integrative power, networks, and relationship patterns are key elements of both immediate interventions and sustainable long-term change. We need to study not only "bottom-up" and "top-down" change processes, but also the "middle-out" ones, and, particularly, the processes of reconstruction of the social fabric.

Notes

1   According to information collated in the *SIPRI Yearbook* of 2011, these countries were: Afghanistan, Iraq, Myanmar, Rwanda, Occupied Palestine Territories, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. They ranked among 37 of the world's poorest countries according to the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) of 2010. A further 20% of the most violent conflicts registered in 2011 took place in medium–low HDI countries: the Philippines (97), India (119), and Pakistan (125).
2   There are, nevertheless, two important exceptions that must be mentioned due to the relevance and coherence of their contributions in this matter: the reflexion of Colombian academics and experts (Amparo Cadavid, Omar Rincón, Clemencia Rodríguez, Jair Vega, and the like) and the work of the World Association for Christian Communication (WACC), which, from the 1990s, has observed the interaction dynamics between development, conflict, and peace.
3   Interview with the author, Barcelona, April 25, 2012.

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17

Social and Behavior Change Communication

Neill McKee, Antje Becker-Benton, and Emily Bockh

This chapter documents the experience of the Communication for Change (C-Change) project[1] in developing and rolling out a holistic and comprehensive socioecological approach to social and behavior change communication (SBCC) within the context of a donor-funded program with short term goals. The project documentation and statistics are derived from C-Change records and other experiences.[2]

One of C-Change's mandates was to combine principles of social change and behavior change communication (BCC) and operationalize them for capacity strengthening (CS) of NGOs, ministries, and USAID missions for work across development sectors. While BCC has its origins in the dominant medical model of public health and often uses communication to persuade individuals to adopt healthier behaviors and lifestyles (Green and Tones 2010), social change communication is influenced by the social sciences' focus on social determinants or enablers of change. According to social change communication principles, SBCC should be empowering and horizontal; encourage communities to be agents of their own change; promote dialogue, debate, and negotiation (as compared to information and persuasion techniques); emphasize the process of interactions, shared knowledge, and collective action (rather than a sender–receiver model); and focus – beyond but to include individual behaviors – on social norm change, policies, and culture to unfold sustainable change in communities and among individuals (Figueroa *et al.* 2002).

While some of these principles were recently integrated into more sophisticated BCC strategies and products, C-Change's gap analysis showed individual behavior change continued to be the default and final goal of most communication efforts. In fact, various BCC concepts and strategies acknowledge the importance of

social determinants of change but underestimate how shaped, sanctioned, and ingrained individual actions are within the fabric of community norms and governing structures.

Triggered by the lack of sustained progress in changing individual risk behaviors in HIV transmission there has been a shift in how many researchers and programmers think about human behaviors.[3] As noted by Glass and McAtee, "the study of health behavior in isolation from the broader social and environmental context is incomplete, and has contributed to disappointing results from experiments in behavior change" (2006: 1664). Without ignoring the science of individual change measurement, this includes a gradual move away from the strict medical model, which tends to view risk as responsibility of the individual, toward emphasis on sustainable, social, and structural change (Green and Tones 2010).

This change has long been demanded by development and social change communication practitioners, and health promotion planners (FAO 2011; Servaes 2008). The principles and values of recent health promotion approaches, for example, provide guidance for the practice of SBCC: they include a socioecological perspective on health and development; taking into account the social, cultural, and economic determinants of change; a respect for cultural diversity and sensitivity; a dedication to social justice and sustainable development; and a participatory approach to engaging intended audiences in identifying needs, setting priorities, and planning, implementing, and evaluating practical and feasible health and development solutions using effective communication to address those needs (Fertman and Allensworth 2010).

Beginning in 2009 and based on the above thinking, the C-Change project developed a framework for SBCC and a comprehensive CS toolkit, including a set of six training modules for SBCC as part of a comprehensive capacity building strategy. These C-Modules were given open source website status and have been downloaded in part or in whole over 25,000 times by various users worldwide, at the time of writing. In addition, in late 2010 the C-Modules were adapted for online courses in SBCC on Ohio University's website platform. With support from C-Change, SBCC courses were also established in the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa; Del Valle University, Guatemala; Tirana University, Albania; and two universities in Nigeria, University of Calabar and Cross River State University of Technology.

Theoretical Basis of the C-Change Framework

C-Change's SBCC framework uses a socioecological model for change (see Figure 17.3 later in this chapter). This model views social and behavior change as a product of multiple, overlapping levels of influence as well as political and environmental factors (Sallis, Owen, and Fisher 2008). By using this larger ecological perspective to understand change processes, theories and models from

Table 17.1   Change: process and targets

Level of change	Change process	Targets of change
Individual	Psychological	Personal behaviors
Interpersonal	Psychosocial	How the person interacts with his or her social network
Community/social	Sociocultural	Dominant norms at community and societal levels

Source: Adapted from McKee *et al.* (2000).

various disciplines come into play. Theories and models address human behaviors on one of three possible levels of change: individual, interpersonal, or community/social. The change process and the targets of change (Table 17.1) show which related discipline best describes these levels: psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, and media studies, to just name a few.

By looking at theories and models, practitioners can begin to understand or further reinforce "what, why, and how health problems should be addressed" (Glanz, Rimer, and Su 2005). Theories and models are essential for program planning because they identify and make clear the assumptions behind the development of interventions and strategies. They can help to formulate communication objectives for programs and determine how to measure them, as well as clarify the reasons why programs succeed or fail (McKee *et al.* 2000).

As noted earlier, over the years, there has been a shift in thinking about human behavior. In addition, theories developed for application in industrialized countries have seldom been sufficient in trying to understand and predict behavior and social change in developing countries. While cognitive behavioral models may be able to explain the links between intention and behavior, particularly at an intrapersonal level, they are less able to account for interpersonal and contextual factors related to the complexity of sexual behavior, such as the experience of youth and disparities in social, cultural, and economic realities in sub-Saharan Africa (Michielsen *et al.* 2012).

More recently, many of the dominant theories are viewed as "out of context" since they are embedded in very different psychological and social dynamics. Development communication practitioners now acknowledge four key facts about human behavior:

1. People give meaning to information based on the context in which they live.
2. Culture and networks influence people's behavior.
3. People can't always control the issues that determine their behavior.
4. People's decisions about health and well-being compete with other priorities.

Below are some selected theories for each level of change that go beyond the usually mentioned theories and that can help practitioners start thinking about how theory can assist their communication work (C-Change 2012).

Individual level

While not a new model, the "health belief model" helps to find out why audience's perceptions are not in favor of change (e.g., buying and using an insecticide-treated mosquito bed net) in the search for tipping points for change. According to the model, beliefs about certain issues can be predictors of behaviors (Glanz, Rimer, and Su 2005). The model explores:

- perceptions about the possibility of acquiring a health problem (such as malaria);
- perceptions about the risk or vulnerability to the disease (e.g., perceptions about the severity of malaria);
- perceptions about the effectiveness of taking preventive action (e.g., the use of nets);
- perceptions about barriers or costs associated with taking action (e.g., the cost of buying nets);
- perceptions of one's ability to use it (e.g., self-efficacy to use the net regularly).

Interpersonal level: Theory of gender and power

In any society, members face constraints and barriers, many of which are gender specific (Connel 1987). Understanding the relationship between power and gender is crucial for planning interventions to address issues of gender-related inequality and to identify barriers. Social norms and practice and raising and educating people within these norms reinforce existing gender norms. Because gender inequality is the result of these institutions and processes, any communication intervention/ activity design should consider how gender and power relations may affect participation (do women have time or need permission to attend?) and the ability to act on recommended actions (can a woman ask her husband to get tested for HIV without him accusing her of cheating on him and/or reacting with violence?).

Community/social level: Culture-centered and positive deviance approaches

A major concept included in the culture-centered approach is the idea that traditional cultural beliefs do not need to be perceived as barriers to social change. Instead, they can be viewed as assets and resources to be harnessed in change efforts. Along similar lines, the "positive deviance approach" begins with the idea that the solution to existing challenges most likely already exists within the community. In other words, in any given community, there are often individuals and/or families that deviate from the norm in a positive way. For example, if a village has a 95% malnutrition rate for children under the age of five, a Positive Deviance Approach would begin with the 5% that are *not* malnourished and

attempt to identify promising practices that can be used by the entire community. However, if an individual or family (positive deviant) has access to additional resources (like extra farm land) then that solution is not applicable to the community – only practices that can be replicated by *all* in the community are selected and incorporated into programs. In the positive deviance approach, the deviating community members are the experts and it is they (not an external expert) who are called upon to share their successful practices with other community members.

The socioecological model has synthesized the concepts of the above and other models and theories in the "cross-cutting" factors as seen in Figure 17.1. It demonstrates how different theories and models contributed to and were synthesized into each ring of this model. The intention of demonstrating the potential connection with so many theories is largely educational rather than research based. This is because no single theory has proven sufficient to explain

*These concepts apply to all levels (people, organizations, and institutions). They were originally developed for the individual level.

Figure 17.1   Socioecological model for change.
Source: Adapted from McKee, Manoncourt, Chin, and Carnegie (2000). C-Change Project, 2011.

human behavior change or social change in development contexts. C-Change has had experience in exposing training participants to these concepts and helping them to back up their own "theory of change" thinking with critical questions related to relevant theories and models for particular applications.

SBCC Framework: Three Characteristics

According to C-Change's framework, SBCC comprises the systematic application of interactive, theory-based, and research-driven communication processes and strategies to address *tipping points* for change at the individual, community, and social levels. Instead of individual behavior change as a default, the SBCC framework requires a socioecological analysis to find *tipping points* at various levels. A *tipping point* in this sense refers to the dynamics of social change, where small, sometimes unpredictable changes rapidly accelerate change and may become permanent change. They can be naturally occurring events or something which is determined or researched and planned such as "political will" by senior leadership that provides the final push to "tip over" barriers to change. *Tipping points* may entail processes that build momentum to a point where change gains strength and becomes unstoppable.

While addressing individual behavior can achieve individual empowerment, and may address perceptions of the behavior of others (perceived social norms), SBCC involves processes of looking at a problem from multiple sides by analyzing individual, societal, and environmental factors to identify and address barriers to change. These are often found in social norms embedded in policy, legislation, cultural identity, and group behaviors and pressures. Addressing them is anticipated to lead to more sustainable change.

The three characteristics of SBCC are described below.

1. SBCC is a process

It is an interactive, researched, planned, strategic process with the aim to change social conditions and individual behaviors. C-Change's model follows well-known steps in applied communication (see Figure 17.2). Many communication planning models have been developed over the past 30 or more years. C-Planning is derived from many of these, as referenced below. However, it should be noted that within the first step, "Understanding the Situation," the creators of the model emphasize more than formative research on knowledge, attitudes, and practices but more attention to barriers and facilitators of change as well as their indirect and underlying causes. It also includes looking at key players at the community, service providers, district and higher levels, including national or international. Hence, as

Figure 17.2   C-Planning: principles, competencies, and planning tools.
Source: Adapted from Health Communication Partnership, CCP at JHU (2003); The P-Process, McKee *et al.* (2000) *The ACADA Model*; Parker, Dalrymple, and Durden (1998) *The Integrated Strategy Wheel*; Roberts *et al.* (1995) *The Tool Box for Building Health Communication Capacity*; and National Cancer Institute (1989) Health Communication Program Cycle. C-Change Project, 2011.

indicated in Figure 17.2, there is a strong relationship between step one of C-Planning and the socioecological model.

The second substantial difference in C-Planning is the attention on "Focusing and Designing" (step 2) and "Creating" (step 3). While many frameworks include communication strategy formats requesting individual behavioral objectives, they tend to do so without requesting sufficient analysis. An immediate focus on behavior change tends to be prescribed from budgetary or bureaucratic consider-ations rather than on evidence and true involvement of audiences in having a say in what is needed to induce positive change.

2. SBCC uses a socioecological model for change

A socioecological approach to understanding the situation is essential to arrive at barriers and opportunities for social and behavior change, as well as to design strategies that will accelerate change in the long run. C-Change's socioecological model (see Figure 17.3) is derived from earlier writing on participatory methods for behavior change (McKee *et al.*, 2000).

1

ENABLING ENVIRONMENT
**Media theories
Social movement theories
Network theories**

2

COMMUNITY
**Community organization theories
Social norm theories
Gender theories
Culture theories**

ORGANIZATION, SERVICES, PRODUCTS
**Organizational change theories
Social marketing approaches
Patient centered
Communication models**

Enabling environment: Policy/Legislation, Politics/Conflict, Economics, Religion, Technology, Natural environment

Community: Organization, Services, Products

Interpersonal

Self

Partners , Family, Peers

Leaders, Providers

Leaders: Government, NGO, Private sector

Cross-cutting Factors*

INFORMATION Knowledge

MOTIVATION Attitudes, Beliefs

ABILITY TO ACT Skills, Efficacy, Access

NORMS Perceived, Sociocultural, Gender

3

INTERPERSONAL
**Social learning theories
Diffusion theories
Dialogue theories
Social network and social
Support theories
Patient centered
Communication models**

4

SELF
**Individual level theories
Theories highlighting
Perceptions**

* While these concepts were originally developed for the individual level, they can also be applied to groups, organizations, and institutions.

Figure 17.3   Theoretical base for the socioecological model.
Source: Adapted from McKee, Manoncourt, Chin, and Carnegie (2000). C-Change Project, 2011.

This model, used in both analysis and planning, applies core concepts central to most ecological models, such as environmental determinants, community capacity, and the relationship between individuals and their social context (Richard, Gauvin, and Rain 2011). In addition, it offers a practical way to analyze barriers and opportunities, sources of influence, and potential audiences, partners,

and allies from national to community, family, and individual levels based on a variety of SBCC theories and models.

Models and theories are essential in guiding SBCC, providing methods for studying and addressing development issues. C-Change's socioecological model for change is based on existing theories, models, and approaches from several disciplines, including political science, sociology, psychology, and communication. Through a synthesis of the information included in these theories and approaches, the socioecological model proposes several levels of influence to find effective tipping points for change. The model has two parts:

1. *Levels of analysis*, the rings of the model represent both domains of influence as well as the people involved in each level. The innermost ring represents the individual most affected by the issue (self) and moves outwards to direct influences on the individual (two inner rings). Both the interpersonal and community rings shape community and gender norms, access to and demand for community resources, and existing services. Indirect influencers make up the outer enabling environment.

2. *Cross-cutting factors* in the triangle influence each of the actors and structures in the rings. These include the larger categories of Information, Motivation, Ability to Act, and Norms. By affecting these cross-cutting factors SBCC interventions may be able to generate change. They may act in isolation or in combination.

   - People need information that is timely, accessible, and relevant. For most people, information is not enough to prompt change.
   - People require motivation, which is often determined by their attitudes, beliefs, or perceptions of the benefits, risks, or seriousness of the issues that programs are trying to change. Practitioners should also look at the actual skills, self-efficacy (or collective efficacy), and access of the actors as motivation may not be enough. For instance, few women and girls in the countries hardest hit by HIV and AIDS have the power to negotiate the time and conditions for having sex, including condom use, or they may lack the funds to buy condoms. Note that: (1) skills include psychosocial life skills;[4] (2) self-efficacy is concerned with the confidence of individuals and groups (collective efficacy[5]) in their own skills to affect change; and (3) access includes financial, geographical, or transport issues that affect access to services and ability to buy products.
   - Finally, norms have considerable influence on behaviors and vice versa (Mollen, Rimal and Lapinski 2010). Norms reflect the values of the group and/or society at large and social expectations about behavior. Practitioners distinguish perceived norms (those that an individual believes others are holding), sociocultural norms (those that the community as a whole follows) and gender norms (views of expected behaviors of males and females).

SBCC operates through three key strategies

The ecological approach requires that SBCC works through *three key strategies*: advocacy for policy change and resource mobilization; social mobilization (including community mobilization) for involvement of a broader coalition and capacity strengthening of partners and allies from the international to the community level; and BCC, using interpersonal, group approaches, mass media, and new information technologies for specific behavior and social norm changes. These three strategies, essential for sustained behavior and social change, are visualized in Figure 17.4.

Definitions of these key strategies are helpful for full understanding of SBCC. Very often, projects only focus on BCC, attempting to change individual behaviors without addressing, for example, the demand for more accessible and friendly service delivery through advocacy. It is not essential or even realistic that any one project or entity leads all three strategies as they can engage partner and allies who are already doing it. However, SBCC should always be linked to services or to products that people can access. If these are not in place, SBCC efforts remain toothless, and communication activities may not have significant impact.

Figure 17.4   Three key strategies of social behavior change communication.
Source: Adapted from McKee (1992). C-Change Project, 2011.

Both advocacy and mobilization strategies tend to use communication techniques to reach their goals. Practitioners do not always apply strategic communication principles to this type of work, which could make interventions more effective. For example, techniques used under social and community mobilization include publicity, public discussions, dissemination of information using mass and community media, and training/coordination of stakeholders.

While social mobilization may often take place at a national level among civil society organizations, donors, and parts of government to build coalitions for certain issues, community mobilization can do the same at a community level with similar techniques. Practitioners can begin with any one of the three strategies (represented by the left arrow in Figure 17.4), depending on such factors as:

- the problem being addressed;
- the policies in place to deal with it;
- the organization(s) and resources already engaged in addressing the problem.

For example, if leadership isn't ready for advocacy on a certain issue, a program might concentrate instead on building a critical mass of a social network or coalition that can put pressure on leadership through a well-defined social mobilization strategy. Or, if resources allow, consideration could be given to working with the community on a broad-scale BCC effort linked with a mass media intervention to set the public agenda. This could eventually affect leaders' perspectives and engage them and others in a social movement.

In South Africa throughout the 1990s, for example, there was very little recognition of the impact HIV had on the country or the rights of people living with HIV and AIDS to care and treatment. In fact, there was a lack of political will and this caused government inaction well into the new century. Concerted advocacy by the South African Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) was one of the factors that changed the situation. After gaining assurances from the government on treatment provision, TAC utilized social mobilization strategies to pressure the government to follow through on its promises (see www.tac.org.za).

Experiences in Applying SBCC Approaches

While there are various multilevel interventions using individual and interpersonal strategies (Richard, Garwin, and Raine 2011) there are few well-documented examples of full-scale SBCC approaches. This is largely because few SBCC projects are funded by donors. Donors usually request competing agencies to achieve specific measurable results, including individual behavior changes within limited time frames such as three to a maximum of five years. Development project models are usually built on the time it takes to complete infrastructure projects,

not the achievement of social change. Where there is an attempt to measure social change it is usually equated with changes in perceived social norms or changes of individual attitudinal or behavior change often based on medical model thinking. Under such short time frames, sustainable social change is seldom considered since accountability remains within the time limits of the specific project. Most recently, efforts under AIDS prevention and treatment started using the term "structural interventions" to address determinants of new infections. These include cultural, demographic, economic, educational, legal political and social issues. It remains to be seen if their evaluation methods will measure those effects within a social change framework (AIDS Star 1 2011).

However, as mentioned above, the intention of the SBCC approach is not usually to put the onus on any one project to work on all fronts at the same time. It is recognized that few projects have a mandate to carry out advocacy, social mobilization, and targeted BCC. Instead, the intention is that different social forces join together to engender change, using their resources in different ways. Or, it may be that an initiative begins with advocacy, moves to social and community mobilization and then begins to design and implement specific, focused BCC approaches according to needed. A strong example of the need for an SBCC approach to HIV prevention in Africa is grounded in research. Through extensive formative research in South Africa and Namibia, C-Change has found that many existing communication initiatives are not connecting with adult women who remain very vulnerable to HIV infection (Parker and Connolly 2011; Parker 2012).

C-Change has devised a strategy to help organizations address some of the deficiencies in approaches to adult HIV prevention in Africa noted in the above formative research example from South Africa and Namibia. This is the Community Conversation Toolkit (CCT), a set of tools that are now being used by 31 organizations in Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The Toolkit directly addresses the above studies call for the "development and expansion of horizontal systems of response that are led on the ground and incorporate contextually relevant solutions." In Box 17.1, there is a summary of the main features and achievements of this initiative.

Moving from Africa to South Asia, it is worth noting that one of the first SBCC initiatives, which started in the early 1990s is still being used in health and development programs. This is the Meena Communication Initiative of UNICEF (McKee and Shahzadi 2008) for the development and empowerment of South Asian girls. It includes a set of tools originally developed for Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. Since it was launched in 1992, Meena has also spread to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and has been adapted for use in Vietnam, Indonesia, and the South Pacific island nation of Kiribati.

The original three-pronged strategy of Meena: advocacy, social mobilization and BCC, was derived from experience in the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) and other child health and development programs in Bangladesh (McKee 1992). It is interesting to note, therefore, that this tradition of communication continues in that country.

Box 17.1   C-Change's Community Conversation Toolkit

Background
C-Change's Community Conversation Toolkit (CCT) mobilizes adults in southern Africa to engage with their HIV risks – including concurrency, alcohol abuse, gender-based violence, and harmful cultural practices – and take action toward prevention. Geared toward adults over age 20 with lower literacy skills, the regional toolkit includes six interactive materials grouped around a simple community mobilization process. This process is supported by steps to facilitate community-driven dialogues to trigger culturally and locally specific individual and group actions that respond to the epidemic.

The CCT was developed in rural South Africa, using the participatory "Action Media" methodology. It was later adapted and field tested in local languages in seven African countries, in collaboration with Soul City partners. A total of 41 NGOs are using the CCT in southern Africa.

In order to evaluate the CCT, C-Change worked with four community-based organizations (CBOs) of the Southern African AIDS Trust engaged in HIV prevention in Malawi and Zambia. They used the CCT with 23 community groups with whom they were working. Peer educators were trained to prompt dialogues that fostered reflection, problem solving, and action at individual and group levels.

Evaluation
Over 80 dialogues with four partners were monitored and interviews and focus group discussions held with implementing partners, peer educators, participants, and other stakeholders. Based on a model that addresses change processes in a particular context through identifying cultural scripts, the evaluations assessed whether CCT activities resonated with individuals and groups, helped them to internalize their HIV risk, led to individual or community actions, and fostered a new understanding of how to respond to the epidemic.

Results
Results include an increase in individual acknowledgment of HIV risk, stronger links to support services, more advocacy by local leaders, and more partner communication on concurrency. Dialogues resulted in specific actions – such as tested couples encouraging other couples to get tested and use condoms, and police services being called upon to enforce laws against rape.

Facilitators and participants voiced strong appreciation of the CCT's interactive components because they prompt thinking, reflection, and problem solving and engage audiences affected by "AIDS fatigue."

Lessons learned

- Participatory development and testing led to relevant and valued communication tools.
- The interactive, game-like approach promoted dialogue.
- The CCT is most effective with ongoing training in facilitation, observation, and note-taking.
- The established relationships between CBOs and community stakeholders fostered group actions and follow-up.
- While dialogues and specific actions prompted are grounded in a given community and culture, the application of the CCT can be taken to scale in any country and community.

Overall, the CCT demonstrates that communication tools can generate individual, interpersonal, and social change actions to address HIV risk, such as in sexual relationships and with risk embedded in harmful traditional practices. Moreover, participants supported changes they discussed beyond the dialogues, and implementing organizations worked to secure funding for continued implementation. These evaluation results validate the need for non-traditional communication approaches that spur home-grown solutions, focus on relationships, and foster critical group thinking.

Conclusions on the Evaluation of SBCC Approaches

At this point, the key models and concepts of the C-Change's SBCC framework are incorporated into at least 75 government programs in Africa, as well as Guatemala, Jamaica, and The Bahamas. Additionally, worldwide, at least 3,405 government and non-governmental personnel have been successfully trained in SBCC.

Evaluations of multilevel interventions following an ecological approach have increased domestically (Richard, Gauvin, and Raine 2010). At their best, they require monitoring community and social processes involved in the development, implementation and evaluation of interventions, their unintended effects and interactions with local culture. Overall results of recent meta-analyses of communication programs at the international level show that the likelihood of success is substantially increased by the application of multilevel interventions. The availability of and access to key services and products continue to be crucial in persuading individuals motivated by media messages to act on them. Likewise, supporting policies provide additional motivation for change, while policy enforcement can discourage unhealthy or unsafe behaviors. Media advocacy campaigns

that frame public health issues in the news and entertainment media also represent a promising complementary strategy to conventional media campaigns (Wakefield, Loken, and Hornik 2010).

The request for more impact evaluations – often from public health professionals trained in the medical model in which the "gold standard" is the randomized control trial (RCT) – has proven problematic. This is because the goal of all SBCC activities is to have synergistic effects of their interventions and messages across the many types of strategies and channels used. Applying the RCT model to prove communication effects has been unproductive, especially when the measurements simply focus on exposure of messages between treatment and control groups (Hornik 2002). Hornik recommends instead a number of approaches (e.g., natural experiments, time-series designs, and other quasi-experimental approaches) that have been used in other research domains where it remains unpractical and unethical to have a true control group (US Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.).

Conclusion on the Sustainability of SBCC Approaches

As indicated in the above examples, C-Change's socioecological model recognizes, in its outer ring, the importance of the "enabling environment" for both going to scale and sustainability. The extent to which the overall environment will enable change depends on: (1) policy and legislative support, (2) political support or conflict on the issues involved, (3) economic support, (4) religious institutional support, (5) technology and infrastructural support, and (6) natural environmental factors usually beyond the complete control of one country or geographic area.

SBCC approaches and their evaluation should be designed in a collaborative style to ensure that communication programs are not limited in length to the life of a particular project and evaluations are able to measure change over time; this requires a change in the typical modus operandi. Of course, programs should not last longer than they are needed. However, many of the challenges of health and development programs will take decades to solve because many of the populations involved are also facing huge economic and environmental challenges.

More recently, donors in the US have recognized that intersectoral collaboration and coordination is needed in order to provide effective and sustainable programs. The Global Health Initiative and Feed the Future represent concerted efforts to release programming from limitations of stove piped funding and related dominant approaches. However, as long as funding structures and measurements of success have not changed these programs face rather big inherent challenges.

The advocacy and social mobilization strategies of SBCC are aimed at ensuring sustainability through host government "buy-in" and support. It is obvious that some interventions, such as exclusive breastfeeding, may be more popular with politicians and partners than others, such as ensuring safer sex among key affected populations to prevent the spread of HIV. More popular and less controversial programs will, no doubt, receive organizational support and resources. But are there other specific and common elements that can be considered for the sustainability of SBCC programs? Below are some factors:

- *Effectiveness*   If there is no baseline, midline, and endline evaluation evidence of the effects of the program it is unlikely to be sustained. In addition to behavior change, permanent social norm change should be a major goal of the program.
- *Affordability*   What is the cost of continuation? Who will pay? For instance, is the intervention relying on separately paid staff or is it integrated into existing structures? (O'Loughlin *et al*. 1998). Does the intervention require expensive equipment and resources? Are funds available to subsidize new startups?
- *Attractiveness*   Are the interventions entertaining and attractive to the audiences and also appealing to various implementing organizations?
- *Leadership*   Is there a champion (or champions) to speak and work for the continuation of needed elements of the program? To what degree is leadership support perceived? (O'Loughlin *et al*. 1998)
- *Communication and facilitation*   Did the lead organizations take an open, facilitating approach to program development and implementation, bringing in the suggestions of partners and communities?
- *Ownership*   Is there agreement by various institutions on issues such as, the importance given to the problem being addressed? How wide is the ownership of the program? Is it a program belonging to one department or entity only or are there multiple stakeholders? To what degree were communities involved in design, implementation and evaluation? (Wisener and Jarvis-Selinger 2012).
- *Technology and infrastructure*   How easily do the structural requirements fit into the organizational capacity and structure of long-term agencies? Is there compatibility with the existing interventions and approaches? (Scheirer and Dearing 2011; Bossert 1990)
- *Flexibility*   To what degree are the program's approaches and materials adapted to various community settings?
- *Capacity strengthening*   Can we ensure that appropriate knowledge and skills, as well as the abilities to act are firmly embedded within key staff, such as health providers and other field workers, and their supervisors?
- *Timing*   How can we ensure good timing of implementing sustainability strategies to reduce uncertainty in whether and how much the intervention will be sustained? (Johnson *et al*. 2004; Pluye, Potvin, and Denis 2004).

These factors are not comprehensive but they can guide us in the further development, implementation and evaluation of SBCC programs. The authors' main concern here is that we provide the beginnings of practical guidelines to more comprehensive and long-lasting programs that have a chance to have a positive impact on individual behaviors and social norms, as well as social change. Our hope is that this chapter illustrates a practical approach for program managers on how they can move towards this goal.

Moving Forward

Moving forward we still need to address challenges that the discipline of program communication has known for a while. Here are some ideas for discussion:

- As we continue to address complex social and behavioral challenges, our approaches have to be able to capture this complexity, break it down, and collaborate with each other to address crucial elements rather than to limit our reach or "dumb it down." Having tried the latter now for decades, it has not shown the desired results!
- Brain surgery is not done by working with a handbook and neither is social and behavior change communication. Communication programming needs to have quality control in measurable terms in order to show short- and long-term results. There is a certain agreement on the basic quality criteria (C-Change SBCC Capacity Assessment Tools, for instance), which needs to be broadened and discussions continued.
- For the same reason, it remains crucial to continue building capacity at the academic levels as with donors, government, the NGO and private sectors. Capacity needs to be established and institutionalized to achieve effective and state-of-the-art communication programming and its measurement. Capacity strengthening indicators for SBCC do exist at this point but consensus has to be created here as well.
- Continued exchange between academia, donors, and programmers on the ground needs to continue to challenge valued assumptions with evidence.
- Evidence cannot only be defined by the still dominant medical model in public health in order to further the discussion on communication impact. Other disciplines have demonstrated research and evaluation methods that hold as much value (for example, complexity science frameworks).
- And, lastly, the concepts of SBCC, health promotion, health or development communication, BCC, and social marketing all have certain strengths for certain audiences, situations, and geographies. There is no need to compete with each other for the "one and only" model.

Notes

1   C-Change, funded by the United States Agency of International Development (USAID), was led by FHI 360 and in partnership with Ohio University, Care, Internews, Soul City, Centre for Media Studies, and New Concept Information Systems from 2007 to 2012.
2   The opinions expressed below are those of the authors only, and do not represent the opinions of FHI 360 or USAID.
3   See, for example, the conclusion of Susan Kippax (2012): "Effective prevention entails developing community capacity and requires that public health addresses people not only as individuals but also as connected members of groups, networks, and collectives who interact (talk, negotiate, have sex, use drugs, and so on) together."
4   For example: problem-solving skills; decision-making ability; negotiation skills; critical and creative thinking; interpersonal communication skills; and other relationship skills, such as empathy.
5   Collective efficacy is defined as "social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good" of a neighborhood or community (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). "Building the community capacity to act for the common good is essential for health and development" (Goodman *et al.*, 1998).

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A Participatory Framework for Researching and Evaluating Communication for Development and Social Change

Jo Tacchi and June Lennie

The growing dominance of project planning cycles and results-based management in development over the past 20 years has significant implications for the effective evaluation of communication for development and social change and the sustainability of these processes. These approaches to development and evaluation usually give priority to the linear, logical framework (or logframe) approach promoted by many development institutions. This tends to emphasize upward accountability approaches to development and its evaluation, so that development is driven by exogenous rather than endogenous models of development and social change. Such approaches are underpinned by ideas of preplanning, and predetermination of what successful outcomes look like. In this way, outcomes of complex interventions tend to be reduced to simple, cause-effect processes and the categorization of things, including people (Chambers and Pettit 2004; Eyben 2011). This runs counter to communication for development approaches, which prioritize engagement, relationships, empowerment and dialogue as important components for positive social change.

Alternative, participatory approaches to development, complexity theories and whole systems approaches understand social change as unpredictable and emergent. Social change is unknowable in advance, something to learn from and adapt to. The former instrumentalist approaches prioritize evaluation that is based on the categorization of abstract concepts, control of planned activities and inputs, and predetermined measures of success; the latter prioritize evaluation that captures relationships, openness, emergence, innovation, and flexibility. The former are mainstream, considered rigorous, and largely based on standardized methods; the

latter are alternative, considered (by proponents of the former) to lack rigor and based on a range of approaches, methodologies and methods selected according to each initiative and its context. The latter are considered most appropriate for evaluating communication for development and social change, and herein lies a double bind: On the one hand there is a need to promote the importance of communication for development and social change and demonstrate this through evaluation; on the other hand the most appropriate evaluation approaches are not well understood by mainstream evaluators whose preferred approaches are, in turn, considered inappropriate by communication for development practitioners.

The rigor and effectiveness of non-standardized, participatory approaches to evaluation needs to be established and the very conceptions of what rigor in evaluation means, challenged. This situation has been well rehearsed for a number of years (Chambers 2009; Guba and Lincoln 1989; Lennie 2006), and is what led us to develop a comprehensive, overarching framework[1] for evaluating communication for development (Lennie and Tacchi 2013). This framework seeks to assert and demonstrate the value, rigor and appropriateness of alternative approaches to evaluation. Based on the latest thinking and research in the fields of international development, communication for development, evaluation and organizational change, it has seven key interrelated components: *participatory*, *holistic*, *complex*, *critical*, *emergent*, *realistic*, and *learning-based*.

The framework reinforces the case for dialogue as a central and vital component of participatory forms of development and evaluation. It highlights the need to attend to the local and wider context, gender and power relations, diversity and difference, and social and cultural norms in the evaluation process. Recent research suggests that this approach is critical for sustainable social change and development (Jallov 2012; Quarry and Ramirez 2009; Servaes *et al.* 2012).

In this chapter we first discuss evaluation of communication for development in relation to ideas around participation and social change, before presenting the framework for evaluating communication for development and social change, and the key principles that underpin it. We then describe some of the most interesting current trends and debates in development evaluation that informed the development of the framework and outline some strategies for overcoming the many challenges and issues associated with implementing this alternative evaluation approach. In conclusion, we consider the implications for increasing the sustainability and effectiveness of communication for development and social change.

Evaluation and Communication for Development and Social Change

Significant concerns have recently been raised that participation and ideas around long-term change are being overcome by an ascendance of accountancy and linear planning models (Eyben 2011; Mebrahtu, Pratt, and Lönnqvist 2007; Quarry and

Ramirez 2009). This is driven by agendas such as the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, produced in 2005 at a high-level international meeting organized by the OECD. The declaration sets out five mutually reinforcing principles for development: ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability. The premise of the Declaration was to reform how aid is delivered and managed, five years into the Millennium Development Goals' 15 year timeline. It emphasized targets and "partnerships" between donors and aid recipients, the importance of aid effectiveness, and the need to measure and demonstrate it, with a goal of greater efficiency in the disbursement of aid funding (Conlin and Stirrat 2008). Yet, as Robert Chambers reminds us, through an analysis of the words used in the declaration, it displays a very strong underlying model of development and evaluation that prioritizes things over people. Words never used in the declaration include "negotiate," "evolve," "agreements," "optimize outcomes," "poor, vulnerable, and marginalized people," "interactions," "relationships," "trust," "power," and "conflict" (Chambers 2007: 125). Evaluation becomes an exercise in accountancy whereas its function *should be* downward accountability and learning (Mebrahtu *et al.* 2007).

Participatory Evaluation Approaches

For those of us working in communication for development and social change, evaluation has a key role to play in ensuring that we don't ignore the lessons of the past in favor of mechanistic approaches to monitoring and evaluation (M&E), that technocratic approaches do not overwhelm participatory approaches and the involvement of those on the ground, and that innovative and creative approaches designed for learning rather than accounting are promoted. In short, evaluation and our framework can help us to be searchers rather than planners (Easterly 2006), listeners rather than tellers (Quarry and Ramirez 2009).

We define evaluative research as the way in which we determine, through systematic, regular research, the value that primary stakeholders place on development programs and activities, and their outcomes. Evaluation is undertaken in order to improve development's effectiveness and sustainability, to help reach objectives, to make good decisions about future activities, and, in its participatory forms, as a means of engaging and empowering people in development activities and building their capacities in evaluation. In the framework, evaluation is seen as an ongoing, action learning, project development and improvement, and capacity development process. The aim is that this process becomes embedded into an organization's culture and its project planning and management processes. Evaluation enables mutual learning and understanding about the activities, opinions, values, and experiences of diverse stakeholder groups (including community participants). It helps us to understand and identify the expected and

unexpected outcomes of development activities against a clear understanding of an initiative's vision and objectives, based on community needs and aspirations, and its theory of change. Evaluation can identify and explain unexpected and negative outcomes, and can help us learn from any failures to meet pre-planned activities to better develop new initiatives and innovations and improve relationships and future activities.

Participatory research and evaluation approaches are underpinned by interpretivist philosophies and constructivist frameworks, in which evaluation is seen as leading to social action and positive change. In our framework, a participatory approach to evaluation is an essential principle. This means developing a partnership between stakeholders to collaboratively design and systematically implement evaluation processes, develop tools, set indicators (if they are used), and share concerns, experiences and learnings. This type of participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) differs from conventional M&E in attempting to include all relevant stakeholders (staff, community participants, NGOs, donors, researchers, and such like) in all aspects of the process (Holte-McKenzie, Forde, and Theobald 2006: 365). Our framework is congruent with new evaluation and planning approaches such as outcome mapping (Earl, Carden, and Smutylo 2001), which has shifted from a focus on assessing the impacts of a program (defined as changes in state such as reduced conflict) towards changes in behaviors, relationships, actions and activities of people, groups and organizations. The focus of this realistic approach is on more subtle changes that nevertheless "are clearly within a programme's sphere of influence" (Earl, Carden, and Smutylo 2001: 10).

Complexity-Based Approaches to Social Change

While there are many different perspectives on social change, we consider social change as nonlinear, dynamic, emergent and complex. Social change in complex systems such as communities occurs through multilevel, interconnected, interdependent, nonlinear and unpredictable relationships and processes (Lacayo 2007; Ramalingam *et al.* 2008). This means that when change happens it is often disproportionate and unpredictable, making it hard to capture in any meaningful way using evaluation approaches based on predictable and linear processes that seek measurable outcomes. Understanding the local culture and context and the relationships between people, groups and organizations in that context, is therefore vital to understanding social change. Notions of social change that encompass complexity and difference recognize that technological changes and development interventions may have complex, diverse and often contradictory effects on different communities or groups of people such as women and the very poor.

Evaluating communication for development and social change requires that we attend not only to the potential benefits and possibilities of communication, technologies, and media, but also to the particularities of the contexts through and in which they are shaped and experienced. Social change is contextual. Effectively understanding social change requires considering broader dimensions of the process, beyond the "social," to encompass the political, economic and cultural dimensions (Wilkins 2009: 4). It also requires a shift in focus from the impact of particular interventions on specific groups to changes in wider social and organizational systems. This entails an open, holistic, and realistic, yet critical, approach to development and evaluation that draws on a wide range of related theories, concepts and approaches.

Critical Perspectives on Participation

Communication for development intrinsically links communication with participatory development, yet participation is a contested concept (Cornwall 2011). Participation "first hit the development mainstream" (Cornwall 2008: 269) in the 1970s, and took hold in the 1980s. For some, the practice of participation in development is considered false, simply rhetoric, and incompatible with procedures and goals of aid organizations and their positions of power (Bailur 2007; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Fraser and Restrepo-Estrada 1998; White 1996). It has become a development buzzword (Cornwall and Brock 2005; Leal 2007), often assumed to be essential to development, and necessarily and intrinsically good. It holds both the potential for tyranny (Cooke and Kothari 2001) and transformation (Hickey and Mohan 2004), because it implicates the political and exists in relations of power.

In communication and media studies, particularly in the era of Web 2.0, participation is used to mean "everything and nothing" (Carpentier 2011: 14). Ultimately, participation is about power and control and, like evaluation, is an inherently political process (Cornwall 2008). In our framework, participation means engagement by a range of stakeholders at all points in the development process, including evaluation. Indeed, because of its communicative aspects, communication for development has been shown to provide a mechanism for achieving the levels of participation, voice and choice that development more broadly often struggles to achieve (Tacchi 2009). Recognizing that participatory approaches to development and to evaluation inevitably bring with them issues of power, it is important to be alert to power dynamics and issues of inclusion and exclusion, empowerment and disempowerment. Participatory evaluation of communication for development will always, to some extent, involve challenging power relationships and structures. This is because it depends on actively engaging a range of people, encouraging voice but also prioritizing effective and active

listening and respecting alternative forms of knowledge (Quarry and Ramirez 2009; Servaes 2008; Tacchi 2012).

Participatory Framework
for Evaluating Communication
for Development

Four new conceptualizations of evaluation and shifts in evaluation practice underpin the framework and are significant to understanding and evaluating communication for development:

1. Evaluation is best considered and most usefully practiced as an ongoing action learning and organizational improvement process.
2. There is a shift from proving impacts to improving development practices.
3. Evaluative processes can effectively support the development of innovations.
4. There is a shift from external to internal and community accountability.

This approach focuses on outcomes rather than impacts that are measured through predefined, top-down indicators. This is because the complexity of communication for development and social change makes it very difficult to assess direct cause and effect impacts, and because the outcomes and ripple effects of communication for development can be difficult to capture adequately using standard approaches. This approach requires keeping evaluation methodologies and systems as practical and simple as possible, and using strategies such as ongoing meta-evaluation and critical reflection to improve evaluation capacities and practices (Lennie, Tacchi, and Wilmore 2012).

Our framework emphasizes processes, principles and values such as inclusion, open communication, trust and continuous learning. It recognizes the complex, emergent nature of processes of social change and the need for a dynamic, open, flexible approach. The framework is designed to be practically accessible and theoretically and methodologically rigorous, and draws on work that promotes innovative and creative approaches to research, monitoring and evaluation, and alternative paradigms of development.

The framework is based on concepts and principles derived from systems and complexity theory (described in more detail in the next section), action research, feminist and gender-sensitive evaluation methodologies, new approaches to social change, and holistic approaches to community development, organizational change, and evaluation capacity development. These approaches promote ongoing learning from and continuous listening to a broad diversity of participants and stakeholders. In this section we describe the framework and its seven key components, along with some thoughts on its implementation. The framework is presented in Figure 18.1 and is discussed in greater detail in Lennie and Tacchi (2013).

Figure 18.1 Key components and concepts in the framework for evaluating communication for development.

Key purposes of the framework include to:

- Guide the ongoing development and improvement of communication for development and social change;
- Help to conceptualize communication for development in realistic ways and to clarify solutions to complex social problems;
- Enhance capacity development in evaluation within organizations and communities, from grassroots to management levels, and develop learning organizations;
- Encourage long-term engagement in evaluation processes to increase the effectiveness and sustainability of communication for development; and
- Improve mutual understanding and relationships among diverse stakeholders involved in communication for development and its evaluation.

The Seven Framework Components

Component 1: Participatory

A participatory approach is central to the framework. This helps to ensure ongoing development and improvement of initiatives and policies in ways that better meet community needs and aspirations; increased evaluation capacities; greater utilization of evaluation findings and learnings; and empowerment of participants. A participatory approach is considered fundamental for effectiveness, innovation and sustainability of communication for development. The knowledge and experience of local participants is drawn on, as well as relevant experts and outsiders. This approach includes an action component to continuously develop and improve communication for development and evaluation processes and is consistent with the values, principles and aims of communication for development.

While participatory approaches to evaluation that use creative and engaging communication methods are particularly well-suited to communication for development, they may appear to cost more in time and resources than non-participatory approaches, and the political will to invest in these approaches is often weak or absent (Parks *et al*. 2005: 13). There are also issues with the dominance of quantitative approaches and the entrenched use of tools such as the logframe approach, which are seen by some as incompatible with alternative, participatory approaches to evaluation (Earle 2003; Joseph 2011). In this context, it is important to take a long-term view of the evaluation process and the benefits of adopting a participatory approach. In the long run, participatory approaches are often less costly when their many benefits are considered. We return to this point in our conclusion.

Component 2: Holistic

In the framework, evaluation is based on an understanding of wider social, cultural, economic, technological, organizational and institutional systems and contexts within, and in relation to which communication for development activities take place. Organizations and communities are seen as greater than the sum of their parts. This approach includes analysis and understanding of the interrelationships, interconnections, and networks between the various organizations, groups, and agents involved in an initiative, directly or indirectly. It also considers the boundaries and local communicative ecologies (see below), including communication flows and barriers, within which an initiative operates.

Underlying principles of the holistic component of the framework include:

- Evaluation recognizes that social, cultural and economic systems within which communication for development is happening are dynamic, historical and capable of continuous transformation and change.
- Evaluation aims to describe and understand how wider systems and networks operate.
- Evaluations include continuous monitoring of the local communication environment.
- Evaluation capacity development is seen as a long-term process that focuses on the whole organization and aims to improve coordination, cooperation and collaboration between internal and external agents and groups.

Component 3: Complex

Complexity theory and complexity-based research and evaluation approaches such as developmental evaluation (Patton 2011) and outcome mapping (Earl, Carden, and Smutylo 2001) offer valuable alternatives to understanding how development and social change actually occur (Byrne and Vincent 2011; Miskelly, Hoban, and Vincent 2009; Papa, Singhal, and Papa 2006; Ramalingam *et al.* 2008). The framework recognizes that social change and communication for development are complex and involve processes that are often contradictory and challenging. The evaluation process recognizes that communication for development is often undertaken in social, economic and cultural contexts with high levels of social conflict, and involves people and organizations with multiple perspectives and agendas. Impacts and outcomes, therefore, are often unpredictable or unknowable in advance. As a result, evaluation approaches need to be flexible, participatory, creative, and well-planned and facilitated in order to adequately take complexity into account. Evaluations also attempt to understand how and why social change happens and includes an analysis of social and organizational norms and other contextual factors that affect the process of social change.

Component 4: Critical

The framework requires actively and explicitly addressing issues of gender, caste, ethnicity, age, and other relevant differences, and unequal power and voice among participants. Many contemporary participatory evaluation approaches openly acknowledge and take into account the political nature of research and evaluation practices and differences between participants, particularly those related to gender, power and knowledge (Burns 2007; Hearn *et al.* 2009; Lennie 2005). Nevertheless,

gender is in danger of slipping from the international development agenda (Newton 2011), suggesting the need for more effective evaluation approaches that focus on gender. Local social norms and the challenges, contradictions and paradoxes that often characterize the process of social change need to be critically assessed, and evaluation carried out based on an awareness of the strengths and limitations of various evaluation approaches, methodologies and methods, including participatory approaches. Evaluation methodologies and methods also need to be culturally appropriate and used in culturally sensitive ways.

Component 5: Emergent

An emergent approach recognizes the dynamic nature of communities and local contexts. Evaluation processes themselves (including theories of change) must be dynamic, and flexible, adaptive, alert to critical incidents and tipping points. The focus is on *progress* toward social change and the *contribution* of communication for development to social change and sustainable development. Principles and processes such as self-organization, powerful listening, and continuous feedback loops are important. The aim here is that the evaluation contributes to developing effective, innovative and sustainable communication for development initiatives and continuously improving them.

Emergence is about "giving up control, letting the system govern itself as much as possible, letting it learn from the footprints" (Johnson 2001, in Patton 2011: 126). This emphasizes the importance of a holistic approach to developing and evaluating initiatives and the significance of *self-organization* for effective social change and development (Chambers 2008; Lacayo 2006; Ramalingam *et al*. 2008).

Component 6: Realistic

There are often unrealistic demands, targets and timeframes for the impact assessment process. Donors often want to see results in an unreasonably short timeframe. We therefore identified a need to take a more realistic, long-term view of the outcomes of communication for development and its evaluation. Evaluation approaches and methods must be grounded in local realities, and based on methodological pluralism. The aim here is to increase the usefulness of evaluation results, which should focus on intended, unintended, expected, unexpected, negative and positive change. Systems and complexity theories can help us to conceptualize, understand, and evaluate complex development interventions in more realistic ways. For the framework, the focus is on the actual process of development and change and the networks of relationships and complex contextual factors that influence people's behavior, actions, emotions, and decision making (Patton 2011: 117–118).

Other principles of this framework component include:

- Evaluation methodologies, methods and tools are as simple, practical, responsive and rigorous as possible, and grounded in local realities.
- Evaluation planning and the selection of methodologies, methods and indicators involve openness, freedom, flexibility and realism – what is achievable is considered.
- Wherever possible, evaluations use a mixed methods approach and triangulation.
- Evaluation processes produce action-oriented knowledge, consensus about further action, and agreed visions of the future.
- Evaluation processes ensure a high level of independence, integrity, and honesty.

Component 7: Learning-based

Evaluation is increasingly seen as an integral component of development initiatives and a means of fostering continuous learning, evaluative thinking and an evaluation culture within organizations. Actively engaging in evaluation can often result in positive changes to an organization, including to its capacity, processes and culture (Horton *et al*. 2003; Patton 2008). This process aims to develop learning organizations by improving organizational evaluation systems and capacities, and contributing to the development of effective policies, strategies and initiatives that address complex development goals.

These wider effects of evaluation are significant, given the identified need for long-term evaluation capacity development at all levels of development organizations (Bamberger 2009; Lennie and Tacchi 2013). The learning-based component aims to facilitate and encourage continuous learning, mutual understanding, empowerment, creative ideas, and thinking, and responsiveness to new ideas and different attitudes, values and knowledge. This helps to develop the wide range of evaluation capacities that are required in this approach, and to create learning organizations. The process is open to negative findings and weaknesses and includes regular critical reflection and ongoing meta-evaluation in order to learn from "failure" and experience.

Implementing the Framework

Effectively implementing the framework requires a receptive organizational and community context and culture. Staff at all levels and relevant stakeholders and community members need to be willing to engage in constant reflection and

learning in order to continually develop and improve organizational systems and communication for development initiatives in ways that meet community, organizational, and stakeholder needs, goals, and visions of the future. The support of management and a commitment to long-term engagement in the evaluation process is particularly important. The framework itself does not specify which methodologies and methods will be appropriate for specific evaluations, but frames an overall approach that can guide the design of evaluation, and the selection of methodologies and methods, taking a critical approach that considers their strengths and limitations.

It may be useful to conduct an evaluability assessment as part of the process of implementing the framework. This assessment helps to identify "whether a programme is in a condition to be evaluated, and whether an evaluation is justified, feasible and likely to provide useful information" (UN Women 2010).

Identifying key stakeholders or boundary partners (Earl, Carden, and Smutylo 2001) is important. These are the people whose active participation is contingent to achieving the changes or outcomes that are sought from the communication for development initiative. It is also important to clarify what key participants and stakeholders (including funders) expect from an evaluation and what its purpose is.

It is important to be realistic about what kinds of outcomes can be expected from communication for development initiatives within certain timeframes. This process should be seen as open to revision as the evaluation proceeds and new learnings emerge that have implications for the focus of the evaluation.

Undertaking scoping research and/or communicative ecology research in selected communities can help build an understanding of the inter-relationships and inter-connections between various groups and organizations involved in the initiative, and the complex contextual factors that can affect outcomes. If conducted in a participatory way, this type of research can also help to generate community interest in and ownership of an evaluation. Processes such as communicative ecology mapping (Tacchi *et al.* 2007) enable participants and evaluators to understand and explore communication systems, patterns and issues in a community and identify barriers to information and communication access among different groups. Effective implementation of the framework also requires the establishment of good communication and feedback systems in order to communicate findings to different stakeholders and enable continuous sharing, discussion and critical reflection on evaluation learnings and outcomes. This process aims to achieve continuous learning and downward, upward and internal accountability. It also requires identifying the most effective and appropriate ways to present results to different stakeholder groups. The implementation process also needs to consider the many factors involved in selecting the most appropriate approaches, methodologies and methods to use. It is important to consider how well the approaches, methodologies and methods selected will engage primary stakeholders and audiences in the evaluation process, and which particular mix of approaches, methodologies and methods will best fit the evaluation outcomes

being sought. Other factors to consider include the flexibility and robustness of the evaluation design, and the time, resources and support available.

Assessing the capacity development and support needs of organizations and key stakeholders involved in the evaluation will help to increase the effectiveness, quality and rigor of the overall evaluation process and the effective utilization of evaluation outcomes. It is also highly beneficial to establish appropriate meta-evaluation processes to enable ongoing critical reflection and review of the effectiveness of the evaluation, and evaluation capacity development strategies.

Current Trends in Development Evaluation

There is growing interest within the development sector in using a broader range of evaluation approaches and methodologies that can more effectively meet the complex challenges and issues that evaluators face with the evaluation of development initiatives (Bamberger, Rao, and Woolcock 2010; Conlin and Stirrat 2008; Stern *et al.* 2012). They include participatory, mixed methods, complexity, systems and theory-based evaluation approaches. This has led to increasing tensions between the dominant, results-based management approach and emerging participatory, learning-based approaches to the evaluation of development interventions (Armytage 2011; Cracknell 2000). Divisive debates have emerged about the "'paradigm war' between positivism and constructivism" that are often centered round the logical framework approach (Armytage 2011: 268).

Current trends in development evaluation signal an interest in holistic and particular understandings of development effectiveness, paying attention to wholes and relationships rather than isolated interventions, and appreciating the need to consider the messiness of contexts with uneven and contradictory outcomes. Systems thinking and complexity theory are increasingly drawn upon, and centrally informed the development of our framework for evaluating communication for development.

Systems thinking is valuable for understanding complex or "wicked" problems such as poverty, gender inequality, HIV/AIDS and domestic violence, and evaluating development activities and programs (Burns 2007; Byrne 2009a, 2009b; Byrne and Vincent 2011; Eyben 2011; Hearn *et al.* 2009; Imam, LaGoy, and Williams 2006; Patton 2008, 2011; Rihani 2002). Complexity theory meanwhile provides a sophisticated, realistic, effective, and sustainable way of conceptualizing, implementing and evaluating development projects and initiatives (Chambers 2008; Jones 2011; Miskelly *et al.* 2009; Papa *et al.* 2006; Ramalingam *et al.* 2008; Rihani 2002; UKCDS 2011). Both of these approaches have significant implications for the ways in which we conceptualize, plan and implement communication for development and their evaluations. In this section we go through some of the aspects of systems thinking and complexity theory that inform the framework, and give brief examples to illustrate their relevance.

Systems Thinking and Relationships

Systems thinking is a very broad field which includes complex adaptive systems, soft systems methodology and systems dynamics (Imam *et al.* 2006; Patton 2011; Rihani 2002). In contrast to linear, reductionist approaches to research and evaluation based on Newtonian thinking which tries to isolate variables and focuses more on "things" (Chambers 2008: 172), a systemic perspective aims to understand the relationships between the different elements in a system and what happens when they interact and combine (Burns 2007: 29). Here, the whole is greater than the parts; the parts are inter-dependent and inter-connected through relationships (Patton 2008). Systems thinking assumes that social dynamics are not always visible through scrutinizing individual interactions because any explanation of a phenomenon cannot point to a single cause and effect (Hearn *et al.* 2009). Positive and negative outcomes have more to do with complex patterning of interrelationships (Burns 2007).

As we have seen, the logical framework approach is based on a substantialist perspective in which the impacts of complex interventions are reduced to simple, linear, cause-effect processes. In contrast, from a relational perspective, individuals are embedded in relational contexts. While some development interventions, such as building bridges or schools, might lend themselves to a substantialist approach and a focus on bounded problems, where there is broad agreement on the nature of the problem and some mutual understanding of the solution, many do not. Here, complexities of history, power and culture must be brought into the frame (Eyben 2011).

The communicative ecology approach (Lennie and Tacchi 2013; Hearn *et al.* 2009), for example, is based on a holistic, systems perspective. This places all modes of communication within a larger system, or ecology, with interrelationships and interdependencies. In order to understand a single communicative action or channel or information flow it is necessary to understand how that action, channel or flow is situated in broader and complex communicative ecologies. The concept of the communicative ecology was developed to avoid a reductionist approach (Eyben 2011) that insists on narrow focus and linear indicators and measures. This involved exploring the appropriateness of qualitative approaches to evaluating ICT for development initiatives. The location of the research was a community multimedia center in Sri Lanka in 2002 (Slater, Tacchi, and Lewis 2002).[2] It was felt that the multimedia center could only be adequately evaluated if it was understood as part of a broader and complex environment. In terms of the communication of information and ideas, this could only be understood in the broader context of all information and communication activities, channels, and flows.

The multimedia centre consisted of a community radio station and an Internet-enabled computer centre. The computer centre was considered to be important as an access point for the massive amount of knowledge already available in 2002 via the World Wide Web. However, literacy levels, knowledge and interest in using computers, English language skills, and physical access to

the center meant that the most effective way to access and share knowledge from the Web was via the radio station. Beyond this, we looked at where people usually turned for information and knowledge, and what differences there were between different ethnic groups, genders and ages. In fact, communicative ecologies' research allowed us to understand the importance of trust and face-to-face communication in the everyday lives of local people. Reaching out to excluded and marginalized communities was a lot more complicated than building a multimedia center (Tacchi and Grubb 2007).

This tells us that in order to understand the potential and real impacts of media and communications in any situation, it is important to place this within a broader understanding of the whole structure of communication and information in people's everyday lives. A communication for development intervention takes place within already existing communicative ecologies, and how communication happens in everyday lives involves a range of media including roads, transport systems along with broadcasting, the press, and telecomms. People's communicative ecologies include face-to-face communication in public and private spheres, and combine a range of different and often conflicting knowledge sources. Understanding which are trusted and relied on when people need to take action is important.

The concept of communicative ecologies can be used to emphasize the importance of understanding any communication activity within a wider under-standing of the diversity, even within single locations, of people's lives, their access and use of communication technologies, and the availability of communication channels. Simple exercises in exploring how information and communication flows – who discusses what with whom, how news and local knowledge circulates – in the Sri Lankan research led to an appreciation of the persistent dominance of face-to-face and very local flows of information and modes of communication.

Sensitivity to contextual factors, organizational norms and societal values is critical in systems-oriented evaluations (Patton 2011: 120). The critical reflection, problem solving and action learning skills that are required in systems approaches are increasingly seen as important to the effective, ongoing evaluation of development initiatives. However, at the same time, organizations that rely on funding from major donors have to contend with managerial and operational systems and processes based on the substantialist mode of thinking. Participatory forms of research and evaluation that take the wider context and inter-relationships into account such as empowerment evaluation, utilization-focused evaluation, ethnographic action research, feminist participatory communication research, and developmental evaluation have been influenced by, or can be seen as fitting well with systems perspectives (Lennie and Tacchi 2013). There are close synergies between action research and systems thinking, with both relying on a holistic and interconnected view of the world (Burns 2007; Greenwood and Levin 2007; Hearn *et al.* 2009; Imam *et al.* 2006; Wadsworth 2010).

A systems perspective provides a valuable lens through which to understand the complex process of development and social change, helping us conceptualize

development interventions realistically, to clarify messy solutions to complex social problems, and improve mutual understanding and relationships among a diversity of stakeholders (Imam *et al.* 2006; Miskelly *et al.* 2009; Ramalingam *et al.* 2008; Rihani 2002). As illustration, the concept of communicative ecologies takes a holistic approach, but understands that different perspectives within the same social groupings can produce different understandings because of differential social status, levels of access and engagement, and power. This encourages a focus on, and respect for, the complex interrelationships within the local social and cultural context in which people live and the way "each media initiative, event, and relationships will change and shift the power relations at both an individual and community level" (Hearn *et al.* 2009: 33).

Complexity Theory and Contexts

Interest in complexity theory has grown rapidly in recent times. Indeed, Guijt *et al.* (2011: 13) suggest that it has become the latest "buzzword" in the international development field. Development practitioners are increasingly questioning the dominance of top-down evaluation approaches based on simplistic, cause–effect models of development and change and associated "managerial," "results-based" methodologies which are increasingly imposed on development initiatives, often in inappropriate ways (see http://bigpushforward.net; Chambers 2008; Jones 2011; UKCDS 2011). The paradigm of complexity presents a major challenge to dominant approaches to development planning and evaluation that are based on linear, highly predictable systems, a sense of order and control over long-term events, top-down management, and assumptions of replicability (Rihani 2002). It is not a single theory but the study of complex adaptive social systems, patterns of relationships, and how they change or remain the same. It debunks substantialist approaches to evaluation and, instead, privileges self-evolving and adaptive approaches (Papa *et al.* 2006).

The recent application of complexity theory to development and social change can be linked to the global interest in a range of alternative holistic, critical, feminist and postmodern perspectives, and participative and creative ways of fostering development and social and organizational change (Lennie and Tacchi 2013; Stevenson and Lennie 1995). Complexity theory demands a broad and open-minded approach. It implies methodological pluralism, important for flexible and adaptive or responsive evaluation practice (Midgley 2006: 26), and is essential in the evaluation of complex development interventions. Rihani (2002) argues that development and its underlying political, social and economic processes behave as complex, adaptive systems. Key complexity theory concepts are outlined by Lacayo (2007), Patton (2011), Ramalingam *et al.* (2008) and Rihani (2002).

Systems and complexity theories have been used to understand complex interactions between people and organizations in a wide diversity of systems including agricultural extension, preventive health organizations and international development (Lacayo 2006; Ramalingam *et al.* 2008; Rihani 2002). The application of complexity theory to international development provides a realistic view of our world that can help us develop appropriate strategies for change. It improves our understanding of complex problems and gives us concepts and ideas that bring together old and new insights to develop new theories of change and greater appreciation of underlying processes (Jones 2011: viii). Its value is in providing a way of thinking about human relations that can help us form realistic and holistic understandings, which, in turn, can lead to effective action – it makes us think about the way we are thinking (Burns 2007; Ramalingam *et al.* 2008).

Further Development and Application of the Framework

There are clearly many challenges, issues, tensions and contradictions in successfully implementing this framework, given the current dominance of the results-based management approach. A key challenge is to find ways to implement this approach, while at the same time meeting current donor requirements for upward accountability and evidence of impact. However, we believe that implementing the framework can help to bridge the gap between various ideas, theories, concepts and practices that can be usefully incorporated into the evaluation of communication for development. It advocates a mixed methods approach that strengthens evaluation outcomes by enabling a diversity of perspectives and different forms of data and information (including creative and visual forms of data) to be included in an evaluation. As we have noted, this approach is increasingly recognized as important to effective development evaluation.

Other strategies that can help to address these challenges include:

- *Drawing on and better valuing the contributions of feminist and gender-sensitive approaches*   For example, Newton (2011) has proposed a range of practical and innovative evaluation approaches that provide valuable strategies for undertaking the type of gender-oriented evaluation that our framework advocates.
- *Demystifying and valuing participatory evaluation*   This requires actively promoting the many benefits of participatory evaluation, and encouraging participants to think in an evaluative way. Including a diversity of people in an evaluation forces us to pay attention to the appropriateness of the language used, and the perceived value and relevance of participation and evaluation to various groups (Lennie 2005: 410).

- *Using creative and innovative approaches, methodologies and methods*   We advocate the use of innovative research and evaluation approaches such as ethnographic action research, and creative methods such as digital storytelling as a means of visualizing or expressing important relationships, needs, problems and solutions at the community level. These methods can powerfully drive home messages to key stakeholders and donors about important development and social change issues identified by community members. They can also demonstrate the value of these approaches, including their ability to give a voice to largely excluded people and their capacity building benefits.
- *Incorporating meta-evaluation into initiatives*   Our research has demonstrated the value of using meta-evaluation to develop new approaches to evaluation, identify challenges and issues, and develop and share valuable learnings. Meta-evaluation can also be an important means of improving the quality of evaluations and increasing organizational learning and the utilization of evaluation results (Lennie *et al.* 2012).
- *Using online communities and networks*   Online networks, communities of practice and knowledge networks and hubs are a valuable means of connecting people in this field, who are interested in using new approaches to researching and evaluating communication for development and social change. We plan to use such initiatives to promote the framework, as well as to undertake proposed future research that will involve forming international linkages and collaborations, and enhancing ongoing capacity development in this area. Such strategies can also help to identify good examples of how various development agencies, NGOs and others are experimenting with new approaches to impact evaluation and redefining concepts such as accountability and learning.

Achieving change toward the approach we have advocated in this chapter will require collaboration and cooperation between of a wide range of stakeholders, including development agencies, NGOs, academics, consultants and practitioners, to reach mutual understanding and agreement on more appropriate and effective ways of evaluating communication for development. This would entail integrating complementary evaluation approaches with results-based and upward accountability approaches in order to develop a new paradigm that moves beyond the dichotomies and divisions that have hindered progress in this field.

In Conclusion

Communication for development proponents recognize that "without peoples' participation, no project can be successful and last long enough to support social change" (Gumucio-Dagron 2008: 70). Community participation in planning, decision-making, evaluation and implementation of communication for development,

along with community ownership, are crucial for sustainability (Baulch 2008; Jallov 2012; Quarry and Ramirez 2009). Servaes *et al*. (2012: 102) suggest that "communication and information play a strategic and fundamental role" in sustainable development, arguing that a focus on culture and participation is crucial for sustainability. Tacchi (2009) shows how communication for development can provide a "mechanism" for participation, and thus greater chance of sustainability, in development.

Participatory approaches that promote dialogue and engagement are often seen as costly, time consuming, and difficult to accommodate in well-defined plans and logframes (Balit 2010). Our framework insists that effective communication and participation is a central and vital component. While greater time and resources are often required to use participatory evaluation approaches and methodologies effectively, our framework takes the position that a critical, long-term view of the value of participatory approaches is required. Evaluation needs to be seen as an integral part of development initiatives and a means of fostering continuous learning, evaluative thinking and a culture of evaluation within organizations and communities. Local capacities for undertaking evaluation need to be developed. At the same time, it is important to be realistic, and to understand that, in practice, idealized notions of participation including and empowering everyone are not possible, and to think in terms of what Cornwall (2008: 276) calls "*optimum* participation: getting the balance between depth and inclusion right for the purpose at hand." It is also important to recognize that participatory processes can serve to exclude people unless special efforts are made to include them (Tacchi and Grubb 2007; Lennie 2005), and that some people strategically or deliberately exclude themselves (Cornwall 2008: 279).

The framework promotes holistic, learning-based evaluation capacity development approaches, to develop learning organizations and communities. Learning organizations engage in constant reflection in order to continually develop and improve organizational systems and development activities in ways that meet community and stakeholder needs and goals, and their visions of the future (Raeside 2011). The process of engaging in well-designed and implemented participatory research and evaluation can have significant effects in terms of the empowerment and capacity development of participants and stakeholders. It is important to critically consider issues of gender, power and knowledge to increase the effectiveness of these processes and the inclusion of disadvantaged groups. Creating sustainable communication for development that facilitates the engagement of disadvantaged groups such as poor people can be complex and time consuming. Baulch (2008) clearly demonstrates this in relation to the sustainability of community-based ICT centers in Indonesia. As Jallov (2012: 29) notes: "Sustainability is multi-faceted and complex." No participatory evaluation will be perfect (Newman 2008), but participatory approaches to the evaluation of communication for development will lead to improved and sustainable development initiatives and better long-term outcomes in terms of development and social change.

Notes

1   The development of our framework was informed by a number of research projects funded by a range of sources. As well as those specifically mentioned in this chapter, they included Finding a Voice, supported by the Australian Research Council (ARC), UNESCO, and UNDP; Assessing Communication for Social Change, supported by ARC, Equal Access, and USAID; and the development of a resource pack for research, monitoring, and evaluation of communication for development, supported by a UN Inter-Agency Group and led by UNICEF. Details of these projects can be found in Lennie and Tacchi (2013).
2   This research project was funded by DFID and supported by UNESCO.

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Emerging Issues in Strategic Communication for Development and Social Change

Rafael Obregon

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the field of communication for development entered into a new phase of conceptual and theoretical debates, which had significant implications both for its academic and intellectual growth, and for its praxis. Academics and researchers debated about the need to re-energize participatory approaches, while taking distance from prescriptive and strategic approaches that had become so dominant in the field throughout the 1980s and 1990s, mainly fuelled by the financial muscle and influence of international development organizations that often pushed vertical approaches to communication for development.

A second debate focused on whether the field had to move beyond the concept of communication for development, raising concerns with development being closely associated with agendas defined by international agencies and governments, often with limited inputs by and engagement of communities and civil society organizations (CSOs). There was an increasing push for a broader emphasis on communication for social change (Deane and Grey-Felder 1999) as an imperative to move toward recognizing (1) that processes of change are a recurrent and permanent feature of societies, and (2) that communication plays an intrinsic role in those processes. The core argument of this perspective was that the decision to change, the type of change needed, and the process for that change had to be defined by communities themselves, and that, therefore, communication was central to facilitating that process. In other words, the role of communication had to shift from persuasion to facilitation. Critical perspectives also emerged in areas such as HIV/AIDS, wherein the role of communication was seen as intrinsic to

facilitating change across multiple determinants as opposed to an almost exclusive emphasis on changing individual behaviors for HIV prevention (Airhihenbuwa, Makinwa, and Obregon 2000).

There is no question that those debates contributed to a significant rethinking of the field and that they created opportunities for engagement in global and regional exchanges (e.g., Deane 2001; UN Communication for Development Roundtable 2001). As with most academic debates, the communication for development field benefited from these discussions as it provided a platform for new ideas and directions. Increasingly, in the 2000s, researchers and scholars in the communication for development field, and in subfields such as health communication, began to argue that while these were useful debates, such dichotomies were rather artificial. The practice of communication for development showed that there was an increasing convergence of approaches that drew upon both participatory and strategic approaches (Singhal and Stapithanonda 1996; Waisbord 2001; Morris 2003). In a review of participatory and diffusion approaches in communication for development, Morris (2003) concludes that there is tremendous cross-pollination and integration of both approaches. Likewise, while it is true that social change is intrinsic to any society, development work remains critically important across the world and communication continues to play a central role in it.

This section of the handbook attempts to capture recent conceptualizations of this convergent thinking in the field, as well as trends in participatory and strategic approaches to communication for development. While the authors who have contributed to this section implicitly or explicitly recognize that these tensions still remain in place, it is also clear that it is not a matter of either/or. Instead, what ultimately defines the role that communication plays in each case is (1) the context of the development or social change processes practitioners or researchers are immersed in, and (2) the types of questions or issues that researchers attempt to answer or address (Obregon and Waisbord 2012). Thus, what are the emerging issues in this section of the handbook?

Rethinking Old Tensions in the Field

The highly interdisciplinary nature of communication for development, which for the purpose of this discussion subsumes media, has been historically the source of conceptual and theoretical tensions about the role of communication in development and social change processes, some of which have been discussed above. While several authors and scholars have deemed this divide rather unnecessary, three chapters in this section re-examine this issue and provide powerful arguments to further our thinking toward a convergent perspective.

In his chapter "The strategic politics of participatory communication," Silvio Waisbord writes a provocative piece about the need to examine more closely the

role of strategic communication in communication for development and social change, with a particular focus on participatory approaches. Waisbord argues that the political dimension of many, if not all, development issues requires strategic communication approaches to facilitate collective action and mobilization that can, for instance, more effectively address the roots of discrimination or inequity. Waisbord underscores the need to bridge the gap between strategic and participatory approaches and calls for an effort to bring these two perspectives together as a means to strengthen the field of communication for development.

One of the most significant changes in the praxis of communication for development has been its shift toward the role of communication to address broader social determinants of development. McKee, Becker-Benton, and Bockh provide a detailed account of the application a socioecological model to guide communication for development strategies and campaigns with a particular focus on health. In many ways, this chapter captures the key principles that guide strategic communication for development campaigns today: research and theory-driven, systematic, and with a strong monitoring and evaluation component that assesses contribution to development-related outcomes. The use of a socioecological model to guide communication for development strategies and campaigns provides a very useful conceptual model that also allows for the integration of multiple theoretical perspectives. This chapter also contributes to the convergent nature of communication for development practice as it integrates strategic and participatory dimensions.

James Deane's chapter on media development examines another long-standing tension in the communication for development field. How do media development efforts and approaches fit within communication for development practice? Deane provides a substantive overview of the various dimensions of media development and of emerging trends in this area, while placing them within the larger communication for development field. Deane's attempt at developing a taxonomy of how media approaches, particularly those that focus on strengthening the media sector for broader participation, the role of journalists, and other aspects of media in development, is extremely helpful. The profound changes in the media sector provide new opportunities for greater integration of media development into communication for development.

Rethinking Storytelling for Empowerment and Social Change

The use of storytelling and entertainment formats has been a mainstay of communication for development and social change for decades, even before the communication for development field was "formally" born. Yet, over the past decades development programs seem to have coopted storytelling formats and

approaches to be used in a rather vertical and unidirectional way that focuses primarily on conveying critical information to achieve predefined development outcomes, with a lesser focus on facilitating opportunities for consciousness raising, empowerment and engagement of the audience, which guided the work interventions framed under Freirean approaches to communication.

In their respective chapters, Winskell and Enger, Kerr, and Obregon and Tufte discuss how storytelling and entertainment approaches have been or are used in ways that privilege notions of subject, agency, and empowerment that can lead to changes on a range of individual and social determinants, as opposed to a primary focus on persuasion to raise awareness or change behaviors regardless of context and structure. In essence, these authors argue for the need to revisit how interventions that rely on entertainment or storytelling approaches view their relationship with the audience. This idea is not new, having been discussed by several authors (e.g., Tufte 2005). However, the chapters by Winskell and Enger, Kerr, and Obregon and Tufte bring a renewed emphasis on the importance of using these approaches in an entirely different way, and particularly with a greater focus on the politics of change and the participation of subjects. These chapters clearly question the dominant way through which these approaches, for the most part, have been and continue to be used in development programs to date.

Broadening the Frontiers of Communication for Development and Social Change

Arguably, the history of communication for development and social change has been strongly linked to the agriculture and health sectors. In the early years of communication for development it placed great emphasis on the provision of critical information to farmers for improved yields, or to the public for prevention of disease. Moreover, in the past 20 years the field of public health has influenced greatly research and practice in the communication for development field worldwide. While this trend has, undoubtedly, brought conceptual and theoretical growth to the communication for development field, it has, in some ways, overshadowed similar growth in other development areas in which communication plays an equally critical role. This is not to say that communication is not used in other development sectors; instead the role of communication is often not defined from a communication for development angle, which contributes to conceptual fragmentation and, at times, confusion. Ana Fernández Viso discusses the distant relationship between communication for development and studies of communication in conflict resolution and peace building, although, as she effectively articulates, communication is at the heart of conflict resolution and peace building. Fernández Viso provides a rich discussion in which she clearly outlines the intrinsic role of communication in conflict resolution and peace building, and provides examples

of how communication for development has contributed to this area of work. Yet, Fernández Viso also compellingly makes the case about the lack of a consistent body of knowledge or literature that adequately places communication for development within the conflict resolution and peace building arena.

Emile McAnany introduces one element that has been barely studied in communication for development. The role of economics in the communication for development field emerges as a very attractive possibility toward broadening the scope of the field. The reality of it is that many CSOs have often included income generation and finance mechanism components in their work; however, very little attention has been paid to this approach in the academic literature in communication for development. Through his focus on social entrepreneurship, McAnany brings to our attention the need to explore this dimension more seriously. Can we make social entrepreneurship an integral component of communication for development? When is it viable? In the current sociopolitical environments many development programs operate in contexts where the majority of the population comprises youth and others whose opportunities are dependent upon some form of income generation, and interventions that focus on gender inequality issues also view income generation as an empowering factor for women. An increasing focus of communication for development on social entrepreneurship is absolutely critical as it has tremendous implications for empowerment and ownership. Moreover, the inclusion of social entrepreneurship would provide communication for development programs with the opportunity to address social determinants more broadly.

Evaluating Communication for Development from a Complexity Perspective

Arguably, one of the significant shifts in the praxis of communication for development in the past 20 years has been an increasing focus on demonstrating the impact and/ or contribution of communication to development outcomes and social change. No one denies the importance of communication in either case; however, when it comes to investments in critical development priorities communication often faces great challenges. This issue has become even more complex in today's international development environment. Some of the questions raised by donors and governments no longer remain associated with measurements that are intrinsic to communication or media interventions such as exposure and reach, but the questions asked have a greater focus on the extent to which there is a correlation between communication interventions and intermediate outcomes, and eventually development outcomes. Process of indicators of change, which are central to issues of empowerment and citizenship, as important as they are, often do not suffice. Attention to accountability guides this interest in solid and informative evaluations.

Several authors have addressed these questions through systematic reviews that focus on the strength of existing evidence of communication's contribution to change, particularly in the public health field. Wakefield, Schneider, and Hornik (2010) conducted a systematic review on media and behavior change in which they conclude that there is substantial evidence in some public health areas about the impact of mass media-driven campaigns. Organizations such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) have embarked on systematic reviews to examine what evidence exists on the role of communication in facilitating social and behavior change.

While it may be argued that there is increasing documented evidence of the contribution of communication to social and behavior change, one area that remains elusive is what and how participatory evaluation approaches add value to understanding processes of change in development. Tacchi and Lennie tackle this question by introducing a framework that provides clear guidance on the conceptual and operational principles of such evaluations. Tacchi and Lennie also add to their discussion the issue of complexity, which could be a turning point for the field. Hardly anyone would argue that development and change are not unidimensional issues; they are multidimensional by nature, defined not only by the specific characteristics of a development sector or a social issue, but also by context, politics, and many other factors. While evaluation approaches that focus on isolating cause–effect relationships are necessary to evaluate development interventions, they do not provide all of the answers. A key question is how we might evaluate programs that draw on approaches that recognize the complexity of development and social change. Tacchi and Lennie attempt to address this question here on the basis of a clear conceptual framework derived from complexity science, an approach that should receive increasing attention in the next few years.

What these chapters reveal is the dynamic nature of the communication for development field both in its conceptual refinement and practice. In addition, the convergent nature of participatory and strategic approaches is evident, which provides an opportunity for a stronger and more effective use of communication for development strategies and tactics. The increasing focus on research, theory, and evidence also constitutes a turning point for the field, which has contributed to its centrality in the development sector. The theoretical, conceptual and applied richness of the communication for development field is likely to continue over the years. Contributions to this section of the handbook provide important directions and questions for such growth.

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Part III

Activist Approaches for Development and Social Change

20

Social Movement Media in the Process of Constructive Social Change

John D.H. Downing

The focus of this chapter is on what some in our digital media era have termed "the Long Tail" of media (Anderson 2008; cf. also National Alliance for Media Arts and Culture 2004); in other words, small-scale media projects, typically operating on low to no budget. In a study of media uses in educational contexts Wilbur Schramm wrote of "little media," but focusing strictly on their technological scale (Schramm 1977). An obvious example of "little media" at that time would have been a classroom projector for still photo slides or transparencies. However, Mojca Pajnik (of the Peace Research Institute in Ljubljana) and I have suggested calling the far wider spectrum of such media "nano-media" (Pajnik and Downing 2008: 7–16), thereby categorizing this mediatic zone by institutional rather than technological scale.

Our aim in proposing the term was principally argumentative. We aimed to shake media researchers free – once they paused to consider the enormous impact of nanotechnologies in our contemporary world – free from their typical obsession with the power of highly visible macromedia such as News Corp., Sony, Bertelsmann, Publicis, China Telecom, and Apple. Nanotechnologies are invisible to the naked eye, so by the visibility criterion would have to be deemed to be collectively irrelevant and powerless. Such is not the case, clearly, and nor is it the case with nano-media.

Nano-media need to be understood both anthropologically and historically. This means stretching our vision beyond more technologically complex media such as print, broadcasting, cinema, the Internet and smartphones, and engaging also with many forms of communicative media such as bodies (as speaking, shouting, percussive, singing, and dancing communication instruments), and thus

also with popular song, dance, street theater, satire, tattoos, graffiti, murals, dress. Not to forget, moreover, painting, sculpture, and other art media.

Historically, nano-media did not begin with cell phones, Twitter, and Facebook. Notwithstanding the glib assumptions of numerous commentators who seized upon media uses in the 2009 uprisings in Iran and then in 2011 in the Arab region as evidence of a brave new nano-media world that could bring repressive regimes to their knees, these media forms are not yesterday's invention. They include the flyers (*Flugblätter*) of the Protestant Reformation in Germany; the jokes, songs, and ribaldry of François Rabelais' marketplace; the revolutionary pamphlets of the English Civil War of the mid-1600s, and of the American and French revolutions; the books, pamphlets, and cartoons of the nineteenth century anti-slavery and women's suffrage movements; the diapers worn by the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires, challenging the Argentinean military's seizure and disappearance of their children; the dance performances of Indian artist Mallika Sarabhai against Hindu–Muslim communalism; the street theater of Augusto Boal; the anarchist, socialist, and Marxist posters in Spain and Catalunya up to 1939; the street *toyi-toyi* dance challenging apartheid in South Africa; the *samizdat* and *magnitizdat* underground media in the former Soviet Union; the Internet links of the global social justice (*altermondialiste*) movement; the worldwide community radio movement; and the political documentary movement in country after country.

Nano-media also present a challenge to the influential division of labor on university campuses. Their study demands that we break down the university-derived categorizations which split up communication, the arts, and education into almost watertight spheres and hence push researchers into mutually uninformed communities of "knowledge." Latin Americans have been a major outlier in this regard, with significant attention to nano-media as regards practice (e.g., Downing 2010: entries on Latin America), but also as regards theory. The work of Paulo Freire on education and literacy practice in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Freire 2000) and many other works, and of his fellow-Brazilian Augusto Boal in *Theatre of the Oppressed* (Boal (2008) and his other texts on theater for social change, have inspired generations of Latin Americans inside and outside Brazil. These two authors' ostensible focus on education or theater has never stood in the way of media activists, who intuitively brushed aside the sclerotic university division of labor and applied Freire's and Boal's concepts to forming and shaping nano-media projects.

The distinctive quality of both writers was not simply their joint focus on enabling the downtrodden to write and read, or to put on short plays and sketches. It is particularly found in their joint attention to the importance of opening up voices, of drawing out and upon the cultural capital of the downtrodden, in a *process* of collective self-empowerment well described for some media projects by Huesca (1995) and Rodríguez (2001). It is also found in their disinterest in the supposed requirement for significant finance to organize literacy programs or theatrical performances, spurring the budget-less to create what they have in them with the resources they already have. The essence of Freire's and Boal's approach

was to evade the hegemonic monologue of the powerful and to stimulate dialogue among the powerless. This fundamental argument carried enormous sway among social activists in and beyond Latin America, and indeed implied an important critique of the hierarchical Leninist model of social justice media which was rather influential for a while in the 1960s and 1970s in Latin American (and other) revolutionary movements (Simpson Grinberg 1986a, 1986b). Freire and Boal would have been the first to recognize, too, that their ideas grew out of the experience of democratic communication practices in the 1960s and 1970s Latin American context, all too often in the teeth of military dictatorships.

Taking all these considerations together means we have to acknowledge macro-media and nano-media as symbiotic, imbricated worlds, not as an absolute, mutually repelling binary. The Amazon river at one point in its mighty flow resembles this relationship, namely the confluence of the Rio Negro and Rio Solimões just east of Manaus, where the warmer, black-water Negro runs faster than the colder and slower creamy-muddy Solimões. Both bodies of water travel separately for a number of kilometers – there are visible differences – but soon enough both rivers mesh.

Until the beginning of the 2000s, nano-media projects – most often small scale, often ephemeral, almost always underfunded or entirely unfunded – were basically under the radar of conventional media research, outside of Latin America (Gerace Larufa 1973; Simpson Grinberg 1986a, 1986b; O'Connor 2004). They were too messy, too pathetic in comparison to mogul media, and altogether too "nano" to be worth spending precious research energy on. The commentocracy would occasionally nod in their direction and then move on to what they saw as greener pastures.

That scenario has changed quite noticeably, with the publication of more and more research studies in this area, many of them of book-length, and with the emergence of an annual international conference dedicated to such media, the OurMedia/NuestrosMedios conference, which to date has met in the USA, Spain, Colombia (twice), Brazil, India, Australia and Ghana. With the advent in the mid-2000s of the so-called "social networking" and microvideo sites such as YouTube, MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, and the rest, followed by the upheavals throughout the Middle Eastern region from 2009 onwards, to sweep airily past this zone of media has finally ceased to be plausible.

The scenario I have just sketched concerning slow public recognition of the *significance* of nano-media – not of their mere existence – has been typical of Europe and the USA, indeed of the global North at large. However, the Latin American analyses, both those already cited and those more recent (e.g. Gumucio-Dagron 2001; Vitelli and Rodríguez Esperón 2004; Herrera-Miller 2006; Rodríguez 2011), point us in a particular direction, namely away from the generic "nano-media" term that Pajnik and I put forward to characterize the entire and immense continent of such projects and initiatives. Rather, they point us toward a subset of nano-media (extremely large in its own right), namely those framed to advance social justice and also, broadly speaking, democratic in their forms of organization.

These are the subset of nano-media, which in earlier work I have characterized as "radical" media (Downing 2001), having had no intention of engaging with the full spectrum of nano-media.

It is appropriate therefore to try now to clear the conceptual ground, given the considerable number of terms for nano-media which are also out there. These have variously included alternative media, horizontal media, citizens' media, tactical media, independent media, counter-information media, participatory media, and Third Sector media. Each of these terms carries its pluses and minuses; often their meanings overlap. I shall now review a number of them, concluding in more detail on three further terms: "community media"; "networked media"; and "social movement media." The diversity of terms partly reflects the sheer diversity of this media continent, and is not simply an index, as Alfonso Gumucio-Dagron (2004) provocatively but fairly suggested, of academics' propensity for endless debate over definitions to the point of generating political inertia.

A Multiplicity of Terms

Probably the commonest term is "alternative" media, though from one perspective it is a completely vapid designation, since everything is alternative to something. Yet from Chris Atton's angle of vision, the term's very diffuseness encourages us to acknowledge how everyday cultural practice is suffused with an extraordinary variety of self-produced media forms (Atton 2001). Until recently, as noted above, this multitude of expressive forms has largely escaped the attention of media researchers and anthropologists alike. Thus, although Atton in this and a later study (Atton and Hamilton 2008) develops interesting arguments concerning the specifics of alternative journalism and how they throw into question the shibboleths of conventional professional journalism's truth-claims, he is more concerned to draw attention to this broad cultural phenomenon in its own right than necessarily to develop any further overall taxonomy of this area. On that level, Pajnik's and my term "nano-media" pursues the same goal, albeit focusing on institutional size rather than ebullient diversity of cultural expression.

Many of the other terms used do not aim at such completeness. "Horizontal" media is a term which was in quite intensive use in Latin America in the 1970s (Gerace Larufa 1973) and then suffered a period of neglect, only to be resurrected in the 2000s by people focused on then-novel forms of digital networking media. These latter voices notably included the activist ethnographer Jeffrey Juris (Juris 2008), to whom we will return below in the discussion of networking media, but also some voices associated with initiatives in "citizen journalism" (Rosen 2011). It was a term which in its beginnings owed much to the vigorous social justice movements in Latin America, where in particular the independent miners" radio stations of Bolivia were a beacon example of self-managed social movement media

(Huesca 1995; Gumucio-Dagron 2010). Thus the "horizontal media" term is more politically delimited than the term "alternative media," zeroing in on the potential of media for *lateral* communication within and between publics as opposed to from on high – or even from below upwards.

"Citizens' media" for Clemencia Rodríguez – also deeply influenced by Latin American traditions of politically committed research – is a term that acknowledges the force field of *cultural* citizenship (Rodríguez 2001), and seeks to establish the signal contributions of media projects generated by ordinary citizens. Rejecting notions of media power, which presume it to be only significant when enacted on a giant scale, Rodríguez emphatically valorizes local, small-scale media projects, even though they may be virtually invisible from the bourgeois sky. She energetically rejects the assumption that citizens' media can be usefully evaluated by the conventions deployed to evaluate the impact or organizational forms of macromedia. In a further study, she identified microsteps through which, in a region of Colombia ravaged by armed violence and the consequent poison of suspicion, antagonism and fear, small community radio stations contributed over time to slowly rebuilding constructive ties (Rodríguez 2011). As she would readily agree, however, in the era of mass refugee movements and undocumented labor migration, the word "citizen," as applied to media, has to be explicitly stripped of its legal connotation. Consequently, the implication of her approach is that smaller, local social movements also seem to have to be evaluated by national or even transnational impact, if they are to be accorded significance. Yet they have irreducible validity in their own right.

"Tactical media" is a term favored by Internet activist and writer Geert Lovink (2002: 268), even though his explanation of the term appears almost an anti-definition:

> [tactical media is] a deliberately slippery term, a tool for creating "temporary consensus zones" based on unexpected alliances … hackers, artists, critics, journalists and activists … Tactical media retain mobility and velocity. (2002: 268)

It is not always completely clear what he means by "zones" and "media," but in general he seems to have in mind multimedia "happenings" rather than media technologies or organizations as such. In situations then where the "post-modernity" concept has genuine analytical traction, "tactical media" is no doubt a viable term, moving and grooving in sync with Hakim Bey's notion of "temporary autonomous zones" (Bey 1991). However, hopefully without horrifying readers by arguing that post-modern Amsterdam with its Social-Democratic cultural bureaucracy may not be the twenty-first century's Zeitgeist in its entirety, Lovink's term does risk losing traction the further one moves away from that part of the world. And when does "tactical" become *merely* slippery?

"Independent media" is the term favored by Herman and Chomsky (2002) in order to denote non-corporate, non-state, non-religious news media. The term

has a primarily rhetorical motivation, namely to dispute the prevailing ideology that *news* media in liberal capitalist polities, especially the USA, enjoy total freedom and independence. So far so good; yet the implicit news bias in Herman and Chomsky's use of the propaganda model – indeed its tendency to focus especially on US foreign news – forecloses on a whole array of grass-roots media and cultural expression which have nothing directly to do with news or journalism. Arguably the specified focus of Herman and Chomsky's model also provides its strength – it does not purport to be a theory of all media everywhere, or of entertainment media – but "independent" begs more questions than it answers when applied to what I have called above "social justice media."

"Counter-information media," originating with the late Pio Baldelli (1977), but still very much current (Vitelli and Rodríguez Esperón 2004), is also a term framed predominantly within the journalism arena, with "information" used as a synonym for "news." Undoubtedly, the mission to fill in the gaps and distortions in hegemonic news sources is an important one, as mainstream war, labor, and environmental news coverage repeatedly demonstrates. Yet if social justice is the goal, we need much more still than punch-for-punch counter-information, and much more too than an information strategy whose agenda is dictated by the need to respond, rather than radically reframe. To be sure, some counter-information projects do also seek radically to reframe the issues in the course of denouncing specifics – but the term "counter-information" does not automatically evoke this larger mission. Nor does it help evade the all-too-frequent avoidance of emotion-based and imagination-based communication, leaving social justice to be an affair of the head alone. The one frequent exception to this rule – coverage of police and state brutality, a commonplace of radical news – is necessary, but too often serves as the *only* gesture in the direction of imagination and emotion, appealing to outrage, and perhaps then too easily to fear, rather than political vision.

"Participatory media" is a term used intensively in Global South development projects, and in its original design meant that people affected by these projects should have an active role in framing them and subsequently evaluating their progress (Mefalopulos 2003; Wilkins 2010). To some degree this term too owes an original debt to Freire. The strategy prioritized the ways in which communication media of all kinds should be deployed to these ends, in other words the dead reverse of top-down communication strategies. Habits die harder than rhetoric, however, and in practice the term "participatory" has mostly become an empty buzzword batted to and fro among development administrators in their Request For Proposal announcements. Carpentier (2011) has skillfully and thoroughly examined the uses of "participation" in discourses of democracy, media, the arts, development, and spatial planning. He makes clear how in practice the term's meaning is highly unstable, notwithstanding its implicit promise of empowerment and democracy. And let us not duck the difficulties: Rodríguez (2011) confesses how in the process of studying peace media in Colombia's armed conflict zones, she was compelled, against her most basic

assumptions, to acknowledge the irreplaceable role of certain individual leaders in the operation of community radio stations.

"Third Sector media," denoting media in the voluntary social action sphere, is a term sometimes used in European discussions and even further afield. It is implied, though not actually used, in the European Parliament's report *Community Media In Europe* (European Parliament 2008). It is a policy-based term a little like "alternative media," that is, primarily if inadvertently defining these media as what they are not, in other words as that part of the media spectrum not funded by business, government, or a major institution (e.g., Vatican Radio). It is thus a convenient term for media policy debate, but offers little or nothing by way of conceptual traction.

At this point, we might again be inclined to agree with Bolivian videomaker, author, poet, film historian, and media activist Alfonso Gumucio-Dagron (2004) in his cry of despair at the iron determination among academics to produce absolute definitions of social realities – definitions to which those resistant realities are then required to conform, and which then become the center of attention in academic debate rather than urgent needs and inventive experiments at the grass-roots level. We do indeed need to acknowledge a further basic truth noted earlier, that defining these media is certain to be far more difficult than defining mainstream media, whose formats, genres and organizational structures are really quite commonplace in comparison. It should not surprise us then that the definitions that I have just skated through overlap at points, and are always lacking at some point. It is a direct reaction to these anthropologically polymorphous media forms.

One thing at least is clear: so far only the terms "alternative media" and "nano-media" seek to encompass this media continent in its entirety. All the others focus on one or other subset of the zone, and even then, on one particular facet, such as citizen empowerment, tactical mobility, counter-news, or participatory involvement. Do the terms "community media," "networked media," and/or "social movement media" bring more clarity or multidimensionality?

"Community" media

The term "community" carries different senses in different localities and contexts. Urban planners have used it to refer to "participatory" community consultations, which often meant the planners would subject themselves to the ritual ordeal of being angrily shouted at in one or more public meetings, before going ahead and reconstructing the neighborhood according to their original plans. It has been used as a way to invoke the shock and dismay of a supposed "international community" in order to denounce some monstrous terrorist attack – never mind that this very international "community" was often composed at least partly of a number of countries at war with each other, or close to it, or recently having negotiated a ceasefire. A "gated community" signifies a group of rich people

voluntarily enclosed in their own prison walls in order not to mix with the wider "community" around them. To take a step further, in India the word "communal" alludes to antagonism between Hindus and Muslims.

We need, then, to be cautious with this word "community," which can be used in such varied ways in English. In Spanish, *comunidad/comunitario* often imply a working-class locality, whereas in Italian, migrant workers and refugees are often referred to as *extracomunitari*, positioning them outside – and implicitly against – an imagined national or European community. In French, *communauté* can denote a commune, joint marital ownership or the former European Economic Community, although German's *Gemeinde* and Russian's *obshchestvo* are not so overloaded. It is certainly the case that actual locally defined communities very frequently have internal tensions of class, of "race," of religion, of language, of generation, and not least of gender. Everything is rarely rosy in the community garden.

On the other hand, when speaking of media, "community media" is one of the commonest terms to denote local radio and television, local newspapers and weeklies, telecenters, and public access video facilities. The irreplaceability of locality is precisely what we saw emphasized in Rodríguez's term "citizens' media." The *radio comunitaria* movement is extremely strong in Latin America, in a number of European countries, in Canada and Australia, and is taking wing in India. In Uruguay there is actually legislation in place now that guarantees the rights of community radio stations and provides support for them. The European Union's new "Third Sector" policy also provides a defined legal status for community media.

This provides an important contrast to their status in a number of other Latin American nations, where their undefined legal position means they are frequently threatened with closure. Brazil is estimated to have 10,000, maybe 15,000, community radio stations, but only a few hundred legal ones. And again, it is important to look beneath the surface. In Bolivia, the long-running miners' stations, with a fierce tradition of independence, have been largely bypassed in favor of new stations with new equipment donated from Venezuela, and tightly harnessed to the Morales administration's priorities and preferences (Herrera-Miller 2006). On paper the legal position of community radio stations in Venezuela itself is extremely strong, but in practice the Chávez administration maintains quite close control over them and deploys them where possible as his media weapon against the conservative media monopolists who represent the historically entrenched elite (Madriz 2010).

So – once again – do we need to be cautious when we see the word "community"?

Numerous researchers, such as the Australian Ellie Rennie (2006), the Danish researchers Per Jauert and the late Ole Prehn, and the Dutch/American Nick Jankowski (1993), the American Kevin Howley (2005, 2009), the Irish researcher Rosemary Day (2007, 2009), the Indian researchers Vinod Pavarala and Kanchan Malik (2007), to mention only a few, have produced excellent empirical studies using this designation. Let us dwell a moment, however, on Rennie's, and then Howley's, conceptual arguments for the term.

Rennie argues that the value of the term "community media" is that it captures the everyday, "ordinary" (2006: 41) cultural process of the mass of citizens. She anchors "community media" within "civil society," which in turn she defines as "associations formed out of non-profit motives [which] are seen as legitimate participants in governance" (2006: 35). Civil society, she emphasizes, requires there to be "communication platforms" (2006: 35) Unlike some analysts, she excludes the market, and also both commercial and public service media as constituent parts of civil society, while of course recognizing that they influence civil society in myriad ways.

Rennie also links the importance of "community media" to the widespread perception of the failings of liberal democratic politics as currently organized, leading to a growing confidence gap between political parties and large sections of the public – a syndrome sometimes referred to as the "democratic deficit." In her view, "community media" can help to fill that gap, significantly strengthening participation in governance on an everyday level. The term "Third Sector media" is also one she endorses. Ultimately her argument would seem to be that "community media" strengthen the living tissue of civil society, and the instances she cites offer a whole gamut of practical ways in which this happens. In a way, her approach resembles a non-revolutionary anarchism.

For Howley, the sense of "community media" partly overlaps elements in Rennie's description, but is especially focused upon their operation as an assertion of local realities against global pressures:

> The growing popular interest in community media across the globe indicates profound dissatisfaction with media industries preoccupied with increasing market share and profitability at the expense of public accountability and social value… community media represent a dynamic response to the forces of globalization, not unlike other more frequently discussed phenomena, such as the rise of ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism, terrorism or popular demonstrations [of the *altermondialiste* movement]. (Howley 2005: 33)

Howley flags as well the roles of "community media" as "a resource for local social service agencies, political activists, and others whose missions, methods and objectives are antithetical to existing power structures" (2005: 34), and as "a forum for local arts and cultural organizations" (2005: 35). But he does not adopt a binarist perspective, splitting "community media" radically from the commercial mainstream. Explicitly acknowledging his debt to the work of Jesús Martín-Barbero, he writes that "community media provide a unique site to illuminate hegemonic processes: community media demonstrate not only signs of resistance and subversion but evidence of complicity and submission as well" (2005: 35). He also notes how these influences go both ways, for instance how the *cinéma vérité* style of early alternative Super 8 cinema and guerrilla video has become a standard feature of mainstream TV news coverage.

To sum up so far: Rennie focuses more on the governance gap, and Howley on the globalization gap, as explanations for the contemporary emergence and importance of these small-scale media forms. Both agree, however, that the strength of "community media" lies in their being rooted within the processes of everyday life, that they permit ordinary citizens and non-citizens forms of expression and self-organization and connection that are only rarely and partially open to them in mainstream commercial media – and even in most public service media as currently organized.

Let me offer three critical comments on their approaches. One is historical, the second geographical, and the third comes from a globalist perspective.

Both approaches define what I have termed nano-media as a relatively new phenomenon, something emerging to strength particularly over the past couple of decades. As I indicated in my remarks at the beginning, however, nano-media have been a feature of the cultural and political landscape for a very long time now. Historians have often failed to study them, as too have media sociologists until recently. But that says more about the assumptions of historians and sociologists, who were arguably captivated by the illusory equation of large scale with social significance, and therefore focused on macromedia of various kinds.

It was not only the historians' and sociologists' fault. Very often activists in these media projects were too busy at the time, or too exhausted and saddened when the project collapsed, to archive. Indeed, one of the pluses of both Rennie's and Howley's books is their snapshot summaries of a number of these media projects around the world. However, a careful comparison and contrast among different nano-media projects past and present is of the greatest importance, and therefore their history is crucial to consider.

The "geographical" criticism I would voice is that "community" in both writers' arguments is effectively equated with "local." Implicitly, this draws attention away from communities not based on or solely connected to their particular locality, and *their* forms of nano-media: women activists; young people; minority ethnic communities; migrant workers', refugees', and transnational communities; sexual identity communities; environmental activist communities. Admittedly, the face-to-face dimension of locality is often missing or much weaker in such communities, lacking that key dimension of the more conventional community. But the minority ethnic press and radio are long-standing examples (e.g., Sinclair and Cunningham 2001).

The third matter flows from this directly, namely that transnational examples – for example, of the anti-apartheid or environmentalist movements, or the transnational dimensions of the Lebanese, Greek, Iranian, and then Arab regional uprisings beginning in 2005 – do not feature generally in the term "community media." This is not intended as a cheap shot, only to note the increasing centrality of global dimensions in some social movement media histories.

Now particularly in the Internet era, with streaming audio/video, a local community radio station can easily be picked up even around the world. For instance, Radio Popolare, Milano, streams its cutting-edge musical selections. Young people throughout Italy no longer have to travel up to Milan in order to be, every day if they so wish, active members of its music community from Agrigento to Cagliari, and Ventimiglia to Muggia. And beyond.

"Networked" Movement Media

Manuel Castells' enigmatic phrase "the space of flows" does serve to point us toward the extraordinary fresh opportunities for social movements that have been presented by the Internet and mobile media. Not all such movements are ones we can celebrate: one of the earliest US users of the Internet for political mobilization was the Ku Klux Klan, and white supremacist groups and neo-Nazis continue to be active through these media. Not every regime permits these media to be used freely – Chinese Internet activists have used the term "Internet winter" to refer to their government's interventions. Globally, the denial of Internet access is widespread for both economic and political reasons. Internet surveillance is rather easy, and mobile phones are mostly straightforward to locate. All these repressive options were very evident in the Iranian uprising of 2009, and the so-called Arab Springs from 2011 onward.

Nonetheless, as we look back over the 2000s, beginning with the four-day mobilization against the WTO in Seattle at the end of 1999, democratic communication opportunities have sharply altered. Less known, outside Southeast Asia, is the space opened up via the Internet for horizontal communication in Indonesia, in Malaysia, and among the exiled opposition groups from Burma (Basuki 2010; Brooten; George 2010). In the so-called "Middle East," standard low estimates of Internet penetration in the 2000s were often wildly off, because they neglected widespread use of telecenters and Internet cafés. Egyptian bloggers in particular, men and women, were extremely active in the years leading up to 2011, often challenging their own and other regional regimes as well as ventilating everyday frustrations (Shoukry 2010).

Thus the term "network" continues to dominate discussions of alternative communication processes. As a term denoting a global set of electronic connections for Internet use, its meaning is clear. But as used to refer to *social* networks, its sense is much murkier.

For a long time, what passed for "network" analysis was fixated on the analysis of social dyads, and was compulsively empiricist in its methodology. Political scientists Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, in their collection of studies of social movements and networks, have emphasized how social movement research has been one of the factors helping to push traditional network analysis beyond these fixations toward emphasizing

the inextricable link between social networks and *culture*…the relationship between the social networks and the *cognitive maps* through which actors make sense of and categorize their social environment and locate themselves within broader webs of ties and interactions. (Diani 2003: 5; my emphasis)

Indeed one of the problems of the term "network" in the post-Internet age is the way it tends today to push our thinking about networks in the direction of "channels" of communication, conveying neutral information pulses, which is certainly a component of the process, but which without cultural tissue and texture is as meaningless as a piece of granite. Diani and McAdam's point is well taken, although not much in their collection of essays actually addresses cultural issues in any depth, as they are more concerned with the organizational dynamics of movement mobilization: individual recruitment, emergent mobilization and movement expansion (McAdam 2003: 297).

Indeed much of what is written about the Internet and mobile telephony is concerned with mobilization issues, as were the examples from Greece and Iran already cited. A study of mobile communication by Castells, Fernández-Ardèvol, and Qiu (2007: ch. 7) has a chapter on its political dimensions, but focuses entirely on mobile telephony and instant political mobilizations ("flash mobs").

In Qiu's later study of what he terms "working-class network society" in China, however, there is a much deeper investigation of the meshing of mobile telephony and the Internet in the formation of China's new working class. Qiu particularly focuses upon uses among young workers, migrant workers, and seniors, and writes:

What is achieved through communication technology in this class formation process is therefore not the annihilation of the local but the opportunity to allow critical local incidents to transcend social boundaries and reach other have-less groups under similar conditions … the haves as well as have-nots, may join the cause of the have-less to safeguard the welfare of all citizens, including the right to communicate using working-class ICTs. (Qiu 2009: 245)

A recent contribution to debate by Olga Guedes Bailey, Bart Cammaerts, and Nico Carpentier (2008: 25–33) takes the network notion from a less instantaneous focus. They deploy the term "rhizome" to denote the type of network established by alternative media. The rhizome is a type of plant which sends out runners, usually underground, and gradually, almost invisibly, but very effectively, establishes dominance over a wide territory. This is the metaphor they prefer to "community media," "alternative media," or "civil society media." The rhizome metaphor was coined, so far as I know, by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), but it also echoed language common in the Italian political movements of the 1970s and early 1980s, which spoke often of the "molecular" and "capillary" processes of social movements. In some sense, Diani and McAdam and their colleagues have been trying to move beyond these metaphors in order to pin down the constantly shifting hydrodynamics of social movements.

Anthropologist Jeffrey Juris's study *Networking Futures: the movements against corporate globalization*, a large part of it developed in interaction with other social justice activists in Catalunya, focuses on globalization from below, "from the ground up … a dynamic interaction among multiple practices, flows, and processes at varying scales" (Juris 2008: 297). He specifically addresses what he terms "the cultural logic of networking" at the core of these movements. He means by this:

> Cultural struggles involving ideology (antiglobalization versus anticapitalism), strategies (summit hopping versus sustained organizing), tactics (violence versus non-violence), organizational form (structure versus non-structure), and decision making (consensus versus voting). (Juris 2008: 15)

It is a relief to turn to "networking" as a flesh-and-blood set of conflictual practices rather than the frequent image of smoothly lubricated and magically productive digital links, the kind of fantasy that mainstream media commentators endlessly generated concerning the Arab region in the early months of 2011. Sociologist Roger Gould's discussion of the 1871 Paris Commune, even if his specific thesis about its community rather than class character is overdrawn, usefully directs attention to the ongoing urban networking tissue that played a vital role in that historic insurgency without, evidently, benefitting from digital links of any kind whatsoever (Gould 1995).

Putting these studies and insights together, it is clear that the term "network" has multiple potential applications in understanding the various forms of social movement media. At the same time, it is used in multiple senses, and I propose we should avoid pivoting any discussion of these media on the single term itself, which is more likely to confuse than illuminate. I also think it critically important to de-technologize the term, not least by consistently integrating our discussions of the Internet and mobile telephony with the many other forms of social movement media. The huge expansion of cell phone usage in the Global South is embedded in actual social relations – it is not a fresh, autonomously evolved noosphere.

"Social Movement" Media

This term anchors these media projects in social movements large and tiny, constructive and repressive – all of the above (Downing 2008). In doing so, it endeavors to evade both mediacentrism and technocentrism. On the other hand, no more than "digital networked media" or "community media" does it cover all nano-media: as Atton rightly insists, there is a vast plethora of small-scale media, from parish magazines to mosque bulletins, from zines to fan websites, which only partially or not at all carry any intimate connection with any kind of social movement.

However, if our focus is on constructive social change and the roles which nano-media projects may play within that process, then the term "social movement media" buries these media technologies and their uses in what above I termed the "hydrodynamics" of actual social relations and social change. I choose this metaphor to emphasize both the power and the opacity of social movements. As with the movement of large bodies of water, the internal currents and flows of social movements are often unfathomable to the naked eye. This is above all true at the time of social movements' gestation and emergence, but also even at their activity peaks – as during their subsequent periods of seeming quiescence, during which some nano-media activity may be almost the only immediately detectable pulse.

The remarkable impact of a variety of nano-media projects, sometimes in the short term, but most often over the longer term, has everything to do with this complex integration within the process of social movements. This is what those who fetishize large scale media and dismiss nano-media as trivial, freakish, irritating, miss. Judged by the standards, processes *and objectives* of macro-media, social movement media cannot but come up short. The same is precisely true in reverse.

At the same time, we find ourselves back in a problem of definition. What is a social movement? And what is not? Indeed, what should we include in or exclude from the social movement category? A national revolution? Fascism? Immigrants' rights campaigns? Campaigns to deny refugees' rights? A local environmental defense campaign? The *cristeros* who sought to defend the Catholic Church against Mexico's anticlerical government in the 1930s? The global anti-apartheid movement? Punk rock? Hip hop? dada? The global social justice movement? Human rights global networks? Islamist networks? Home improvement? The cell phone *MMORPEG* phenomenon?[1]

This is an issue I have explored at more length elsewhere, accompanied by research citations (Downing 2008), but let me summarize that argument here. The earliest sociological definition did not use the term "social movement" at all, but basically lifted a term of the elite to express their fear and disgust at large-scale urban or rural riots and insurgencies: "the mob," or "the crowd," possessed of potentially demonic force that needed to be subdued by much greater force, if necessary an orgy of violence. The story of the massive vengeance wrought on the Paris Communards illustrates the latter point, as does the devastation by Franco's forces in Spain and Catalunya.

Partly impelled by the global social unrest of the 1960s and 1970s, some sociologists swung the pendulum in the opposite direction, and underscored the rationality of protest, its deployment of those forms of power and resources which people without much money or connections *can* use: blocking highways, occupying factories and government offices, strikes, and many other forms of bodily action. Thus the "rational actor" model was mobilized, challenging the "demonic mob" model.

Then arose a third perspective, the so-called "new social movements" model. This one zeroed in on feminist, environmentalist, and peace movements, and drew a sharp distinction between their goals and those of labor movements. The

difference between them they saw as the attempt of labor movements historically to negotiate outcomes with the state, or particular corporations or both, such as the eight-hour day, or a new pay contract. These "new" movements, they claimed, were all about reformulating collective social identities and had no expectations of negotiating specific outcomes with the authorities.

From my point of view, the mob approach had one element of validity, namely the capacity of people in large numbers, especially when provoked by aggressive policing, to take extreme actions way beyond anything they anticipated when they joined the protest and had their emotions dynamized. The rational actor approach saw the sense in protest, as opposed to dismissing it out of hand as pointless or misconceived. The New Social Movements school was right to take feminism and the rest seriously and to note their points of difference with other social movements. So far, so good.

Yet, obviously, the "mob" approach was basically contemptuous, not analytical. The "rational actor" approach was comprehensively uninterested in emotion, almost by definition, and in its drive to grasp the rationality of social movements often reduced them to mute pieces on a social chessboard, decultured, and apparently uninvolved in any kind of communication process, whether mediated or face to face (or at least any communication process with dynamics or contradictions).

The "new social movements" school was, seemingly, entirely uninterested in any movements outside the Global North, such as Brazil's landless workers' movement, the anti-apartheid movement, the movement against Indonesian dictator Suharto, indigenous people's movements, or anything outside their cultural identity framework. Moreover, anything resembling the labor movement model within "new social movements" was banished from the frame – such as feminists demanding child care rights, or environmentalists demanding new legislation, or peace activists demanding the abolition of nuclear arsenals.

More than many social phenomena, social movements and their media may be fluctuating and transitory and thus especially resistant to ironclad theorizing. They frequently demand the subtlety and delicacy of an Antonio Gramsci or a Raymond Williams for genuinely penetrating analysis. Latin American researchers have especially insisted on these issues, and on the centrality of *process* in the analysis of social movement media (Gumucio-Dagron 2004; Huesca 1995; Rodríguez 2001).

However, recognizing this transience dimension must not blind us to the equally important dimension of the *duration* of many social movements. Examples include anti-slavery (whose target is still with us), the labor movement, women's suffrage movements, movements for colonial freedom, the transnational anti-apartheid movement, indigenous peoples' movements, the environmental movement. Over the *longue durée* these movements have persistently mounted challenges to some of the most entrenched constellations of power in modern history. They have waxed and waned and resurfaced, but their multifarious media expressions' impact over time is on a scale just as significant as the instant influence of mainstream macromedia.

A further issue is the question of size. Does a social movement need to be city-wide, region-wide, or national to qualify as a real social movement? I would argue not, and in support would cite examples such as the Bogotá *barrio* rural migrant women whose video activism Clemencia Rodríguez describes in her book *Fissures in the Mediascape* (Rodríguez 2001). These women had no ambition to talk to the whole of Bogotá, let alone the whole of Colombia. At the same time, in the process of learning to document their neighborhood's issues and its residents' lives, including their own, they became a local social movement.

At the same time, defining what is "local" is not as straightforward as it may seem. Take the dramatic role of social movements and their media in 1974–1976, in successfully consolidating the overthrow of Portuguese fascism and colonialism. Portugal was impoverished, a small nation on the European perimeter, but its ability to head off challenges from the prior regime's comeback attempts held international ramifications – in next-door Spain and in Greece, under fascist rule; in Brazil, under military dictatorship; in Mozambique, in Angola, in Guiné-Bissau, in Timor Leste, all of them centuries-old Portuguese colonies. (At the same time, we still risk sliding back into the fallacy of gigantism, of fetishizing *macro*media and *macro*-impact, if we take such cases as Portugal in 1974 as sole yardstick of validity.)

A further key question concerns the formal organizational components of social movements. In Italian usage around 30 years back, the plural *movimenti sociali* was often used to describe what elsewhere would have been called leftist microparties or splinter organizations, each one usually with its own little newspaper, sometimes operating with a blend of messianic and Leninist fervor. What was interesting however was how by the early 1980s, partly under the influence of the 1976 self-dissolution of the nationally influential *Lotta Continua* [ongoing struggle] organization, a number of these newspapers were effectively declaring independence of their official sects. In some sense, therefore, social movement logic was progressively disrupting the assembly-line organizational logic of the would-be Leninists. At the same time, the organizational components of social movements are critical to their development, as police forces across the world understand very well.

In the twenty-first century, with the Soviet experiment long behind us and hopefully never to be repeated, media operating in direct relation to movements for constructive social change, represent our best prospect for an alternative, counter-hegemonic public sphere, composed of many such subspheres (Downing 1988; Fraser 1993). Within that plural sphere, within "the global movement of movements," the numerous challenges that face us – climate change, women's subordination, the repression of labor activism, digital surveillance, war, and terrorism – can begin to be addressed over time with collective wisdom, insight, and argument, not with the pathetic policies trotted out by our official political leaders.

Concluding Reflections

So let me pull together the threads of my argument. I would suggest that the term "community media," though in Rennie's and Howley's work it includes attempts to counter the democratic deficit and/or the globalization steamroller, principally focuses attention on the undramatic, everyday stuff of our lives. The "network" media terminology draws our attention to the new and important opportunities for social movement mobilization that now exist, but tends to focus on immediate and dramatic mobilizations, in a sense the opposite of the quiet, almost humdrum flavor of "community media."

A melding of both seems indicated. A huge question is how far ongoing almost invisible social activism and exchanges among groups and communities in developing the thick cultural tissue of their daily lives may constitute fertile soil for social justice activism. Though Juris (2008) sometimes appears to map the technological too tightly on to the political in his analysis of digital networks, the extension of social networking through digital media is important over the long term, as well as in situations of immediate emergency and high drama. Taken together, these are vital components within the growth of local and transnational social movement activism in collectively determining the human future on a democratic rather than authoritarian basis.

Social movements and their media are not a panacea. As underscored earlier, some very significant social movements are highly regressive and dangerous. Nonetheless, at their most constructive, they may help to fill in the cavernous spaces left by capitalist structures and contemporary liberal democracy. The challenge for media researchers committed to social justice is to explore critically the accumulated experience of such media, their forms of organization, their interrelations with their environment (from local to transnational), their aesthetic inspirations, their interrelations with mainstream media and – not least – their histories.

Here, developing a functioning taxonomy will also be helpful in seeking to lay bare the varying dynamics of these media and thus to move beyond the sweeping generality of "alternative" media or "nano"-media. Indeed this taxonomy needs to engage very seriously as well with regressive movement media. In another study by Atton (2004), he devoted some analysis to ultrarightist media rhetoric in Britain and found that it quite often portrays the ultraright as marginalized by powerful forces. Given the ultraright's frequent history of financial backing behind the scenes by wealthy individuals, this self-characterization may appear self-deluding. The fact remains that as an appeal to White or majority ethnic citizens who see themselves as "racially" disenfranchised in depressed neighborhoods, the solidarity of exclusion may have a powerful appeal.

The other massive task for future research, currently only slowly appearing here and there, is on the audiences, readers and users of these media. Elsewhere

(Downing 2003) I have addressed in some detail the importance of this critical gap in our knowledge, and readers are encouraged to engage with the arguments there.

There is much to be done. We have nonetheless to hope that those researchers who take up the challenge will not take the easy path of simply identifying and describing one more "case-study" of these media, but will harness their analyses to practical political activism designed to achieve social justice and cultural freedom.

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Note

1   MMORPGs: massively multiplayer online role-playing games.

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21

Transnational Civil Society and Social Movements

Anastasia Kavada

Stemming from social and political shifts associated with globalization, the emergence of global civil society is facilitated by developments in communication technologies. The expansion of satellite television, the popularity of international news networks, as well as the growing use of the Internet have accelerated the process of globalization. By flooding the local with images and information from remote places, the media aid in the building of transnational solidarity, making people feel part of an "imagined community" of distant strangers (Kaldor 2003: 104).

However, what the emergence of the Internet has highlighted most powerfully is the ways in which the media shape internal communication and therefore the organizational forms of civil society. In this respect, the Internet is considered to be partly responsible for making network forms of organization "a signature element of global organising" (Anheier and Themudo 2002: 191). On the conceptual level, this marks a shift in how we perceive the role of communication technologies in collective action. While earlier studies posited the media as political arenas where social movements interacted with targets and the public, current research also stresses the role of media as tools of organization and coordination. This is nonetheless a nascent field of enquiry and still in need of concrete theoretical frameworks that help to conceptualize how the media affect the organizational forms of civil society.

Yet recent years have seen an increase in the number of studies dealing with this topic. These studies form the basis of this chapter, which traces current changes in the organizational forms of global civil society and examines how these are related to new communication technologies. Organizational forms are conceived in broad terms here, as referring not only to organizational structure,

but also to "resource types, governance, accountability, organisational culture, informal structures, and external relations" (Anheier and Themudo 2002: 191). To set the background for this discussion, the next section defines the notion of global civil society focusing particularly on social movements and non-governmental organizations.

Global Civil Society, Non-Governmental Organizations, and Social Movements

According to a popular definition, global civil society is "the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and economies" (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001: 17). Its emergence can help to extend universal human values and the institutions of democracy on the international level (Baker and Chandler 2005). However, critics note that the concept tends to conflate the normative with the descriptive (Baker and Chandler 2005) as it outlines both an emancipatory political project and "an actually existing reality, which may not measure up to the goal" (Kaldor 2003: 11). Thus, a more suitable conception of civil society for the purposes of this chapter is the one by Keck and Sikkink who describe civil society as an "arena of struggle, a fragmented and contested area" (1998: 34) where groups and institutions vie for power and legitimacy.

Global civil society is largely viewed as a product of globalization. Kaldor (2003) considers the 1989 revolutions as the turning point, when the disintegration of competing blocs and the establishment of "an increasingly norm-governed global system" (Lipschutz, cited in Baker 2002: 928) increased the collaboration between nation states. This opened the political system to the influence of more informal political actors, allowing social movements and groups advocating for a variety of causes to gain influence and legitimacy (Kaldor 2003). The growth of NGOs in this era is regarded as undeniable evidence of the rise of global civil society. This resulted not only from the thawing of international relations, but also from the establishment of the Western states' "New Policy Agenda," which combined a focus on neoliberal economic strategy with parliamentary democracy. Considered as a useful "mechanism for implementing this agenda" (Kaldor 2003: 88), NGOs saw their funding and support grow as a result.

The NGO sector is difficult to define as it includes a variety of organizations, such as charities, foundations, voluntary groups, local associations, and even think tanks (Kaldor 2003). However, all NGOs are oriented toward the public good (Martens 2002). Some aim at changing societal norms and improving understanding, others seek to influence agendas and policies, while still others aim at solving problems and implementing policies, particularly in states where

the government is absent or dysfunctional (Simmons 1998). To achieve these goals, NGOs undertake different types of activities that include advocacy, information gathering and dissemination, monitoring, service delivery, mediation, as well as financing and grant-making (Simmons 1998). Most importantly, NGOs are not profit-oriented organizations (Martens 2002; Kaldor 2003). Their funding mechanisms vary but they mainly include "sponsorship fees and private donations" (Martens 2002: 282), which ensure the organizations' independence from official funding.

NGOs are relatively formal organizations as they "have – at the least – a minimal organizational structure which allows them to provide for continuous work. This includes a headquarters, permanent staff, and constitution" (Martens 2002: 282). Some also have "permanent committees or commissions for study or activity purposes" (Martens 2002: 281). Their personnel can be strictly voluntary but it often includes experts and professionals, as well as employees fulfilling managerial roles (Simmons 1998). Still, the organizational forms of NGOs differ in their degree of formality, hierarchy, and centralization. Some international NGOs are organized more as networks, while others adopt a more formal federated structure with clear hierarchies and lines of command (Kaldor 2003).

Compared to NGOs, social movements are defined as more informal and fluid actors with a rather loose and dispersed organization (Diani 1992). They are also "engaged in political and/or cultural conflicts, meant to promote or oppose social change either at the systemic or non-systemic level" (Diani 1992: 11). Social movements are non-institutional as their participants are drawn from a broad range of actors, including churches, trade unions, and neighborhood associations (Diani 1992).[1]

Even though their organizational designs differ, social movements tend to adopt a decentralized structure that allows them to evade suppression by the authorities (Gerlach and Hine 1970). Social movements are prone to be internally diverse as they include a wide range of groups and activists whose participation in the movement varies with time. They further tend to have multiple centres or leaders, each having control over one part but not the entirety of the movement. However, movements also include more formalized and sustained organizations. These social movement organizations (SMOs) fulfill different functions, such as mobilization, resource-generation, and management (Della Porta and Diani 2006). They also help social movements to communicate more strategically with the media and to endure in periods of dwindling activity.

The organizational forms of social movements further depend on their life-cycle. While social movements normally begin as spontaneous and decentralized collectives, with time they become more institutionalized and they develop more hierarchical organizational structures. Following the stage of institutionalization, social movements tend to decline and eventually dissipate as they are "tamed" and coopted by the political system they were once challenging (Piven and Cloward 1979). Yet other scholars stress that this is not an inevitable trajectory as the

organizational forms adopted by social movements are affected by "competitive and institutional pressures, as well as broader political and sociocultural changes" (Clemens and Minkoff 2004: 163).

Nevertheless, the process of globalization together with the use of new media have led NGOs and social movements toward even more networked and decentralized organizational forms "that push them away from the model of nineteenth- century bureaucracies" (Anheier and Themudo 2002: 202). The following section provides an overview of the main characteristics of such forms.

Network Forms of Organization: Transnational Advocacy Networks and the Global Justice Movement

"Networks are forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 8). They are composed by diverse nodes, which are connected to each other with different types of ties. "These new forms transcend traditional boundaries (personal, national, institutional) and are built around symbolic, informational, and material flows that link people together, often for short periods of time" (Flanagin, Stohl, and Bimber 2006: 47). Compared with large bureaucratic organizations, networks are fluid configurations and able to respond quickly to changes in their environment (Anheier and Themudo 2002; Flanagin, Stohl, and Bimber 2006). The limited need for central control also restricts the costs of coordination and means that networks can flexibly adapt to local conditions. Networks are thus "particularly suited for highly variable task environments" (Anheier and Themudo 2002: 201). They operate most effectively when they are dense, when information flows are reliable, and when relationships between members of the network are strong (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

However, it is exactly this flexibility and adaptability that makes networks inherently unpredictable. Based on a "spirit of goodwill" (Podolny and Page 1998: 60), interdependency, and complex transactions between their members (Powell 1990), networks can be hampered by internal conflicts. The lack of central coordination may leave them open to "free-riding" behaviors as it makes it difficult to monitor whether members fulfill their obligations. Developing a cohesive common identity may also be a challenge within such flexible structures (Anheier and Themudo 2002).[2]

Network-type forms have existed throughout history, but their demand for dense communication between interacting members limited their development (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996). It is thus recent advances in information and communication technologies that, according to Castells (1996), have rendered networks the dominant morphology of current societies. Global civil society is no exception to

this trend. In a survey of the organizational forms of global civil society in 2002, Anheier and Themudo noted the "growing number of organisations that no longer fits standard classifications of INGO forms" (2002: 196).

The social and political developments associated with globalization are the primary drivers of this shift towards network forms of organization. Globalization has meant that civil society organizations now need to operate across geographical boundaries, in different jurisdictions, each one with its own particular legal and fiscal requirements. They should also appeal to multiple constituencies and targets at regional and international levels (Anheier and Themudo 2002). Furthermore, globalization has increased the complexity of issues and their interdependency, highlighting the need to develop heterogeneous coalitions and campaigns that cut across previously distinct issue areas (Lichbach and Almeida 2001). It has also led to "the emergence of a class of ordinary citizens who increasingly see the sites of their political action as ranging from local to global without necessarily passing through national institutions on the way" (Bennett 2003: 27).

This increasingly complex task environment has led NGOs like Amnesty International and Action Aid to reorganize their operations. For example, local chapters of international NGOs often establish relationships of cooperation with diverse actors that do not fit "the conventional headquarter–subunit structure" (Anheier and Themudo 2002: 191). Falling transaction costs have allowed civil society organizations to move away from global hierarchies "towards 'operational downsizing' where organisations concentrate on their 'core activities' and contract out auxiliary activities" (Anheier and Themudo 2002: 205). For example, Northern development NGOs may prefer to subcontract the offer of local services to NGOs embedded in the local community in order to concentrate more freely on their strategic capacities (Anheier and Themudo 2002).

Globalization has also increased the involvement of NGOs in what Keck and Sikkink (1998) call "transnational advocacy networks" (TANs). TANs consist of "those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). "Relevant actors" can refer to NGOs, local movements, and grass-roots groups, trade unions, churches, consumer associations, and foundations. They may also include the media, intellectuals and even "parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of government" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 9).

TANs should be understood as both structures and agents (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). They serve as political spaces where actors come together to discuss policies and formulate campaigns. At the same time, TANs operate as agents striving to change the policies of targets that may include national governments, transnational corporations and international institutions. In this respect, networks advocate for causes that cannot necessarily be reduced to the separate interests of their members. TANs help in creating synergies between different types of groups, bringing together actors who fulfill complementary functions (Kaldor 2003).

TANs also increase their members' accessibility to the international system by establishing new relationships with allies and targets. Keck and Sikkink (1998) note the potential "boomerang effect" of TANs, when domestic groups which are censored or restricted in their local territory use their access to the international level to effect changes at home.

Information exchange lies at the core of TANs as "[t]heir ability to generate information quickly and accurately, and deploy it effectively, is their most valuable currency" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 10). Their main tactic is mobilization around specific campaigns which help to consolidate the relationships between actors of the network, the public, allies and opponents. Campaigns also require the establishment of common frames of meaning – at least for the specific issue on which the campaign is waged – and a more formal division of labour – at least for the duration of the campaign (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

Yet despite this fluidity, NGOs still form the core of such networks. They drive the actions of the network, "introduce new ideas, provide information, and lobby for policy changes" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 9). Thus, TANs do tend to have a rather centralized structure, as their agenda is controlled by lead actors in the network and the framing of their campaign goals is relatively tight (Bennett 2005).

The emergence of the Global Justice Movement in late 1999 has led scholars like Bennett (2005) to talk about two generations of transnational activist networking, the former associated with TANs, the latter representing a shift towards less NGO-centered activist networks that are more multi-issue, informal, and fluid. The Global Justice Movement or anti-globalization movement, as it was formerly (but erroneously) called, first appeared in the Trade Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in late 1999. The movement represented the consolidation of diverse activist networks, some formed in solidarity to the Zapatista uprising in Mexico in the mid-1990s, others mobilized against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998 (van Aelst and Walgrave 2004; Smith and Smythe 2001). Since then, alter-globalization activists have continued to organize protests during the major summits of large international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, the G8, or the European Union. They also started to converge regularly at the social fora. These are designed as open spaces or public squares (Whitaker 2004) where activists against neoliberal globalization can exchange ideas about targets and campaigns and to discuss ways of "making another world possible." The first World Social Forum was organized in Porto Allegre in 2001 and was soon followed by the establishment of regional, national, and local fora around the globe.

What was very distinctive about the Global Justice Movement was its explicit rejection of hierarchical and centralized forms of organization. So strong was the belief in networked forms of organization that they came to be considered as part of the movement's ideology (Bennett 2005). These principles were reflected in the decision-making practices of the movement, particularly those around the organizing of the social fora. Following the rules of participatory democracy,

decisions were taken by consensus, the minutes and agendas of meetings were circulated widely and assemblies were open to any activist who agreed with the Charter of Principles of the World Social Forum (Della Porta 2005a). The emphasis on inclusiveness underlined not only the decision-making processes of the movement, but also its narratives, which were open and decidedly vague, lending themselves to "purposeful misunderstandings" (Bennett 2005) that brought people more easily under the same broad umbrella. Operating as a fluid network, the movement allowed its participants to maintain their particularities while collaborating on common protests and campaigns, a feature which allowed it to grow and expand very quickly. Hence, in relation to the first-generation networking of NGO-centered advocacy networks, the Global Justice Movement was more polycentric and based on affinity ties rather than formal negotiations in strategic coalitions. Its agenda was controlled much more from the collective base rather than by lead actors in the movement. It also had a more diffuse identity that prevented the emergence of fractures around core issues (Bennett 2005).

On the individual level, this mode of organizing was considered as highly suitable to the citizens of late-Modern societies as looser collectives allow space for difference and individuality. For many theorists, the dawn of post-industrial economy and the post-material age meant that issues of identity, autonomy and lifestyle became dominant in the social movement agenda (Pichardo 1997). This was compounded by the transformation of the welfare state, which led to more individualized relationships between citizens and the state (Beck 1999), and the spread of a culture of consumerism that stressed individual difference and identity. Combined with the decline of "grand narratives" and ideologies, this new age is characterized by different forms of solidarity-building where the collective needs to serve people's individual identities and search for self discovery (Bennett 2003).[3]

The Internet and Patterns of Transnational Networking

Developments in transportation and communication technologies have been instrumental for giving "rise to a model of networked organization based on decentralized coordination among diverse, autonomous collective actors" (Juris 2012: 266). Activists can now coordinate more easily across geographical distances and without formal, sustained, and hierarchical organizations. As Della Porta and Mosca note, "[i]n terms of increased speed and range of communication, it [the Internet] gives the new movements what printing, the postal system, the telephone, and fax represented for movements in the far and more recent past" (2005: 167). What is more, the fall in transaction and coordination costs has allowed activists to coordinate protests and campaigns with a lighter structure by reducing organizational budgets (Flanagin, Stohl, and Bimber 2006).

Thus the Internet constitutes an infrastructure that can "transform sets of geographically dispersed aggrieved individuals into a densely connected aggrieved population" (Diani 2001: 388). It allows people to rally around a common cause, to coordinate their activities and to take decisions. Individuals and organizations can easily join a cause or leave it with one click. In addition, the Internet facilitates a process of flexible division of labour and responsibility (Kavada 2009). At the same time, the Internet can help to sustain a process of participatory decision making at an unprecedented scale. Within the European Social Forum, for instance, the email lists were used to circulate agendas and the minutes of meetings and to organize the practicalities for attending face-to-face assemblies (Kavada 2010).

The Internet also facilitates processes of mobilization as it allows activists to publish and circulate uncensored information quickly and at a low cost (Della Porta and Mosca 2005). In this sense, much attention has been paid to the ease with which activists can now establish independent media operations. The case of Indymedia, an alternative news website that was set up during the "Battle of Seattle," has attracted much scholarly research. The information and images produced by activists can more easily affect the agenda and discourse of the mainstream media (Bennett 2004). Whether this empowers activists to challenge the usual ways in which protest is misrepresented or marginalized in the media (Koopmans 2004) still remains to be seen. At the same time, the Internet allows for mobilization activities to be undertaken by a variety of individuals or "movement entrepreneurs" who can use new communication technologies to diffuse information to their own personal networks.

The availability of information about protest tactics and causes also helps the scale of the network to shift from the local to the global without costly negotiations (Bennett 2004). Activists in remote areas can easily imitate the actions organized elsewhere and join the movement by setting up their own actions. Combined with the increased power and scope of social networks, this magnifies the capacity for the transnational diffusion of protest tactics. Organizing protest in a distributed fashion that can be adapted to local needs thus prevents internal conflicts and succeeds in bringing together diverse actors (Della Porta 2005b). The Internet also offers a variety of discussion spaces, where activists can debate about the goals and tactics of the movement even though anonymity often leads to fiercer conflicts within such spaces.

While Internet-enabled activist networks may find it difficult to establish a cohesive identity (Della Porta 2007), they are still integrated through interpersonal relationships between their members. According to Gerlach (2001), such relationships have currently become more important for the integration of movements than shared ideologies. The capacities of the Internet for "networked individualism" (Wellman 2001) allows activists to sustain and expand their interpersonal networks of weak and strong ties. Such ties are often built through common work around the organizing of protests and events (Della Porta 2005b). Particularly for activists based in distant geographical areas, coordinating around

shared organizing tasks over the Internet allows them to develop stronger relationships that bridge ideological divides (Kavada 2009), a feature that further enhances the heterogeneous and plural character of such movements.

New communication technologies and networked organizational forms are also connected on the cultural level. The former are facilitating a "cultural logic of networking" (Juris 2005) that transposes principles of online networking to civil society organizing. In turn, these logics inform the ways in which communication technologies are deployed. Taking into account the cultures and attitudes underlying the use of communication technologies helps us to move beyond technologically deterministic positions with regard to the influence of the Internet on organizing practices. For instance, a study of the 2004 European Social Forum process has shown how competing cultures of strategy and organizing influenced the activists' attitudes towards new communication technologies, with one group viewing them mainly as broadcasting media, while the other emphasized the interactive aspects of the technology (Kavada 2013). In another study, Fuster Morell (2009) has demonstrated how the principles of democracy and organizing of the European Social Forum were reflected in the design and governance of openesf.net, a platform that was used to facilitate online networking between activists.

At the same time, scholars increasingly recognize that the Internet is only one part of the communication ecology of social movements. Research moving beyond the online/offline divide is still scarce but evidence emerging mainly from more ethnographic and qualitative research demonstrates the importance of face-to-face communication for networked movements (see, for instance, Juris 2005; Mattoni 2012; McCurdy 2011). As already mentioned, movements such as the Global Justice hold regular face-to-face assemblies that help to build trust and to repair interpersonal relationships that risk being ripped apart by online conflicts (Kavada 2010). The ephemeral nature of Internet-enabled collectives heightens the need for face-to-face meetings that make the existence of the collective a visible and material reality. In other words, while the Internet facilitates more horizontal, dispersed and fluid organizing structures, face-to-face communication helps to blunt the force of these tensions by rendering the collective more concrete, cohesive and structured.

The Rise of Individuals? Social Media, Hybrid Organizations, and New Movements

These patterns of transnational networking and their relationship with new communication technologies are also evident in current expressions of global civil society. A case in point is the Occupy Movement, which began with the occupation of Zucotti Park in New York on September 17, 2011 (Juris *et al.* 2012;

Constanza-Chock 2012). Inspired by the Acampadas in Spain, the Indignant movement in Greece, the Israeli tent encampments, and the movements of the Arab Spring (Juris *et al.* 2012; Hardt and Negri 2011), the Occupy Movement employed tactics and forms of organization whose lineage can be traced back to the Global Justice Movement. These include "physical occupation of public spaces, mass assemblies, tent cities and direct action" (Juris *et al.* 2012: 3). Although it is too early to draw concrete conclusions about these movements, it is worth considering whether they represent a strengthening of already identified trends or whether they point to significantly new developments.

Like the Global Justice Movement, Occupy activists express a belief in horizontality, decentralization, and direct participation. The movement practiced a type of prefigurative "DIY politics that seeks to make the changes we want to see in the here and now" (Halvorsen 2012: 2). Railing against "the effects of growing inequality and the disproportionate influence of corporate power over our politics and economy" (Juris *et al.* 2012: 3), the movement aims to construct a community of equals "where each voice is as important as every other" (Juris *et al.* 2012: 3). This explains the activists' emphasis on direct participation and on the methods of participatory democracy.

Alongside websites, wiki pages, and email lists, Occupy activists also had social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube at their disposal. According to Gaby and Caren, "[m]ore than 1500 unique Facebook pages were established to spread the movement" (2012: 1). A survey of Occupy activists showed that they were heavy users of digital media platforms, particularly Facebook and Twitter. Respondents mainly used these platforms to gather information about the movement but far fewer activists produced videos or wrote blog posts (Constanza-Chock 2012). Live-streaming websites allowed Occupiers to report live from the camps and to open up the face-to-face assemblies to the real-time participation of people online, albeit often unsuccessfully. Attracting up to 80,000 unique viewers per day, "[l]ive video streaming […] became a key symbol of the sophistication of media practices in the Occupy movement" (Constanza-Chock 2012: 8). Activists set up media tents in the occupations and produced their own independent media and online platforms such as Occupy.net. Twitter was used to share information about the occupations and to rapidly alert Occupy sympathizers in the event of an eviction.

Thus, similarly to the Global Justice Movement, new communication technologies allowed the production and circulation of information about the movement, facilitated processes of mobilization and decision-making, and contributed to the quick expansion of the movement to different localities. However, for Juris (2012) the use of social media brought some qualitative differences to the cultural logics of organizing that characterize the Occupy Movement. If the Global Justice Movement was defined by a logic of networking, then the Occupy Movement operated more with a logic of aggregation. The latter constitutes

an alternative cultural framework that is shaped by our interactions with social media and generates particular patterns of social and political interaction that involve the viral flow of information and subsequent aggregations of large numbers of individuals in concrete physical spaces. (Juris 2012: 266)

The main difference is that while

networking logics entail a praxis of communication and coordination on the part of collective actors that are already constituted including particular organizations, networks, and coalitions (cf. Fox 2009)—logics of aggregation involve the coming together of actors qua individuals. (Juris 2012: 266)

Hence, "rather than mobilizing 'networks of networks' the use of Twitter and Facebook tends to generate 'crowds of individuals'" (Juris 2012: 267). While email lists can foster dispersed activist communities, social media are more suited to microbroadcasting, allowing individuals to mobilize and consolidate their own social networks by circulating information about protests and campaigns (Juris 2012; Kavada 2012). They are also more appropriate for developing individual rather than collective subjectivities (Fenton and Barassi 2011). Even though social media can help create feelings of solidarity with distant others, they do not support the complex interactions needed for the construction of a cohesive collective identity. It is exactly for this reason that the occupation of physical spaces became so important, as it allowed these disparate individuals to develop collective rituals and a sense of common identity (Juris 2012).

Furthermore, social media platforms provide more power to individual activists in the organizing of protest. Activists have greater control over their participation in the movement and the capacity to create information and to rally people around a specific cause. Thus, alongside more formal organizations, entrepreneurial activists with the requisite digital skills can now play a more crucial role in collective mobilizations (Bennett and Segerberg 2012).

The emphasis on individualism is also evident in the narratives of civil society organizations that accord more space to individual stories and voices. Social media platforms are again better suited for weaving individual and collective perspectives. In this respect, among the top 100 Facebook posts of the Occupy Movement, many included personal narratives "often ending in the line 'I am the 99 percent'" (Gaby and Caren 2012: 5). These personal action memes are useful for the rapid spreading of messages as, compared to collective action frames, they require less "elaborate packaging and ritualized action to reintroduce them into new contexts" (Bennett and Segerberg 2012: 747).

Bennett and Segerberg (2012) note similar dynamics in more traditional types of activist networking, such as Transnational Advocacy Networks, which now tend to foreground rather more the voice of the individual. They bring the example of the Put People First coalition, a loose network of 160 civil society organizations,

including Oxfam and the World Wildlife Fund. The network was formed ahead of the G20 meeting in London in April 2009, demanding from the leaders of the richest economies to "put people first" during their negotiations. In their analysis of the network's website, Bennett and Segerberg found that rather than emphasizing the organizations constituting the network, the organizers opted to highlight the voices of individual participants by deploying "an array of custom built (e.g. 'send your message') and outsourced (e.g. Twitter) communication technologies" (2012: 757).

The "logic of aggregation" is also exemplified by new types of civil society actors, such as Avaaz. Describing itself as a "global web movement," Avaaz launched in 2007 with the aim to "organize citizens of all nations to close the gap between the world we have and the world most people everywhere want" (Avaaz website, n.p.). At the time of writing, Avaaz counts more than 15.5 million members around the world even though it operates on a rather broad definition of membership, considering as a "member" everyone who signs an Avaaz petition. The organization has a light structure, with a core of professional campaigners responsible for setting priorities and forging campaign messages. Therefore, Avaaz constitutes a hybrid actor (Chadwick 2007), combining flexible patterns of networking with a centralized organizing structure that is more characteristic of traditional interest groups. Focusing on issues that are in the global spotlight and based on a small group of professionals, Avaaz is able to keep the operating costs low, which grant it greater flexibility and independence (Karpf 2012). To ensure rapid and broad mobilization, Avaaz concentrates on actions that demand limited time, such as e-petitions. The organization's tactics leave it open to criticisms of slacktivism or clicktivism since signing an e-petition or "liking" a Facebook page require little commitment and, for some commentators, they are ineffective in fostering strong ties and a real involvement with the issues of the campaign (Gladwell 2010). However, Avaaz sees its role more as an organization providing the infrastructure for quick and effective activism (Beutz-Land 2009). Its use of the Internet, and particularly social media platforms, is in line with this strategy as it is aimed at promoting the organization's campaigns and leveraging the social networks of supporters. Still social media applications do foster "affiliative ties" between Avaaz members (Kavada 2012), creating a sense of abstract connection with other participants on the platform as a result of their common affiliation to the organization (Flanagin, Stohl, and Bimber 2006).

Civil society actors governed by a logic of aggregation may be even less sustainable, cohesive and durable than those following a networking logic. The collective subjectivity that they foster is fragile, always at risk of becoming disaggregated into its individual components (Juris 2012). In their analysis of the Occupy Movement, Juris *et al.* (2012) further note that compared with the Global Justice Movement, Occupy had more difficulty in coordinating "across specificity and difference" (Juris *et al.* 2012: 3) and in addressing the internal inequalities of the movement. However, further empirical research is necessary in order to render these observations more conclusive.

Research Challenges and Emerging Questions

Focusing on non-governmental organizations, social movements, and transnational advocacy networks, this chapter attempted to trace the connections between the organizational forms of global civil society and new communication technologies. This is still a nascent field of enquiry that lacks concrete theoretical frameworks on how communication technologies shape organizational forms. Still, scholars interested in this topic can draw inspiration from a variety of fields, including, management theories, network, complexity and self-organization theories, as well as specific strands of organizational communication that focus on how communication shapes organizational forms (Putnam and Maydan Nicotera 2009). Researchers should pay attention to the microlevel of interactions and to the ways in which these encounters produce higher order structures (Taylor and van Every 2000). The emphasis should thus be on processes and mechanisms, rather than on simply identifying the characteristics of different organizational forms or on engaging in a post-facto analysis about the reasons why certain forms prevail over others.

At the same time, research in these issues should be based on a solid conceptualization of the relationship between technology and society. In recent years, polarized debates on the existence of Twitter or Facebook "revolutions" tend to posit communication technologies as the factor that determines the characteristics of political mobilizations. Opposing views veer toward the other direction, regarding technology as a blank canvas serving the interests of the activists using it. I would thus like to argue for a middle-way approach, one that avoids both social and technological determinism by viewing communication technologies and civil society organizations as forces that constitute each other. Following actor–network theory, we can consider "digital networking mechanisms (e.g. various social media and devices that run them) as potential network agents alongside human actors (i.e. individuals and organizations)" (Bennett and Segerberg 2012: 753) whose combination forms a "sociotechnical network'. The notion of "affordances" (Hutchby 2001) can also be helpful in this regard as it suggests that the characteristics and capacities of communication technologies enable and constrain – "afford" – certain uses. However, specific "affordances" emerge in the context of the use of these technologies and are also shaped by the users' skills, goals and attitudes.

Research on the connections between new communication technologies and organizational forms should also move beyond an exclusive focus on one technology. While studies may opt to concentrate on specific applications, the role of these applications should be understood against the backdrop of the broader communication ecology of the movement. In this respect, Constanza-Chock "proposes a shift away from platform-centric analysis of the relationship between social movements and the media toward the concept of social movement media

cultures: the set of tools, skills, social practices and norms that movement participants deploy to create, circulate, curate and amplify movement media across all available platforms" (2012: 1). This can help in generating a more in-depth understanding of "transmedia mobilizations" (Constanza-Chock 2012) and of the flows and overlaps between different platforms. Furthermore, by focusing on "communication" rather than the "media," researchers can become more alert to practices that cut across mediated and unmediated communication. They will thus be able to move beyond the distinction between online and offline, a topic of enquiry that has become even more pressing in recent years.

The shift towards more networked organizational forms has also generated many questions that demand further research. For instance, we still know relatively little about how power operates within these more flexible forms of organization. Lack of hierarchy does not necessarily lead to a more equal distribution of power, but reconfigures the ways in which power is accrued and wielded within the collective. In this respect, it is important not only to identify the mechanisms shaping power dynamics but also to understand how these mechanisms are related to new communication technologies. For example, influence can accumulate around specific Internet-related roles, such as the online moderators, software coders, or Facebook page creators.

Another pressing question concerns the impact of these organizational forms on civic identities and political participation. For all the debates around slacktivism and clicktivism, the field is still missing concrete empirical evidence on the experiences and attitudes of lay citizens. Does "liking" an organization on Facebook constitute a stepping stone toward more in-depth commitment to a cause? And if organizations like Avaaz succeed in mobilizing people who would otherwise be inactive, then should we care so much about the types of protest these people become engaged in?

This is related to another set of questions that refer to the criteria we use to judge the effectiveness and "success" of these organizational forms. Should social movements necessarily develop a cohesive mission or can they still effect change with a looser, more individualized collective identity? Are such organizational forms better able to fulfil the goals of civil society and to change the policies of targets? When do organizational forms fail and when do they succeed?

Furthermore, exploring the relationship between the organizational forms of global civil society and communication media entails many practical challenges. As social movements and mobilizations become more rapid and ephemeral, their study requires a significant degree of preparedness on the part of the researcher. Studies focusing on the role of online tools, and particularly social media, are also faced with an overwhelming wealth of online data. While these data are valuable for understanding the information flows on specific platforms, they need to be combined with more qualitative ethnographic approaches in order to yield a more comprehensive image of the connections between communication technologies and organizational forms.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter outlined the role of the Internet in the organizational forms of transnational civil society. It traced the emergence of global civil society and examined various types of civic actors, including NGOs and social movements. While these actors initially adopted more hierarchical organizational forms, the advent of the Internet, alongside changes in the political and social environment brought on by globalization, have led to a shift toward more networked types of organization. Networks consist of diverse actors, which are connected with rich communication flows and ties of solidarity (Keck and Sikkink 1998). They are fluid and flexible formations and easily adaptable to local conditions. The emergence of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and the Global Justice Movement are considered as emblematic of this shift.

Current movements such as Occupy exhibit similar characteristics that can be thought as an acceleration of previously observed patterns. Yet for some scholars, these new movements are underlined more by a logic of aggregation (Juris 2012). Rather than fostering networking and a collective identity, they bring together "crowds of individuals" and are designed to accommodate personal narratives and individual voices.

Yet research in these issues is still scarce and numerous questions remain unresolved. For instance, we currently lack solid theoretical frameworks that explain how communication constitutes different organizational forms. A more nuanced understanding of the relationship between technology and civil society is also necessary as debates on the role of the Internet in protest movements tend to be either technologically or socially deterministic. Studying the relationship between new communication technologies and organizational forms also entails a variety of methodological challenges, emerging both from the wealth of online data and the transient nature of current mobilizations. Further research in this field is however crucial for developing our understanding of how people collectively organize their demands and build solidarity on the transnational level.

Notes

1   Combining these characteristics in a single definition, Diani (1992: 13) suggests that a social movement is "a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity."

2   The concept of network is nonetheless slippery (Stalder 2006) as different strands of network theory tend to approach networks differently. While it is not the purpose of this chapter to provide an overview of these approaches, in analytical terms it is worth distinguishing between networks as agents, "as methodological tools, as metaphors for understanding forms of relations and as descriptors of social forms" (Knox, Savage,

and Harvey 2006: 114). Studies employing network concepts often slip from one category to the other, making it difficult to distinguish the mechanisms associated with network forms of organization from the methods used to study them.

3   However, one could argue that the emphasis on horizontality, inclusiveness, and individuality is not the preserve of the Global Justice Movement, as these principles underlined the New Social Movements (NSMs) of the 1960s, like the student movement or the women's movement. In contrast to the "old" bureaucratic movements of the industrial era, NSMs stressed autonomy and direct participation and viewed bureaucracy as a dehumanizing structure (Pichardo 1997). Yet, compared with the Global Justice Movement, NSMs tended to be more single-issue rather than multiple-issue. The Global Justice Movement also operates more as a "network of networks" or a "movement of movements" (Della Porta 2005b), bringing together very diverse constituents.

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22

Communication for Transparency and Social Accountability

Norbert Wildermuth

Globally, huge investments are made in information and communications technology (ICT) as an undisputed and essential component of almost all activities – state and corporate. ICT-facilitated strategies are, by now, also an integral part of international development cooperation. The rapid and global spread of ICTs – particularly the Internet and mobile telephony – is making information available instantly and at low cost to a degree unprecedented in history. They can be used to seek, receive, create, and impart information by anyone, at any time, and for any purpose.

By reconfiguring the relations between states and between citizens and states, the global proliferation of ICTs has caused fundamental shifts in both human's public and private life spheres, including patterns of civic engagement and governance (Chadwick 2006). Put more bluntly, the ubiquitous presence of ICTs in our lives raises key question regarding their role and influence on the values, processes, and outcomes of public bureaucracies and representative institutions, including political parties and legislatures, democratic pressure groups; social movements; and global governance institutions.

The innovative use of new ICT-enabled, digital media has, for example, created new forms of citizen journalism, which give space to a diversity of voices. In this way, ICTs enhance freedom of expression and the right to information and increases the possibilities for citizens' participation in decision-making processes. ICTs are used by citizens and civil society for networking and to enhance advocacy and mobilization, locally and globally. Social network media, online communities, and mobile phones create new modes of social interaction, for example through the use of mobile phones for documentation of human rights violations, of election processes and the use of SMS for networking and mobilization The rapid and wide spread of affordable mobile telephony points thus to the role of

networked ICTs as a *digital bridge*[1] and participatory mass medium. Yet while ICTs have a potential to enhance community cohesion, political deliberation, civic engagement and participation, they also reconfigure the relationships between surveillance, privacy, and security (Chadwick 2006, 83, 257; Morazov 2011).

In government, the use of ICTs holds a promise to increase state-led, "horizontal" mechanisms of accountability and transparency, counteracting corruption through a more efficient administration and increased flows of information. Thus the employment of ICTs by the executive may strengthen governance and improve interaction between government and citizens. Yet, while the increasing influence of ICTs in almost all facets of our lives, and their role in accelerating globalization and other economic, social, and cultural changes is widely acknowledged, the research field of communication for (development and) social change has so far been characterized primarily by paying attention to some of the more spectacular and, in the global media landscape, highly visible, citizen-led uses of ICT for social and political change. These are, to mention a few, the so-called Twitter and Facebook revolutions (Arab Spring; protests in Iran, Burma, China, and other authoritarian regimes) and other social-movement driven protests, such as the Mexican Zapatistas; transnational advocacy campaigns by Greenpeace, Amnesty International, Invisible Children (Kony 2012); transnational social movement organizations (WTO protest in Seattle, IndyMedia, ATTAC, alter-globalization movement, Occupy Wall Street Movement); and new social movements.

This chapter is, in contrast, an attempt to direct the reader's attention toward a so far understudied cluster of evolving, innovative social change strategies that civil society stakeholders, exploring the appropriation and development of ICT tools and techniques for the empowerment of ordinary citizens (and specifically of the excluded, marginalized, and poor), have sought to develop and carry out in practice. Namely, I will address the communicative dimension of ICT and social accountability. I thereby hope to encourage our discipline's empirical, analytical, and theoretical commitment to an important and promising field of civic engagement and participatory agency that appears to gain ever more ground in the transitional societies of the Global South.

In particular, I will look at a new generation of social accountability practices that through their creation of a solid evidence base seek to facilitate citizens' direct forms of interaction with public service providers and government officials. Speaking in general terms and subsuming a multiplicity of new communicative approaches to further social accountability, we can state a strong explorative emphasis on the role of ICTs in supporting participatory publics'[2] agency to create vibrant public deliberations as well as to engage in social accountability and auditing practices.[3] For citizens to be engaged, they need information to be aware, communication to organize actions, organization to make their action more effective and feedback to have results. ICT-facilitated processes of communication can be used in these contexts as strategic mechanisms in support of citizens' actions. ICT-facilitated communication for social accountability deserves our

recognition as a specific form of communication for social change, as it corresponds in essence to the characteristics constitutive for our discipline's participatory paradigm. The above stated lack of empirical studies and theoretical conceptualization of ICT-facilitated communication for social accountability is thus *not* a reflection on the incomprehensibility of the involved practices, strategies, and approaches with the conceptual ideas and normative values of communication for social change (C4SC). Quite to the contrary! Seeking to emphasize the generic nature of the communication for social accountability phenomena that are the heart of this chapter, we may hence ask three questions:

1. Can social accountability mechanisms be considered as processes of collective civic agency that are highly communicative in nature?
2. Are they intentional and directed at normatively defined processes of social change?
3. Do they adhere to the core principles of the participatory paradigm that has come to define the ideal practice and theoretical conceptualization of communication for social change?

Addressing these questions I will argue and seek to demonstrate that social accountability mechanisms indeed constitute intentional processes of communication for social change and are beneficially studied empirically by the dominant methodological approaches of the C4SC discipline, while they might be best understood along the theoretical and conceptual frameworks that constitute communication for social change as a distinct academic field. My endeavor is to firmly ground the study of ICT-facilitated communication for social accountability in C4SC theory, but not hand in hand with an attempt to make an exclusive disciplinary claim to provide the only relevant systematic, scholarly interpretation. One of the obvious reasons for this is the recognition that each and every theory of mediated communication must start from and build on a social theory. In this sense, my exploration of the ICT-facilitated communicative dimension of social accountability owes heavily to other disciplinary understandings of social accountability mechanisms, as for example articulated in development studies, political science, and social movement theory.

Social Accountability:
The Demand Side of Good Governance

Social accountability is a form of collective civic engagement intrinsically linked to a number of key concepts and agendas, including the normative ideals, developmental goals and discourses of good governance. Thus, social accountability mechanisms are commonly assigned a key role to play in improving governance

and deepening democracy (Reuben 2002, 2003). Social accountability is sometimes referred to as the "demand side of good governance," as it is based upon the active involvement of citizens in demanding accountability from their elected representatives and leaders. Traditionally, efforts to tackle the challenge of account-ability have tended to concentrate on improving the "supply-side" of governance using methods such as political checks and balances, administrative rules and procedures, auditing requirements, and formal law enforcement agencies like courts and the police. These "top-down" accountability promoting mechanisms have met with only limited success in many countries. More recently, increased attention has therefore been paid to the "demand side" of good governance – that is, to strengthening the voice and capacity of citizens (especially marginalized citizens) to directly demand greater accountability and responsiveness from public officials and service providers. Respective aspirations are associated with the con-cept of "participatory governance publics" and a global movement toward more decentralized governmental structures. Both decentralization and the emphasis on participation in governance have thus become an integral part of the "third wave" of democratization, witnessed in countries around Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War.

Social accountability and civil auditing is widely considered to have a strong potential to contribute to poverty reduction through more pro-poor policy design, improved service delivery, and empowerment (Malena, Foster, and Singh 2004; Shah 2003; World Bank Institute 2005). Some social accountability mechanisms have specifically been developed for use by poor (and/or illiterate) populations and many focus on issues of priority importance to poor people, such as public health, education, water and sanitation services (Malena, Foster, and Singh 2004; Velleman 2010). Moreover, social accountability is closely related to rights-based approaches to development and governance. The obligation of government officials and public service providers to be accountable to the population derives from notions of citizens' information rights, often enshrined in constitutions, and the broader set of human rights. Social accountability offers mechanisms to monitor and protect these rights. The concept of social accountability underlines thus the right of citizens to expect and ensure that state institutions and democratically elected/appointed decision makers act in the best interests of the people.

Importantly, the concept of social accountability is closely linked to that of enhanced public participation (Gaventa 2002; Malena, Foster and Singh 2004; Sasaki *et al*. 2010; Simeen 2004). It is the participation of citizens that distin-guishes social accountability from conventional, top-down mechanisms of accountability. In many cases, citizens, communities and civil society organiza-tions do not merely participate in social accountability activities but initiate and control them. While many participatory approaches focus exclusively on the individual community or micro level, social accountability mechanisms expand opportunities for participation at the macro level. This may include, for example, citizen involvement in the analysis and/or formulation of national or local

budgets or linking the findings of local level participatory monitoring and evaluation exercises to budgetary, administrative or governance issues at higher levels of the public service delivery chain.

Last but not least, social accountability mechanisms can complement public sector reforms, by addressing the demand side aspects of public service delivery, monitoring and accountability. Social accountability mechanisms have proved particularly useful in the context of decentralization, helping to strengthen links between citizens and local-level governments and assisting local authorities and service-providers to become more responsive and effective (Malena, Foster, and Singh 2004: 7). They facilitate the emergence of "new publics" and induce civil society activists and government officials to engage each other in public venues whereby they exchange mutually needed information. Government officials gain access to the demands and needs of citizens, often marginalized residents, while these gain access to basic information about state authority, resources, and decision-making processes.

In essence, social accountability is used to refer to the broad range of actions and mechanisms (beyond voting) that citizens, communities, civil society organizations (CSOs), and independent media can use to hold public officials and servants accountable. Hence, social accountability's normative practice and theoretical conceptualization as participatory democracy and governance is linked to key agendas of communication for social change and good governance such as transparency, public opinion and deliberation, social inclusion, and civic empowerment.

By monitoring government performance, demanding and enhancing transparency and exposing government failures and misdeeds, social accountability mechanisms are also powerful tools against corruption (Bekri *et al.* 2011; Malena, Foster, and Singh 2004, 7; Narayan *et al.* 2000). Indeed it has been argued by some that the only true safeguard against public sector corruption is the active and ongoing societal monitoring of government actions and the evolution of more open and participatory anti-corruption institutions. According to the World Bank Institute handbook on "Social Accountability in the Public Sector," there are three fundamental threats to the construction of good governance and the rule of law in the developing world, namely corruption, clientelism, and capture. "It is generally accepted that the best way to combat this three-headed monster and thereby guarantee the public interest character of the state is by strengthening government "accountability" (World Bank Institute 2005: 4). With reference to social accountability tools and mechanisms for improved urban water services in the Global South, Yael Velleman states on a comparable line of argumentation:

> The availability and accessibility of information and the transparency of practices play a crucial role in increasing downward accountability, as well as forming the basis for user-side social accountability tools (e.g., comparing utility-provided data with user-generated data on service level and quality). Such transparency also facilitates the identification of low-performance areas, further enhancing the equitable

distribution, sustainability and efficiency of water services. Importantly, transparency increases users' trust in the provider creates a foundation for partnership, and helps transform negative perceptions held by providers of poor individuals and neighborhoods. (2010: 11)

Accessibility in this context being defined in terms of: (1) dissemination (meetings and outreach, media, Internet, and so on); (2) language (both in terms of actual local languages as well as the simplification of complex technical language); (3) the challenges of education and communication in target areas; and (4) timeliness of information publications (particularly if ahead of deadlines: e.g., local budget processes).

While the outline of social accountability mechanisms given so far may have provided the reader with a rough characterization and basic understanding of the concept, I will now, in a second step, approach the question how communication can strengthen and qualify social accountability initiatives and facilitate outcomes defined in terms of the mentioned key agendas and normative goals.

Communication Approaches and Techniques to Support Social Accountability Mechanisms

In sum, there are three main arguments underlying the importance of communication in social accountability. These are: improved governance, increased development effectiveness, and empowerment. Not surprisingly, all three issues accentuate the communicative essence of social accountability. Social accountability mechanisms allow ordinary citizens to access information, voice their needs, and demand accountability between elections. Emerging social accountability practices enhance the ability of citizens to move beyond mere protest toward engaging with bureaucrats and politicians in a more informed, organized, constructive, and systematic manner, thus increasing the chances of effecting positive change.

Achievement of broad developmental goals (e.g., the Millennium Developmental Goals) is facilitated by improved public service delivery and more informed policy design, based on the principles of just and democratic governance. In many countries, and especially in developing countries, the government fails to deliver key essential services to its citizens due to problems such as: misallocation of resources, leakages, misappropriations and corruption, weak incentives or a lack of articulated demand. Similarly, governments often formulate policies in a discretionary and non-transparent manner that goes against the interests and actual priorities of the poor. These problems are perpetuated because the three key groups of actors in the public policy and service delivery chain – policymakers, service providers and citizens – have different (sometimes conflicting) goals and incentives, heightened by information asymmetries and lack of communication. By enhancing the availability of information, strengthening citizen voice,

promoting dialogue and consultation between the three groups of actors and creating incentives for improved performance, social accountability mechanisms can go a long way toward improving the effectiveness of service delivery and making public decision-making more transparent, participatory and pro-poor. Since poor people are most reliant on government services and least equipped to hold government officials to account, they have the most to gain from social accountability initiatives (Singh and Shah 2003).

Struggles for empowerment, particularly of poor and marginalized people, further underline that social accountability mechanisms seek to address the communicative shortcomings of the state. Research shows that ordinary people's dissatisfaction with government relates largely to issues of responsiveness and accountability. They commonly report that state institutions are "often neither responsive nor accountable to the poor" and "not accountable to anyone or accountable only to the rich and powerful" (Narayan *et al.* 2000: 172, 177). By providing critical information on rights and entitlements and soliciting systematic feedback from poor people, social accountability mechanisms provide a means to increase and aggregate the voice of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. This enhanced voice potentially contributes to the struggles of ordinary citizens without political clout and increases the chance of greater responsiveness on the part of the state to their needs.

As pointed out in the World Bank/CommGap manual titled "Generating Genuine Demand for Accountability through Communication," the public sphere is the dominant communicative space in which social accountability is realized:

> The public sphere is a space between state and civil society. In this space government and citizens exchange information and services: Citizens communicate their demands to the government and, if satisfied with how these are met by the government, reward legitimacy to the government in office. The government provides rules, regulations, and public goods and services to the citizens. The mere delivery of services without accountability is insufficient to achieve good governance. … Citizens are stakeholders in the public sphere. Effective communication among the stakeholders promises to raise the citizen voice and thereby strengthen accountability (Arnold and Garcia 2011: 2).

Ideally, the government sets up channels for two-way communication between public servants and various societal stakeholders. Through these mechanisms the government informs citizens about actions taken on their behalf, while citizens are given the opportunity to make known their needs and preferences. Free and independent (mass) media are a critical pillar in this equation. Thus, the government, citizens, and corporate enterprises are ideally expected to interact through the public sphere, which has a number of characteristics and constitutive elements. These include laws and civil liberties, such as citizens' right for free assembly and freedom of speech. In (liberal democratic) theory, an empowered civil society can exert influence over the state by being active in the public sphere and voicing its concerns (Norris 2001). However, the model presented here is an

ideal case and rarely, if ever, exists in reality. Social-accountability mechanisms, including communication, aim to improve existing public spheres, so that they get closer to this ideal. The stronger the elements of the public sphere, the more empowered the civil society, and the more efficient citizens can be in holding their governments accountable (Arnold and Garcia 2011: 5).

Digital online media and ICTs in general have been shown to create spaces for publication and debate in contexts where access to independent media and freedom of expression is limited. The explosion of citizen journalism – unedited, uncontrolled, and largely and openly biased online content posted by individuals or organizations onto lists, websites, blogs, etc. – has offered a voice to individuals, communities and marginalized groups. This potential has been leveraged by some mainstream media organizations, creating a new relationship with the audience/listener. The new audience/media consumer has now effectively become a co-creator of the content he or she consumes. At the same time, the new digital online media simultaneously create spaces for publication and debate in contexts where access to independent media and freedom of expression is limited.

Thus, while the notion of the press/media as fourth estate and as the "watchdog of civil society" is more than 200 years old, media professionals are no longer considered the sole custodians of government source information. Rather than relying on journalists to procure and distribute information from the government to citizens, we now see a new approach where citizens demand information from their governments and use digital online tools and networked platforms to make sense of that information collectively, and use it to hold their leaders accountable (Sasaki 2010: 9). Civil society, around the world, has begun to move its transparency, auditing and accountability efforts online. These efforts are supported by a growing tech community, nowadays found in the "digital hubs" of the Global South, though a widespread lack of access to information and communications technology and a consequent lack of understanding and interest in these tools, sustained in the surrounding national environments, constitute a significant challenge to their success (Sasaki 2010: 20). Given this incongruous situation, the outline of a conceptual framework by which we can study the opportunities and challenges of using ICT in social accountability initiatives in the Global South in a C4SC perspective, seems a highly relevant and necessary research endeavor.

ICT Facilitated Communication for Social Accountability as e-Participation

With Rafael Obregon (2012: 66) we can state that the conceptual and programmatic shifts in the C4SC field have been discussed widely in academic literature (Servaes 2008; Melkote and Steeves 2011; Morris and Waisbord 2001). From an information-driven focus and vertical communication approaches that dominated

communication for development efforts in the 1960s' and 1970s' dominant para-digm, our field has shifted towards a more inclusive, two-way, participatory communication process that seeks to facilitate engagement of individuals and communities in development programs and social change initiatives (Hemer and Tufte 2005; Morris and Waisbord 2001; Gray-Felder and Deane 1999). This new, participatory approach emphasizes the capacity of social actors to develop their own discourses, create, share and negotiate meaning, and participate in dialog-ical processes that emphasize the realization of human rights. As argued above, increasing access to and the strategic use of ICTs has a potential to help bring about economic development, poverty reduction, and democratization – including freedom of speech, the free flow of information and the promotion of human rights in the Global South. That is, the present advent of ICT on a global scale has been understood to augment opportunities for people's engagement in development- and social change-related issues. In consequence, and in accor-dance with a participatory approach to communication for development and social change, the international donor community has sought to:

> Support the strategic use of ICTs as a tool for democracy, human rights and social development.

> Support a rights-based approach to development, and aim ICT activities at poverty reduction in general, and the promotion of social equity, gender equality, a higher quality of life, and cultural diversity in particular. (SIDA 2009)

With regard to state-citizen relations, we can furthermore distinguish between three levels of strategic uses of ICT to advance democratic processes at the national level:

- **E-government**   ICTs within government, with a view to improving efficiency in interactions and information flows between government departments and state organs.
- **E-governance**   ICTs in the interface between government and citizens, with a view to improving interaction and feedback between government and citizens.
- **E-participation**   ICTs for empowerment of citizens and civil society organizations.

E-government can be narrowly defined as "e-administration," where ICT serves to streamline intergovernmental relations and flows of information with the view to improve government services, transactions and interactions with citizens, businesses, and other arms of government. E-government has a potential to facilitate better service to citizens (1) by offering information via government web pages; (2) by facilitating access to government services, like, for instance, online tax submissions and payments or online passport applications; and (3) by developing depersonalized services that reduce risk of corruption.

With respect to the advance of democratic practice, e-government can entail more efficient registration of state employees and of citizens in general, as well as the collection and centralization – and analysis – of facts and statistics for planning purposes. Increased registration of human births and of girls in particular increases the possibilities of women and men to attain identification documents and to participate in general elections, to receive credits and loans, to buy, own, and inherit property – in short, to enjoy their political and civil rights.

E-governance, in contrast, describes the interface between government and citizens, including increased citizen participation and political influence. E-governance entails a strategic and conscious use of ICT for the purpose of enhancing democratic participation in addition to increased services. Examples of e-governance practice include, among others:

- enhanced communication between government, parliamentarians, and citizens;
- electronic publication of proposed bills and legislation using the Web and SMS in order to enable feedback from citizens;
- electronic election systems;
- deployment of community information centers;
- citizens' and civil society's use of ICT for influencing opinion and political decision processes (SIDA 2009: 26).

While these practices may support horizontal (also called "internal") mechanisms of accountability it is important to note that initiatives of e-governance are state-led and neither initiated nor controlled by civil society (organizations). I therefore suggest locating ICT-facilitated uses of communication for social accountability within the third sphere of e-participation.

E-participation defined as digital empowerment or ICT for empowerment, a third level of ICT use to advance democratic processes, can be broadly defined as the use of ICTs to create new and improved possibilities for horizontal communication and networking, between individuals, civil society and other groups (Wildermuth 2010a, 2010b). As widely observed, while the political uses of these media mechanisms may still be less significant than their role in serving citizens in non-political arenas, activists and advocacy groups are increasingly using digital online media and mobile communication tools to network and to mobilize for specific purposes. The main innovation of the new information technologies affording these participatory network uses is the fact that they are both bidirectional – or multidirectional in the case of the Internet – and real-time tools. Bidirectionality empowers the users and makes information updated in real time. Taking advantage of these characteristics, ICTs support the capabilities that allow for citizen agency (Simeen 2004), facilitating the three main pillars of civic engagement discerned by Norris (2001): (1) what people learn about public affairs, their political knowledge; (2) the public's orientation of support for the political

system and its actors, their political trust; and (3) activities designed to influence authorities and the decision-making process, people's political participation.

If ICTs can be strategically integrated and implemented on all these three levels – the fundamental reasoning behind the emerging ICT (facilitated communication) for social accountability approach goes – they may become a tool to provide capabilities of citizen agency to the people that use them (UNCTAD 2006). In this sense, ICTs are not only understood as tools to empower people, but as providing people the capacity for self-empowerment (Zanelloa and Maasen 2009: 6).

Based on the outlined considerations regarding ICTs and democracy and substantiated by empirical research done in Kenya, as part of the MEDIeA project[4] (Wildermuth 2013), the multitude of communicative approaches to ICT for social accountability can be divided into six stages of strategic action, each of them accentuating the empowering essence of the participatory paradigm, though each with its particular emphasis and set of intentions:

1. *Public educational*
    Objective: provide government source information and create public knowledge, for example about legal rights available services.
    Means: open government data access (online databases) and multichannel info campaigns (dissemination via mail lists, mobile text messages, tweets, RSS, and so on).
2. *Government data interpretation*
    Objective: aggregate, analyze, and mediate open government data.
    Means: collective, civil society led data interpretation and representation in a public accessible (transparency enhancing) and common understandable form (visualization, condensation, translation into non-expert language).
3. *Data collection*
    Objective: generate systematic evidence base for accountability related advocacy campaigns.
    Means: crowd-sourced, citizen-based data collection, monitoring, and social auditing tools (complementary and/or independent of governmental data).
4. *Deliberation*
    Objective: give a voice to ordinary citizens and articulate their complaints, suggestions, concerns, and point of views regarding the performance of the state and its public service provisions.
    Means: communicative spaces beyond the mere collection of feedback and user data; social inclusion of "voiceless" citizens in public discourse.
5. *Public mobilization*
    Objective: mobilize citizens to address non-responsiveness of polity, administration and public services to social accountability mechanisms.

Means: tools to address, mobilize and organize the public (advocacy groups, social movement organizations and other bearers of rights-based campaigns).

6. *Participatory decision making*

Objective: allow ordinary citizens to cooperate in decision-making process of governmental institutions (e.g., through citizen involvement in public commissions and hearings, citizen advisory boards and oversight committees).

Means: expertise-based cooperation tools (Wiki government); participatory budgeting and other cooperative forms of voluntarism that involve citizens in governance and public service provision.

Experiences from the Ground and Need for Further Research

In order to explicate the utilization of ICTs for social accountability along the outlined stages of strategic action we can with advantage consider a concrete case, namely the National Taxpayer Association (NTA) of Kenya.[5]

The NTA is an independent, non-partisan organization focused on promoting good governance in Kenya through citizen empowerment, enhancing public service delivery and partnership building. Since 2006, the NTA has been implementing programs focused on enhanced citizen demand for accountability through monitoring of the quality of public service delivery and the management of devolved funds. The Nairobi-based CSO has pursued this endeavor through the development and employment of social accountability tools, citizen report cards (CRCs), civic awareness and citizen capacity-building, and by initiating partnerships with the Kenyan government and non-state actors. The NTA's specific objectives are, according to their website:

1. To ensure that taxpayers' money is used to deliver quality services, such as health, education, agriculture, roads, and water, for all Kenyans.
2. To ensure transparent and citizen-responsive management of taxpayers' money in devolved funds, such as the Constituency Bursary Fund, Constituency Development Fund, Free Primary Education Fund, and suchlike.
3. To sensitize citizens on their rights and responsibilities as taxpayers.[6]

In addition to the NTA's Nairobi Secretariat, the donor-funded CSO has eight active regional coordination offices that effectively support and enable operations at constituency level. This national–regional structure is complemented by 23 constituency monitoring committees (CMCs), established and trained to help mobilize community level demand for accountability as well as to work with the

NTA regional offices to facilitate monitoring management of public resources and provision of public services. That is, the NTA's multilayered organizational structure, bringing together a limited number of professionals and a broad base of volunteers located all over Kenya, allows for social accountability and auditing activities to be predominantly shaped, managed and implemented by Kenyan citizens at constituency level.

Importantly, while the NTA has proved its capacity to reach and mobilize citizens in their constituencies to generate their own focus of social accountability based on the needs of citizens in their locality, the coordinating NTA Secretariat assists local and regional activities with expertise and capacity building activities. Moreover, the Secretariat: (1) develops and widely disseminates practical tools for monitoring the devolved funds and the delivery of essential services both at district and national levels; (2) provides information to the public through media and other communication channels on a regular basis concerning essential services; and (3) compiles citizen report cards based on submitted reports from Regional Officers, NTA Technical Committees, and CMCs.

With respect to the *public-educational* (first) and *government data interpretation* (second) stage of strategic action, the NTA has provided both relevant contextual information, as well as aggregated, analyzed, and mediated open government data to a substantial part of Kenyan population through the publication of informational and educational materials, through so-called public forums, radio dramas, TV talk shows and online distributed content. These communicative efforts have focused on the Kenyan tax and governance system, in general, and on how devolved funds are being used specifically for development on a constituency level. As issues of governance, tax and accountability can be technical, complex and seemingly disconnected from the day-to-day issues faced by ordinary Kenyans, the NTA has gone to great efforts to dismantle the technicalities of governance and tax processes and to increase citizen awareness on these issues, providing Kenyans with all the basic information in a user-friendly, simple, and accessible manner.[7]

Previously Kenyan citizens have faced severe obstructions when they sought information on management of devolved funds such as the so-called Constituency Development Fund (CDF). Following the NTA's partnership with the CDF Board, they can now most comprehensively access this information with ease from the CDF offices in their respective constituencies. This has contributed to an increasingly informed and rights-aware citizenry with Kenyans now increasingly able to make informed decisions on governance aspects that directly affect them.

The NTA's lasting efforts to enable increased public access to information and citizens' awareness of their right to demand accountability from government service providers and devolved fund managers, build on a multilayered communication strategy that makes ever more use of networked online media. However, so far, the amount of informational and educational content concerning the Kenyan tax and devolved budget allocation system, accessible via the NTA's website, is still limited and has continued scope for enlargement.

It has meanwhile been acknowledged that the ICT-facilitation of social accountability and public auditing mechanisms has to take into account the realities of digital access and inclusion, on the ground. Though three out of four Kenyans owned a mobile phone and one out of two Kenyans had Internet access through mobile data description in late 2011, the educational and awareness raising activities, which necessarily accompany social accountability initiatives' mobilization of engaged citizens on a community level, continue to demand a high level of face-to-face interaction between activists and ordinary citizens. The online provision of relevant knowledge, educational materials and customized open government data should in consequence seek to augment, rather than replace the proven tools and strategies of communicative action. As the example of the NTA and experience from other social accountability initiatives indisputably shows, ICTs are at best utilized to enhance knowledge flows (1) within the CSO, that is from the "experts" to the base, in our case, from the NTA Secretariat to the regional coordinators, CMCs, and community level volunteers; and (2) from the CSO (i.e., the NTA Secretariat) to a broader (Kenyan) public including media professionals with an interest in questions of public service provision and accountability. Moreover, it seems obvious that the public online provision of knowledge is still limited in its probable impact by the very patterns of Internet access and use prevalent in developing countries like Kenya. Downloading and reading large documents on a mobile phone is possible but inconvenient and, due to few flat-rate and high-speed data subscriptions, costly and time-consuming. Also a culture of systematic and sustained information seeking through the Internet is only nascent in wide parts of the Global South, where interpersonal, two-step flows of knowledge attainment and evaluation continue to play a minor role, especially amongst the less privileged and poorly educated masses. At the same time, other dimensions of ICT facilitation have been pushed successfully by the NTA. Customized information and open government data on CDF, other devolved funds,[8] rural roads, registration services, health services, and the education sector, have been widely included and made the base of the NTA's social audits-based *Citizen Report Cards*. Most important among these are the online accessible *Citizen's Constituency Development Fund Report Cards*, covering all of Kenya's 210 constituencies.[9] The comprehensive and detailed report cards, aggregate the empirical assessment data meticulously collected by local NTA volunteers and their respective Constituency Monitoring Committee (see Figure 22.1).

The sheer comprehensiveness and systematic evidence base created and disseminated through these social accountability tools underlines, most impressively, achievements made in regard to the *data collection* (third) and *deliberation* (fourth) stage of ICT-facilitated strategic action that NTA has made in recent years. Publicly launched and presented online, through press conferences and most importantly, on occasion of well attended public gatherings in each and every constituency, the social accountability processes realized around the NTA's citizen

Project Number	CDF E 25	
Constituency	Embakasi	
Project Name	Utawala Village Secondary School.	
Project Activity	Construction of a new Secondary school	
Location/Ward	Mihango	
MPs Name	Hon. Ferdinand Waititu	
Project status	Incomplete and not in use	
Date of visit	4.02.09	
Total Funds Awarded to date	7,177,850	
Total Funds Spent to date	6,177,850	
Total Unaccounted Funds	1,000,000	
Technical Performance Score	12/30 (40%)	
Project Classification	Category C	
Comments	Although the project received money in 2005/06 and 2006/07 Financial Years, the community members feel that the project has stalled for nearly three years. The school is not in use but so far it is well built. Another Kshs 3,000,000 was disbursed to the school in the 07/08 FY.	

Project Number	CDF E 28	
Constituency	Embakasi	
Project Name	Busara Primary School	
Project Activity	Assist in construction of a hall	
Location/Ward	Umoja	
MPs Name	Hon. Ferdinand Waititu	
Project status	Incomplete	
Date of visit		
Total Funds Awarded to date	500,000.00	
Total Funds Spent to date	500,000.00	
Total Unaccounted Funds	Nil	
Technical Performance Score	22/30 (73%)	
Project Classification	Category C	
Comments	The project has so far been well implemented although the funds are very inadequate. The school requested for Kshs 1 Million from the CDF kitty.	

Figure 22.1 Example from NTA's Embakasi Citizen Report Card, March 2010 (reprinted with kind permission of the National Taxpayers Association).

report cards have helped to ease citizen access to government officials, play down power dynamics, and reduce the victimization of "voiceless" citizens.

In 2009, the NTA conducted a national baseline assessment to better understand citizen perceptions of public accountability and the potential for public action. The assessment established that citizens believe health, education, water, security and

roads are the five most important government services. However, 50% of those surveyed were dissatisfied with the delivery of these services. Furthermore, almost 80% of surveyed citizens said that no action was taken about their complaints on public service delivery. It is evident that government complaints systems have been inefficient in responding to citizen complaints and have failed to bring about improvement in government service delivery. This situation allows for a significant utilization of ICTs in terms of the *public mobilization* (fifth) stage of strategic communication for social accountability and social change. In sum, the NTA has succeeded in opening up a nationwide debate on civic demand for accountability in governance and public service provision in an organized, structured, and highly participatory manner. As a result, government service providers and devolved fund managers have been challenged to take appropriate action.[10] With regard to the social accountability mechanism beyond civic auditing, what the NTA expects to accomplish in the near future is:

- to facilitate citizen-led demand for accountability from public service providers and managers of devolved funds both at the local and the national level; and
- to further increase NTA partnerships with public service providers so as to improve service delivery and management of public resources.

To achieve this broader scope of advocacy for good governance, the NTA's partnership with the Kenyan Social Development Network's (SODNET's)[11] INFONET program appears both promising and significant. Cooperation on the nationwide implementation of the INFONET produced the Huduma online platform, which has been specifically developed to enable citizens to amplify their voices in the demand for services directly to authorities and service providers.[12] Huduma, meaning "service" in Kiswahili, exists still only as a beta version, according to the project developer Philip Thigo. However, the basic design of the strategy and a technology tool is already clearly discernible. The technology component entails the deployment of a web- and mobile-based platform that aggregates and channels concerns and observations of citizens (SMS, voice, video, and so on) directly to authorities for redress (see Figure 22.2).

The ambitious project, which will allow direct crowd-sourced feedback from citizen's on issues of governance (see Figure 22.3), has so far (December 2012) only been employed on an experimental level in four Kenyan constituencies. It is therefore too early to predict its de facto impact if scaled up to a national level, as is planned not just in Kenya but in a number of other African countries as well. At this early stage, Huduma seems however already to demonstrate the potential which a non-technocentric employment of ICTs to facilitate social accountability mechanisms, seems to hold. Interfacing between citizens, the government, public service providers and the media, the Huduma platform provides simple technology / media-based tools and channels to amplifying citizen's concerns, displeasures, complaints or suggestions as a means to hold duty bearers accountable.

Figure 22.2 Huduma data flow diagram 01 (reprinted with kind permission of SODNET/INFONET).

In consequence:

- the government benefits from the information provided to follow up and act on key performance indicators to improve service delivery by its own officials;
- political leaders are made aware of the pressing needs of their constituents and the urgent need to address them; and
- public officers receive information on areas that need intervention as linked to their performance contracts.

What appears to be the greatest challenge for the platform's nationwide implementation meanwhile is the need for a CSO that has a well-established network of activists on the ground, who are volunteering to mobilize ordinary citizens to make use of this opportunity to directly engage service providers on public service delivery and resource issues through ICT-facilitated social accountability mechanisms. In this sense the cooperation between INFONET and the NTA, between "tool developing" and "tool implementing" CSOs, could provide the basis of a ground-breaking approach along the lines of Beth Simone Noveck's conceptualization of collaborative forms of "wiki governance" (Noveck 2009). In other words, they could afford for the ICT facilitation of the *participatory decision making* (sixth) stage of strategic action.

With John Siceloff and Rikke Ingrid Jensen (2012) it can meanwhile be argued, that the use of ICTs to enlarge the democratic space in sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the Global South, will not thrive without the persistent intervention

Figure 22.3 Huduma data flow diagram 02 (reprinted with kind permission of SODNET/INFONET).

of the international development assistance and donor community. Resource investment can leverage models that have demonstrated proof of concept into initiatives at national scale. This moves projects from interesting experiments to effective vehicles for advocacy and dialogue with government. Pro-governance strategies can bring government entities to the table, and unite CSOs, NGOs, and government into information partnerships, which address national priorities. Scale and citizen/government partnerships create the basis for long-term sustainability (Siceloff and Jensen 2012). On the same line of thinking the World Bank's Participation and Civic Engagement Group's Malena, Foster, and Singh have concluded their introductory working paper on the concept and emerging practice of social accountability by insisting that the long-term aim should be that social accountability mechanisms are institutionalized as part of existing governance and service delivery systems, thus ensuring greater accountability of governments to their citizens in all sectors:

> Critical factors of success include: access to and effective use of information, civil society and state capacities and synergy between the two. Ultimately, the effectiveness and sustainability of social accountability mechanisms is improved when they are "institutionalized" and when the state's own "internal" mechanisms of accountability are rendered more transparent and open to civic engagement. Social accountability mechanisms to be effective on the long run need to be institutionalized and linked to existing governance structures and service delivery systems. (Malena, Foster, and Singh 2004, abstract)

Also the initial experiences with ICT-facilitated social accountability show, in line with the lessons learned and articulated in the participatory paradigm of C4SC (Hemer and Tufte 2005; Servaes 2008), that it is essential to avoid viewing participatory tools as an end, rather than as a means to an end. That is, the key aim should be not only to raise the citizens' voice, but to turn their crowd-sourced, aggregated, and mediated voice into influence, aspiring to formation of institutionalized processes that lead to long-standing change and avoid the need for endless user mobilization (Wampler and McNulty 2011). The core ambition is thus to further collaborative, citizen-led governance and a participatory democracy of groups beyond mere deliberation by employing ICTs (Noveck 2005, 2009). Linking citizen- and state-led accountability the effectiveness and sustainability of social accountability mechanisms will ultimately be most improved when they are "institutionalized" and when the state's own "internal" mechanisms of account-ability are rendered more transparent and open to civic engagement.

While the competencies and resources (technical and analytical) which CSOs have at their disposal affect their ability to interact with users, providers and other stake-holders, collate, interpret and communicate information and assist the formalization of social accountability processes, a track record of neutrality and non-partisan action contributes to the credibility of the social accountability facilitating organization.

This brings me to my last point, the need to form coalitions that include users from various social classes and income levels and that bring the "louder" voices of the middle and upper classes into the process and helps to brand demands as "user-oriented" rather than "poor-oriented" (Velleman 2010).

Drawing on a broader scope of capacities lends the collective argument and evidence-based advocacy campaigns more credibility, which points to the importance of making coalitions "multidisciplinary," encompassing not only users from all classes but also various NGOs and academic institutions (Velleman 2010). Though the discipline of communication for social change has reached some understanding of the role of ICTs in social accountability initiatives – and this chapter has sought to sum up the present state – there remain many open questions. Future research by a variety of methodological and analytical approaches, focusing on the evolving field of respective practices around the world, provides therefore for a most urgent and promising research topic. A question that should be at the core of forthcoming communication for social change studies in this field is the question how promising experiences made with ICT-facilitated social accountability and transparency tools for good governance can go hand in hand with processes of devolution and decentralization. Another issue that should be addressed is the question how social accountability mechanisms can be designed for a self-multiplying, scaling up system with national reach and for the contextual customization if applied in other sociocultural environments.[13] Finally research should contribute to an identification of the communicative challenges and opportunities that ICTs provide to engage citizens in online / offline communities of participatory governance, and to strengthen their sense of ownership over and identification with emerging social accountability mechanisms.

Notes

1   Roman and Colle (2001) have conceptualized ICTs' potential as a "digital bridge" rather than a facilitation of "digital divides." They thus emphasize digital technologies affordance to bridge existing social, economic, and educational divides.
2   "Participatory publics" are in this context understood to consist of citizens and CSOs who mobilize themselves around democratic values and then hold accountable and promote the adoption of state institutions that mirror practices of just, fair, and participatory governance (Wampler and Avritzer 2004).
3   In the following I will subsume civil auditing mechanisms under the broader, generic concept of social accountability.
4   MEDIeA is an ongoing (2009–2013) research project on Media, Empowerment and Democracy in East Africa headed by my colleague Thomas Tufte (see http://mediea.ruc.dk/).
5   The NTA has been studied as part of the MEDIeA project.
6   At www.nta.or.ke / about-nta / vision-mission-a-values
7   A good example is, the post-budget analysis report on the National Budget for the financial year 2009/2010 produced by NTA. The report broke down the budget to show what the budget means for the ordinary citizen.

8 In early 2011 the Kenyan Government announced that devolved funds such as Constituency Development Fund (CDF), Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF), and Road Maintenance Fund will be phased out following the general elections in March 2013 and be replaced in the following fiscal year by the allocation of 15% (or approximately 1 billion euro) of the national revenues to the counties as required by the (new) Constitution. This will increase substantially the budget allocations decided on a decentralized level in Kenya.

9 Following the promulgation of the new Constitution, the number of Kenyan constituencies was increased to 290 on the occasion of the March 2013 presidential elections.

10 More than 60 press clippings documented on the NTA website provide ample evidence to support this claim (www.nta.or.ke/in-media/newspapers?layout=default).

11 SODNET is a Nairobi-based not-for-profit NGO created in 1994. Its objective is to facilitate strategic and efficient alliances among interested persons and social movements to exert influence in the drafting of policies on social development issues, in particular in the management of resources, globalization, and information.

12 At http://infonet.or.ke/?page_id=5173

13 Contemporarily SODNET explores, for example, the customization of Huduma for employment in other African countries.

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23

Citizens' Journalism
Shifting Public Spheres from Elites to Citizens

Clemencia Rodríguez and Ana María Miralles

It is no accident that this chapter was written by two Colombian communication scholars. New areas of research and theorization, citizens' media, public journalism, and citizens' journalism emerge at the intersection of media studies and social justice struggles, and in Latin America media studies has a long tradition of dialogue with social movements and social justice struggles. In Latin America, media studies and mass communication research emerged in the 1950s under the influence of US media systems and functionalist research paradigms that legitimized this influence. According to Rodríguez and Murphy (1997: 24):

> This foreign influence sparked a phenomenal growth of commercially operated mass media throughout Latin America. The new media came accompanied by a body of theory that legitimized their presence in Latin American societies; Wilbur Schramm's functionalism and Everett Rogers' diffusion of innovations, in particular, emerged as central doctrines of media use for national development. The *desarrollistas* (developmentalists) saw in these communication technologies the possibility of a "bridge" that would allow the region to enter the flow of progress and join the industrialized modern nations.

The wave of social movements and popular struggles for social justice that swept across the region in the 1960s and 1970s left their mark on mass communication research. Latin American communication scholars, aligned with progressive

social movements, began to ask how US-centric theories and methodologies could contribute to social justice:

> Critical scholars armed with Marxism saw the newly established media systems as nothing more than a vehicle for capitalist domination. These writers were quick to point the diffusionists/functionalists failure to acknowledge regional complexities and the strong ties that development projects had with transnational corporate interests. Latin American critical scholars maintained that the mass media, rather than being purveyors of progress and a means of overcoming underdevelopment, were in fact just one more cause of dependency. (Rodríguez and Murphy 1997: 25)

This phenomenon of academics committed to social justice interrogating social science theory and research frames the formation of the fields of citizens' media and citizens' journalism in the region. When it became clear that US-based media theories were insufficient for understanding the role of media and journalism in Latin American societies, communication scholars began to look elsewhere for answers. Grounded in post-Marxist analyses of democracy, Chantal Mouffe's theoretical proposals soon became fertile ground for rethinking media and journalism in historical contexts in which social inequality and social injustice run rampant. In the following paragraphs we explain how Mouffe's ideas and her theory of radical democracy inform citizens' media and citizens' journalism. We then describe how we use these concepts in specific research analyses.

Chantal Mouffe's Radical Democracy

Belgian political scientist Chantal Mouffe shifts theories of democracy from a liberal perspective based on individual rights and responsibilities to a more nuanced analysis of power and political action. In Mouffe's view, power is more of a *position* than an *identity*. By de-essentializing power, Mouffe opens a theoretical door to re-imagining the social subject as having heterogeneous and multiple subject positions (Mouffe 1988: 90). In relations involving social subordination, for example, an individual can be dominant in one relationship and subordinated in another. In her own words:

> [w]e can then conceive the social agent as constituted by an ensemble of 'subject positions' that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of differences, constructed by a diversity of discourses among which there is no necessary relation, but a constant movement of overdetermination and displacement. (Mouffe 1992a: 372)

In Mouffe's theory of radical democracy, social subjects are seen as kaleidoscopic encounters of identities that continuously access or lose "portions-of-power." Seen through the lens of Mouffe's theories, political actions, social struggles, and social movements can be understood as complex and in flux, creating a constant push and pull of dynamics as individuals and collectives attempt to access power, the necessary condition for social change.

Media and communication and information technologies (ICTs) in general are essential elements of a context in which subjects' access to power is central to democratic life. First, unlike any other technology, media technologies are designed to name the world, allowing us to describe our environment in our own terms. As technological devices, ICTs are not comparable to any other technology, because they transform us into artisans of meaning. A video camera, a microphone, and a console for editing allow us access to the process of meaning making, and beyond that, to creating our own vocabulary and our own grammar for naming the world. The act of capturing images with a photo or video camera, and further, editing images into a narrative, allows us access to the *power* to name the world on our own terms, in Mouffe's use of the term. Language does not simply reflect reality – it constitutes reality, and ICTs are technologies specifically designed to play with languages and meaning.

Second, media discourses constitute a public sphere in which different versions of reality compete for legitimacy. In this sense, it is understandable that the democratization of information and communication technologies has become a major threat to hegemonic powers. The struggle for communication rights presents a tremendous challenge to dominant hegemonies because processes of media appropriation imply the possibility of alternative versions of reality in the public sphere.

For example, Radio Andaquí, a community radio station in southern Colombia, relentlessly struggles to promote alternative versions of reality in its community's public sphere. This citizens' medium, located in the Colombian Amazon, interrogates the dominant ideologies that legitimize the act of transforming forests into open pastures for cattle. Here, a local homesteader expresses the voice of tradition, in which the forest is nothing more than an obstacle to agriculture and ranching:

> We found trees thirty and forty meters high … I gave them the ax from six in the morning and by noon they were still standing. You had to brace yourself when one of those trees fell! They knocked down half a hectare of smaller trees I had already cut. You've never seen anything like it. To see one of those trees falling is terrifying! Animals scamper away, birds scream, the land shakes. It is scary if one is not used to it. I am talking about the year [19]83. (Arcila Niño *et al*. 2000, 136–137, in Rodríguez 2011: 79)

Radio Andaquí codifies the territory in different terms in a 30 second promo:

Blue tanager:	feeds on fruit.
Woodpecker:	pecks trees with its beak to make its nest.
Oropendola:	weaver of hanging baskets, so we can have Christmas year-round.
Thrush:	seeker of earth-worms, artisan of the mud.
	Different colors, various sizes, distinct voices; all struggling for life in one single tree. Bárbara Charanga, a radio series about how to use our differences to find common ground (Radio Andaquí 2003). (Rodríguez 2011: 79–80)

By providing access to microphones, knowledge, and broadcasting facilities to subjects typically denied the opportunity to articulate and publicly express their unique versions of reality, Radio Andaquí plays a key role in the dynamic push and pull of forces that shape the station's region.

Public Journalism, Citizens' Journalism, and Mouffe's Notion of "The Political"

One of the main achievements of Radical Democracy theory is regaining "the political"[1] as an articulating language through public debate, renouncing to the idea of a final and inalterable agreement. The political is always present because there are not definitive agreements.

> In politics the public interest is always a matter of debate and a final agreement can never be reached; to imagine such a situation is to dream of a society without politics. (Mouffe 1999: 77)

According to Mouffe, the modern form of political community is defined by the bonding that is formed by shared public concerns. The political community is not held together by a substantial and previous idea of common good. Therefore the debate about public issues is always open to contradictions and civil arguments, and citizens remain active not around a fixed and defined identity but through a constant process of reactivation. This idea is essential to the notion of public journalism, as we will discuss later, as it works with groups of citizens defined as deliberative publics invented and re-invented according to the public concerns of the moment. Remarkably, Mouffe states that the political refers to the *construction* of a political community and not to something that happens *within* that political community. This distinction is central to taking distance from pre-modern and undemocratic notions about the collective such as we find in communitarian approaches.

The political community in a radical democracy is articulated on the idea of *agonistic pluralism*, one of the most interesting concepts developed by Mouffe (2003: 93–119). Based on the fact that dissent and not consensus is the constitutive element of democracy, Mouffe considers that in truly democratic societies, dissent and conflict coexist naturally, ergo the act of recognizing differences of all kinds is in itself a democratic value. Thus, differences are negotiated among adversaries, not enemies, as long as adversaries accept the rules of the public in a limited framework of pluralism. Other authors state that human rights represent the limit of pluralism in contemporary societies because human rights are not questioned despite cultural differences. This universality of human rights is the backdrop (Miralles 2011: 41). From this perspective, the roles of communication and journalism are not focused on seeking consensus or being messengers of a public order (challenge owned by

sectors involved in politics and the art of governing) but on being able to show these differences. In the beginning, we shared the vision of our North American colleagues, and placed much emphasis on building consensus from deliberations. In common with Jay Rosen, we began by building our theoretical structure from Habermas's visions on deliberative democracy. Nevertheless, 10 years later this has changed due to our contact with citizens and our own academic analyses of the traditional behavior of the media in market-centered societies, which we compared with the findings of political philosophers and reflections about how common good is constructed in modern communities. From this, we have concluded that one of the main functions of the reporter and the media in general is to investigate and make visible dissent in our societies (Miralles 2010: 149).

Dissent, the plurality of views leads to working with counter-publics, will be discussed in the next section. Public journalism does not assume that democratic debate will facilitate the construction of collective consensus. Instead, the goal of public journalism is to use media technologies to move dissent – the multiple voices of counter-publics – to the public sphere.

Mouffe's "Citizenship"

Based on her notion of multiple subjectivities, Mouffe (1992b) proposes a redefinition of the term "citizen." Mouffe's concept of citizenship "implies seeing citizenship not as a legal status but as a form of identification, a type of political identity: something to be constructed, not empirically given" (Mouffe 1992b: 231). Thus, citizens are not born as citizens and citizenship is not a status granted on the basis of some *essential* characteristic. Instead, Mouffe's understanding of citizenship is based on a continuous effort to access specific instances of power in particular historical conditions, "[citizenship] is about the capacity to generate power, for that is the only way that things get established in the world. And it is about the capacity to share in power, to cooperate in it, for that is how institutions and practices are sustained" (Wolin 1992: 250). It is through day-to-day efforts that subjects enact their citizenship, as they participate in everyday political practices: "The citizen is not, as in liberalism, someone who is the passive recipient of specific rights and who enjoys the protection of the law" (Mouffe 1992b: 235).

In Mouffe's theory of radical democracy, citizens produce power as they actively reshape their social environment. In this sense, citizenship is much more than simply a matter of bestowing or claiming individual rights:

> A political being is not to be defined as the citizen has been, as an abstract, disconnected bearer of rights, privileges and immunities, but as a person whose existence is located in a particular place and draws its sustenance from circumscribed relationships: family, friends, church, neighborhood, workplace, community, town,

> city. These relationships are the sources from which political beings draw power –
> symbolic, material, and psychological – and that enable them to act together. For
> true political power involves not only acting so as to effect decisive changes. It also
> means the capacity to receive power, to be acted upon, to change and to be changed.
> From a democratic perspective, power is not simply force that is generated; it is
> experience, sensibility, wisdom, even melancholy distilled from the diverse relations
> and circles we move within. (Wolin 1992: 252)

One of the new symbolic powers is exercised by counter-publics (Fraser 1997: 115),
as it has been seen in the Colombian context by the project Voces Ciudadanas (Citizen
Voices) of the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana de Medellín (Colombia) through a
public journalism perspective. Based on the idea that egalitarian and multicultural
societies only make sense if they recognize the existence of a plurality of public spaces
wherein groups with different values and rhetorical discourses participate, the *counter-
publics* are groups of citizens who come together around insubstantial identities
typically generated in the periphery of the public sphere. Counter-publics are, in other
words, subaltern groups that decide to build their own identities, which have been
previously usurped by others through the traditional power of enunciation, and who
aspire to a place in the public sphere in order to avoid becoming *ghettos*.

> The *counter-publics* have a dual nature: On the one hand they serve as spaces of
> withdrawal and regroupment; on the other, they also function as sites and training
> grounds for agitational activities directed to wider audiences. (Fraser 1997: 117)

Citizens' Media

By the end of the 1970s, Latin America led the world in alternative media initiatives.
Various key players in the region (i.e., the progressive Catholic Church as well as
progressive social movements) welcomed the recommendations of UNESCO's
1980 MacBride Report on communication and information inequities between the
Global North and the Global South. The MacBride Report demonstrated that
most global media traffic was controlled by a few transnational communication
corporations in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. The MacBride
Report also showed that Global-South-to-Global-South communication was then
practically non-existent (Hamelink 1997).

Solutions proposed by those striving for more democratic communication
practices included changing national communication policies, increasing South-to-
South communication and information initiatives (such as press agencies), and a
code of ethics for mass media. In order to multiply information and communication
sources and break the monopoly of transnational media corporations in the public
sphere, alternative media became key players in processes of democratization of
communication (MacBride Report 2004). In Latin America numerous social

movements, grassroots organizations, and popular groups established their own small-scale media outlets and spun their own communication and information networks, bypassing global communication giants. In addition to providing their audiences with alternative content, alternative media resisted top-down vertical modes of communication. While corporate media traditionally function on a model in which media producers send messages to passive media audiences, alternative media embraced horizontal communication, in which senders and receivers share equal access to communicative power.

Latin America's media landscape grew to include all types of alternative media: community radio stations, social movements' media, grass-roots media, and suchlike. The available theoretical vocabulary seemed insufficient, however, for describing the new power dynamics emerging from these appropriations of media technologies. Community media theories ignored communication and power dynamics because their approach is focused on identifying the media producers (i.e., community organizations, grass-roots collectives), the range of broadcasting signals (i.e., community broadcasting as opposed to mass broadcasting), or the type of broadcasting license granted by the state (i.e., community broadcasting license). Alternative media theories, in contrast, define media by what they are not (i.e., alternative to the mainstream media, alternative to vertical communication), instead of defining their specific characteristics, elements, and power dynamics in democratic life. Also, "alternative media" implies a reactive relationship with dominant media, and a corresponding acceptance of a lesser status.

Drawing on Chantal Mouffe's theories of radical democracy and citizenship, the term "citizens' media" was coined to better capture the power dynamics and processes of social change made possible when people take over media technologies. Citizens' media theory also strives to redirect analyses away from simple comparisons to mass, commercial media, focusing instead on the cultural and social processes that are triggered when local communities appropriate information and communication technologies for their own use (Rodríguez 2001).

Mouffe broke away from theories that define citizenship as a status granted by the state, and proposed a move to reclaim the term "citizen." She proposed that a "citizen" should be defined by daily political action and engagement and argues for citizenship as a form of enactment, a type of political action: something to be constructed, not given as a right on the basis of identity (country of birth, citizenship of parents, and suchlike). Citizens have to enact their citizenship on a day-to-day basis, through their participation in everyday political practices, as localized subjects whose daily lives are traversed by a series of social and cultural interactions. These are framed by family interactions, relationships with neighbors, friends, colleagues, and peers. Each individual gains access to power – symbolic power, psychological power, material power, and political power – precisely from these interactions. According to Mouffe, when individuals and collectives use their power to redirect and shape their communities, these actions should be theorized as "citizenship," the building block of democratic life.

Adopting Mouffe's definition of citizenship, "citizens' media" refers to alternative, community, or radical media that facilitate, trigger, and maintain processes of citizenship-building, in Mouffe's sense of the term (Rodríguez 2001). "Citizens' media" are those media that promote symbolic processes that allow people to name the world and speak the world on their own terms. Citizens' media are open to participation (participatory communication) and their only agenda is cultivating processes for appropriating symbolic power. In this sense, citizens' media are different from militant media and, in some cases, from radical media, which, although open to community participation, require participants to align their media products with their medium's political cause. In some cases, though, the same medium can be militant and citizens' at the same time. Puerto Wilches Estéreo, a community radio station in Colombia's Magdalena Medio region, is a case in point. Most of this station's programming is produced by people from the community and the station encourages its community producers to develop their own programs, find their own voices, and explore their own visions for what the station should broadcast. However, the station's programming also includes a series of more militant programs that pursue progressive political agendas around issues of land tenure, water use, and sustainable development. Clearly, Puerto Wilches Estéreo is a radical or militant medium deeply involved in a social struggle around inequality and unfair distribution and access to resources in Magdalena Medio and in Colombia in general (Rodríguez 2011: 133–180).

Citizens' media encourage women, men, children, and youth to use media technologies to produce their own version of social reality, pointing microphones and cameras into their environment and producing their own meaning, using their own symbolic matter. In this sense, citizens' media encourage local languages and local aesthetics, so communities learn to speak the world in local grammars and vocabularies. This is easier said than done, however. For a medium, or a communication initiative, to achieve robust community participation requires sophisticated know-how. Guillermo Pérez, one of the main leaders in the Colombian community radio movement, is a good example of this kind of expertise. Decades of effort and community engagement have transformed this Colombian high-school teacher into a citizens' media expert. Pérez explains that, when trying to figure out if the medium is successful, he compares the programming grid with the social and cultural map of the community. The programming grid of a medium that has achieved community participation should reflect, like a mirror, the map of the community:

> [In my region] we are number one in hepatitis B, malaria, coca, and all that stuff. To live here is to experience major issues around land tenure and land use, border problems, and armed conflict. In a region like this, what I worry about most is my programming grid; is my programming grid truly reflecting this terrible mess [todo este mierdero]? Is it obscuring it? Is the grid looking away, in a different direction, neither reflecting nor concealing this mess? (Pérez 2004, in Rodríguez 2011: 223).

Pérez carefully designs strategies to encourage the participation of local groups, collectives, and even individuals, so that the community radio station's programming grid reflects the diversity of local voices and identities. Programs, formats, production routines, regulations, and procedures are meticulously designed to trigger participation:

Let me tell you about one case. [Inírida], just thirty-six years old, is the youngest municipality in the country, and a frontier region full of religious missions. Their idea of a mission, however, is so crude … the more shit they eat, the prettier they feel … and the churches compete for parishioners, so the pulpits become sordid spaces of violence and self-serving monologues. This brings negative consequences, especially in schools, because after all, the schools in a region like this are social spaces of convergence. In these towns, schools are often the only shared social space where everyone converges. Kids from every faith, and every church come together and in the school classroom we can feel the aggression between kids of different faiths. The aggression is also evident in the neighborhoods, and even within families, because maybe you are Adventist but your daughter wants to be a Baptist. The problems of violence and aggression are visible everywhere. So when the radio station became a solid presence in the municipality, I called leaders of the different churches and told them "I have a proposal for you. You are all very interesting, so there will be a daily program on the station for all of you." We carved out a five minute spot every day, from six to six o' five; Monday was for Catholics, Tuesday for the Movimiento Misionero Mundial [World Mission Movement], Wednesday for Adventists, Thursday for Gran Sion de Amor [Great Sion of Love], and Fridays for Jehovah's Witnesses … But, we told them, "You cannot attack the others. Neither can you, for example, use the radio station to promote the Catholic Holy Week. The idea is that the station's programming grid is a reflection of the town, and as we are not all Catholics, the station cannot promote one over the others. The medium guarantees equity to all religious communities." Because they behaved well, we extended the program to fifteen minutes and titled it En el Cuarto con Dios[2] [A Quarter of an Hour with God]. Today, this program is three years old, and full of beautiful things … because we told them, "listen, at the pulpit, you can say that the others [from different faiths] are idolaters. At the pulpit, if that's what you want, you can sink your teeth into each other to death, but not here! This is a different medium, here you cannot attack each other, because this medium, this little gadget intrudes everywhere, in people's bathrooms, in the kitchen, in the car, the plot, the conuco.[3] In other words, radio is like the crazy aunt [la loca de la casa] that goes everywhere, so we cannot use it to attack others." So the groups began listening to each other, and the more they listened to each other, the more sophisticated their discourse became, because now when they talk, they have to consider what the other said yesterday. Listen, I give a shit about religion, but this here is really amazing! It's such a good example of peaceful co-existence. You don't see the atrocious levels of aggression that we used to see before. I believe that the fact that it's a daily program, week after week, helps people get the idea and makes them ask themselves, "What's the deal with listening to someone who is very different from me? Someone who sings songs that I don't sing?" (Pérez 2004, in Rodríguez 2011: 215–216, author's emphasis)

Citizens' media are carefully designed communication and participation initiatives. Led by community leaders deeply connected to the cultural and social characteristics of their communities, citizens' media emerge from a profound knowledge and desire to use ICTs to create a public sphere that reflects a diversity of voices and versions of reality. Citizens' media are never the product of donor funding, formulas imported from one context into another, or simply making technologies accessible. Instead, citizens' media are the product of community leaders who, creatively and drawing on a deep knowledge of their communities and technology, figure out how to trigger processes of technology appropriation in the women, men, children, and youth of their communities. The level of wisdom and know-how expressed by Guillermo Pérez in the following paragraphs is a case in point:

> There was a very cool old guy, from Boyacá, an elderly lawyer, and the guy all of a sudden decided that the station was good for nothing because it didn't have any programming on poetry. So I told him, "Brother, right now we are making a call for new programs; what do you say? Are you capable of producing a program on poetry? Would you do it? Are you brave enough?" I told him, "All I have is Mondays from four to five in the afternoon," thinking, there's no way he'll say yes. But the old bastard said, "Yes!" Can you imagine? Monday afternoons, in a frontier town where people only want to listen to vallenato[4] and the man is talking about poetry? To make matters worse, the guy did not just read the poems, he was truly passionate about poetry, so he declaimed them! I swear sometimes he forgot half the poem. He was so into it, he would close his eyes and be completely spaced out and he would forget! So, he just made up the verses, I swear! But of course, no one could confront him on this, because in those latitudes, who would know these poets? Carlos Castro Saavedra? People began calling us to say, "Listen Guillermo, the station is doing great! But please, get that guy out of there! Poetry at four in the afternoon? No, please!" The program was called Raudales de Poesía [Torrents of Poetry]. We are interested in this kind of program.

> The station tells people, "If you have something to say, this is your place; the station will support you, we believe that what you have to say is very important, even if you don't have a large audience. Audience size is not our game! The fact that you are one of our citizens and you have something to say is important for the station, so we are going to help you and support you." So I said to the old man, "Orlandito, we need to do something, maybe we need to change the program's schedule, maybe we need to publicize the program, something," and he told me, "I have it under control. I have designed an Expectations Campaign." The guy went school by school and told the kids, "M'ijo, I am going to be here every day from ten to eleven, to meet with whoever is interested in reading poetry, writing poetry, and talking about poetry." Poetry Circles, he called these meetings. Soon, the guy had groups of about a dozen youngsters in six local schools. These kids were his guests during the program, so their mothers and fathers would listen to the program, and then their teachers and classmates became listeners too. The Poetry Circles became stronger, and later the kids started organizing a School Poetry Festival, so poetry really took off. The

medium should trigger social processes, and these processes in turn should impact what goes on at the station. For these media to truly be citizens' media, they need to place their bets on triggering social processes that start with the medium then travel to the social fabric, and back to the medium. (Pérez 2004, in Rodríguez 2011: 225–226)

When we look at a case like Pérez's, we can see how citizens' media has the theoretical potential to detect and focus on the processes of meaning-making and power that are triggered when ICTs are properly placed in the hands of people. In contrast, "alternative media" continuously make us focus on what community media are not – not commercial, not professional, not institutionalized. Researcher Jo Tacchi and her colleagues have shown how transformative processes activated by citizens' media spill over in concentric circles, beyond the small circles of media producers, to touch the lives of producers' neighbors, extended families, friends, coworkers, and ultimately their audiences (Tacchi, Slater, and Lewis 2003).

This type of expertise cannot be improvised, produced on a whim, or transferred. And although it is highly sophisticated, it is not uncommon. Scholars in the field of community/alternative/radical/citizens' media research frequently stumble upon this type of community leader, who thoroughly knows his/her community and is able to envision how to creatively use ICTs, developing extraordinary strategies to trigger community participation and media appropriation (Downing with Ford *et al.* 2001; Geerts, van Oeyen, and Villamayor 2004; Gumucio-Dagron 2001; Halleck 2001; Howley 2005; Langlois and Dubois 2005; Rennie 2006; Rodríguez 2001, 2003, 2011; Rodríguez, Kidd, and Stein 2009; Salazar 2004, 2009; Stein, Kidd, and Rodríguez 2009). This type of expertise should be nourished, cultivated, supported, and funded. It is sophisticated because it emerges at the intersection of a profound commitment to the community and knowledge of the community; a vast knowledge of ICTs and their potential (convergence, uses, availability, potential to be recycled, hybridized, redesigned, and so on); and perhaps most importantly, immense creativity in designing strategies to draw people in and entice them to produce their own media, on their own terms. Citizens' media then emerge at the intersection of political engagement, technological expertise, and creativity. Citizens' media connects Mouffe's notions of radical democracy, citizenship, and political action with Jesús Martín-Barbero's theories of identity, language, and political power. According to Martín-Barbero, the power of communities to name the world in their own terms is directly linked with their power to enact political actions. In Spanish, Martín-Barbero plays with a linguistic pun between the terms *"contar"* (to narrate) and *"contar"* (to have a strong presence, to count) and explains that only those who can *"contar"* (narrate) will *"contar"*-only those with the ability to narrate their own identities and to name the world in their own terms will have a strong presence as political subjects (Martín-Barbero 2002).

Citizens' media are those media that facilitate the transformation of individuals and communities into Mouffe's "citizens" and Martín-Barbero's powerful

subjectivities with a voice. Citizens' media are communication spaces where men, women, and children learn to manipulate their own languages, codes, signs, and symbols, gaining power to name the world in their own terms. Citizens' media trigger processes that allow individuals and communities to recodify their contexts and selves. These processes ultimately give citizens the opportunity to restructure their identities into empowered subjectivities strongly connected to local cultures and driven by well-defined utopias. Citizens' media are the media citizens use to activate communication processes, which shape their local communities.

Public Journalism and Citizens' Journalism

Based on Mouffe's theories the idea of public journalism emerges as a way of confronting discursive publics and counter-publics. Clearly articulated as a radical democracy movement beyond local-communitarian scenarios, public journalism emerged over 20 years ago as a way to strengthen public citizen opinion by deploying strategies that sought to encourage public debates around matters of public interest while recognizing ordinary citizens as protagonists (Miralles 2001: 19).

This movement is based on the idea of repositioning the citizen as an active voice in the construction of the public sphere and, at the same time, redefining the public sphere as an arena for open and dynamic discussion characterized by different forms of citizen participation aimed at building agendas through post-Habermasian deliberations (at least in the case of Latin America[5]) that could have an impact on public and political agendas derived from citizens' heterogeneous perspectives.

By assuming that citizens are fragmented into changing and dynamic groups, public journalism allows libertarian exercises of agenda setting. One of the most influential cases was that in which, at the request of the Constitutional Court and through the Citizens' Monitoring Commission, the public journalism project Voces Ciudadanas held meetings with victims of forced displacement by the armed conflict around the country to establish compliance with their fundamental rights as groups affected by violence. Voces Ciudadanas traveled around the country and worked with counter-publics with a focus on generating debate among indigenous communities, afro-descendant women and other counter publics who built their own interpretation of the public policy aimed at helping displaced victims. Their perspectives became visible in the public sphere, and even better, before the decision-making power, in this case, the Constitutional Court (Citizen Voices 2006).

Public journalism and citizen journalism have in common their concern for agenda items, but act in different ways. In the first case the public agendas are defined through public discussion, while in the second public agendas are defined through the appropriation of ICTs in the emergence of informative processes that were previously reserved for large media corporations. That is, we are talking

about two different ways of de-professionalizing journalism; in citizen journalism, citizens appropriate media technologies to produce information about specific issues; in public journalism, the agenda emerges from political discussion among counterpublics that vie for a place on the public sphere. These two models of participation in the public arena have important differences, but does not make them mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they are complementary movements. On the one hand, citizen journalism is interested in *challenging* traditional media. On the other hand, public journalism goes beyond informative agendas and focuses on influencing political agendas through processes of citizens-led collective construction.

Public Journalism and Collective Construction

Through its sense of being "public," this form of journalism finds a temporary space in the commercial media through the work of people participating in projects that enable them to build political dialogue. Born in the United States in the late 1980s, the public journalism movement was mainly concerned with building a strong notion of the public sphere (Rosen 1999: 63). The movement builds from John Dewey's concerns and proposals on the construction of the public as not directed to an elite but referring to ordinary citizens (Dewey 2004: 161). A group of brilliant scholars and journalists committed to alternative views undertook the dual task of providing clues while, at the same time, becoming actively involved in civic participation projects led by local media.

Exactly 10 years later (1998), the Citizen Voices project opened democratic spaces in Colombia, bringing debates of public interest to broadcast from commercial media. Differing from the US Model, this project in Colombia relied more heavily on influential mainstream media. In order to promote public journalism, it was necessary to redefine "the democratic public" as not necessarily identified with the state (Pécaut 2001: 103). Instead, "the democratic public" was seen as a site for dynamic construction of citizenship, amid changing alliances and power dynamics. Overcoming the concept of citizenship as defined by civic republicanism and communitarianism (Mouffe 1999: 91), while emphasizing the sense of "the collective," public journalism brings life to the political community; that is, a political community that is formed by citizens who discuss not with the intention to determine who is right and to reach consensus, but to identify new approaches and angles of the topics under discussion, and in some cases to introduce new agenda items that reflect citizens' multiple demands and expectations. By discussing and building public policy agendas for economic and social development (Bogotá 2010) or by determining criteria for the Ten-Year Education Plan in Colombia in a national debate organized by the Ministry of Education (Citizen Voices 2007), citizens found new themes that had been ignored by government officials and experts. As a result

of these public conversations, governments often had to accept the ideas proposed by citizens. Gaining a space among the elites who previously had made decisions without consulting citizens has been one of the greatest achievements that public journalism has had in our society.

Turning the average citizen into a valid interlocutor is central to the debate process. Citizens are no longer seen as outsiders seeking individual solutions to their problems; they meet each other in discussion scenarios, where they collectively build issues of public interest. As opponents and not enemies, citizens have very different life experiences they bring to public debates (Rescher 1993: 23). When debating the quality of education, citizens then recognize that although their circumstances may differ, they share in their experience of marginalization by the government. Laclau (2005: 103) refers to this as "changes of equivalence," meaning that even with heterogeneity in a complex world, people have enough in common to form collective popular demands. This sense of collectivity brings together social movements, through which citizens build agendas through the work of public journalism.

Although most of the public journalism experiences have been led by civil society organizations such as universities and the media, it must be said that Voces Ciudadanas also has worked within the new dynamics of cooperation between civil society and the state (De Sousa Santos 2005: 78). One outcome of the Voces Ciudadanas initiative was that the Colombia government recognized how important it is for citizens' public debates to inform government policies and strategies. Ultimately, public debates strengthen civil society and independent citizens' agendas.

UNESCO has played an important role in the expansion of public journalism, with particular emphasis in Central America. They have trained journalists from capital cities and provinces through courses and workshops in which, after exploring new ideas of citizenship, journalists recognize a public debate system focused on citizen participation with visibility in the mainstream press. From elitist processes of public opinion toward agenda movements convened by local universities and the media, the logic of public journalism has expanded within the academic world through seminars and workshops, as well as through a body of knowledge through capstone projects.

While some critics have noted that the public journalism movement is not emanicipatory enough because it is embedded in the logic of commercial media (Schudson 1999: 125), the extensive use of ICTs suggests new directions for these experiences and promises to radicalize their push for democratic participation.

From Public Journalism to Citizens' Journalism

For those who for many years have worked in public journalism in the United States, the natural continuation of this process has been the so-called citizens' journalism. This has not been the case for public journalism in the Latin American

context. It is interesting to analyze the reasons behind this difference. The public journalism movement in the USA attempted to achieve a goal that we did not expect in Colombia or in other Latin American countries: changing the journalistic profession and the practices in the newsroom. Paradoxically, we were more pragmatic in the South and have understood from the outset that the feasible task was to open spaces for public discussion with emphasis on citizens' processes and with goals that were not confined to the margins of the journalistic profession. This has facilitated our adaptation to the changing conditions of the context. Years later, one of those who worked in public journalism in the US admits:

> In looking at the sphere of Communications, we concentrated on public journalism and the conditions that made it possible, it may be time to invert the question and ask what kinds of innovation citizens need to properly communicate among themselves. (Friedland 2003: 134)

This transition in the direction of citizen journalism is promising but it is not exempt of challenges and difficulties. While it recognizes citizens' capacity (incipient in many cases) to produce information and to challenge the hegemonic concept of agenda, the predominant mode of participation in the public space is through the production of information. This is where citizens' journalism differs from public journalism, although this difference is about the how, not the what. To rethink and democratize the information agenda is perhaps the greatest achievement of citizens' journalism but we must recognize that it still needs to undertake an arduous process of empirical verification. As ICTs expand and the process of social appropriation accelerates, the diversity of emerging themes, paradoxically, makes it more difficult to influence the public agenda (Salvat and Serrano 2011: 84). In other words, citizens' journalism still has a limited ability to determine the public agenda. In the meantime, citizens' media redefine not only the agenda but also the interpretations of social realities. Precisely, the visibility, still dominant, of commercial media in public spaces has been one of the hallmarks of the public agendas in the case of public journalism. Even in the so-called wiki-revolutions, such as the "Arab Spring," it is accepted that there is a need to coordinate these self-organized movements through ICTs as well as mainstream press. The mainstream media have no choice: either they ally with Internet and citizens' journalism, or they will become marginal and economically unsustainable. But today, this partnership is crucial for social change. Without Al Jazeera there would have been no revolution in Tunisia (Castells 2011).

Citizen participation is a common element to both public journalism and citizens' journalism, although it is anchored in different scenarios in each case. In public journalism, citizen participation is a means to achieving an agenda for collective issues through political debate among citizens, while in citizens' journalism the notion of citizen participation is structured around information production.

The use of debate is perhaps the main methodological difference between public journalism and citizens' journalism. Debate, as stated before, is crucial in public journalism while information production in citizen journalism does not necessarily attempt to go beyond the circulation of information. Undoubtedly there is a potential articulation between these two models that we must address immediately to enhance citizenship, as defined in radical democracy, through heterogeneity and emancipation.

Emerging Challenges

Clearly the main challenge for citizens' media and citizens' journalism scholars is today's social movements' uses of ICTs and online platforms (i.e., Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and the like). The Arab Spring, Occupy, Indignados, and Chilean and Iranian student movements used media technologies in ways that challenge our theories and methodologies. We need to monitor how information and communication circulate through different networks, including social media, mainstream media, and citizens' media. Never before have we seen such close connections between mainstream and alternative communication circuits.

Also, the corporate nature of the new online platforms is problematic. Are social media platforms such as Facebook and YouTube empowering or restricting social movements? On one hand, corporate social media allow social movements immense communication and information reach; on the other hand, these platforms can be used for surveillance and commodification.

Finally, it is important to insist that citizens' media and citizens' journalism research be developed in the field of communication for social change (CfSC). Now that citizens' uses of ICTs have become so trendy, researchers tend to ignore the field, thus wasting key opportunities to build on an already existing body of knowledge. CfSC is a field with its own history, canon, and theoretical and methodological contributions, as this volume clearly demonstrates.

Notes

1   The authors make a distinction between the issues and politics. The political is the language used to debate issues of public interest. Politics is the specific activity carried out by a particular sector.
2   *En el Cuarto con Dios* uses a pun on the Spanish word *cuarto*, which means both "room" and "quarter of an hour."
3   *Conuco* is an indigenous family dwelling. Pérez mentions it because Guainía is a department with only one municipality; the rest of the department is made up of indigenous *resguardos*.

4   Colombian popular music genre, frequently critiqued for its misogynistic and sexist lyrics.
5   In the North American model strongly influenced by Habermas.

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Citizens' Media
Citizens' Watchdog Groups and Observatories[1]

Rosa María Alfaro Moreno

Watching, a New Paradigm for Social Inclusion in Society

Although they are two separate and different spaces, the old dichotomy between public and private spheres, where the first space prevails over the second, has been confusedly diluted throughout the democratic and mediatic experiences of modern life and the many possibilities that they provide to citizens. Every aspect of social life reflects similarities. However, when problems and lifestyles present in our societies reach public visibility and political relevance, they tend to define a new thematic and aesthetic field that grows and is confronted by what belongs to the public sphere, and by what belongs to the private world of each media consumer. Private issues become public when they emerge as social problems (Ferry 1995), and the private and the public are forced to interact, especially at a time when mass media and virtual/digital technologies have acquired an undeniable relevance. New locations of *me*, *us*, and the *others* are created in these newly generated public and private spaces. This is a positive but dangerous innovation given its invasive capacity over the subjective worlds of the audiences.

Development issues are expressions of this transition towards "the public" that raise concerns over issues such as gender equity, individual human rights, poverty, employment and urban coexistence. Private issues become public by detaching themselves from intimate spheres and turning into social concerns with no disciplinary or thematic separations. This is a result of media narratives that bring public and private issues together, as seen in many current soap operas, for instance. And due to their social nature they are also defined as public issues. Audiovisual

narratives, as organizational axes of media content, have been created out of blends that integrate different genres and formats. Habermas reiterates that this phenomenon originates "a tendency to assemble the public sphere and the private realm" (Habermas 1986: 172) and also suggests that "leisure activities give the pseudo code from the privacy of the new area, the des-intimacy of what is called intimacy" (Habermas 1986: 188). From our very homes it is possible to see the world and each other. The public sphere reaches private spheres through on-screen representations that are lived and stimulated as individual and common interests. To look at the world from the private space of home becomes the praxis of satisfaction and admiration, stronger than rational judgments about the quality of what is offered, which is also a mix between the public and the private. The intimate is the subject of various genres and formats that become public. Hence, there is no real separation between information and entertainment, and both of them are part of our lives. Many people, for instance, declare that watching TV news is a common practice of personal and family relaxation.

Thus, the private world is a space to shape public opinions that define electoral processes or protest movements, but it also helps to model ethical or anti-ethical perspectives of the government and its own responsibility, in an ongoing dialogue with subjective beliefs and meanings. Understandings of democracy or populism are forged in those experiences, which draw on the initial capital provided by lived experiences in schools, neighborhoods and families. The citizen is nurtured by different logics that confront what is *watched* with what is *lived*, acquiring cultural meanings and appropriations. What is educational, whether in a good or bad sense, is found in this interaction. When ordinary people participate in news broadcasts, they know how to act in the only place assigned to them, namely from their sociocultural or political position of victims who voice their views to trigger compassion and to get help. They know how to do it. Or they act as aggressors. They make visible their problems and let other people see their identity hoping for some sort of response from society. Many times they find this society in the most individualized approach to help: *charity*. This interaction is defined in these terms, and thus media narratives collect people's demands and styles, transforming and using them with commercial criteria. The reverse also occurs when the spectacle of the private lives of people in power become public scandal, which defines political positions against the state for example. But this mostly happens when individual or family problems, or those derived from daily interactions between individuals, bring out collective problems that affect many of the current "kingdoms" of social and cultural inequality. These spark private controversy about themes, characters and public institutions.

The public power of politics is no longer an exclusive space of truth and deliberative reason about power and collective decision making; it also involves the Government. In Peru, for instance, we face an exchange of demands that reflects conflicts between different interests, although the state's political culture of secrecy still is a dominant practice. In other words, the definition of citizenship and power

conflicts are influenced by people's lives today, which are again influenced by the media; citizens are able to interpret what happens to us through the media formats, which may be understood as mechanisms for telling what anyone is or can be.

From this perspective, the media constitute spaces of cultural production and reproduction that could be individual, family based, generational, and suchlike. To recognize the self is a mysterious adventure that could be, or not, satisfied. Simplification of reality makes us see some of ourselves in different programs, transforming the intentional act of watching into a space meant to reconstruct different meanings and personal and public universes. Watching and listening through viewing become activities of real, symbolic, and illusory insertion in the social, political, or cultural life. Therefore, media consumption today takes on first order meanings that we can challenge, understand and clarify. This is where the audience learns to believe in watchdogging and vice versa.

At the same time, the mentioned media narratives that link together different aspects of human life are not the only important ones; they also give legitimacy to discourses that turn into stories, contests, performances and articulations that we all require in order to aspire or to legitimize our behaviors in our interaction with others. Images are not ethically good or bad by themselves; what is good or bad are the lifestyles corresponding to this confusing modernity, and to the social, cultural or political places where one is situated. Narratives constitute the pedagogical field of "how we are or want to be" and of discursive provocation as an interpretative framework of the opinion that guides our insertion in the collective, social life and power.

Watching: Ethical Commitment
to What We Ought to Be

Citizen watchdog groups (*Veedurías*) attempt to critically understand public narratives beyond first order meanings that are not necessarily oppositional. These readings provide a new opportunity to understand the medium, and the audience that obtains some satisfaction by listening to radio, listening to local or international music, and by watching and interacting with TV programming. Now citizens have an exponentially higher mass media experience, through consumption as well as establishing some distance with which to analyze and critique media content. Both activities assume learning and educational requirements. Thus *watching* is today a hyperactive personal, social and political process, although it may be confusing at times. *Watching* connects what is of interest to the audience with the experience of having fun and being entertained. This attitude acquires renewed importance because it focuses on watching to improve what is watched and how it is watched. Citizen watchdog groups and observatories confront the challenge of watching, debating and proposing in order to achieve a better understanding of the public

world from their own private worlds. This is about understanding the audiovisual reading of the immediate future, and the quality of life promoted by entertainment and information sources. It refocuses on the private side of watching in order to make it public, and then return it, transformed, to the public sphere that we all watch.

Citizen watchdog groups and observatories are located in that interaction between public and private issues in the mass media, tracing the footprints left by public/private/intimate actors. Citizen watchdog groups and observatories analyze the mediations and intermediations that are regularly built. In some cases they analyze both levels, while in other cases they only analyze the source and how social issues are framed in connection with daily lived experiences in the private sphere. This is about watching outwardly and inwardly. It is about opening our eyes, but also about changing how we do it. Surprise or delight is not enough; it is also important to ask about our objectives. In so doing, we can see new perspectives that result from a transformation that does not question our own culture, but renews it in an ethical aspiration. This captures the difference between the elitist perspective of cultural consumption that demonizes the media, and the mass public's perspective that recognizes the relevance of watching in order to improve the media through efforts from both media actors and the public. We have evidence of some optimism about the symbolic place of a new source: a public that listens, reads and sees the power that it can have when media consumption is transformed into innovative ideas. Some years ago our organization, Association of Social Communicators, Calandria, which led a citizen watchdog group, had a continuous relationship with the news telecast of the Peruvian channel "Frecuencia Latina." That relationship was guided by the idea of pointing out possible mistakes, and proposing alternative solutions to avoid them in the future. Journalists and directors of "Frecuencia Latina" called us when we were late in sharing our analysis of their programs. They valued a third opinion that was able to analyze their work based on systematic and continuous monitoring. This experience demonstrated that watching, informing, and promoting quality is possible when media are open to a dialogue that seeks to improve and innovate. Citizens' watchdog groups can help.

A Citizen's Practice to Learn Democracy from the Act of *Watching*

The political history that has shaped democracy has undergone several transformations that make it even more difficult to understand. Since the emergence of mass media, these have facilitated other means of public intervention and influence creating a powerful triad: political (formal power influenced by economics), mass media (public relevance) and citizenship (culture and political opinion), where the social cuts across new relationships between the private and public worlds, as discussed earlier. When the social interacts with the private this interaction

becomes symbolically communicative and it shapes what constitutes the public world. None of this, however, ensures democratic communication, because in the midst of such process there is no meaningful participation from the audience. This does not help either in the formation of social and political linkages expressed in the public sphere. Minorities cannot even talk to the majority, nor are simple ways of building a new democracy that starts with the audience possible. Thus, this communication has not been able to overcome fragmentations derived from the assumption that being together is more important than working together, which undervalues the concept of community (Lechnner 2003: 14). On the contrary, what is emphasized is the specific location of each individual member of the audience and the presumed interaction resultant from ratings and surveys, hiding inequalities and differences under the guise of a presumed homogeneity. Citizen watchdog groups precisely add the "doing something together while watching and accepting differences." The joy of media consumption is accompanied by new ideas of pleasure and learning.

Paradoxically, we have a limited picture of the public visibility of social issues and their actors as shown by entertainment media. They are delivered by the media in technical and fancy languages with little interest in being examined in the very public places from where they come. Social demands are privatized in a public display that personalizes, dramatizes, and enjoys them through entertainment strategies created to obtain commercial ratings. Moreover, the media have become a public power with influence over the social and political life of our societies. It is possible to see interactions between media and politicians who negotiate power based on shared interests, or on specific conflicts and confrontations often marked by corruption.

As long as citizens do not have relevance as subjects of power in the media and society, they will be "guilty" of media consumption. In the future citizens are the ones who should do their own synthesis through reflection of what they watch as a sign of freedom, but they are not yet ready for that role. This responsibility should be shared among the established and new powers to be. Thereby public issues would be a real and quotidian site of contestation. This is not yet obvious or practiced. Today, public issues are endorsed by reactive audiences. Or, it is only when both observatories and citizen watchdog groups make watching a new mechanism of critique and influence, while pushing the experience of media consumption toward shared joy and discomfort. One can learn how to be a citizen by transitioning from the role of private consumer to one of protagonist, able to voice opinions and exert pressure over the media.

The Veedurías seek a new space wherein citizens are transformed into subjects of watching and change. They are committed to monitoring the public sphere where social issues, cultures and political perspectives are entangled and clarified through representations. This approach will contribute to citizenship education processes because it defines citizens as media subjects with the right to speak. We are in the midst of a different time of media experience. Lighting allows us to see

beyond the threshold but this time the limelight is on the definers of the public agenda, the media. But watchdog groups and citizens will also be forced to direct the limelight over those who set the public agenda. In other words, this is about making public and including in the public agenda the quality of those energetic services in the subjective and symbolic world of a society.

Watching to Change: Between Rights and Responsibilities

Citizens have access to and consume media, whether newspapers, radio, television, Internet or other communication instruments. This has meant a private valuation of the media that should be made evident in all its public complexity. Watching is also testing ourselves, seeing what we are, directly or indirectly. We realize this when we move ourselves emotionally, or when we look at other people and identify what we would like to have. This is an active, mobile exercise through learning and questioning. Discourses and interpretations of life, society and power fill the screens, even though we cannot always discover them. Because watching for change involves more than viewing television, but understanding what is permitted to be visible. In other words, to question the media does not mean to be against them, but rather to be concerned with the problems associated with media production. "So television is less an instrument of leisure and entertainment than a daily scenario of the most secret perversions of the social, as well as of collective images from where people recognize themselves and represent what they are entitled to expect and desire" (Martín-Barbero and Rey 1999: 17). Thus, what is important is the critical eye, especially because in analyzing and interpreting television we discover what it says as well as what satisfaction is conveyed.

Television, for example, portrays the worst of our society in newscasts but also in talk shows, sitcoms, dramas, and soap operas. They function as portraits of our lived experiences and of the discomfort derived from looking at ourselves from an outsider's perspective. Media narratives involve discourses such as legitimizing the elimination of our opponent, especially when the eliminator is portrayed as the good character. It does not present to the audience what needs to be changed because the audience is imagined by the media outside the exercise of viewing what they produce, as spectators but not active agents. The very nature of the media sector is not enunciated in terms of rights but it is rather defined as a commercial relationship, understanding audiences only as consumers of cultural products with an ad tag, namely the overvaluation of ratings and the money that they produce. Narratives are the schemes where public discourses are developed. There is not, however, a narrative of social transformation. Although its primary root in the epic genres still exists in the memoristic excitement of the past, it is not present in today's media discourses. The *Veedurías* and observatories should help in

rebuilding them. Watching the media has become a critical and demanding exercise that coexists simultaneously with the need for entertainment, narrative forms, and the pleasure obtained through them. The role of the public viewer through screens, radio stations, and websites, currently creates an important opportunity for inclusion in society. Appeals are made to the subject to develop public judgment of private spaces. Reason sets distance to contemplate while analyzing. The need for quality asks for improved quality, which is sustained by public discontent not only about the media but also about the society as a whole.

The visibility of public issues is not defined by their emergence but by the appropriation that audiences make of them in relation to their relevance and to understand or take on specific positions in social life. Audiences become citizens when they are aware that as they *watch* they are exercising their right to access information and entertainment about what happens and is produced in the world. We are Peruvian citizens; therefore, we achieve a world nationality. But at the same time the citizen discovers that he/she takes on a responsibility in the act of *watching* from a critical perspective because he/she analyzes and judges, an important difference in relation to other discourses that focus only on pre-existing alliances. For that reason he/she must express informed disagreement when needed. This gives way to another right and duty with regard to freedom of expression. *Watching* is part of an educational process where he/she learns how to be a citizen in a connection between the self and the other. This questions the instrumental separation of knowledge in quantitative or qualitative categories as limited presentations of knowledge. Freedom of expression is also a citizen's right towards the media that is part of citizens' lives.

Brief History of the Veeduría

The Veeduría Ciudadana de la Comunicación Social [Social Communication Citizen Watchdog Group] was founded in 2000 as a result of a popular social movement that reacted to the evident cooptation of freedom of expression by some media owners at the end of President Fujimori's presidential period. So many irregularities were disclosed that it was impossible to classify them as exceptional cases. This situation involved popular print media, most national television, and many local radio stations. Because of the large number of cases it was difficult to point out the accountability of each media organization in this case of corruption. The country faced not only a media problem but also a challenge that involved professionals with no ethical commitment to our democracy, instead working toward profit and economic efficiency. Their allegiance was to their corporate success rather than to being journalists with a responsibility toward their communities.

Founded in 1983, the Association of Social Communicators (Calandria), which focuses on the role of communication for development and democracy, could not

remain impassive to this reality. We could not, however, take sole responsibility for the immense and impressive ethical problems and weaknesses, with little ability to act in a field so undermined by other actors. Thus, we decided to build a broad movement that involved Peru's civil society, which up to that point worked as a disarticulated body of citizens as communicative subjects and media audiences, some politicians with ethical prestige, people recognized by their personal, academic or professional standards, professors and students from various universities in the country, the Advertisers Association whose members did not have a media origin but were responsible for funding them, and parents associations. Our goal was not only to express our inconformity, but also to take that opportunity to generate improvements in the ethical standards of the media. We released public statements that coincided with a series of public events including public scrutiny of the media and the self-exile of some media owners.

Our first activities focused on facilitating dialogue and debate among those actors who were committed, which we increasingly expanded to reach broader participation. We also took this debate to the streets using a motivational video showcased in public plazas and squares, whose main actor was an ambivalent, critical, and media consumer "clown." In the video he questioned ordinary people and himself about the citizen's acquiescence with the media, while highlighting citizens' abilities to critically reflect on the role of the media. Many public dialogues took place. New perspectives were pedagogically encouraged in order to promote a critical view of the media society. Debates took place in parks, squares and streets in several cities during and after the video was played through audio-taped, oral, graphic and written opinions registered on flip charts and papers. Only the national TV channel "Frecuencia Latina" and many other channels in the provinces covered the public debates about this media scandal. Many private media approached this issue as a business problem. Even the government decided to address each specific problem as particular case through bureaucratic trials. It was obvious that corruption arose and revealed the power of the media derived from being "the society's eyes." Although legal efforts were made to punish media owners, these quickly failed due to pressure that misrepresented scrutiny of the media as a case of censorship. However, we did not want people to forget this issue so quickly; we wanted to keep it alive for a while. Thus, we changed our approach. The media have always raised critical issues in the public agenda, but we now looked at it from an entirely different perspective.

Our approach was to put media managers themselves in the public spotlight through an analysis of their media performance with respect to citizens' input. With this purpose we developed research that confronted supply and demand, research that was useful and understandable on children and television, on gender issues, and on coverage of politics. We also applied surveys with more questions and better design (avoiding simplifications), quantitative media monitoring both during the presidential elections of 2001 and 2002, plus other techniques that examined the impact of media on their audiences from an information point of view.

The work of the Veedurías lasted until the end of 2010, with some changes along the way. There was a second phase in which the Veedurías developed a proposal for a new law concerned with the generation of a new ethical and institutional order in relation to audiovisual media. This process involved citizens and institutions especially from civil society. To counter our initiative the National Congress formulated another proposal that eventually remained archived for some years. The Veedurías used this long pause to focus its efforts on developing a bolder and demanding, yet democratic, law. It was drafted in a participatory manner between 2000 and 2004. It was the subject of several consultations with media owners, politicians, and journalists in private and specialized meetings designed to explain the project and receive feedback. We also promoted open forums in several cities, which gave us rich material that derived in many adjustments to the proposed law. To our favor, the Citizenship Participation Law authorized the introduction of laws after meeting some legal requirements. We began the process of collecting signatures for several months, and coordinated actions with newspapers and the Press Council, adding more allies to this fight. The law was approved and 34 of the articles suggested in our process were kept in the final version of the law. When the idea of expanding media concentration of properties to 51 percent was introduced, we protested along with other honest print and radio media. The National Congress reviewed and changed that clause. We had an innovative law in some respects. The Consultative Council of Radio and Television (CONCORTV) was created with representation from citizens, civil society, media and universities. It was included in the Ministry of Transport and Communications, but unfortunately it currently plays an advisory role only.

Throughout the process we were interviewed by TV channels, newspapers, and other media, which sometimes used aggressive language toward us, but we always replied with a focus on ethics, heart in place, and conviction in mind. It was interesting how the citizens themselves defended the Veeduría by calling radio stations or answering to pollsters, in a highly critical and encouraging mode for those of us interested in legitimizing the act of *watching* from the society standpoint.

A Voluntary and Participatory Movement with No Representation: The Quest for Consensus

Organizations require leaders and minimal institutionalization of internal and external power. Representation is negotiated and used, accumulating more visibility for those who exercise it and therefore capitalize more individual power. The process of developing new proposals for change becomes more difficult. At the same time, the public is distrustful when their participation is reduced to obeying a majority that is not theirs or to a leader who often abuses his/her power. In this sense organizational formalization represents the standardization of

positions and goals supported by those in power. We did not want hierarchies but multiple leaderships and an extended citizen inclusion. Let us not forget that the crisis of political representation is what gives importance to communication (Touraine 1995: 47), enhancing its ability to affect and dialogue with citizens' act of *watching*.

We invested our efforts on documenting frustrations that existed in our society and did not alter their spontaneity. Thus, we set up a small team whose task was to mobilize and generate educational processes. It was not a pyramidal structure that organized other people. Instead, there were many volunteers undertaking specific tasks such as encouraging discussion or collecting signatures while talking about public issues. Public consultations were also more qualitative, impressing many analysts because of the high number of respondents (between 2,000 and 7,000 people in each case). Street parades, with billboards in some cities, and stilts in others, that used costumes and creative posters were organized. The private dimension of *watching* was made public by speaking up on the streets and in the closed *"raje-cabinas"* (enclosed public cabins in plazas) where citizens audio-recorded their opinions with no obligation to reveal their identity.

We separately invited media owners, politicians from various positions, and journalists, and asked them about their expectations of the new law. We did the same with citizens from around the country. Some reviewed the full proposal, others only in some aspects, while others just wanted a simple explanation. This is why we exceeded the number of signatures needed to support our proposal for a new law to be submitted to the National Congress as a Citizens Legislative Initiative. In that sense the universities of Lima, Iquitos, Puno, Cuzco, Trujillo, Arequipa, and Chimbote contributed time and effort to the process and they did it of their own volition and interest as they were not required to do so.

A key factor was the participation of young volunteers of the Veedurías. They chose a name for themselves: "Revolcom," which stands for Communication Volunteers Network (but also means big change in Spanish). At first Revolcom involved students and young professionals from many fields, then journalism and communication students took leadership positions in the intervention. They helped by gathering opinions, organizing debates, collecting signatures on the streets, and invigorating the forums held throughout the country. In recent years the volunteer base has gone down and Calandria is considering the reinvigoration of the *Veeduría*.

The *Veeduría* had a steering committee with participation of NGOs, universities, and churches that functioned with limitations. However, advisers and volunteers worked well and with extended vitality. We used the Internet but it was not a very important tool at the beginning of 2000. The streets and people in each city or town were first and foremost. Each public gathering was a reunion of students with grassroots citizens. We realized that watching was possible. However, if we had imposed a representative and rigorous organization we would have killed participation and its constant motion. Often an open and unpredictable flow works

better, such as that of rivers, which build their banks in a more open and natural process; in such cases, each one of us was involved by choice and not by obligation or mandate.

It was interesting to experience the participation of professionals from the judicial sector. Their selfless support was substantial and highly effective. We had allies such as the Defensoria del Pueblo [Ombudsman's Office], the Ministry of Justice, an association of lawyers, and several independent lawyers, including law students, who not only helped formulate the proposal for a new law but also guided public debates at different times. Formal lawyers and creative communicators worked well together, as we had never seen before.

The Opportunity to Influence Supply and Demand

We had to be aware of what was happening; we could not afford to ignore any event. A key event was the unveiling of the scandal of media corruption committed by several authorities in the country, and led by the Government itself. The first video "found" by one of the country's few independent channels interested in questioning the government revealed the existing political corruption. Other videos followed, including those that showed the unscrupulous negotiations that curtailed freedom of expression of different media, especially television and radio, and also the so-called "chicha" or popular press. TV channels made public the piles of dollars exchanged in different transactions, whether bagged or in ordinary style. The media events always gave rise to the intervention of the Veeduría, for example at times of trials or when a channel was returned to its creditors. We learned that these opportunities came from society itself, which led us to release news and reports of the Veeduría in those relevant times.

New Horizons of *Watching* to Believe: Media Ethics and Relaunch of the Veeduria

When one learns to believe actively in the possibility of change, one can change its path. When one understands that it is possible to influence and generate specific changes, one values oneself and society's ability to change. It is possible to see and envision more possibilities of transformation to which one had been blind. Hence, watching to believe is a strategic process of human liberation. That transformation gives us another perspective and location in the world, beyond the pragmatism enclosed in the phrase "watching is believing." It is evident that the great result of having a law, though flawed in some aspects, was a success. Gradually this popular movement declined in the face of the legal achievements and the public debate

generated around them. For several years this situation has inspired us to reflect about the relevance of reactivating the *Veeduría Ciudadana de la Comunicación* after a long break. We achieved several accomplishments, but there was a need to redefine our role in the new scenario of the radio and television law. Thus, during the past few years we worked on the slow but significant reconstruction of media ethics. More than 15 media organizations produced, in a participatory manner, their codes of ethics as internal social pacts that had our support. Calandria wants to return to the idea of the social movement discussed above, using the basic but broad formality of working with many allies. The Veeduria went from working for a law against corruption defining a self-regulated system that demonstrated that watching is also related to ethical oversight. This ethics leadership is necessary and urgent now.

Our new approach intends to focus on the citizens' rights to quality of communication and to be respected in their freedom of expression and opinion. We are in a process of reorganization in economically difficult times as a result of international aid and cooperation crisis. It is true that the audience can and should speak. This would be the basis of our intervention in the future. That is, we would privilege the idea of monitoring and analyzing what is offered to us while protesting and proposing changes in an era where the ideological left and right do not determine the site of confrontation in society. Rather what prevails is what we might term an internal civil war of markets. In other words, the ethical and democratic oversight of the citizenship is what matters the most. Consumers have rights and exercise them. And by doing so they are validating and demanding better ideas of information, aesthetics, ethics, and entertainment that can help to build a new society. It also would promote the generation of new communication approaches by the media. These interventions should be primarily educational in their results, because by participating in the Veeduria people must learn to judge, analyze and propose. We call, for example, for more political, cultural, and social knowledge derived from monitoring of both public and private media. Therefore we should consider some basic thoughts about civil society that we have found in several research exercises. This suggests that we must limit our work to a few core activities and from there rebuild a citizens movement aimed at monitoring and proposing to the media from an ethical-cultural and sociopolitical perspective. We basically want to generate citizenship both in communication students and audiences. What we have formulated has been tested, but we need to extend it. Therefore we put forward the following three proposals.

1. Media parliament for citizens with participation of college students

Over four years we installed the so-called "media parliament" (2007–2011). At the beginning we invited citizens to assess Peruvian television programming and content in public spaces: streets, public squares, parks. We interviewed citizens and

asked for their personal opinions; we organized group games that helped us to critically evaluate, think, and propose new television programming.

The first media parliament focused on entertainment content. The second media parliament focused on news or opinion shows. The third media parliament was concerned with the first round of 2011 elections and was named "From the state to the public. Media from whom and for what?" We used to meet annually in a room of the National Congress to choose a communicative issue to be discussed. Citizens became congress people. They were provided with the results of a previous survey had to examine the results. Then they pointed out mistakes, problems, and successes. Finally the best proposals from each of the three media parliaments received an award. Citizens suggested ideas for each existing channel, which they deposited in opinion boxes located in the room. A new power was created from the participatory action of the so-called consumers who became citizens with opinion and demands for change. In the first two cases, the enthusiasm was significant when they recognized themselves as primary communication subjects.

Calandria is reconsidering the possibility of applying this experience to university training in communication. Before, students organized some small citizen forums, preceded by other regional forums organized by communication schools interested in encouraging discussion about the media and propose changes. Those who attended were congress people who *watched* by virtue of being media publics and national citizens. In our new approach, other virtual forums designed to prepare the issues to be discussed would also precede this great forum. It would start with a website, the call to Revolcom (Volunteers in Communication Network) and several small activities leading to a successful media parliament. We would focus on news and children's programs broadcast on private and public media. Part of our work would be to define the methodology of the debate, the guest speakers and the type of dialogue. We would start with an educational video to spark the debate. Perhaps a theater play to warm up the human climate could also be considered. We are planning to separate the tribunes: media and journalists, other agencies such as CONCORTV, and the Ombudsman office. They could only speak at the end of the exercise. Obviously the citizens' tribune should be the most important, even more if the word has been previously requested via Internet once the program has been defined. We would nominate three public defenders in charge of summarizing the emerging proposals and a couple of devil's advocates focused on encouraging and organizing deliberative aspects. They would differentiate the time for critiques, always with some grounding and without insults, from the time for proposals (that should be viable). Somewhere we would post proposed criteria to judge or we would deliver booklets to facilitate this process. There must be a lot of images to facilitate the *watching* exercise. At the end people would vote on contradictory opinions. The final message should be: "Repeat this in your neighborhood and in your family; the more citizen demand, the better TV programming." Volunteers will be key in organizing this process.

We need to articulate and develop various communicative pedagogies at the individual level: one might be motivational to generate participation, another might be persuasive about citizens' abilities to think and argue, and another might be able to challenge and accept mistakes or criticisms, but its efforts might focus on proposing. At the collective level we need to encourage communicative practices by learning to value dialogue, listening, deliberating with equanimity and reaching some agreements, accepting the right to be different. We all have something to say and we can be a community because it is not and should never be homogeneous. In this regard it would be a highly symbolic media parliament.

2. Generate argumentative-educational capital to improve the quality of the media

We carried out assessments, public consultations, and research on media at specific times, whose results were publicly shared, generating dialogue among various sectors, including media and universities that in combination with others had more impact. Education should be forged as a method of analysis and dialogue. All people consulted or interviewed knew that they were supporting the Veeduría and this movement, thus we invited them to the Media Parliament. We created relationships with universities whose students' thesis could focus on our objectives. But, these efforts were aimed at influencing the media using contests and awards as tools. We organized two competitions on the best television productions in this field. The prizes were very simple but they generated enthusiasm among citizens and media. One was directed to entertainment programs, the other to news shows. And the entire process was done in the National Congress, in a room previously used by senators. The *watching* exercise became a motivating power of new communications between all citizens of our society.

3. Network of Latin American observatories

It was not just isolated actions; articulated efforts were made from different places in Latin America, which allowed us to compare results. This experience has been shared in eleven countries. This is not to be observed by experts only but the main interest is in every citizen that can play that role. This involves two objectives: to have comparative reports that may be presented to journalists, entrepreneurs and communicators in international events; and to share research and promote citizen participation in other observatories. This Latin American articulation will help to enrich our capacity to exert influence. For instance, we worked on a comparative

analysis of newspaper coverage of development issues in eight countries. And we keep working; there is much to be done.

The experiences presented, created and implemented by the ACS Calandria express other transformational possibilities. A communicator cannot just be a media critic but also should be a proactive and creative individual, committed to action. Improving the media in our countries is not possible only from a questioning position assumed by few intellectuals. This is a public task of the citizens that must also engage the efforts of some media. This is not just an intellectual proposal but also an inclusive exercise of a society that seeks to improve and transform itself. The critique in itself is insufficient towards the development required and sought by a society. This is an integrative proposal formulated by media and citizens, from small and major territories. Calandria will respond to this demand with feasible and refreshing activities. The media will not change if their users do not shake them by giving opinions and demanding changes. To critique is a necessary but insufficient first step, requiring proposals that engage all social actors. The media are already self-regulated and their potential to improve is limited. A single action or change will not generate the required transformations; we need to rethink media development as social development. In this respect, research requires more comprehensive reformulations and transforming paths that slowly settled in, evaluating them in plans and innovations that are created, evaluated and improved. Social development and therefore communication for development is a collective and demanding task. Hence, we have an important and critical role in transforming our media.

Notes

1   Claudia Nieto, a Ph.D. candidate at Ohio University, provided support on the translation of this paper. The editors contributed revisions of the translated essay.

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Community Radio

Tanja Bosch

This chapter focuses on community media, critically reflecting on the changing understandings of the concept over time, with particular reference to community radio. Also referred to as citizen's media by theorists such as Clemencia Rodríguez, or as radical media by John Downing, its key tenets have been access, participation and self-management. The term community media is used in this chapter, to refer to small-scale media initiatives, largely run by community-based organizations or local groups, which attempt to provide programming that differs from that broadcast by mainstream commercial media. Definitions of alternative media are not always fixed or universally accepted (Elghul-Bebawi 2009), precisely because of the wide range of existing formats and technologies. Community media projects could range from print initiatives such as magazines or newspapers, to audio projects such as radio stations, or initiatives that make use of new media technologies and the Internet.

This chapter focuses on community radio as one form of community media, and explores how citizens and activists use community radio stations for development and social change, despite the challenges of financial sustainability. Other contemporary challenges will also be explored – including the liberalization of the airwaves, particularly in Africa, which has seen a proliferation of FM radio stations. First, a brief history of community radio is provided, in an international context; after which the chapter continues to explore various examples of how community radio stations have been used for social change. The chapter also explores how stations have new media technologies, accommodating digital platforms, engaging with listeners via online social networking sites, and using cellphone based systems of feedback. Finally, the chapter concludes with some reflections on the role of radio in creating a space for the formation of publics, and as a tool of resistance.

Brief History of Community Radio

In Latin America, credit for the first ever station is often given to Radio Sutatenza in Colombia, set up by a Catholic priest in 1947 to reach the rural population with developmental information (Fraser and Restrepo-Estrada 1988). The Bolivian miners' radio stations formed in the 1940s are probably also among the earliest examples of the use of alternative radio in political struggles (see O'Connor 1990). The miners' radio began in 1948 with Radio Sucre in the Radio Nuevos Horizontes in Bolivia, and, by the 1960s, 23 radio stations were operating at all the mining centers, becoming a credible source of information and a platform for local debate (Buckley 2000). Later community stations began to emerge organically in the Caribbean, Asia, Australia, Europe, and Africa. In North America, especially Canada and the United States, community media emerged in the 1970s and shortly thereafter in Europe. *Radio libre* or pirate stations were widespread in Italy and France (Gumucio-Dagron 2001). Stations had varying models ranging from those that emphasized access (in the United States) to those that took the form of open channels encouraging special programming, as well as community-run channels in Canada and parts of Europe (Fuller 2007).

Besides Latin America, there was no experience of community radio in developing countries until the emergence of the Tambuli project in the Philippines in 1991. In the same year the Malian revolution led to the opening up of the airwaves, followed in 1992 by community radio in Benin (Buckley 2008). In South Africa, community radio projects were formed in 1993, but only licenced in 1994 after the country's first democratic elections. In general, the emergence of community radio has often been in parallel with moves towards more democratic political systems in Africa and Asia. Community radio in Mozambique, for example, emerged after the end of conflict and rise of multiparty democracy; and similarly, in Nepal, community radio emerged in 1997 following that country's first democratic revolution (Buckley 2008).

In Africa the proliferation of independent radio stations generally followed the liberalization of economies and gradual rise of democratic governance. In Mali for example, a process of deregulation gave way to the formation of small rural community radio stations, which have considerable public support (Buckley 2000). Similarly, in South Africa, it was after the country's democratic elections in 1994 that the airwaves were opened up and community radio stations could broadcast. On 30 March 1994 the Independent Broadcast Authority (IBA)[1] was formed by the parliamentary IBA Act of 1993. Anti-apartheid organizations had campaigned actively for a free press and transparent broadcast environment, and these were high on the agenda of the multiparty negotiations, which led to the democratic transition (Mtimde 2000). Community radio was intended to give marginalized communities access to the media, as well as to demystify media processes. For the first time, people who had had access only to the state-run media with its biased

propaganda now had their own radio stations, broadcasting in their own languages. Over two years following the IBA act over 80 stations were licensed, representing a range of diverse interest groups. Today around 100 community radio stations are licensed and operate in South Africa. These include stations like Radio Zibonele, which broadcasts a range of educational programs in isiXhosa to the peri-urban township residents of Khayelitsha in the Western Cape region; to the Christian religious radio station, Radio Tygerberg, which broadcasts in English and Afrikaans, and boasts a higher listenership than some local commercial stations.

Defining Community Radio

In general, community radio advocates critiqued the mainstream mass media for privileging narratives and agendas irrelevant to the citizens of developing countries, and drew on scholars like Paulo Freire (1970, 1985) for inspiration and the creation of participatory communication initiatives, which included community radio (Rodríguez 2000). The evolution of community radio is usually traced to the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debates of the early 1980s (Fuller 2007). Previous research (see Bosch, 2008b) has conceptualized community radio through Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) model of the rhizome, arguing that while the growth of community may not be vertical, like the tree-like growth of commercial media, it is growth nonetheless. Like the rhizome, community radio creates linkages within and between communities, and leads to horizontal growth through its grass-roots engagement with community organizations and community members.

The World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC) describes community radio as "a non-profit station, currently broadcasting, which offers a service to the community in which it is located, or to which it broadcasts, while promoting the participation of this community in the radio" (AMARC-Europe 1994: 4). Community stations are generally defined as those run, owned and controlled by community members or organizations, for their own communities, and funded by grants, sponsorships, donations, and advertising, with profits ploughed back into the community (Mtimde 2000). In other contexts such stations have been referred to as local radio, citizen's media (see Rodríguez 2010) or radical media (Downing 2001), but the term community radio is probably most widely used an globally understood.

Predominantly referred to as community radio in Africa and the Caribbean, the term alternative radio is used in Latin America and the United States. In Europe it is more likely to be known as free or association radio, and in Australia it is often called ethnic or aboriginal radio. Rodríguez (2001) coined the term citizens' media in an attempt to overcome binary categories traditionally used to theorize alternative media. While used widely, the term "alternative" suggests its own

lesser relationship to dominant media. British theorist John Downing (2001) prefers the term radical media to refer to any small-scale media that express views alternative to hegemonic perspectives. Community radio stations are comparable with non-profit organizations and are often similarly organized in terms of their management and financial structures.

The key tenets of community radio are access, participation and self-management (Lewis 1993). Access includes feedback, where audience members interact directly with producers of messages, participate during the broadcast of programs, and are encouraged to comment and criticize. Participation implies the widespread involvement of ordinary people at the levels of production, decision making, management, and planning. Self-management is thus the height of participation, through which the target audience exercises decision making on all levels (Lewis 1993; Bosch 2010).

While stations interpret these guidelines in varying ways, in many cases it often translates into the use of volunteers to produce and present programs. In most countries, there is no policy documentation to define exactly what is meant by the terms "access" and "participation," and the widespread use of these terms has led to varying interpretations. In its strictest sense, access might mean that community or audience members have physical access to the resources available on radio station premises; though in a more abstract sense, "access" and "participation" might simply mean that community members can access the airwaves by calling in to the station. Listeners of XK FM, a community radio station for the !Xû and Khwe ethnic communities in Platfontein, South Africa, consider participation to be the use of their languages !Xûntali and Khwedam, on the air (Mhlanga 2009). At Mama FM in Kenya, a station run by a group of professional women journalists, there are rigorous entry procedures to the premises and listeners have to call ahead to book an appointment before they are let in (Javaru 2012).

Internationally, community radio stations are thus often characterized by high levels of volunteer participation, as an extension of the listening community (Dunaway 1998). Most South African radio stations, for example, are volunteer-driven, with usually only a few staff – station manager, administrator, and programming manager – on the payroll and the rest of the team, including all on-air staff, volunteers. Besides the different management and funding structure, community radio stations usually differ from their commercial counterparts in that they usually focus on civic or public journalism, or a kind of journalism that emphasizes service to the community. This is sometimes achieved by identifying important social issues and highlighting these issues through broadcasts, and by framing news in a way which facilitates collective efforts to find solutions, not just problems and conflict (Shepard 1994). It may also entail journalists being involved in attempts to help create and sustain public discussion to ensure that communities face their problems, with a wide-ranging exploration of conflicting perspectives and sources of information aired and discussed. This approach encourages

journalists to put citizens first and to share with them the task of setting the news agenda (Graber, McQuail, and Norris 1998).

The Role of Community Radio

The main role of community radio stations is usually considered in relation to dominant mainstream mass media. Community stations are considered to provide a different type of programme, with content targeting local populations in local languages, and with audience members playing an active role in station management, programming and production. Community radio stations operate for social benefit and not for profit (Buckley 2008), and through participatory practices, provide a range of educational (and entertainment) programming to facilitate community development.

While community radio practices vary widely around the world, the main association of community radio has been where it has been used as communication for development. Community broadcasting is often seen by development experts as a vital tool to empower socially and economically marginalized communities, who are often poorly served by private commercial media (Buckley 2008). As a tool for social change, radio has several advantages over other media, most notably its cost-efficiency, as well as more widespread geographic coverage; access to rural or illiterate populations and the ability to broadcast in minority languages. There are many such examples of the use of radio for education in Latin America, with a number of informal education projects; radio stations run by peasant organizations and women's groups, the church, universities, and trade unions (Buckley 2000). Radio Chaguarurco in rural Ecuador is one example, as is Radio Margaritas in Mexico, which provides programming in local languages and Spanish. Similarly, Radio Izcanal in El Salvador provides programming on health, human rights, and education (Gumucio-Dagron 2001).

Radio is usually considered an ideal medium as a tool for social change as it is relatively cost-efficient, can be reached by illiterate populations and those who are geographically remote; and its content can be adapted to local cultures and broadcast in local languages. Radio has thus been the most appealing tool for participatory communication and development projects around the world, but especially in developing countries. In Ghana, for example, Radio Ada, the country's first community radio station, has enabled fishers to learn about their livelihood from each other, provided them with useful information about their work, and created opportunities for dialogue among themselves (McKay 2009). In Kenya, several community stations are owned and operated by development and civic organizations, for example, the women's organization Mang'elete community Integrated Programme owns Radio Mange'elete, and Bondo Community Multi-Media Centre owns Shinyalu FM (Javaru 2012).

Community Radio and New Media

The rise of competing media is often thought to be a threat to more traditional media such as print and radio. As Rheingold (1993: 11) warned, "CMC [Computer Mediated Communications] might become the next great escape medium, in the tradition of radio serials." But despite the apparent supposed threat of the portable MP3 player to radio listening, most of these portable music players (and mobile phones) also feature radio receivers, which are widely used by the owners of these devices. The iPad and iPhone devices feature an application called Tune Up, which allows users to tune into local radio stations, set via the device's GPS function. And a 2010 study (Bosch 2010) of cell phone use in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Kenya found that besides the calling and messaging functions, users often used their phones for secondary functions such as the light, alarm clock, reminder function and radio. This seems to indicate that the function of the radio remains a primary function for users, who enjoy tuning in to their favorite radio stations on their MP3 players or cell phones.

Besides these competing new media tools, the Internet has also made it possible for listeners to tune into local radio stations from anywhere in the world (and also for local audiences to tune into national or international stations). In addition, the increasing popularity of social networking sites has made it possible for listeners to engage with their favorite radio stations not only via the airwaves, but also via the Internet. Many radio stations have created Facebook groups or profiles and twitter account, to continue the conversations with listeners off the airwaves. As Mudhai (2011) has argued, convergence has made it possible for radio to remain a significant arena of information dissemination and exchange, particularly in rural and other areas not served by modern cabled ICT infrastructure.

The Kothmale community radio Internet project in Sri Lanka is one of the most successful examples of the use of ICTs by a community radio project to empower marginalized rural communities. Their daily "Radio Browsing the Internet" slot allows the audience to "browse" the Internet as presenters conduct searches on their behalf and information is explained and contextualized, sometimes with the help of studio guests (Jayaweera 2001). Similarly, the Púlsar news agency in Latin America provides daily reports and news to hundreds of community stations, via email and the Internet (Gumucio-Dagron 2001).

The intersections of radio and the Internet are interesting in that they offer stations opportunities to close the gaps between producer and consumer in the networked public sphere; as well as an additional medium through which to reach listeners (and potential listeners). The growth of social media represents an opportunity for radio stations to maintain relevance and grow audiences. By increasing the space in which they attract and interact with listeners from the airwaves, to Facebook and Twitter, they are presented with the opportunity for increased listener engagement. Radio has always been considered a 'blind' medium

in that it comprises only noise and silence (Crisell 1994). In the 1950s this was considered a primary disadvantage in the competition with television. The introduction of picture and text has reduced the anonymity of the radio host and started to close the gap between presenter and audience. What is surprising though is that despite the growing numbers of social media followers, in Africa these numbers are still very small compared to radio listening numbers, most likely because it is still easier (and cheaper) to just tune into a radio station's FM frequency instead of logging on to the Internet to surf their website or social networking site.

Radio can also potentially play a role in bridging the digital divide, as the station's access to the Internet means it carries information found in cyberspace back to the listeners, in their local languages and providing a platform for discussion, while also connecting people into a global dialogue (Buckley 2000). Of course, the main challenge in the rising trend of convergence between radio and the Internet is the low levels of Internet access, particularly in developing countries; as well as relatively low penetration of smart phones and tablets; and prohibitively high data costs even when these mobile devices are available. In Africa, for example, there is only a 15.6 percent Internet penetration,[2] though large numbers of those with access use social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook. Simultaneously though, the continent is experiencing a rapid growth in mobile telephony, which is accompanied by a rise in access to the mobile Internet. With more people able to access the Internet using their mobile phones, this somewhat counteracts challenges of access related to the digital divide.

Challenges to Community Radio

Despite the large number of examples from around the world of community radio stations playing a key role as communication for development, stations are also struggling to maintain this identity in the face of financial difficulty. Higher levels of participation from audiences means that community media can offer representations and promote discourses that differ radically to mainstream media discourses (Jankowski 1994). This might involve providing local interpretations of national or global news events, broadcasting in local or minority languages, and addressing audience members as citizens versus consumers. However, stations often model commercial counterparts to compete more effectively for advertising. The most significant effect of this is a change in their programming formats and styles. In South Africa, for example, in the early stages of community radio's development, talk was an integral part of stations' programming; but to a large extent this has dwindled over time.

Discussion and debate have always been considered integral to democracy and the formation of a public sphere. On air talk and discussion have been seen to

contribute towards the constitution of public opinion and citizens' subsequent participation in democratic structures (Dahlgren 2006). One role of media in developing societies is to inform citizens about public policy so that they become a more informed electorate (e.g., Sandbrook 1996); and it is generally agreed that the mass media can promote democratization by making citizens more aware of their roles in a democracy (see, e.g., Hyden and Okigbo 2002). The role of community radio stations is of course much broader than this good governance model might imply, but deliberative talk and debate is still a central part of programming content. During election time this kind of talk is very prominent on community radio, but it is more sporadic at other times. Stations are increasingly managed by a younger generation of broadcasters who focus more exclusively on music (Bosch 2010). The production of documentaries is more expensive than hiring one presenter to host a talk show, and documentaries are rarely heard or frequently rebroadcast. In Denmark, we see a similar trend, where community stations have been reappraised in terms of format and structure because of cutbacks in funding from their local governments; similarly, many US-based stations abandoned the community radio format for more commercial formats (Dunaway 1998). As a consequence of these financial constraints, community radio stations are finding new ways to engage the public in democracy. The rise in music programming, for example, has often been used to engage youth on a range of social issues. At Bush Radio in Cape Town, South Africa, hip-hop music is used to generate discussions among youth about health issues such as HIV/AIDS. Young local musicians are invited to content workshops and then encouraged to write socially conscious lyrics, which are recorded and broadcast by the station.

As a result, internationally, community broadcasting has often been criticized as being a poor imitation of mainstream media as it does not offer critical debate about current issues of local, national, and global significance. Moreover, community radio has been defined as playing a role in the celebration of local culture in response to globalization, while community radio stations, particularly those in urban areas rarely play much local music (Bosch 2010). Stations have also been critiqued for the widespread adoption of dominant media broadcast practices, particularly in news gathering, with stories often sourced from mainstream newspapers, the Internet, and other commercial radio stations. Stations do not always practice development journalism or prioritize local news or "good news." This has implications for the role these stations might play if one considers local news or, at the very least, the localization of global news events as one way to contribute to the formation and maintenance of community identity. In the arena of global journalism, the norms and values of news are constantly contested, though journalists in newly democratic societies have often struggled to articulate their roles in the agenda-setting process (Graber, McQuail, and Norris 1998). The news media inform, but also identify and consolidate community, orchestrate public conversation, and play a role in reforming the political system (Schudson 2003).

In general, news bulletins sound very similar to the items on commercial radio, and stations rarely conduct investigative research into local news items (Bosch 2010). News is often considered as an agent of representative democracy (Allan 2004); as important to everyday life and culture (Hartley 1988); and as a central element of human communication, keeping people connected to the world around them (Halberstam 1992). In developing contexts one might expect radio news, particularly items on community stations, to move beyond traditional Western notions of news values toward a news journalism that directly supports development and democracy.

The constraints on radio news in developing contexts include rapid technological development, increasing competition for fragmenting news audiences, and the development of a global news market (Harrison 2006; Van der Veur 2002). Compounding matters are fears about the loss of journalistic independence and trends toward media "tabloidization." The convergence of globalized news flows similarly impact on radio news in developing contexts. However, the rise of localized forms of news reporting, including citizen journalism, bring with them new media ecologies intrinsically tied to development.

Besides the variable quality of news and other broadcasts, the presentation style on community stations are often radically different to commercial stations as presenters may be volunteers or untrained. The issue of volunteerism itself presents some challenges, as many community members either cannot afford to volunteer their time, or do so in the hope that it may lead to more permanent employment. Community radio presenters often regard their positions as a path to employment at commercial radio stations, and in fact many of them are often "poached" by commercial stations that offer higher salaries. Some stations do pay volunteers a stipend, but this is not a competitive salary.

Hocheimer (1993) raises other potential problems for community stations such as: (1) whether a station exercises any form of gatekeeping or whether it should be a conduit for all who step before the microphone (or perhaps both); (2) what happens when power or people become entrenched, and when the interest or agendas of newcomers are at odds with those of the founders; and (3) whether a station functions to serve its constituent community segments and whether the community acts as a resource for the station. Firstly, community stations are forced to exercise a degree of gatekeeping and exclusion since they cannot open their resources to entire communities. "To be accepted as a legitimate alternative voice in a wider mainstream public sphere, a process of exclusion ensures that access to broadcasting is limited to those individuals and groups whose points of view best represent a station's purpose and thus preserve its value and purpose" (Van Vuuren 2003: 380).

While this exclusion is necessary, it raises key issues around the notion of access and participation, key tenets of community media. The issue of entrenched power is also of particular relevance in consideration of station management or board

membership. The most financially stable radio stations are often those who have strong top-down leadership structures, even though this is less than ideal. And finally, the relationship between community and station is often conflictual – while the two may act as resources for each other, community members may choose to tune in to different commercial stations, and community stations may prioritize music programming in order to attract advertisers.

Finally, and possibly most importantly, is the issue of financial sustainability. Internationally, stations are struggling to sustain themselves financially, especially as they compete with older commercial broadcasters for listeners and advertisers. In the United States alternative funding schemes were explored, but stations are funded by one-third from local institutional support, one-third from listeners and business support, and the rest from federal monies (Dunaway 1998). Small-scale, independent and horizontally structured organizations that carry non-dominant discourses and representations are not guaranteed financial and organizational stability (Carpentier, Lie, and Servaes 2007). Because it is often thought of as a binary opposition to the professionalism of slick commercial broadcasters, community radio is still often perceived as "poor radio for poor people" (Mtimde 2000), with lower socioeconomic groups and marginalized minorities as its primary audience. This affects stations' ability to secure lucrative advertising and increase audiences; and that leads to a potentially negative equation of community radio stations to tabloid print media.

Financial sustainability is often linked to social sustainability, with the latter understood as a strong sense of ownership and participation in stations by their target audiences, as a result of their relevant quality programming. The relationship between station and audience is strengthened by audience involvement and the broadcast of programming which they find useful, interesting and entertaining. While it is probably more likely that audiences are "cultural omnivores" (i.e., they tune in to a range of additional stations including commercial music or talk stations), community radio can strengthen this audience–station relationship to boost audience figures and possibly generate more advertising, particularly from local businesses. In South Africa, religious community radio stations appear to have had greater success with financial and social sustainability. This may be as a result of tapping into international funding structures (in the case of Christian radio), or because there are more listeners who own local businesses (in the case of Muslim radio) (Bosch 2008a).

Conclusion

Radio remains a widespread medium with its advantages of portability, cost-effectiveness, versatility, and orality (Mudhai 2011) contributing to its usefulness as an alternate form of media. Community media is central to debates about the

role of the media in the formation of the public sphere, and the continued existence of small community radios around the world certainly implies the possibilities for the creation of political mediatized spaces where subordinated social groups can create and circulate counter discourses. Furthermore, community radio has the potential to be used by social and economic minorities as a tool for resistance.

Ideally, community radio should be driven by social agendas and not rely on advertising for their continued existence. Community decision making and participation are key aspects of community media, but local policies provide little guidance on how stations are to implement this. The impact of stations may vary, but it is critical that they are held to their original mandate of providing spaces for education and self-expression, as well as playing a role in the development of the public sphere. In principle, stations may continue to play the role as "voice of the voiceless" by becoming vehicles for the expression and articulation of alternative voices in the public sphere. As subaltern counter-publics, community radio stations have great potential to increase diversity in the media landscape and to drive social agendas, which are not influenced by government or commercial imperatives. However, an inadequate funding system means that stations rely on government funding and/or commercial interests, which may affect programming output. In an attempt to compete for advertising, stations are adopting programming formats that are more similar to commercial music radio, rather than maintaining their full-spectrum formats to allow a wider range of debate and dialogue.

The continued existence of community radio is a key part of the global media landscape. With the increased centralization of media ownership and the growth of music radio, community radio remains a key space for alternative voices, for deliberative talk and dialogue; but also a space for the rise of civic journalism and a move away from the myth of journalistic neutrality. Community radio stations demystify media by potentially turning media consumers into media producers, and training them to produce radio programs. There may not be consensus on the role the media play in the formation of a Habermasian public sphere, but the continued existence of community radio certainly implies the possibilities for subaltern counter-publics (Fraser 1990), where subordinated social groups can create and circulate counter discourses.

Nonetheless, a number of challenges remain for future research. These include detailed engagement with community radio stations to explore management and participatory practices. Research is often based on interview material, with no way to test that stations do indeed utilize the participatory practices they say they do. This might involve longitudinal ethnographic approaches. Another challenge for research is to study community radio audiences, both quantitatively and qualitatively. And finally, future research should explore community radio stations' use of new media technologies, with particular references to issues of citizenship and political activism.

Notes

1 In 2000, the IBA merged with the South African Telecommunications Authority (SATRA) to form the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), the current regulatory authority.
2 Figure for 2012 Q2. Available at www.Internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm (accessed September 13, 2013).

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26

Youth-Generated Media

Joe F. Khalil

As the means of producing and distributing media become cheaper, smaller, and more accessible, the ubiquity of communication messages for and about development and social change are increasing. Whether as part of a collective or as private individual, young people are at the core of media initiatives for social mobilization and political transformation. This is not surprising, given the broad economic, educational, cultural, political, and social challenges and anxieties facing youth today. By developing their own communication statements, young people are advancing particular processes of agency and development.

This chapter arose from this handbook's aim to provide pathways and bridges between the myriad perspectives on development and social change. It is an introduction based in a conceptual and historical understanding of youth agency and participation, and grounded in extensive and empirical recent fieldwork. The chapter gives readers a sense of the history, development, and central concepts of youth-generated media, providing the specifics necessary to understand the "big picture" without getting lost in a sea of details.

This chapter also offers a comprehensive framework for understanding young people's self-expressive artifacts. Such youth-generated media exist within and across communities, in the cultural West or East, both in the Global North and South, and in many cases they transcend political, cultural, or economic barriers. The range of artifacts, development and distribution processes covered by the term *"youth-generated media"* will be explored conceptually in this chapter. The main questions addressed in this chapter are: How do youth-generated media relate to other, perhaps equally fitting, concepts such as youth media? What is the spectrum of activities and artifacts covered by youth-generated media? What limitations can we expect when studying these media?

Organized in four sections, the chapter provides an overview of approaches to youth and their media, defines youth-generated media and outlines their spectrum followed by brief case studies. The questions about the meaning(s) of youth are not new, their answers are varied, complex and sometimes contradictory. Drawing on insights from psychology, sociology and communication, the first section offers a historical trajectory concerning the study of youth and media. The second section proposes an explication of the concept of youth-generated media as developed by young people themselves, and juxtaposed to youth-oriented media (media primarily produced by adults for youth). The third section proposes two broad conceptual approaches to youth-generated media: a "sponsored-development" approach with a relatively dominant adult involvement and an "organic" approach with youth taking charge of their own media production. It is important to note that these are not locked categories but represent signposts across a continuum of youth-generated media. The fourth section offers brief illustrative case studies from the Arab Spring. This section is intended to give a sense of the problematic in defining youth-generated media, as well as the ensuing dilemmas of such media. The chapter concludes by highlighting the utility of the concept of youth-generated media and the challenges in understanding and interpreting young people's activities.

Traditions of Thinking about Youth and Media

This is not the place to review the extensive and often contentious historical research on the emergence of youth and their studies as a field of inquiry (France 2007; Kassem, Murphy, and Taylor 2010). However, it is generally acknowledged that the field is dominated by two traditions of thinking about youth and media, each offering a radically different epistemological approach to youth. This first section provides a capsule summary of two debates associated with these traditions: youth and moral panics, and youth and subcultures.

Youth and moral panics

For a little less than a hundred years, cognitive and developmental psychology argued that "youth" is an important period or stage in acquiring specific cognitive and emotional skills. Promoted by Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, this perception of a young person as an "adult in the making" has been at the core of youth organizations, youth education, and policymaking. When youth emerged as a category in post-war Britain, it was perceived as "one of the most striking and visible manifestations of social change in the period" (Hall and Jefferson 1976: 9). The post-war discourse on youth positioned them as either harbingers of, or threats

to, consumer society. Children and youth became the targets of "moral panics" in relation to the changing structures of the family, the increase in delinquencies, their social disengagement and apathy toward traditional forms of politics.

Clinging to the mantra, communication researchers fostered these "panics" with research investigating the supposedly negative effects of (mainstream) media. Coupled with a changing media environment that allows for newer and unusual forms of music, literature, film, and interpersonal communication, these "moral panics" crystallized the often genuine fears about different and changing social values (Pearson 1983). Particularly extensive and often controversial are the behavioral empiricist traditions, which focused on the relationship between television and deviant behavior, such as violence (Bushman and Huesmann 2001; Huesmann, Moise, and Podolski 1997; McQuail and Windahl 1993). Proponents of this tradition are still actively engaged in conducting research, particularly in support of links between media – including video games and the Internet – and certain childhood behaviors (Bartholow and Anderson 2002). At every turn of the debate on youth and media, and at the introduction of each "new" media, communication scholars introduced similar and particular "moral panics" (Critcher 2003).

In an attempt to identify the ways in which youth activities are vilified by other social groups, and particularly mass media, Cohen (1972) coined the term *moral panics*. Within this perspective, any research about youth may be a reflection and a refraction of adult society with its "moral panics," and generationally defined economic conditions, political structures and geocultural landscapes. Young people are then seen as vulnerable, easily impregnable, incomplete adults in need of protection from the media world. But this view of children and young people was not shared across the social sciences, and particularly not within sociology.

Youth and subcultures

Since the 1990s, and contrary to these received wisdoms, the sociology of childhood recognized and critiqued self-serving social structures in organizing and conceptualizing childhood and youth. Instead of thinking of young people as outsiders or emergent members of the (adult) society, the sociology of childhood regards young people as active members with self-developed cultural politics. This understanding of young people was preceded by the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, particularly its theoretical and methodological contributions.

The broadly ethnographic work undertaken by cultural studies researchers has focused on the relationships of certain cultural practices and larger processes of social power. Using innovative methods from ethnography and sociology, researchers turned their attention to working-class subcultures and middle-class counter-cultures. While both are cultures of consumption, the former operates as a culture on the margins of the mainstream, while the latter resists the

mainstream. First introduced in the sociological studies of the Chicago School, the notion of subculture remains a principal contribution of cultural studies' perspective on youth.[1]

Anchored in the sociological changes of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States and Europe, these subculture studies have been instrumental in researching young people's cultural preferences, trends and in explaining their behavior. For instance, Hebdige (1979) reads the punk style of the 1970s as "style in revolt" and observes how the market was exploiting this subculture's music, fashion, and visual "street style." In the same vein, Thornton (1995) analyzes subcultures' symbiotic relationship with dance music and other market interests. Hebdige, Thornton, and others support the view that media are one manifestation of capital and its contradictions. Over the years, cultural studies overcame the economic-base analysis to address issues of race and gender with media featuring as an exploitative economic entity. For instance, McRobbie (1991) addresses gendered identities from a feminist perspective; others, like Gilroy (1991) and Back and Solomos (2000) point to the importance of ethnicity and race in young people's subcultural identities; and Bennett (2000) addresses the impact of place in shaping cultural forms and subcultures. With the increased interest in postmodernist analysis, subculture theorists addressed what they termed *post-subcultures* – the multilayered and complex contradictions that subcultures express.[2]

While the early work of cultural studies failed to address the relationship between subcultures and the production of niche or alternative media, some later research has attempted to critique and remedy this gap. For instance, Thornton's (1995) work on the British "acid house" and club scene subculture highlights the multitude of platforms used to communicate that subculture's message including word of mouth, flyers, fanzines, and pirate radio stations. Duncombe (1997) identifies a consciousness-raising potential of zines and how subcultural groups use them as platforms for cultural identities. Hodkinson (2002) examines the possibility of thinking about the intersection between subculture and alternative media in what he calls "subculture media." Driven by an absence of, misrepresentation of, or dissatisfaction with the mainstream (media, but also politics), subcultures benefit from the do-it-yourself ethic or *bricolage* to develop a presence in public life.

These contributions of development psychology and the sociology of childhood have been useful in thinking about the relationship between youth and media. Both paradigms provide valid and important contributions to communication and media studies. The former recognizes the "dangers" of mainstream media and advocates a proactive approach to usher youth into the responsible adult world. To that end, educational programs, public policies, and various measures are introduced to curb mainstream media and empower youth media literacies. The latter paradigm recognizes distinctive youth cultural politics associated with independent youth identities. Work within cultural studies highlights the emergence of various subcultures characterized by cultural practices including specific modes

of communication. These are key distinctions especially because both paradigms have conditioned our perceptions of youth and crucially blurred not just how the relationship of youth and media is studied but perhaps more importantly how some youth-generated media are funded, organized, and controlled.

From Youth Media to Youth-Generated Media

The term "youth media" implies an undue sense of coherence. Does it refer to media produced by or for young people? And under what conditions are young people engaged in such activities? In the music, film, and television industries, products are developed with young people, as talent and as audiences, for commercial, educational or other purposes. Similarly, young people themselves are producing school plays, short documentaries, and songs in schools, community centers, and development programs. Too often, "youth media" refer to a range of media developed for young people under adult supervision with or without the direct involvement of youth. The task of this section is to move beyond this catch-all term to distinguish between youth-oriented media (media produced for youth, such as music videos) and youth-generated media (media developed by youth, such as amateur videos). This section argues for adopting the term "youth-generated media" when discussing the range of artifacts developed and circulated by young people. To that end, the discussion focuses on three interrelated terms: "youth," "generated," and "media."

Youth refers to a plural, diverse, and complex tapestry of youth cultural politics. Although youth and young people are interchangeably employed, the embedded meaning is that youth is not a monolithic, fixed, and spatially and temporally defined construct. In many ways, as Griffin (2001: 149) notes, youth and adulthood are "fundamentally intertwined, and can never be completely disentangled." Therefore, any attempt to define youth is most often overly influenced by an adult (mis)understanding of what being young means and insufficiently informed by how young people define themselves.

It is therefore wise to start by cautioning against a definition of youth that will entrap us in binary thinking: "youth as subjects" versus "youth as actors." Instead, there is a dialectical nature to young people's social existence: They are simultaneously subjects and actors. In fact, this dialectic is best represented in the advertising industry's understanding of youth as passive/active. On one hand, advertising attempts to turn youth into consumers through an acculturation process. Accordingly, advertising can be seen as working in tandem with other social institutions to accelerate the processes by which youth adopt "adult" habits, particularly consumerism. In this whole process, young people are treated as passive audiences to advertising messages.[3] On the other hand, the growing field of brand marketing capitalizes on the idea that youth have an active identity.

Advertising offers its brands as conduits for resistance. The brand is then discursively presented as an empowerment tool, as in the ability to design one's shoes (NikeID), or express an anti-racism statement (United Colors of Benetton).

Realizing this dialectical nature, the advertising industry is marketing products by emphasizing the tension between youth as passive consumers and youth as active individuals. In brief, young people are no longer viewed as reactive and easily influenced, but rather as difficult, challenging, and cynical consumers. Similarly, Livingstone notes, young people, as well as children, have become targets "with a distinctive and significant cultural grouping in their own right – a sizeable market segment, a subculture even, and one which often 'leads the way' in the use of new media" (Livingstone 2002: 3). This understanding of youth is consolidated not only in marketing but also in politics, culture, education and a range of fields and areas where communicating to or about young people is essential.

The term *generated* has four characteristics that help explain what these media are about. The first relates to creativity, whereby the end result is a unique byproduct of young people's experiences. With youth-generated media, creative attributes are irrelevant to the extent that young people do not follow the market logic as present in mainstream media. The second characteristic concerns young people's ability to render this creativity in a physical shape – an artifact that is self expressive of individual or collective experiences. The third characteristic suggests the origination of forms of energy, as young people are self invested in their artifacts. The term *generated* accounts for the intensity and passion that often motivates young people to develop and circulate specific artifacts. The fourth characteristic accounts for the ripple effect of youth-generated media that are, in many cases, part of a sequence of activities. The artifact is usually one element in a chain of events that link media to other forms of youth cultural politics. The brief case studies later in this chapter will highlight these four characteristics and reveal how youth actively engage in exercising their agency to varying degrees.

The third definition relates to the term *media*, which in recent times have extended well beyond the customary mass communication model of "using" radio, television, and the press. The meaning of media that inspires the concept of youth-generated media is precisely driven from the realm of alternative media, an increasingly expanding area of research. While it is customary to define alternative media by focusing on what it is not, two significant propositions are particularly inspiring: one is John Downing's articulation of "radical media" and the second is Clemencia Rodríguez's "citizen media." For Downing, radical media "includes a huge gamut of activities from street theater and murals to dance and song … and not just radical uses of technologies of radio, video, press and the Internet" (2001: 8). Media are not isolated from the context of production and consumption, taking place in societies where mass, popular and even oppositional cultures are distinct yet interdependent. Downing goes on to emphasize the human elements revealing relationships between radical media producers, activism and social movements. The same can be said of Rodríguez's citizen media:

However, despite their geographic, economic, and cultural differences, they all have one thing in common: they express the will and agency of a human community confronting historical marginalizing and isolating forces, whatever these may be. (Rodríguez 2001: 63)

To be more precise, Rodríguez (2001: 64) underlines the human agency, the citizen's agency, over media tools and warns against trying to define media because they come in "all shapes." More profoundly, Downing (2001: xi) cautions against rigid definitions because radical media always "break somebody's rules, although, rarely all of them in every respect." In line with these propositions, media are adaptive to and adoptive of new tools for development and new forms of distribution; they are constantly changing and very difficult to categorize. In an increasingly mediated world comprised of both alternative and mainstream, Lull argues against binary understandings of media, particularly when assessing social change:

The contrast of the social impact of mainstream culture and subculture, of mainstream media and alternative media, should not be drawn too sharply. Most audiences have been influenced by both (Lull 1987: 25).

In brief, any analysis of youth-generated media should be both media-centered (focusing on platforms and content) and people-centered (addressing the personal and social contexts of development). What follows is an attempt to develop a framework that puts the emphasis on a specific practice: young people's development and distribution of self-expressive statements. There is recognition, from the outset, that although youth-generated media are "alternative," "radical," or "citizen," they bear their own additional characteristics, as just discussed. This framework will seek to accomplish two interrelated objectives. Its first goal is to help identify and explain the spectrum of contexts under which young people are developing media. It also aims to provide analytical reference points for identifying young people's media toolkit.

A Framework for Youth-Generated Media (a Spectrum)

By way of reintroduction, youth-generated media are historical processes of reappropriation and redefinition of multiplatform converging media – from graffiti to blogs, flyers to online videos. As media-making tools become more diverse and pervasive, youth are appropriating these means to develop expressions in and across various forms. In the process, they redefine the utility and usage of these media. Youth-generated media are not limited to a specific geographic, social, cultural, or political context. They do not only figure in industrial and developing societies, but also flourish in both liberal and extremist circles. My

ongoing research suggests that youth-generated media are located across a spectrum of possibilities, each with a differing degree of independence from adults. On one end, a sponsored-development approach indicates that they should be modeled after "professional" media and with adult involvement. Examples of these are after-school projects, student newspapers, political newsletters and church group performances – all involving both youth and adults. On the other end of the spectrum, an "organic" approach indicates that youth-generated media are developed from within youth groups and independent from adult involvement. Examples of these could be blogs, graffiti, certain video making, and music – all involving individuals or groups of young people. While the focus of this framework is youth-generated media, it can be argued that the sponsored-development approach combines what Melkote (2003) describes as the two dominant modes of development communication: a modernization framework reflecting a top-down organization of media as a delivery system and an empowerment framework echoing a bottom-up development of a participatory culture that views media as conjoined to culture and integral to social change.

A sponsored-development approach

Debates about the effects of mass media, particularly on children and youth, tend to have resonance on one end of the youth-generated media spectrum. Sociologists, psychologists and communication-effects researchers have routinely drawn correlations between certain social deviance, such as delinquency and violence, and media. These studies, albeit inconclusive, have left their mark on youth-generated media in the form of a sponsored development approach. By emphasizing literacy, sustenance, support, intervention, facilitation, and education, this approach aims to create programs and initiate media-related activities that manage and sometimes control youth self expression. A sponsored-development approach is firmly anchored in the belief that society should play a significant role in the process of "making an adult" as opposed to watching youth develop their own cultural expressions. With the faith of missionaries, this approach gained popularity in policy circles, development studies and with globalization advocates. In most cases, these programs, often labeled as "media literacies" (Bers 2011; Drotner and Schrøder 2010; Lankshear and Knobel 2008) or "youth empowerment" (Akpan and Ekong 2006; Carlsson 2008), are ideologically loaded and attempt to articulate adult politics to a junior audience.

An organic/grass-roots approach

Standing at the opposite end of the spectrum from the sponsored-development approach, there is an emphasis on young people's active participation from inception to execution; it is about youth self-expressions that "form up on the terrain of

social and cultural life" (Clarke *et al.*, 1976: 14). Acknowledging an equality of rights between youth and adults, the organic approach reflects young people's ability to resist or consent to power structures. Essential to this view is the belief that young people should develop, manage and control their media initiatives without any dependency on or interference from adults. While this approach echoes the work of culture studies (as previously noted), it also has resonance in post-modernist analysis. For the former, it is young people's cultural expressions and practices that demonstrate a non-traditional form of collective "politics." Cultural studies focuses on describing and analyzing young people's "agency": their ability to engage actively with dominant structures (Williams 2011). Shifting the attention from the collective to the individual, a post-modernist analysis recognizes the ephemeral nature of media movements: they appear, gain visibility, fade, disappear or become a reference – an intertext (France 2007; Kellner 1995). In most cases, such an approach applies to individuals developing media, such as graffiti artists or bloggers, as well as to collective activities that are often linked to social movements.

The wide spectrum that exists between the sponsored-development and organic approaches opens up a fertile area for considering the range of youth-generated media, where young people are increasingly involved in developing artifacts within and outside institutional structures, individually or collectively. While much of youth-generated media are developed and circulated at various points across this spectrum, these two approaches provide the binaries within which descriptions and analyses are situated.

Examples

Using the parameters established in the previous sections, we can now describe and map particular youth-generated media associated with a movement advocating sociopolitical change in countries of the Arab world. The story of what Western media dubbed the "Arab Spring" has been retold often enough for a consensus to emerge: beginning on December 18, 2010, a series of demonstrations and protests swept through various Arab countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and others). Demanding regime change, democratic freedoms, social justice, and economic reforms, these demonstrations were mobilized and organized predominantly by young people using various alternative media as platforms for communication. These platforms included Facebook groups, Twitter feeds, videos, posters, graffiti, placards, poetry, and other online and offline activities.

If the key "facts" of the story are accepted, their meaning is often contested. How can we make sense of youth-led revolutions at a time when youth were accused of political apathy? Was the role of these media restricted exclusively to mobilization and organization? What, if anything, do these youth-generated media tell us about youth cultural politics? How did young people execute these demonstrations? Were their statements truly organic – or were they sponsored by adult organizations

(foreign or domestic)? Answering these questions fully is beyond the scope of this chapter, but looking at the key features of youth-generated media emerging from the Arab Spring will provide a common focus and a place from which to begin the inquiry. In the following examples, two specific and widely discussed artifacts from the Arab Spring are examined first by highlighting their characteristics and then by situating them along the spectrum of youth-generated media.

Tunisian rapper, El Général

For two years prior to the Tunisian uprising, rapper Hamada Ben Amor, also known as El Général, had been engaged in political and social rap. Released in December 2010, his song *Rayess El Bled* became an inspiration to disenfranchised Tunisian youth while its music video went viral and offered a visual testimony of Tunisian rage. Unlike other talented Tunisians, many of whom became teenage pop-music sensations addressing a pan-Arab audience, El Général opted for the least appreciated musical genre in Arab commercial values: rap. The creativity associated with El Général's work, particularly *Rayess El Bled*, extends beyond the mixing of rap and Tunisian poetry traditions to represent a unique expression of his and his peers' anxieties about an uncertain future.

> Mr. President, your people are dying
> People are eating rubbish
> Look at what is happening
> Miseries everywhere, Mr. President
> I talk with no fear
> Although I know I will get only trouble
> I see injustice everywhere. (author's translation)

This rap resulted in an artifact that represents a significant personal investment. After all, El Général was jailed during the demonstrations for recording yet another song, *Tunisia Our Country*, and was released after signing a statement promising to stop making political songs. His energy was divided between escaping the watchful eyes of the security police and engaging with others in a sequence of activities in which the song played one part. The rap's ripple effect included the production of a music video, public performances, and media interviews where the same anti-establishment statement is reiterated on different platforms. It can also be argued that the song acted as an empowering, mobilizing, and motivating tool, as it was repeated or emulated by young people in Tunisia and abroad.

El Général's interest in politically engaged rap music began before the uprisings and continued well after a new government came to power. He is a self-taught musician/rapper whose raw music reflects a tinkering with instruments and words. He could best be described as an example of organic/grass-roots, youth-generated media developed by an individual and circulated virally by a group of like-minded individuals with no commercial revenues. Yet a closer and

more recent inspection into El Général's career reveals him collaborating with commercially oriented artists and developing his first CD under the sponsorship of the Tunisian Ministry of Culture.

Egyptian video blogger, Assmaa Mafouz

If El Général is a politically engaged artist who applied his talents to inspire his peers, Assmaa Mafouz is a political activist who produced a media artifact with the purpose of mobilization. Posting a video blog – or "vlog" – one week prior to the demonstration on January 25, 2011, in Egypt, Mafouz called on men and women to participate. As a founding member of the April 6 Movement,[4] Asmaa's vlog could be interpreted as part of the movement's media strategy. After all, movement members have been trained in non-violent tactics by Serbian 1990s activists, have attended US-sponsored training, and have built alliances and shared experiences with a number of international organizations. This vlog could therefore be understood as the result of sponsored development.

But the point that should also be emphasized here is that the vlog displays the four characteristics of youth-generated media. It is an artifact that displays unique creative attributes that are different from those of Egyptian mainstream media. On Egyptian state media, veiled women were almost absent and generally portrayed as weak and dependent. In the video, Asmaa appears in a veil as a confident, defiant young woman reminding her audience of her gender ("a girl") and challenging them to "show some honor." The energy she displays is both verbal and visual. She is both bold and cheeky, looking straight at the camera and engaging her viewers with eye contact and silent pauses. Her self investment in her artifact extends to offline activities, which she announces in the video saying, "I'll hold up a banner." As the video circulated, it created a ripple effect with response videos, Facebook group pages, media appearances, and engagement with activists outside of Egypt.

While these were illustrative rather than exhaustive cases, this section aimed to apply the framework of youth-generated media to the Arab Spring. We cannot appeal to any single factor in explaining the emergence and durability of young people's involvement in social change; however, youth-generated media allow us to investigate, map, and analyze the variety of ways in which young people develop and circulate their self expression. In the process, we increase our understanding of young people's cultural politics.

Future Research and Challenges

This has been a preliminary foray into the concept of youth-generated media. The purpose of this chapter was to debate the relationship between youth and media by focusing on communication for social change. To that end, it became important to distinguish between youth-oriented media and youth-generated media. The

former reflects top-down models; the latter encourages participatory models. Within youth-generated media, a distinction was made between a sponsored-development approach in which adults play a prominent role in funding and facilitating young media engagement, and an organic approach in which young people as groups or individuals develop and circulate media artifacts. In considering the utility of youth-generated media when analyzing communication activities and artifacts for social change, several observations stand out.

The relationship between youth and media traditionally has been caught in misleading binaries influenced by ideological positions, funding agencies, institutional mandates, and others. The ability to participate in effective social change rests on transcending these binaries by developing new models of media empowerment that flatten the hierarchies, whether in organized media trainings or in loose collective movements.

As noted earlier, youth-generated media are not a new phenomenon, but despite the increased visibility of young people's development and circulation of artifacts in a highly mediatized world, it still can be argued that existing research offers a highly problematic separation between what is youth centered and expression centered. While the former is concerned with youth activities, practices, and behaviors, the latter focuses on the meanings derived from youth cultural performances such as dance, fashion, music, and so on. Through youth-generated media, the development and circulation of these artifacts are seen as integral to youth cultural politics and as a bridge to link youth-centered and expression-centered approaches.

Third, there is a justifiable feeling of insecurity when studying youth-generated media. Our lenses need constant adjustment because none of us is getting younger, and there is a fine line between speaking *with* youth and speaking *for* them, and between learning about their media and understanding them. Should we fail to get it right, then our work would be supporting what Clarke describes as "the tendency … of the dominant culture to seek and find, in 'youth,' the folk-devils to people its nightmare …," (Clarke *et al.* 1976: 74), instead of actually understanding young people's self-expressive choices. Isn't it perhaps time to understand young people by listening to them instead of speaking on their behalf?

Notes

1   It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze the concept of subcultures historically. A useful mapping of subcultural studies can be found in Ken Gelder and Sarah Thornton's *The Subcultures Reader* (2nd edn., 2005, Routledge).

2   David Muggleton's notion of "post-subcultures" is articulated in *Inside Subculture: The Postmodern Meaning of Style* (2002, Berg) and another valuable insight is available in Andy Bennett and Keith Kahn-Harris' *After Subculture: Critical Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture* (2004, Palgrave Macmillan).

3   Examples of this approach can be found in John Storey's *Cultural Consumption and Everyday Life* (1999, Hodder Education) and Juliet Schor and Douglas B. Holt's *The*

Consumer Society Reader (2000, Penguin). In the latter, there is an essay by Jean Baudrillard, "The ideological genesis of needs," in which he uses the metaphor of the drug to compare how advertising has a narcotic effect on consumers.

4   April 6 Youth Movement started as a Facebook support group for the workers of el Mahalla el Kubra in the spring of 2008. Stressing that they are not a political group and using non-violent tactics, the movement was an active participant in the anti-Mubarak demonstrations.

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27

Video for Change

Tina Askanius

Participatory video, radical video, alternative video, community video, development video, guerrilla video, underground video, advocacy video, DIY video, subversive video, labor video journalism, video for social change … Over time and across disciplines and in different political contexts a wide range of different labels have been used to describe and analyze the ways in which video is recruited for political purposes by a variety of different actors across the political spectrum. While there is no shortage of terms to choose from, a clarity and consistency around the various uses and meanings of these terms is harder to come across. The term means different things to different people and communities working with video, be it for use in legal proceedings, video aimed at getting footage on the international news agenda, video for public screenings, or video intended for the "imagined" global publics of the web (Gregory 2010).

A certain distinction (and perhaps divorce even) can be found between theoretical/academic and the more "hands-on" and practice-based definitions of video activism. In theoretical accounts, video activism is described and examined as a range of aesthetic forms for political investigation and portrayal. Scholars within the tradition of political documentary by way of example define radical film and video with reference to form, subject matter and purpose/intentionality and isolate the politically committed video for analysis as a discernible type of media text by looking at the strategies of revelation, exposition, argument, testimony or emotional registers through which video attempts to create change in its viewers (see, e.g., Corner 2011; Gaines 2007). A more straightforward definition is offered in some of the practice-oriented literature on the topic. Harding identifies video "as a tool to bring about social justice and environmental protection" (Harding 2001: 1). Again from a practitioner's perspective, Caldwell

(2005: 3) defines video activism as "the process of integrating video into an advocacy effort to achieve heightened visibility or impact in your campaigning." While these definitions may work readily for and with some of the more established and formalized ways of working with video within an organization as part of a broader advocacy campaign or lobbying effort, they are not so apt for the more individualized video practices that we see emerging in the online realm. As a response, this contribution aims to open up a debate of how we may establish an understanding of the different manifestations of what we might loosely categorize as online video activism in a manner which proves pertinent in a digital online mediascape marked by video ubiquity and an of evermore diverse range of voices around social justice competing for attention in contemporary social media environments.

In contemporary online environments, hybrid media technologies and new communication practices are diffusing and destabilizing the boxes and labels academic and practitioners have worked with so far. The army of self-proclaimed amateur filmmakers throwing themselves into the "participatory" cultures of the Internet obviously creates a complex mess and a blurring of boundaries of the meaning and practices of video activism. Online remix cultures and video sharing platforms disturb the amateur/professional and community/commerce binaries based on the rules and rituals that once regulated access. They challenge our conception of what "counts" as video activism, and blurs the boundaries of what has historically been seen to constitute a set of shared and relatively confined practices around the ethical frames of sharing tapes in a joint commitment to social critique and explicit political argument.

This chapter argues that in order to understand contemporary forms of video activism, we need to extend our analytical scope beyond the confinements of the *strategic* work of social movement actors. To understand the complexities and contingencies of video for change in contemporary online environments our analytical horizons should include a motley range of more informal, individualized modes of political expression and video practices that do not necessarily form part of a political campaign or the strategic communication repertoire of a specific organization or activist network. Contemporary modes of video activism are characterized by tensions between individual and collective forms of political engagement as well as a duality of mundane and militant modes of political expressions exhibiting diverging degrees of political intentionality and argument.

To illustrate and develop this argument, this chapter directs attention toward contemporary modes of digital video recruited for left-wing politics and social justice activism arguing that an understanding of such media practices requires close attention to the *history* and *contexts* of video activism on this political vector. It starts by offering a schematic map of the various fields and disciplines in which video for social change has been given analytical attention pointing towards three key approaches and theoretical horizons in the literature. In order to invoke a sense of the historical trajectory of and predecessors of digital media and new communication practices, the chapter moves on to provide a brief history of

video activism by drawing parallels between the early days of analog video cassettes during the so called "Portapak revolution"[1] to the emergence of digital video and online sharing platforms such as YouTube.

In order to develop a perspective that connects and contextualizes the dispersed frameworks of video activism across theoretical and historical contexts, I introduce the notion "radical online video" as a label for identifying and analyzing a broad range of video for change in contemporary online environments. In doing so, I focus the discussion to the context of the popular video sharing site YouTube, mitigating how this platform, as part of the broader social mediascape, provides a key arena for the distribution and mobilization of images to support and sustain social activism today.

Finally, the chapter broaches a discussion of some of the challenges facing video activism today, arguing that the shared ethical frameworks and political practices that once characterized the work of video collectives are challenged as the long-standing tradition of working with the power of the image in political portrayal and argument is increasingly reallocated to the mechanisms of social networking and "mash-up" practices of online video culture.

Bridging Theories and Practices of Video Activism

I want to start by inducing a sense of order into the somewhat motley body of literature available on the politics and practices of video activism. This body of literature span from prescriptive case studies and practice-oriented literature in e.g. communication for development studies to other strands of scholarship in both the social sciences and humanities dedicated to the theories of video documentation and documentaries and the relation between aesthetics and action in political portrayal and argument more broadly. In trying to understand this conceptual jungle, this first section thus maps and connects the various conceptual frameworks and vocabularies within the different (often divorced) fields and disciplines in which video is an object of study.

Therefore, trying to understand this complex and fluctuating landscape of politically committed videos today, let us first look at the multiplicity of terms on offer and the variations in what these are seen to denote. While these variations cannot merely be understood as a result of scholars' work in "silos" across different academic disciplines, a certain pattern does emerge in how the different terms link with different forms of scholarly attention toward the object of analysis, for example, in development studies, film, and documentary studies and social movement studies. To guide the reader in this conceptual jungle, I identify three distinct trails to follow in the academic literature on video activism, pigeonholed by the different accentuations on and understandings of video in terms of *alternative news*, *empowerment*, and *documentation*.

Video as alternative news

This strand of scholarly inquiry committed to video for politically progressive ends has predominantly pursued the study of video in terms of a source of *alternative news* and *bottom-up political commentary* that picks up the challenge of independent, informed, and counter-hegemonic news production where corporate mainstream media fail (Atton 2001, 2007; Downing 2001; Halleck, 2005; Stein 2001). This perspective evokes notions of counter-public spheres and of counter-publicity, which for some years now have been at the center of attention in the study of political activism and social movement media (see, e.g., Fraser 1992; Downing and Fenton 2003). Among the labels most commonly applied to practices of video activism in this area of research are "alternative video" and "radical video," both of which have etymological roots in the video activism and the reinterpretations of political documentary born out of experimental videomaking in the late 1960s among US-based collectives such as TVTV, Paper Tiger TV, and Deep Dish TV. Feminist and queer theorists have focused on the category of AIDS videos made in the 1980s as one important chapter in the history of radical video (Juhasz 1999; Juhasz and Saalfield 1995). Meanwhile, the alternative news agenda of the numerous alternative television groups and networks that have come and gone over the years, promoting alternative anti-capitalist/consumerist worldviews and lifestyles, have been subject to study from the perspective of citizens journalism and alternative media (see, e.g., Chanan 2011).

Some of the key disciplines in which this perspective has been applied are social movement studies, media and communication studies, and film and documentary studies. Over time a certain art/craft distinction can be seen to have emerged within this conceptual frame, in which perspectives on visual art, video installations, and various modes of video documentary and radical cinema differ from the focus on news and actuality in being more about creating new ways of *seeing* and *perceiving* the world (Boyle 1992; Hill 1995). Put crudely, this divide reflects a difference between ways in which scholars have approached and understood the object of study across disciplines. In much work within the arts and humanities, video has primarily been seen to reflect a certain cultural imaginary and art form: a set of cinematographic and artistic investigations of human consciousness in some cases foregrounding the dimensions of perceptual process over the actual product (see, e.g., Gaines 2007; Renov and Suderburg 1996). Meanwhile, as a prevailing line of inquiry within the social sciences, radical video is seen as primarily concerned with matters of alternative representations, news production, counter-framing, and communication strategies of social movement actors (see, e.g., Atton 2001, 2007; Downing 2001). In recent years, a growing body of literature within a dominantly social scientific perspective has emerged focusing on online video platforms as public spheres and curators of political discourse

(Edgerly *et al.* 2009; Milliken, Gibson, and O'Donnell 2008; van Zoonen, Vis, and Mihelj 2010; Vergani and Zuev 2011). These contributions to the academic debate focus mainly on the production and distribution contexts of online video with little or no concern for the content of these videos as such or their aesthetic qualities.

Video as empowerment

The focus on video as a source of personal and collective empowerment prevails within the academic areas of development studies, globalization studies, and the interdisciplinary field of communication for development. Empirically attention is focused on the video practices of diasporic communities, ethnic minorities or indigenous groups as well as case-based interventions in the context of Third World countries. Historically, film and documentary studies have also directed attention to video formats such as Third World Newsreel (TWN) (see, e.g., Renov 1987) and the Canadian "Challenge for Change" video project, which ran from 1968 to 1980 to promote the self-representations of ethnic minorities and their social struggles as diaspora communities under- or misrepresented in Western countries (see, e.g., Waugh, Baker, and Winton 2010). Conceptually, terms such as participatory video, social change video and community video is commonly used in the literature. With a particular emphasis on the dimensions of *self-assertion*, *self-reflexiveness*, and *empowerment*, video is, for example, examined as empowering low-income, inner-city communities or remote rural areas (see, e.g., Aufderheide 1995; Calvelo Rios 2006; Harris 2008; Hausmann 2004; Lunch 2004; Turner 2002; White 2003; Worthham 2008). What distinguishes this understanding of video for change from other forms of video practice is the importance assigned to the very *process* of video making as an empowering and emancipatory practice "promoting self/other respect, a sense of belonging and a claim to an identity rather than the final product" (White 2003: 65; for a classic reading on the Fogo Process[2] that pioneered video for change from this perspective, see Snowden 1984). Understood as a reflexive, self-changing experience more than a tactical tool, participatory and community video does not always directly address options for social change. Rather, the empowering element lies in the options made available for individual and communities "to reconstitute their own cultural codes, to name the world in their own terms" (Rodríguez 2004). The field is to some extent dominated by handbooks offering practical guides for how to set up participatory video projects across the world (see, e.g., Harding 2005; Lunch and Lunch 2006; Shaw and Robertson 1997) as well as descriptive evaluations of participatory video projects and discussions of best practice case studies conducted in collaboration with NGOs and aid organizations (see, e.g., Braden 1998; Evans and Foster 2009; Lie and Mendler 2011).

Video as Documentation

To examine and understand video as tools for visual evidence is most strongly associated with the strand of literature engaging with issues of human rights and the role of media in the documentation of social injustices and human rights violations. The scope of investigation involves video practices in the context of both repressive regimes and liberal democracies. Terms such as "advocacy video," "witness video," "video testimony," "sousveillance," and "citizen watch" proliferate (see e.g. Anthony and Thomas 2010; Huey, Walby, and Doyle 2006; Whitty 2010). From the perspective of human rights activism, Gregory *et al.* (2005) tap into the conceptual discussion of what differentiates one type of video activism from others by offering a useful taxonomy of video genres and their potential audiences in accordance with how these have been used to document human rights abuses. Within this tradition, video is accentuated and studied in terms of its use as (1) evidence in courtrooms and international war tribunals, (2) in quasi-judical settings and UN bodies (see, e.g., Pillay 2005), and (3) as a direct form of address to decision-makers, or alternatively they are used (4) as *mobilization videos* in community mobilizing campaigns – shown in order to mobilize a community to take action on a specific issue, for and by activist and participatory organizing within a community or virtual community of solidarity (Gregory *et al.* 2005). An example of an organization working with video from this perspective is the US based human rights organization WITNESS that was born out of the so called Rodney king riots in 1992 (Gregory 2010). In December 2007 activists behind the organization WITNESS set up the online video space "The Hub" dedicated to human rights videos. As of 2010 however, The Hub shifted from being a "living" platform to becoming an archive of "videos for change" uploaded to the site since its launch. The project thus illustrates the numerous, not always successful, efforts to create non-corporate alternatives to platforms such as YouTube. Another interesting example includes the online video hub of B'Tselem,[3] an Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories that works extensively with online video and camera distribution projects relying mainly on YouTube's host and distribution services.

Connecting the Histories of Video Activism: The Short Story of a Long History

As this short conceptual discussion indicates, video for change is not one but many things depending on vantage point and the different *contexts* in which we are trying to understand practices of video activism. Yet another important dimension of understanding contemporary forms of video activism is that of *history*. Over the past couple of years social media have been shrouded in optimistic rhetoric and hailed as catalysts of rapid political mobilizations and radical change epitomized in

catchphrases such as "Twitter revolutions," "Facebook politics," or "YouTube democracy" (for critical analyses of these debates, see, e.g., Christensen 2011; Cottle 2011; Curran, Fenton, and Freedman 2012). Within this broader debate on the role of social media in political change, YouTube has been heralded as a contributor to the transformation of political discourse and a keeper of free speech and democratic participation (for critical investigations of such claims, see, e.g., Gillespie 2010; Kim 2012; Wasko and Erickson 2009). In some parts of the optimistic literature, YouTube has been seen to embody the visions of some of the pioneers of the analog video activism and the guerrilla television movement,[4] with the army of amateur "produsers" and the promise of broadcasting yourself on its pages seen as the fulfillment of the radical dream of making "people's television" in the 1960s and 1970s (see, e.g., Jenkins 2006). In the midst of these discussions of the transformative potentials of digital video and new platforms for online storage and sharing it is important not to forget that practices of video activism have a long history that preceded the current proliferation of online video. Analytical sensibilities toward the trajectory of video art and activism shows us that whereas YouTube and similar social media sites may represent the epicenter of contemporary participatory cultures built around video sharing, it represents neither its point of origin nor its end point. While the limited scope of this chapter does not allow for an elaborate historicizing effort, I do wish to provide a few examples of how close comparative attention to the very recent history of video activism and social movement media practices can help us understand the contingencies of online video recruited for political activism today.

The term "video activist" first came into widespread use during the 1980s with the proliferation of camcorders (Harding 2001, 2005). However, while the arrival of inexpensive portable video cameras may have marked a sudden and radical boost in alternative video production, it does not mark the beginning of such practices, which have roots in the early history of the radical cinema (Gaines 2007). Listing some of the practices that precede radical online video take us to the workers' photography movement of the 1920s and 1930s[5] through the Soviet newsreels distributed through "agit-trains," "agit-boats," and town screenings in the first decades of the twentieth century, to the Griersonian social realist, pro-labor documentaries (Nichols 1991). The list continues through the newsreel collectives and guerrilla television movement of the late 1960s and 1970s (Boyle 1997; Nichols 1973; Renov 1987), the "third cinema" of revolutionary movements in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Solanas and Getino 1969) to the AIDS video activism of the 1980s (e.g., Juhasz 1999), into the narrowcasting and systematic video documentation of the mass demonstrations for global justice and counter-summits of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the kinds of alternative image-productions and counter-frames of these protests activists have sought to impel through visual media (see, e.g., Askanius 2012a, 2012b; Teune 2013).

In the late 1990s as the web radically democratized access to production, consumption and distribution of video, many launched themselves into video and

filmmaking in order to document and challenge prevailing social ills and power structures (Gregory *et al.* 2005). In this period of increasingly globalized media structures and infrastructure, a number of alternative media networks were set up among transnational groups of left-wing activists. Most notably, Indymedia was born out of the collective project of providing independent coverage of the shutdown of the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle in 1999 by a broad transnational coalition of activists, networks, organizations, and movements (see, e.g., Kidd 2003). In the following years, many similar alternative media projects would follow in connection with the mass protests and economic counter-summits in Genoa, Prague, Gothenburg, Paris, Rostock, and Toronto and elsewhere. Such events were, and continue to be, video documented and covered at a grass-roots level by provisional networks. Alongside these short-lived visual media networks, a number of more established video activist organizations emerged or reinvented themselves after the long period of silence in left social critique in the 1980s and early 1990s. In this period, these media networks provided people dispersed across the world with a place to turn to for alternative news reporting of the demonstrations against neoliberal globalization and governance. The importance of such alternative coverage endures today, as mainstream media continue to prove prone to framing left-wing activism as the meaningless acts of violence and undirected anger (see e.g. Juris 2005). Efforts to contemplate, mobilize for, document, and raise awareness of these decentralized, but "spectacular" forms of protest event were part of what brought about the rapid growth of video activism in the late 1990s (Harding 2005).

A new generation of media activists tapping into the new possibilities offered by the Internet thus (more or less knowingly) furthered a time-honored tradition of working with the moving image for progressive ends. Up until YouTube came along in the mid-2000s it was still quite difficult to upload and watch video online. With the advent of YouTube, alternative video cultures began to involve not only techno-geeks and social activists, but a pot-pourri of amateur videographers, video diarists, video artists, self-proclaimed documentary filmmakers, communities, and individuals uploading seemingly raw or roughly edited cell phone footage. In this manner, much like the way in which technological development in the late 1960s had put the power of the moving image into the hands of the "ordinary user" with the handheld camcorder (see, e.g., Boyle 1997; Hill 1995), the democratization of access to visual media took a new turn with the rapid growth and popularization of online video-sharing on YouTube and beyond. Political organizations and activist networks were quick to turn to YouTube, Facebook, MySpace, and, later, Twitter for the quick and cost-free distribution of their material. In so doing, activists are increasingly abandoning sites such as Indymedia and other non-profit media spaces for these corporate-run platforms. Today, virtually all alternative media organizations and video collectives have a YouTube channel.[6]

As this brief historical outline suggests, the novelty of the kind of video activism we encounter in online environments concerns not so much the use of video as a

political tool as how these videos are produced, distributed and consumed in new digital settings and global networks. To be sure, contemporary modes of video activism are characterized by practices in which the old and the new, the past and the present, clearly overlap. However, while we may recognize the incentives and dynamics behind online video activism as well known to the trajectory of left thinking and action, new communication practices are reorganized and refocused in keeping with the emergence of new means of, and arenas for, political engagement. Most of the materials in circulation online are forms and aesthetics well known to a left political imaginary, but new technologies amplify, reconstruct and reinterpret existing practices. Whereas the video productions of the "Portapak days" circulated within grass-roots networks as edited documentaries on tape, today the material is often put directly onto the Web, signaling a different kind of immediacy and simultaneity with the events covered. However, new tensions and risks also emerge in this enlarged space of visibility and actions. Whereas the gatekeepers at the time of early video activism were the networks and cable television stations, in a present day context, where technological capacity to share content has radically "democratized," social media such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and the like have become the primary gatekeepers. Very recent history provides numerous examples of how these companies systematically remove content of a politically "controversial" nature and in various ways seek to monitor and monetize online video. In this sense, gatekeeping today has become a question of censorship (Gregory 2010).

Radical *Online* Video: Understanding Video Activism within the Mechanism of Social Media

In order to illustrate and develop a perspective that connects the different strands of academic literature in the field and have sensibility towards the longer historical trajectories of new forms of online video activism, I want to introduce the notion of "radical online video" as a way of labeling and describing a range of videos for change of a similar kind in contemporary online environments. In doing so, I posit that the level of "genre" stability required for such an exercise can admit a degree of contingency and variation. For these purposes, YouTube and social media more generally provide windows onto considering how new actors and communication practices are shaping contemporary struggles for visibility and the spaces of video activism today. If we want to understand what video activism signals and entails in a digital age, we need to direct analytical attention toward the orbits of circulation and political economy of the spaces where videos are predominantly screened and watched today.

Although the pages of YouTube are primarily filled by home videos of cute cats and giggling babies or the videos of large content providers and commercial

partners, the platform, increasingly marketed and redesigned to also facilitate political and civic purposes, has today become a site of and tool for video activism. In this new digital video context, video activists are increasingly diverse. New assessable media technologies, easy to use online drag-and-drop editing software, and a multiplicity of video sharing sites have created new conditions of possibility. But if mobile cameras, combined with social media, turn people into video activists, is then the figure of the video activist taken to be that of everybody – and hence nobody? A first step to make sense of and identify radical video in this pluralistic and motley landscape is to start by situating video activism beyond the entry level of mere raw mobile footage uploads (Chanan 2011). There is, of course, a world of difference between the amateur video documenting a demonstration, shot on a mobile phone and uploaded directly onto the Web and an edited documentary showcasing violations of protesters' rights and creating a political argument around issues of, for example, police brutality and state repression. Such an exercise allows us to filter out the abundance of videos lacking intentionality or even an implicit political argument. At the same time, it allows for a level of interpretation, and acknowledges the contingency and blurring of boundaries of these practices.

Under the broad banner of radical online video we may consider the range of videos put online by social movement organizations, groups, and networks. These include "mobilization videos" (videos explicitly calling for, and providing directions for, action distributed prior to protests and direct actions) or the "witness video" (videos documenting and creating a narrative around the exhibition of unjust conditions or political wrongdoings/doers, police brutality or human rights violations). Another category consists of the large number of videos documenting community meetings, happenings and actions. Such videos represent a straightforward archival mode of using social media for shared "storage." Also, an increasing number of "old" 8 mm and 16 mm films are being digitized and uploaded to YouTube in order to preserve them as historical documents but also in the hope for them to potentially reach new audiences. However, YouTube is also a space in which we find an abundance of political mash-up videos in which individuals with little or no ties to political organizations play with video aesthetics and protocols of political arguments, often drawing on material from or video responding to the videos of social movement actors.

In this sense, YouTube offers a window to consider how online spaces offer a broad range of pathways to political engagement for citizens through mundane yet playful ways of creating videos (Bennett 2008). At the same time, the range of video activist organizations and collectives that are active on the platform are suggestive of how very serious issues taken up by the political hard core can take on playful and creative forms in a space primarily constructed for and around entertainment. To understand what defines and typifies video activism today requires that we include the more ephemeral forms of individualized political expression that do not necessarily form part of a communication strategy or

political campaign of an organization or activist network. Let me briefly unfold this argument in some more detail.

In the past alternative video production was largely confined to the work of *collective* efforts in political and/or artistic groups and organizations. Watching video was built around a collective experience around for example video screenings from the back of a van or in community meetings (Boyle 1997). On a platform such as YouTube, the videos and video channels are, however, often the work of individuals who are not necessarily affiliated with a political organization, group, or network. Indeed, YouTube has proved to be a platform for individual, self-centered political expression and identity as much as it is part of the communication repertoire of political organizations, groups, and networks (Fenton and Barassi 2011).

These changes in technology and in political climates requires us to rethink a number of assumptions of what video activism is and can do today and platforms such as YouTube complicate our sense of what the term video activism can now be used to signify. The broad and motley range of radical online video we meet on YouTube, in some sense conflates and collapses all of the different categories and distinctions between advocacy, radical, community, amateur, DIY, and participatory video described above. On a site such as YouTube, the work of, for example, established video collectives documenting police brutality is mixed with that of unaffiliated, more or less politically motivated individuals who, perhaps even by chance, have caught a demonstration on video and uploaded roughly edited sequence footage.

The remix ethos of online video cultures should not only be understood in terms of how videos from all of these different traditions of video activism are sandwiched randomly together in the search results. The "mash-up" practices also manifest themselves in how snippets of video material are cut up and put together in new compilation videos. The circulation and reappropriation of images shot by others is a key aspect of contemporary online cultures in which people engage with the annotation, appropriation and recirculation characteristic of what has been described interchangeably as expressions of "do-it-yourself citizenship" (Hartley 2010), the practices of "Photoshop democracy" as described in the work of Jenkins (2006) or what Bennett and Toft (2009) refer to as "self-actualizing styles of civic participation through participatory media." Still, very little is known of how this remix ethos relates to and translates into video practices concerned with social justice issues, or of whether it is even possible to reconcile the mash-up aesthetics of online video with the evidentiary truth claims made in and for radical video. In this process, the practices of video activism whether from the vantage point of alterative news production, communication for development or human rights documentation, are changing as a consequence of this dual process of, on the one hand, expanding grassroots access to media production and circulation and, on the other, corporate control over grassroots media and communication infrastructure.

One way to gauge the changing conditions of video activism is thus through a dual consideration of how social media environments work to (1) bring "ordinary" citizens and amateur mediamakers into the practices of video activism and vernacular political commentary, as well as (2) increasingly form a space where social movement actors and political communities (demonstrating a different form of explicit argument and intentionality) make use of online tools and spaces in and for their actions by uploading videos in the name of a stated goal and for an intended community. YouTube, Vimeo, and similar video sharing sites are spaces in which these two groups of actors come together and communications practices merge. As the practices and political imaginaries of video activism become increasingly situated within the mechanisms of social media, we need to address and understand the gray zones between mere video documentation and efforts to construct video documentary narratives and argument.

The practices of radical online video can be understood as part of the communicative repertoire of political organizations, groups as well as unaffiliated activists and individuals in loose affinity groups and networks. In contemporary online environments we encounter both videos produced as part of a political program or campaign and may form part of a broader media strategy of a specific organization, group or network. But radical online video can also be seen to include the more individualized forms of mediated engagement in contemporary online environments. On YouTube, these two modes of video activism not only co-exist, but also interact with one another. Radical online video practices thus comprise both individual and collective modes of political engagement, and may be seen to straddle both expressive and creative modes of "mass self-communication" (Castells 2009), and the collective, collaborative efforts of social movement media practices. The different modes of political expression in online video activism range from a very explicitly instrumental and self-conscious engagement with core political issues that seek to wield power in the world for particular ends, to the much more subtle, informal, and latent modes of political expression.

On a platform such as YouTube, social movement media practices, and the collective modes of intentional and directed political engagement these represent, merge (and sometimes clash) with the media practices of unaffiliated individuals and the mundane practices of (potentially political) commentary and remixing that develop and assert themselves in online video cultures. These insights demonstrate how we may understand the modes of political engagement around the practices of radical video as attracting individuals without any initial store of political authority. In that sense, these practices, emerging within the spaces of interaction and action facilitated and allowed for by YouTube, form part of the larger media manifold currently changing "the who of politics" (Couldry 2012: 120). Certainly, the dimensions of latent individual politics and new reserves of potential political actors and actions should not be seen to translate directly into political efficacy or changes in actual political agendas (Fenton and Barassi 2011). Or, if we remain

within Couldry's terminology, the reshuffling of "the who of politics" does not necessarily entail changes in "the what of politics" (Couldry 2012: 123).

The Changing Spaces of Video Activism: Challenges and Ethical Concerns

Let me end this discussion by briefly broaching some of the challenges facing video activism today and signposting a few directions for future research. As suggested in this short discussion, the spaces of dialogue and action in video activism have today largely moved online. In this process the shared ethical frameworks and political practices that once characterized political collectives formed around this medium are disrupted in a context where the longstanding tradition of working with the power of the moving image in political portrayal and argument is increasingly reallocated to the mechanisms of social networking and "mash-up" practices of online video cultures. We are currently at an intersection point and still know very little of what will happen to political practices and projects in these gray zones created by popular online spaces in which amateur meets professional, anti-capitalism meets corporate control, and the mundane politics of everyday life meets militant activism. To examine and isolate cases for analysis in this cacophonic and motley blend of voices, genres and interests makes for a particularly difficult methodological task that requires analytical attention to the political economy of the social media environments and circuits of distribution in which video activism operate today.

Contemporary modes of video activism are situated within an arbitrary and chaotic media environment dominated by corporate platforms with no commitment to the radical agendas and political projects that these videos promote. In such online environments one of the main problems faced by activists when uploading to YouTube is that the video is taken out of its context and put into a hybrid media space. Taken from its original location, videos for change become decoupled from options to act unless those are built into the video itself (Gregory 2010). In this sense, unless the video directs the viewer to a space of action outside the platform itself, YouTube consolidates action into the video production and consumption of the individual, rather than into a community. In so doing, social media environments fail to unite the like-minded voices that are in fact present online (see, e.g., Fenton and Barassi 2011; Juhasz 2008).

The emergence of new technologies and communication infrastructures have "democratized" video activism in the sense that access to and distribution of video have been made available to a group of people whose self-representations, political portrayals, and arguments have previously been confined to the remote margins of the Internet, and before that to the small distribution circles of communities formed around making, sharing, and watching tapes. Critical ideas, debates, and

discussions are no longer ghettoized at the margins of public life and in an online space, such as YouTube, videos can potentially reach a very broad audience.

Yet, the opening up of the field of video activism comes with a duality of potentials and risks that needs to be addressed (Gregory 2010, 2012). Future research will need to raise continued concern about how these emerging technologies might bulldoze ethical frameworks built up through the shared set of practices and codes of conduct of past video collectives. Across countries and collectives, "veteran" video activists are currently working to educate and to promote an increased awareness among the so-called "digital natives" and a new generation of activists born into a participatory media culture of content sharing and remixing (see e.g. Askanius 2013; Gregory 2010, 2012). Such research may raise questions of how the ethical frameworks and shared codes of conduct within the longstanding practices of radical video can translate into guidelines that will work in a space such as YouTube or whatever site may follow it – be this the live-casting video services currently growing in popularity or even a third-generation video phenomenon. To pursue such questions will provide directions for how practitioners and scholars dedicated to the theories and practices of video activism can support emerging norms in online environments that promote respect, tolerance, and an understanding of risk in and beyond these mediated spaces.

Notes

1 The term "Portapak revolution" is seen to broadly designate the upsurge in political activism and counter-culture followed by the release of the Sony Portapak video camera in 1965. In the Western hemisphere, New York served as a hub for underground cultures of independent filmmakers, radical cinéasters, and media enthusiasts who all responded to the new possibilities for activism and cultural expression offered by this new technology (For recent works on the activism born out of this period see, e.g., Boyle 1992,1997; Hill 1995; Stein 2001.)

2 Widely recognized as one of the first models of communication for development, the Fogo Process refers to a community project initiated by Donald Snowden in 1967 in a small island outpost on Newfoundland. Using small format video, Snowden encouraged local fishermen to articulate their problems, ideas, and visions on film, which was later viewed and discussed amongst themselves and distributed to remote communities where people were experiencing similar challenges of unemployment and poverty. The new horizontal forms of learning and increased awareness created by the video process made community members realize the need to organize politically and eventually led to change in government politics and actions.

3 B'Tselem is an Israeli NGO established in 1989 that works to document human rights violations in the West Bank. In 2006 the organization began to expand its video activities by joining YouTube and later MySpace and Facebook. For a detailed account of video projects run by the organization consult www.btselem.org/video.

4 The so-called "Guerrilla Television Movement" was initially born out of consumer access to low-budget video cameras and the development of video cassettes allowing

for informal distribution systems in the late 1960s and onward. The term refers specifically to US-based activists and artists in video collectives such as Paper Tiger TV, the Videofreex, and Raindance Foundation (later to become TVTV), which aimed to design and implement alternative information structures to transcend and reconfigure existing power structures and challenge commercial television codes. The term "guerrilla television" was coined by Michael Shamberg (co-founder of the Raindance Corporation) in the 1971 Movement manifesto bearing the same name.

5   Examples of groups within this movement include the Workers' Film and Photo League in the US, organized in 1928 and existing until around 1935 (Nichols 1973).

6   For a few examples of video collectives now streaming old 8 mm and 16 mm film on YouTube, see Peoples Video Network on www.youtube.com/user/peoplesvideo, Deep Dish TV on www.youtube.com/user/DeepDishTV, The Media Burn Archive by Tom Weinberg, one of the founders of the San Francisco-based video collective TVTV (Top Value Television) on www.youtube.com/user/MediaBurnArchive, and many more. For examples of contemporary alternative media networks that make extensive use of YouTube, see, for instance, Indymedia on www.youtube.com/user/IndymediaPresents, www.youtube.com/user/PostFactMedia, and Undercurrent on www.youtube.com/user/visionontv.

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28

Emerging Issues in Activism and Social Change Communication

Thomas Tufte

Worldwide, we have in recent years experienced a resurgence in practices of bottom-up communication for social change. A plethora of social movements have gained visibility; many of them are mobilizing against exclusionary development processes, contesting social injustice and articulating very material demands for food, housing, health, income, and education. In other words, many of today's social movements are fighting for social and economic rights known from the classic "first generation" social movements of the industrial era. As such, many of our times' social movements distinguish themselves from the identity-based post-material social movements that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s and that came to be known as the "new social movements" (Della Porta and Diani 2006; Ingelhardt 1977). In the context of the recent global wave of social movements, Thompson and Tapscott remind us to be cautious about our understanding of social movements as being too caught up in Western paradigms (2010: 2–4).

The increased prominence and visibility of social movements in current development processes must be seen as parallel to two other processes; firstly, the massive transformation and proliferation of civil society, which has led to new power relations in governance structures; and secondly, the development and proliferation of mobile telephony and the Internet, which have contributed to new socioeconomic and political dynamics, opening up for new and potentially more dynamic forms of relations between decision-makers and citizens, between media and activists, and between offline and online spaces of deliberation.

These are some of the development processes that constitute the backdrop to Part III of this book, and which have informed the conceptual reflections and empirical illustrations in the section. Stated more bluntly, we can say that these developments together constitute "the new frontier" of development

communication – challenging our definitions of the field, how to organize and communicate for social justice, development or social change, and which social actors to consider as part of these processes (Tufte 2013).

From Alternative Media to Social Movement Media

One of the emerging issues in development communication today has to do with recent media developments. They have led to a whole new language around media, communication and social change. John Downing draws an overall outline of key concepts used to theorize around bottom-up processes of communication driven by social movements, citizen movements, local communities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While stretching the whole conceptual accordion, from alternative media to nano-media, over horizontal, tactical, citizens, independent, participant, and other media, Downing fixates three core conceptual approaches to media, communication, and social change. They are community media, network media, and social movement media. This typology does indeed help us understand histories and trajectories as well and the current scenario ranging from alternative media to social movement media, but the true challenge for the field, both in theory and in practice, is to have a more embedded taxonomy of social movement media. In his chapter, Downing states that the goal is: "to explore critically the accumulated experience of such media, their forms of organization, their interrelations with their environment (from local to transnational), their aesthetic inspirations, their interrelations with mainstream media and – not least – their histories."

Organizing Social Movements and Civic Engagement Using Media and Communication

A core challenge in the strategic exploration of activism and social change communication is how to organize and sustain social movements and their demands. A lot of attention has been given to their fascinating mobilizing capacity and the creative, dynamic and important roles attributed to social media in the mobilizing processes. Less attention has been given to the sustainability of these efforts. Anastasia Kavada uncovers in her chapter the challenges of building transnational solidarity in the form of transnational advocacy networks. The fluidity and informality of social movements, their loose organization and their decentralized structure all point to the difficulties of organizing for social change. However, as Kavada rightly uncovers, there exists a broad variety of social

movement, including "Social Movement Organizations" (SMOs). International NGOs often take on the role of SMOs in transnational social movements.

Drawing on Lance Bennett's work (2005) and her own (Kavada 2012), Kavada uncovers two generations of transnational social movements; firstly, the transnational activist networks, the TANs with NGOs often placed at the core of these networks; and secondly, the more fluid, multi-issue and less NGO-centered networks known from the Global Justice Movement or anti-globalization movement. In unfolding her analysis, Kavada explores the patterns of new transnational networking and their relationship with new communication technologies, and in this process suggesting what we might call a third generation of transnational activist networks. "Occupy" is a prolific example of this latest generation of transnational activist networks. What Kavada, drawing on Juris (2012), emphasizes, is that these networks use the new communication technologies to generate "crowds of individuals" (Juris 2012: 267, in Kavada). It builds on a "logic of aggregation," which Juris explains as a "coming together of actors qua individuals" (Juris 2012, 266). One of the crucial differences from former generations of social movements is their orientation towards individual rather than collective subjectivities.

This theorizing of transnational social networks points in Kavada's chapter toward a series of emerging research challenges; from the need for a deeper exploration of how power operates in these social dynamics, to the affordances that new communication technologies enable and constrain. Central to Kavada's emerging research agenda is her call for stronger attention towards conceptualizing the relationship between technology and society. A way forward in this regard is a stronger emphasis of IT use in the broader context of the communicative ecologies of everyday life.

While Kavada's contribution to this part highlights the transnational social networks and their uses of communication technologies, Norbert Wildermuth's chapter has a focus on the citizen-driven social and political dynamic within the nation-state. Wildermuth sheds light upon a rapidly growing communicative practice, which is that of civil society-driven media platforms that enhance social accountability, developing their own technologies and practices to monitor the performance of decision-makers. He develops an interesting theoretical argument for the importance of communication in social accountability, arguing that it helps improve governance, increase development effectiveness, and articulate processes of empowerment. These civil society driven media platforms, he argues, enhance e-participation supporting three levels of strategic use of ICT to strengthen democratic processes at national levels: e-government, e-governance and e-participation. While Wildermuth's focus is on ICTs and his case in point is the dynamic ambience of a thriving civil society sphere in Kenya, there are also widespread examples, not least from Africa, of civil society-driven media platforms enhancing social accountability by making use of radio, print, and TV. A seminal example of this is seen in the communicative practices of organizations like Soul City in South Africa and Femina HIP in Tanzania (Tufte 2011).

Making governance more open and responsive to civic engagement initiatives is a key challenge as well as a key achievement in the use of communication in social

movements and in citizen-driven processes. This is the case both at community, national and transnational levels. Some of the processes seen in Kenya and many other places are, however, as Wildermuth argues, donor-driven processes, thus challenging the bottom-up approach so fundamental to these initiatives. The claimed advantage of this prominent role of international development assistance is to ensure some enlargement of democratic space. However, this is a risky balancing act between using donors to pursue longer-terms interventions and ensuring independent and locally driven change processes. One of the emerging issues to further research is thus, according to Wildermuth in his chapter, "how social accountability mechanisms can be designed for a self-multiplying, scaling up system with national reach." Given that the prominence of citizen-driven (multi-)media platforms are rather new phenomena on the development agenda, there remains a lot of work in deconstructing their role in a more inclusive and sustainable development process.

Civic Engagement Forms Using Media and Communication

The use of media and ICTs amongst social movements has recently, and with some good reason, tended to highlight the use of social media for social change, thus emphasizing social media activism. However, as this part of the handbook has shown, activism within social movements also stretches back and out to classical media formats such as print, TV, and radio. This is exemplified by Clemencia Rodríguez and Ana Miralles' work on citizens' media, public journalism, and citizens' journalism; Rosa María Alfaro Moreno's work on the citizen-driven and controlled "Observatory" in Peru, reviewing media, covering and influencing broadcasting. Tanja Bosch's review of the very rich field of community radio experiences worldwide reflects a classical and important long-standing experience within social movement media, dating back to the first communication for development experiences amongst miners in Bolivia and ordinary citizens in Colombia, both in the 1940s. John Downing's *Encyclopedia of Social Movement Media* from 2010 is a powerful testimony of decades of experience covering all media formats used by social movements (Downing 2010).

What we see happening these years is a multiplicity of cross-media uses, convergence and polycentric and networked forms of media use. What Rodríguez and Miralles rightly highlight are the close connections between mainstream and alternative communication circuits. What consequences does this have for content of both sorts of media, and what impact does it have upon relations between decision makers and citizens? The work of Rosa María Alfaro Moreno in Peru presented here, and her well-conceptualized proposal of citizen-driven "Observatories" that monitor media broadcasting, can possibly offer some answers to the call and question posed by Rodríguez and Miralles. The

Peruvian "observatory," part of a growing international experience, is a way of mobilizing critically around the mediated public discourses. This is, according to Alfaro Moreno, an empowering citizen experience.

Rodríguez and Miralles further highlight the fact that many of the social media used today by social movements are large private corporations (e.g., Facebook and YouTube). Are social media platforms such as Facebook and YouTube then empowering or restricting social movements? Two of the other contributors to this section are engaging with this research question. Joe Khalil's chapter explores self-expressive artifacts, his focus being on youth-generated media, conceptualizing approaches to youth and their media, and developing a conceptual basis for "youth-generated media" juxtaposed to youth-oriented media. Particularly noteworthy is his distinction between sponsored-development approaches to youth media vis-à-vis "organic" approaches where youth take charge themselves. Likewise, in her chapter, Tina Askanius engages with social media activism, video activism in particular, exploring radical video practices online and how they on one hand may "bring 'ordinary' citizen and amateur media makers into the practices of video activism and vernacular political commentary, and on the other hand increasingly form a space where social movement actors and political communities make use of online tools and spaces in and for their actions by uploading videos in the name of a stated goal for an intended community."

A particularly recurrent emerging issue called for amongst the contributors to this section is to give more attention to audiences and/or users of social movement media. It is traditionally an underresearched area, something which is confirmed by John Downing who has reviewed so many experiences from his encyclopedia work (Downing 2010 and in this publication). Kavada delivers a strong call for longitudinal ethnographic studies, and Wildermuth argues similarly for research to understand how the civil society driven media platforms work on the ground. This resonates well with Costanza-Chock who Kavada draws on and who calls for a less platform-centric focus and rather turning our attention to the communicative ecologies of everyday life, suggesting the deeper study of "social movement media cultures" (Costanza-Chock 2012). With or without a distinct focus on social movements or not, the call for a deeper understanding of media cultures in everyday life is a core research challenge which we here emphasize the importance of. It will strengthen our understanding of how the aims of development communication play out in people's lived lives.

Conclusion

In a recent publication edited by Florencia Enghel and Karin Wilkins (2012), attention was given to issues and approaches dealing with power, human rights, and social justice, but more focused on case studies than this handbook does. From

the article Oscar Hemer and I contributed I would like to highlight the context in which our research field is evolving, and which very much connects to this part of the book, dealing with activism and social movement media. Referring to communication for social change broadly, we wrote:

> This field is in a state of crisis. And it should be. Because what we are coping with is precisely the transitional process of the global present, in all sectors of society and at all levels. And maybe the challenge for us, at this moment, is to take a step back and reflect, to analyze and understand rather than to impose development strategies. While ComDev historically has been about developing prescriptive recipes for communication for some development, it is high time we refocus our attention to the deliberative, non-institutional citizen-driven change processes, full of media uses and communicative practices, but emerging from a citizens' profound and often desperate reaction to this global Now. And we must become better at defining our field and carving out our space within culture, media and communication research at large. (Hemer and Tufte 2012: 234–235)

Rodríguez and Miralles reconfirm this argument when they, in outlining their research challenges for this field overall in their chapter, state: "Now that citizens' uses of ICTs have become so trendy, researchers tend to ignore the field, thus wasting key opportunities to build on an already existing body of knowledge. CfSC [Communication for Social Change] is a field with its own history, canon, and theoretical and methodological contributions, as this volume clearly demonstrates."

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